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ABSTRACT. 
S.B. COURT. 
JOB-COGNITIVISM AND LIBERAL-1 INDIVIDUALISM. ( P h i l o s p p b y and I d e o l o g y 
i,n t h e H i s t o r y o f Contemporary Moral and P o l i t i c a l L i f e . ) 
T h i s t h e s i s i s about t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t t h e o r y o f 
e t h i c s and i t s p r a c t i c a l impact on contemporary moral and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . I t i s suggested t h a t n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m , u n d e r s t o o d as a 
d i s t i n c t s t y l e o f e t h i c a l t h e o r i s i n g advanced most n o t a b l y by Ayer, 
Stevenson, Hare and Mackie, has b o t h a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c h a r a c t e r , and 
an i d e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f a l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t k i n d . I n t h e 
f i r s t f o u r c h a p t e r s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t 
a ccount o f e t h i c s i s c r i t i c a l l y examined. I n c h a p t e r s f i v e and s i x 
i t i s argued, f o l l o w i n g M a c l n t y r e , t h a t t h e r e i s a need t o s k e t c h 
o u t t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t o f t h e emergence o f t h e t h e o r y i n o r d e r 
t o g a i n a complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s c h a r a c t e r . T h i s i s 
u n d e r t a k e n by d r a w i n g upon p r e v i o u s l y u n p u b l i s h e d or u n a v a i l a b l e 
m a t e r i a l by such t h i n k e r s as Duncan-Jones, Barnes and Stevenson, I n 
c h a p t e r s seven and e i g h t t h e i d e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e t h e o r y i s 
examined by i n d i c a t i n g t h a t p h i l o s o p h y and i d e o l o g y c o n s t i t u t e two 
l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t forms o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t i s suggested t h a t t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments advanced w i t h i n n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m s e r v e t h e 
purpose o f g i v i n g c o h e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n t o a presumed i d e o l o g i c a l 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f man and h i s r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s 
i n t h e w o r l d . C h a p t e r s n i n e and t e n c o n s i d e r s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
contemporary l i b e r a l t h e o r y o f t h e n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t dominance o f t h e 
moral p h i l o s o p h y and p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s o f t h e Western democracies. 
I t i s c l a i m e d t h a t t h e a t t e m p t s o f Dunn, R o r t y and Rawls t o j u s t i f y 
l i b e r a l t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e a r e u n s u c c e s s f u l because n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m 
has e f f e c t i v e l y undermined t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l i t y and 
prudence upon which such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s grounded. The c o n c l u s i o n 
reached i s t h a t l i b e r a l i s m i s i n a s t a t e o f c r i s i s . 
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1. The .PMlQ^opMcga Character Of Jtoxx-CngxAtlvAsw.. 
Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has been governed for many years by 
a c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e s e t of metaphysical presuppositions. These 
presuppositions have given r i s e to an e s s e n t i a l l y uniform treatment of 
questions concerning the o b j e c t i v i t y of values, the s t a t u s of moral 
judgements, the place of r a t i o n a l i t y i n e t h i c s , and the r e l a t i o n of 
moral thinking to other kinds of thinking. The orthodoxy thus generated 
may be c a l l e d the non-cognitivist theory of e t h i c s . Although the key 
metaphysical elements of t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e s t y l e of e t h i c a l t h e o r i s i n g 
can be traced back to the w r i t i n g s of David Hume, i t i s i n t h i s century 
that the non - c o g n i t i v i s t approach has been expressed i n a systematic 
and coherent fashion. I t was f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d i n the 1930's by 
th i n k e r s such a s A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, and t h e i r 'emotivist' 
formulations have subsequently been revised, most notably, by S.M. Hare 
and J.L. Hackie. 
Hare has himself provided us with a useful c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the 
di f f e r e n t l e v e l s of metaphysical assumptions by which to e s t a b l i s h the 
philosophical character of any contemporary moral theory. (1) These 
l e v e l s enable us to id e n t i f y the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t approach to the 
c e n t r a l i s s u e s which have concerned moral p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate for some 
decades. We can sp e c i f y these l e v e l s i n the following manner: 
(A) Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism (epistemological) 
(B) Realism vs. a n t i - r e a l i s m <ontological) 
(C) Horal judgements a s expressing b e l i e f s vs. moral judgements a s 
expressing a t t i t u d e s (psychological) 
CD) De s c r i p t i v i s m vs. non-descriptivism ( l o g i c a l or conceptual) 
On the epistemological l e v e l (A) non-cognitivism maintains, a s i t s 
name announces, t h a t there i s no such thing a s moral cognition or 
knowledge. The reason that there i s no moral knowledge, according to 
t h i s view, i s th a t knowledge l o g i c a l l y requires a r e a l object s e t over 
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against the knowing subject: but there i s no objective moral r e a l i t y ; 
consequently, as f a r as morals are concerned, there i s nothing to know. 
Th i s epistemological claim i s attached to a r e l a t e d ontological t h e s i s . 
For on the ontological l e v e l <B> n o n - c o g n i t i v i s a hold6 that a s c r i p t i o n s 
of value should not be conceived as propositions of the s o r t whose 
co r r e c t n e s s or a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n s i s t s i n t h e i r being true d e s c r i p t i o n s 
of the world because values are not found i n the world, a s genuine 
properties of things are. Put another way, non-cognitivism c l a i m s that 
moral judgements lack t r u t h - s t a t u s . They are not the s o r t of utterance 
which can be e i t h e r true or f a l s e because there i s nothing i n the r e a l 
world which makes them true, i n the way that the p h y s i c a l conditions 
of the world make remarks about material objects true. 
As John Dunn says, non-cognitivism presents us with 'an absolute 
conception of r e a l i t y - a conception of how the world i s which i s i n 
nD way r e l a t i v i s e d to human c u l t u r a l categories... a conception from 
which a l l anthropocentric properties have been purged.' (2) I t i s a view 
which i s r e f l e c t e d i n J.L. Hackie's contention that: 
I f there were objective values, they would be e n t i t i e s , or 
q u a l i t i e s , or r e l a t i o n s of a very strange s o r t , u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t 
from anything e l s e i n the universe. Correspondingly, i f we were 
aware of them, i t would have to be by some s p e c i a l f a c u l t y of 
moral perception or i n t u i t i o n , u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t from our ordinary 
ways of knowing everything e l s e . (3) 
T h i s d i s t i n c t l y n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t argument i s grounded upon the 
e m p i r i c i s t conception of r e a l i t y and the conditions for knowledge. I t 
assumes t h a t sensory experience which i s manifest within a c l a s s of 
p r i m i t i v e phenomena of consciousness (be i t 'impressions', 'sense-data' 
or 'percepts') provides the only ultimate grounds for any r a t i o n a l 
b e l i e f i n or knowledge of the natural world. According to t h i s view, 
sensory experience i s the only source of information from which we can 
i n f e r how things stand independently from us, and we a f f i r m those 
propositions, or true or f a l s e claims to knowledge, which stem from 
these sense-impressions. 
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The epistemological and ontological t h e s i s advanced by non-
e o g n i t i v i s t s i s r e l a t e d to t h e i r conception of the psychological and 
conceptual l e v e l s of moral thinking. The denial that moral (or any 
other) values c o n s t i t u t e part of the "fabric of the world* leads to the 
suggestion that on the psychological l e v e l (C) moral judgements express 
a t t i t u d e s rather than b e l i e f s . That i s , moral judgements are understood 
to be the verbal expression of some i n t e r i o r s t a t e or sentiment of 
approbation or disapprobation which i s n e c e s s a r i l y emotional i n 
character. These sentiments, t a s t e s , attitudes, d e s i r e s or p r e s c r i p t i o n s 
are a s c r i b e d value i n expressed moral Judgements, and con s t i t u t e an 
a f f e c t i v e and a t t i t u d i n a l r e a c t i o n to the world which i s projected 
onto, not found within i t . Further, n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t s argue that i t i s 
t h i s reaction that provides us with the a c t i o n guiding force, or 
inherent tendency to move us, which i s a l o g i c a l l y i n t r i n s i c feature of 
moral a s s e r t i o n . T h i s contention i s grounded upon the e m p i r i c i s t 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the a c t i v e and the pas s i v e mode of judgement. I t 
suggests t h a t i n our capacity as d e s c r i b e r s of the world we p a s s i v e l y 
read off what we say from the f a c t s (as displayed by our senses) 
according to a s e t of ru l e s or d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t we have given to our 
words: while i n our capacity as judges of value we are a c t i v e i n the 
sense that we are responding or reacting emotionally to those f a c t s , 
and perhaps making a bid to exert c o n t r o l over the emotional 
d i s p o s i t i o n s of others. 
We can see how t h i s psychological d i s t i n c t i o n between the a c t i v e 
and the passive mode of judgement i s r e l a t e d to the non - c o g n i t i v i s t 
understanding of the conceptual l e v e l of moral discourse. For the non-
c o g n i t i v i s t argues t h a t because value a s c r i p t i o n i s active, i t follows 
that moral utterances do not pick out any d e s c r i p t i v e features of the 
world. Th i s i s to a s s e r t that, on the conceptual l e v e l (D), there i s a 
cl e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the d e s c r i p t i v e and expressive functions of 
language. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n gives r i s e to the idea, c e n t r a l to non-
c o g n i t i v i s t thought, t h a t there are two co n t r a s t i n g kinds of meaning 
that words can have: on the one hand 'descriptive' or 'cognitive' 
meaning; on the other 'evaluative' or 'emotive' meaning. The cognitive 
meaning of a word i s conceived a s c o n s i s t i n g i n i t s systematic 
i n d i v i d u a l contribution to the truth conditions of sentences i n which 
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i t occursj while emotive meaning i s conceived a s attaching to words by 
v i r t u e of t h e i r systematic contribution to the aptitude of a sentence 
for expressing or evoking d i s p o s i t i o n s of the w i l l , and thus for 
influencing the behaviour of those addressed. 
T h i s opposition i s represented as an absolute one. The evaluative 
meaning of a word i s not held to play any p a r t i n determining the 
tr u t h conditions of sentences containing i t . As such, the 'peculiarly 
e t h i c a l ' meaning of a word contained within a sentence i s s a i d to 
r e l a t e to an emotive or evaluative component which i s always l o g i c a l l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the d e s c r i p t i v e component. I t i s held, i n other 
words, that p a r t i c u l a r moral clai m s such as 'arson, being d e s t r u c t i v e 
of property, i s wrong' unite the f a c t u a l judgement that arson destroys 
property with the moral a s s e r t i o n that arson i s wrong. The f a c t u a l 
component of t h i s sentence can be agreed to be e i t h e r true or f a l s e 
through an appeal to r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a or the evidence of the senses; 
but the moral judgement, being non-rational, can never be shown to be 
true or f a l s e through any appeal to the relevant f a c t s of the case. 
T h i s idea of moral judgements, understood not as statements of 
f a c t but as expressions of the moral or i e n t a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l , 
leads to the suggestion that the a t t i t u d e s which we express, or the 
p r i n c i p l e s which we adopt, are l o g i c a l l y unconstrained by the f a c t s . 
According to the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t view no amount of d e s c r i p t i v e 
agreement a s to what the f a c t s are can determine the evaluative content 
of any moral p r i n c i p l e which we may consequently choose to adopt. 
Given any s t a t e of a f f a i r s we are fre e to adopt any attitude we please, 
and f e e l whatever we l i k e about i t . As Eorty puts i t , the idea i s t h a t 
"once " a l l the f a c t s are i n " nothing remains except 'non-cognitive' 
adoption of an attitude - a choice which i s not r a t i o n a l l y d i s c u s s i b l e ' . 
(4) I t i s a view which i s r e f l e c t e d i n Hare's reference to 'the 
conviction, which every adult has, t h a t he i s free to form h i s own 
opinions about moral questions', and h i s a s s e r t i o n that 'we are f r e e to 
form our own moral opinions i n a much stronger sense that we are to 
form our opinions as to what the f a c t s are.' (5) 
T h i s d i s t i n c t l y non-cognitivi6t approach to the epistemological, 
ontological, psychological and conceptual l e v e l s of moral thinking i s 
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derived, most notably, from David Hume. We f i n d within Hume's complex 
body of e t h i c a l w r i t i n g s c e r t a i n elements concerning the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between reason and sentiment, and f a c t and value, which have been to a 
s i g n i f i c a n t extent applied by no n - c o g n i t i v i s t s i n the construction of a 
systematic framework for d i s c u s s i n g the 'metaphysics of morals'. 
Hume wrote, of reason and t a s t e : 
The one di s c o v e r s objects a s they r e a l l y stand i n nature, without 
addition or diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and 
gi l d i n g or s t a i n i n g a l l natural objects with the colours borrowed 
from i n t e r n a l sentiment, r a i s e s i n a manner a new creation. <6) 
As Blackburn puts i t , Hume's idea i s that the world proper, the sum 
t o t a l i t y of f a c t s , impinges upon us. In straightforward judgement we 
describe the f a c t s that do so. But i n addition to judging the s t a t e s of 
a f f a i r s the world contains, we may r e a c t to them. We form habits, we 
become committed to patterns of inference; we become affected and form 
d e s i r e s , a t t i t u d e s and sentiments. (7) Such a re a c t i o n i s 'spread on* 
the world by thinking and t a l k i n g a s though the world contains s t a t e s 
of a f f a i r s answering to such reactions. However, t h i s i s grounded upon 
an i l l u s i o n : i t i s to f a i l to recognise that the s o r t of discourse, most 
notably e t h i c a l , which expresses an a f f e c t i v e and a t t i t u d i n a l reaction 
to the world i s not d e s c r i p t i v e of genuine properties of things i n the 
exte r n a l world. 
Hume's ontological conception of value i s r e l a t e d to what we can 
c l a s s i f y a s the epistemological, psychological and conceptual l e v e l s of 
h i s conception of morality. For he contends that: 
Reason i s the discovery of tru t h or falsehood. Truth or falsehood 
c o n s i s t s i n a agreement or disagreement e i t h e r to the real 
r e l a t i o n s of ideas, or to real existence of matter of fa c t . 
Whatever, therefore, i s not susceptible of t h i s agreement or 
disagreement, i s incapable of being true or f a l s e , and can never 
be an object of our reason. (8) 
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For Hume, then, i t i s the fac u l t y of reason which determines what can 
count a s true or f a l s e a s c r i p t i o n s of eit h e r purely a n a l y t i c a l 
statements or statements of fac t . I t follows t h a t a s c r i p t i o n s of value, 
which do not p r i m a r i l y employ the reasoning faculty but rather 
express sentiment, do not qual i f y as true or f a l s e claims to knowledge. 
Further, Hume observes that: 
Since morals... have an influence on the actions and aff e c t i o n s , i t 
follows that they cannot be deriv'd from reason: and that because 
reason alone... can never have any such influence. Morals e x c i t e 
passions, and produce or prevent actions. Season of i t s e l f i s 
ut t e r l y impotent i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r . The r u l e s of morality, 
therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. (9) 
Hume's contention i s that morality i s e s s e n t i a l l y a matter of the 
passions, not reason. I t follows that moral utterances r e l a t e on the 
psychological l e v e l to the a c t i v e rather than the pa s s i v e mode of 
judgement. They are judgements which are uttered with the intention of 
influencing people's minds and behavioural actions. Further, t h i s mode 
of judgement r e l a t e s on the conceptual l e v e l to a form of discourse 
which i s expressive rather than d e s c r i p t i v e . I t i s , i n other words, to 
be c l e a r l y distinguished from s c i e n t i f i c discourse which a s p i r e s to 
s t a t e our knowledge of the world by providing an adequate 
representation of i t . For s c i e n t i f i c discourse employs reason and i s 
consequently morally or s p i r i t u a l l y dead, or, as John McDowell puts i t , 
'motivationally inert'. (10) 
This absolute d i s t i n c t i o n between passion and reason, coupled with 
the notion that d e s i r e causes the motivation for action, leads Hume to 
a s s e r t t h a t the sentiments provide us with the reasons for acting 
although they are not themselves r a t i o n a l l y determined. Rather, they 
c o n s t i t u t e the source of a l l the po t e n t i a l l y j u s t i f y i n g considerations 
which can be appealed to. This view i s r e f l e c t e d i n Stevenson's 
contention that 'reasons serve not to bring our at t i t u d e s into being 
but only to r e d i r e c t them... our reasons w i l l not give us attitudes' 
(11). 
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The no n - c o g n i t i v i s t therefore, following Hume, a s c r i b e s the place 
of reasoning i n e t h i c s i n purely p r a c t i c a l terms. Moral action i s 
explained a s the appl i c a t i o n of instrumental reasoning for the 
ca l c u l a t i o n of how best to s a t i s f y expressed attitudes, d e s i r e s or 
wants. These expressed sentiments are taken to be i n no sense 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y reasonable. Rather, i t i s to denote moral reasoning a s a 
matter of the conjunction of f a c t u a l b e l i e f s about the existence and 
character of objects of expressed desire, with expressions of the 
agent's d e s i r e s . This i s to argue that when a person a c t s we can 
present the action as a conclusion from a major premise of the form 'I 
want such-and-such', and minor premises of the form 'So-and-so i s 
such-and-such; here i s some so-and-so.' As Maclntyre notes, i t i s t h i s 
contention that a l l p r a c t i c a l (including moral) reasoning proceeds from 
a sentiment expressed i n the form 'I want' which captures the sense of 
what Hume meant when he s a i d that 'reason i s the servant of the 
passions'. (12) 
This Humean notion that reason i s the servant of the passions i s 
applied by no n - c o g n i t i v i s t s to suggest the l o g i c a l l y inconclusive 
nature of e t h i c a l disagreement. For the non-cognitivist, we may provide 
a complete l i s t of supporting reasons for those f a c t u a l b e l i e f s which 
purport to j u s t i f y the adoption of a p a r t i c u l a r moral p r i n c i p l e , and we 
may engage an opponent i n providing a s i m i l a r l y exhaustive l i s t of 
reasons which he believes to be supportive of h i s c o n f l i c t i n g moral 
p r i n c i p l e s . However, there must come a stage when nD further reasons 
can be given, and nothing more can be said, Fundamentally, to use 
Stevenson's terminology, i t i s an 'agreement i n attitude', rather than an 
'agreement i n b e l i e f , which needs to be achieved; and such an agreement 
requires an emotional rather than a r a t i o n a l w i l l i n g n e s s to accept the 
same moral p r i n c i p l e . 
Hare s a y s that where a disagreement i n attitude or a c o n f l i c t of 
w i l l p e r s i s t s then we can only ask our opponent 
to make up h i s own mind which way he ought to l i v e ; f o r i n the 
end everything r e s t s upon such a decision of p r i n c i p l e . He has to 
decide whether to accept that way of l i f e or not... I f he does not 
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accept i t , then l e t him accept some other, and t r y to l i v e by i t . 
(13) 
In other words, for Hare, our only recourse i s to i n v i t e our opponent to 
show how h i s adopted way of l i f e i s instrumentally reasonable, or 
request him to i n d i c a t e how the expressed d e s i r e s which h i s accepted 
way of l i f e i s designed to s a t i s f y can best be s a t i s f i e d (and perhaps 
only s a t i s f i e d ) within the l i f e s t y l e or s e t of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of 
conduct he has adopted. For Stevenson, we have the additional ( a l b e i t 
p sychologically contingent) recourse of attempting tD exert our 
influence upon him through the persuasive force of r h e t o r i c , rather 
than continue f u t i l e r a t i o n a l demonstrations. 
Kon-cognitivisui presents, therefore, a conception of morality 
i t s e l f as a kind of p a r t i s a n s h i p . As Lovibond puts i t , i t advances the 
view that a l l moral agents must v o l u n t a r i l y stand up for t h e i r values 
in the face of competition from the r i v a l values endorsed by others. 
(14) Individuals are pictured as struggling to defend t h e i r own moral 
convictions, e i t h e r within an i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework, or (possibly) by 
a t r i a l of brute strength. Such a struggle i s deemed inescapable 
because i t i s a necessary feature of moral l i f e that, given any s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s , the i n d i v i d u a l i s fre e to choose whatever p r i n c i p l e s he wishes 
to adopt i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n of expressed d e s i r e s and wants. There i s 
no comfort to be found i n appealing to any objective or external public 
moral authority which stands independently from those expressed 
preferences, simply because there i s none. Rather, the establishment of 
any moral system depends upon a community of i n d i v i d u a l s s e t t i n g up 
those standards which express shared i n d i v i d u a l attitudes. Such s o c i a l 
co-operation i s p o s s i b l e but, Hare says, we must recognise that 
ultimately 'we have to make our own d e c i s i o n s of p r i n c i p l e ' and, by 
implication, t o l e r a t e the d e c i s i o n s of others. (15) We must recognise 
that the f i n a l b a s i s for adopting any moral p r i n c i p l e r e s t s upon the 
free choice of the i n d i v i d u a l to agree with the standards expressed 
within a moral community, and accept that our moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s 
based upon our i n d i v i d u a l free w i l l to arrange our l i v e s a s we see f i t 
for the s a t i s f a c t i o n of our own i n d i v i d u a l purposes. 
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T h i s conception of moral experience i s grounded upon a s e r i e s of 
c e n t r a l related assumptions. I t assumes th a t the i n d i v i d u a l moral 
agent can separate himself from the p a r t i c u l a r context of the moral 
p r a c t i c e which he f i n d s himself located within, and have the a b i l i t y to 
sp e c i f y h i s i n d i v i d u a l purposes independently from that context. T h i s 
assumption presupposes that there e x i s t s some notion of the s e l f 
which stands apart from whatever i n t e r s e c t i o n of s o c i a l r o l e s we 
happen to occupy. As such, i t i s to conceive of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of any 
communal moral p r a c t i c e i n terms of the sum t o t a l of i n d i v i d u a l l y 
expressed and shared a t t i t u d e s which informs i t . In other words, i t i s 
to understand the sense of communal moral p r a c t i c e a s the product of 
shared i n d i v i d u a l moral experiences which are themselves grounded upon 
a p r i o r s e l f - i d e n t i t y . T h i s notion generates the idea that morality i s a 
matter Df i n d i v i d u a l choice, i n that an i n d i v i d u a l has a 'free f l o a t i n g 
commitment' to whatever standards he agrees with, and volunteers to be 
constrained to follow. 
T h i s notion of the i n d i v i d u a l possessing a free f l o a t i n g 
commitment to moral obligations of h i s own choice i s based upon a 
p a r t i c u l a r conception of moral r a t i o n a l i t y ; one which, as we have seen, 
i s instrumental i n character. For the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t assumes that the 
r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i s one who ac t s i n such a way as to maximise h i s 
u t i l i t i e s , and gains a s much s a t i s f a c t i o n a s i s p o s s i b l e r e l a t i v e to h i s 
output of resources. According to t h i s view, the value of the a c t i v i t y 
i s constituted by the s a t i s f a c t i o n which the agent gains from i t . 
Further, i t i s t h i s purely t e c h n i c a l conception of r a t i o n a l moral action 
which leads the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t to suggest t h a t the content of an 
indiv i d u a l moral agent's b e l i e f s and obligations can be anything 
whatsoever so long a s i t s a t i s f i e s i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s , wants and needs. 
Thus we f i n d Hare acknowledging 'the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of people 
becoming f a n a t i c s without se l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' , and Hume dramatically 
i n s i s t i n g that: 
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the s c r a t c h i n g of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason 
for me to choose my t o t a l ruin to prevent the l e a s t uneasiness of 
... a person wholly unknown to me. (17) 
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In t h i s view, then, the condition of what c o n s t i t u t e s r a t i o n a l moral 
behaviour i s s a t i s f i e d so long as the moral l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l i s 
conducted i n a sincere, coherent, considerate and purposeful manner 
towards the fulf i l m e n t of the individual's preferences, d e s i r e s , wants 
and needs. 
Accordingly, as Lovibond notes, we can see non-cognitivism as an 
attempt to s e t morality on a firmer or more psychologically a c c e s s i b l e 
b a s i s . (18) Rather than seeking with Kant and h i s followers to 
represent the requirements of morality as binding upon any r a t i o n a l 
being qua r a t i o n a l , non-cognitivism s a y s that morally acceptable 
behaviour i s commended by our reason (where i t i s so commended) i n the 
same way a s any other kind of behaviour: namely, as a means to 
s a t i s f y i n g the d e s i r e s we a c t u a l l y have. I t i s to deny that the 
requirements of morality r e s t upon any conception of what i s 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y r a t i o n a l . Rather, i t i s to suggest t h a t these requirements 
r e f l e c t the contingent psychological f a c t that people happen to share, 
to a large degree, the same b a s i c p h y s i c a l d e s i r e s , wants and needs, 
and wish to co-operate with each other towards t h e i r fulfilment. I t i s 
to a s s e r t that the motivation or spontaneous d e s i r e for co-operative 
action enables i n d i v i d u a l s to invent and abide by those conventions or 
r u l e s of morality which best u t i l i s e t h e i r resources and make pos s i b l e 
the s a t i s f a c t i o n of preferences within a community. T h i s i s how 
d i s t i n c t l y moral a c t i v i t y i s ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ' within c e r t a i n s o c i a l 
conventions and leg a l p r a c t i c e s . 
Admittedly, the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t conception of morality i s secured 
at the c o s t of founding i t on something contingent: what Hagel c a l l s 
the 'fortuitous or escapable i n c l i n a t i o n s ' to defend the cause of 
j u s t i c e , l i b e r t y , or whatever. (19) However, the non-cognitivist i n s i s t s 
that t h i s contingency, which can d e s t a b i l i s e moral motivation, i s 
generally counterbalanced by the f a c t that we always have a v a i l a b l e to 
us the means to punish those who break the r u l e s which encapsulate our 
communal moral p r a c t i c e s . There w i l l , no doubt, be those who lack the 
d e s i r e s which make i t r a t i o n a l to behave morally and decently, but the 
r e s t of us, who do possess these d e s i r e s , can defend ourselves against 
the delinquents by means of any sanctions (psychological or p h y s i c a l ) 
that may seem appropriate. In t h i s way we s h a l l constitute, Hume says, 
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the 'party of human kind against vice and disorder, i t s common enemy' 
(20). 
Given t h i s b r i e f sketch of the philosophical character of non-
cognitivism, i t i s apparent t h a t what i s most cent r a l t o i t s assessment 
of the nature of moral experience i s i t s conception of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between f a c t s and values. For non-co g n i t i v i s t s maintain t h a t f a c t s and 
values are l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . They assume, as Wiggins notes, t h a t 
there i s a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between fac t s , which are 'what we discover 
already i n the world', and values, which are 'what i s invented or, by 
t h i n k i n g or fee l i n g or w i l l i n g , somehow put into (or onto, l i k e varnish) 
the f a c t u a l world'. (21) Further, i t i s the acknowledgement of t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n which non-cognitivists have taken t o be of the utmost 
significance f o r our understanding of the form of v a l i d deductive 
reasoning i n ethics. 
The purported significance of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was f i r s t 
a r t i c u l a t e d by Hume, who claimed t o have spotted a common procedure i n 
every day moral reasoning which was greatly mistaken. He observed, i n a 
now famous passage, that: 
In every system of morality which I have h i t h e r t o met wit h , I 
have always remarked t h a t the author proceeds f o r some time i n 
the ordinary way of reasoning... when, of a sudden, I am surprised 
t o f i n d t h a t , instead of the usual copulations of propositions 'is' 
and 'is not', I meet w i t h no proposition t h a t i s not connected 
w i t h an 'ought' or 'ought not'. This change i s imperceptible, but i t 
i s , however, of the l a s t consequence. For as t h i s 'ought' or 
'ought not' expresses some new r e l a t i o n or a f f i r m a t i o n , ' t i s 
necessary t h a t i t should be observed and explained and, at the 
same time, t h a t a reason 6hould be given f o r what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how t h i s new r e l a t i o n can be a deduction 
from others which are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from i t . (22) 
Hume's observation i s t h a t t h i s imperceptible s h i f t w i t h i n deductive 
moral reasoning from the employment of 'is' propositions t o 'ought* 
propositions amounts to a fa l l a c i o u s procedure. In order t o c l a r i f y 
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what Hume held t o be the nature of t h i s l o g i c a l error, i t i s necessary 
to take a preliminary glance at the nature of deductive reasoning. 
Deduction i s a process of necessary inference, i n t h a t v a l i d deductive 
inferences have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of being se l f - e v i d e n t l y or 
necessarily such. That i s , i f a deductive inference i s v a l i d , we s h a l l 
f i n d t h a t t o deny i t and simultaneously t o a f f i r m the premises from 
which i t i s derived i s t o ut t e r a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . For example, t o 
say t h a t ' a l l men are mortal' and t h a t 'Socrates i s a man', and yet deny 
the conclusion which follows from these premises, namely, 'Socrates i s 
mortal', i s t o utte r a demonstrable nonsense. Further, the process of 
deduction i s a process of pure analysis, i n tha t an examination of the 
premises i s s u f f i c i e n t t o y i e l d a l l the elements of the conclusion: 
there i s no need t o import any additional material i n t o the sequence of 
reasoning. As such, an inference w i l l not be self-evident or v a l i d 
unless a l l the evidence f o r i t s v a l i d i t y i s already contained somewhere 
in the premises from which i t i s held to follow. 
Given these remarks, i t becomes clearer what Hume's observation 
amounts to. He observes t h a t a l l previous moral arguments were 
presented i n the form of deductive moral reasoning: t h a t i s , they were 
arguments which purported t o reach c e r t a i n evaluative conclusions or 
'ought* propositions which were necessarily i n f e r r e d from or entailed 
by certain factual premises or 'is' propositions. An example of t h i s 
form of argument i s , f o r instance, t o suggest t h a t since i t i s a f a c t 
t h a t human beings tend t o desire the condition of happiness, therefore 
we ought t o act i n a way which i s appropriate t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
t h i s state. In other words, i t i s taken t o be a necessary inference 
from the r e l a t i v e l y incontestable f a c t t h a t people seek happiness t h a t 
happiness i s therefore a good t h i n g , or something which we ought t o 
value morally. Hume's point, however, i s t h a t t h i s type of e t h i c a l 
reasoning i s fal l a c i o u s because there e x i s t s no shred of evidence i n 
favour of any evaluative conclusions as t o what ought t o be done w i t h i n 
purely fa c t u a l statements. To take our example, i t remains possible t o 
accept the f a c t t h a t human beings tend t o seek happiness w h i l s t 
refusing t o acknowledge t h a t happiness i s a good thing. No l o g i c a l 
contradiction has been committed. As Hume would argue, there may indeed 
be good psychological reasons f o r pursuing happiness, but giv i n g these 
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reasons i s not a matter of engaging i n any formal l o g i c a l 
demonstration by which one ar r i v e s a t cer t a i n evaluative conclusions 
th a t are deduced from purely fa c t u a l premises. This i s because 
statements of f a c t and statements of value belong t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t 
categories, and therefore no necessary inference between them can be 
made. I t i s never l o g i c a l l y possible, Hume contends, t o a r r i v e a t an 
evaluative conclusion which i s deduced from purely factual statements 
or 'others which are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from i t ' . Consequently, any 
attempt t o do so does not constitute the legitimate employment of 
deduction as a process of necessary inference, but rather amounts t o 
the committing of a l o g i c a l error. 
The Humean d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t s and values, and i t s 
implications f o r our understanding of deductive reasoning i n ethics, 
has been restated i n various ways by non-cog n i t i v i s t w r i t e r s . The 
contribu t i o n of Hare i s , i n t h i s respect, notable because he provides an 
analysis of the nature of moral judgements which relates d i r e c t l y t o 
hi s understanding of the form which moral deductive reasoning must 
take. 
Hare contends t h a t moral judgements are prescriptive and universal 
i n character. That i s , they possess the two l o g i c a l properties of 
' p r e s c r i p t i v i t y ' and 'universalisability'. A pr e s c r i p t i v e utterance i s of 
the type 'let so-and-so be done', and Hare takes such an utterance, i f 
sincere, t o express a desire or preference. Moreover, he claims t h a t 
every preference can be expressed i n a pres c r i p t i o n , so any agent who 
has preferences i s i n a po s i t i o n t o make prescriptions, As such, he 
suggests t h a t the function of moral p r i n c i p l e s , as preferences 
expressed i n moral judgements which have p r e s c r i p t i v e force, i s t o 
guide conduct. Further, he contends t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r moral judgement 
must ref e r t o a moral p r i n c i p l e or imperative which i s universal i n 
character, i n tha t i t i s taken t o apply t o a l l relevantly s i m i l a r 
persons i n a l l relevantly s i m i l a r circumstances. He writes t h a t : 
a l l value judgements are covertly universal i n character, which i s 
the same as to say t h a t they refer t o , and express acceptance of, 
a standard which has an application t o other s i m i l a r instances. 
I f I censure someone f o r having done something, I envisage the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y of him, or someone else, or myself, having t o make a 
s i m i l a r choice again; otherwise there would be no point i n 
censuring him. (23) 
Hare's claim, then, i s t h a t a l l p a r t i c u l a r moral judgements relate 
t o a general moral p r i n c i p l e or imperative which takes the form of a 
universal prescription. Further, they are said t o be universalisable i n 
v i r t u e of the meaning of the word 'ought', because i t i s taken t o be a 
necessary feature of the form of moral language t h a t 'ought' statements 
either constitute or r e l a t e t o universal prescriptions. As such, Hare 
contends, i n a manner which i s drawn from Kant, th a t t h i s notion of 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y i s an innate or necessary presupposition of moral 
reasoning. This contention stems from the l o g i c a l point t h a t the 
notion of r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f i s p a r t l y constituted by the p r i n c i p l e of 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y , or the maxim 'similar treatment f o r s i m i l a r cases'. 
To ignore t h i s maxim would be t o act inconsistently, and t o deny i t 
would be t o u t t e r a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n , as a man would be acting i f he 
i n s i s t e d that, i n a s i n g l e and isolated case, 2 + 2 = 5, instead of 4. 
For Hare, then, the e f f e c t of making a universal p r e s c r i p t i o n , or 
judging t h a t I ought t o do a certain t h i n g , i s t o accept t h a t anyone 
else ought to act s i m i l a r l y i n s i m i l a r circumstances. In p a r t i c u l a r , I 
accept t h a t t h i s ought t o be the case i f I were at the receiving end of 
action. In considering what I ought t o do, therefore, I must consider 
what i t would be l i k e t o be the other people affected. I must, i n other 
words, have an i m p a r t i a l sympathy or concern f o r the predicament of 
others. Hare equates t h i s 'ought' or p r e s c r i p t i v e judgement with the 
making of evaluations, as d i s t i n c t from the relaying of descriptions. 
He assumes, as Bernard Williams notes, t h a t 'the p r e s c r i p t i v e does 
something, namely t e l l i n g people to act i n c e r t a i n ways, which the 
descriptive, i n i t s e l f , cannot do'. (24) That i s , he claims t h a t the 
'action guiding' force of evaluative prescriptions most c l e a r l y 
indicates t h e i r l o g i c a l distinctiveness from descriptive facts. For 
although Hare does not deny th a t f a c t s are relevant t o questions of 
value, (in t h a t the act of making an evaluative judgement w i l l involve 
some assessment of two or more concrete factual a l t e r n a t i v e s , and 
t h e i r anticipated consequences, i n best achieving the moral ends of the 
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action prescribed), he contends t h a t these fac t u a l considerations 
cannot, i n themselves, l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l the acceptance of cer t a i n 
evaluations over others. This i s how Hare restates Hume's point about 
the 'non-derivability' of 'ought* conclusions from 'is* premises. 
Hare goes on t o i n s i s t t h a t f o r any reasoning i n ethics t o be 
deductively v a l i d the premises of the argument must include at least 
one evaluative statement i n conjunction w i t h f a c t u a l statements, i n 
order t o generate an evaluative conclusion. He assumes, i n other words, 
th a t any example of v a l i d deductive reasoning i n ethics must take the 
following s y l l l o g i s t i c form: 
Major premise (Universal 'Ought' Principle) eg. 'X-ing i s wrong'. 
Minor premise ('is' statement) eg. 'Y i s a case of X-ing'. 
Conclusion (Particular 'ought' judgement) eg. 'therefore, you ought 
not t o Y'. 
In short, i t i s t o suggest t h a t v a l i d deductive reasoning i n the sphere 
of morals i s pe r f e c t l y possible, given only t h a t there i s a p r i o r 
consensus or agreement between the reasoning parties over such 
evaluative f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s as 'X-ing i s wrong'. Given t h i s p r i o r 
agreement about specified moral rules or p r i n c i p l e s , there i s no l o g i c a l 
problem. A l l t h a t i s then needed i s the procedure of the settlement of 
certain practices - t h a t indeed 'Y i s a case of X-ing', etc. 
The problem arises, of course, when the reasoning parties f a i l t o 
agree t o these evaluative f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . In such a case, according 
to Hare's account, t h i s disagreement about values cannot be r a t i o n a l l y 
resolved through an appeal t o logic. Ho party can formally demonstrate 
to another t h a t certain evaluative conclusions are necessarily i n f e r r e d 
by purely factual considerations. As a consequence, no party can prove 
the 'nonsense' of the other moral standpoint, i f that standpoint i s 
consistently and coherently held. Rather, a l l t h a t he can indicate i s 
tha t the other's moral standpoint constitutes the 'wrong sense', and 
c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s own moral understanding; and a l l he can do i s show 
his abhorrence t o the a t t i t u d e s represented by t h a t c o n f l i c t i n g moral 
standpoint. 
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2. The Form of Ethical Language. 
I t has been indicated i n the previous section t h a t what l i e s 
c entral t o the non - c o g n i t i v i s t theory of ethics i s a d i s t i n c t l y 
e m p i r i c i s t conception of the re l a t i o n s h i p between fa c t s and values, and 
reasons and tastes. I t has been shown how the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c shape of 
the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t thesis depends upon a p a r t i c u l a r philosophical 
understanding of facts and values as a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t phenomena; a 
distinctiveness which i s taken t o be apparent at the epistemological, 
ontological, psychological, and conceptual or l i n g u i s t i c levels of moral 
t h i n k i n g . I t i s not su r p r i s i n g , therefore, t o observe that c r i t i c s of 
t h i s theory have been concerned most notably t o question and undermine, 
at a l l the relevant levels of t h i n k i n g , the non - c o g n i t i v i s t account of 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . I t i s t o an examination of these c r i t i c a l arguments 
which we now turn . 
Non-cognitivism maintains t h a t moral concepts such as 'right', 
'good' and 'duty' are expressed i n statements which contain separate 
normative and descriptive components. Such expressions, according t o 
t h i s account, involve a combination of strai g h t f o r w a r d empirical 
description w i t h an 'expressive' kind of speech-act which i s uttered t o 
commend or prescribe something of value. Thus Stevenson says th a t 
'ethical d e f i n i t i o n s involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive 
meaning'. (1) For the non-cognitivist, therefore, a statement such as 'X 
i s courageous' can be resolved i n t o , f i r s t l y , a 'value-neutral' 
description t h a t X has a cer t a i n property or complex of properties, and 
secondly an expression of a favourable moral o r i e n t a t i o n torwards t h a t 
property on the part of the speaker. As such, these two components of a 
moral judgement are taken to be a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . This leads t o the 
claim t h a t i t always remains possible, i n p r i n c i p l e , t o specify the 
evaluative meaning of a moral term such as 'courageous' without 
prejudice t o the extension of the concept. I t i s t o suggest, i n other 
words, t h a t we could have a concept such as 'courageous' which was 
predicated of exactly the same descriptive range of actions and persons 
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as currently, but without our actually having any p o s i t i v e moral 
a t t i t u d e towards 'courageous' actions and persons as such. Thus Hare 
asserts t h a t w h i l s t ' i t i s true that' i n our current moral language 
'there i s no single evaluatively neutral word which... can be used t o 
describe (courageous) actions without committing the describer t o any 
evaluation', i t i s nonetheless l o g i c a l l y possible that 'we could have 
such a word'. (2) 
Typically, then, non- c o g n i t i v i s t s hold t h a t when we feel impelled 
t o ascribe value t o something, what i s actually happening can be 
disentangled i n t o two components. They maintain, as McDowell puts i t , 
t h a t competence with an evaluative concept involves, f i r s t , a 
s e n s i t i v i t y t o an aspect of the world as i t r e a l l y i s (as i t i s 
independently of value experience), and second, a propensity t o a 
cer t a i n a t t i t u d e - a non-cognitive state which constitutes the special 
perspective from which items i n the world seem t o be endowed with the 
value i n question. (3) Given the disentangling, we can explain the 
character of value experience i n terms of the occupants of t h i s special 
perspective making value judgements i n which they r e g i s t e r the presence 
i n objects of some property they authentically have, but enrich t h e i r 
conception of t h i s property with the r e f l e c t i o n of an at t i t u d e . The 
l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of the disentangling manoeuvre here envisaged 
always being effected, and the separation of description and 
commendation which constitutes i t , leads t o the important claim t h a t we 
are free t o prescribe or commend what we w i l l , w h i l s t being r e l a t i v e l y 
unfree as regards what fact u a l observations we make. 
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), Bernard Williams 
provides us with a f o r c e f u l c r i t i c i s m of the non-cog n i t i v i s t conception 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n between facts and values i n e t h i c a l discourse. (4) 
He suggests t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n , 'such as i t may be', i s mislocated i n 
non- c o g n i t i v i s t thought because i t i s not 'primarily logical', and i s 
s t i l l less to be 'found i n the use of words'. (5) For the purposes of 
his argument Williams focusses upon Hare's p r e s c r i p t i v i s t formulation 
of the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t theory. His f i r s t objection relates t o the 
p r e s c r i p t i v s t insistence t h a t a l l evaluative terms necessarily function 
at the level of prescibing action. At f i r s t glance, Williams claims, 
t h i s insistence 'seems false t o the s p i r i t of many aesthetic 
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evaluations' i n that, f o r instance, ' i t seems t o require our basic 
perspective on the worth of pictures t o be roughly t h a t of p o t e n t i a l 
collectors'. (6) Further, he argues th a t 'even w i t h i n the realm of the 
e t h i c a l , i t i s surely taking too narrow a view of human merits t o 
suppose th a t people recognised as good are people t h a t we are being 
t o l d t o imitate'. (7) 
For Williams, then, i t i s not at a l l obvious t h a t every evaluation 
i s linked t o action. We have good reasons t o doubt whether i t i s the 
case t h a t i n a l l instances of value a s c r i p t i o n what i s being expressed 
i s a preference t o act upon the judgement made. Specific examples, 
such as appreciating a work of a r t or admiring a person's virtuous 
q u a l i t i e s , do not seem t o suggest th a t the desires expressed i n such 
appreciation or admiration are necessarily manifested i n the actions 
of buying the picture or i m i t a t i n g the virtuous, even i f i t i s 
physically possible t o do so. Williams' point, then, i s not p r i m a r i l y 
related t o the empirical observation t h a t we are often i n no posi t i o n 
t o act upon an evaluative preference t h a t we have made. Rather, i t 
relates t o the l o g i c a l claim t h a t i t i s not necessarily contradictory t o 
acknowledge t h a t something i s valuable and yet not t r a n s l a t e t h a t 
judgement i n t o consequent action. 
However, when Hare explains the notion of the p r e s c r i p t i v e force 
of evaluation, he writes that: 
i f we say [of a cer t a i n hotel] t h a t i t i s better than the one on 
the other side of the road, there i s a sense of "better than" (the 
pr e s c r i p t i v e sense) i n which a person who assented o r a l l y t o our 
judgement, yet, when faced with a choice between the two hotels 
(other things such as price being equal) chose the other hotel, 
must have been saying something he did not r e a l l y think. (8) 
Thus, f o r Hare, t o t h i n k something 'better' i n the p r e s c r i p t i v e 
sense i s necessarily t o prefer i t , and wish t o act i n a manner which 
f u l f i l s t h a t preference. I f a person recognises a q u a l i t y which 
something possesses, and favourably values t h a t q u a l i t y , then he i s 
l o g i c a l l y committed to act towards the f u l f i l m e n t of h i s preference f o r 
i t . For example, i f a person recognises the merits of a hotel and i s 
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favourably disposed towards those merits, then he must choose t o reside 
i n t h a t hotel rather than another, given t h a t he can a f f o r d t o do so. 
According to t h i s account, therefore, there i s no d i s t i n c t i o n between 
assessing the q u a l i t i e s of something i n a favourable manner and 
pre f e r r i n g i t , To assess something favourably i s t o prefer i t , and to 
wish to act i n a way which s a t i s f i e s t h a t preference. This leads t o the 
claim t h a t i f a person purports t o prefer something, but f a i l s t o 
choose i t , then he 'must have been saying something he d i d not r e a l l y 
think': t h a t i s , the alleged preference i s insincerely held. For i t 
follows t h a t a person cannot intelligibly assent o r a l l y t o a judgement 
which specifies a favourable assessment of something, w h i l s t refusing 
to a r t i c u l a t e a preference f o r i t , and refusing t o manifest t h a t 
preference i n an appropriate action. 
Williams takes issue, as we have seen, with the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
account of the necessary connection between favourable assessment and 
action. He also questions the purported r e l a t i o n s h i p between favourable 
assessment and preference. He suggests t h a t there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between assessment and preference, and argues t h a t i t i s one which 
applies t o Hare's own example of the hotel. He writes t h a t : 
I can d i s t i n g u i s h between the merits of a hotel, and what I , f o r 
perfectly good reasons, happen t o prefer. " I simply don't l i k e 
staying at good hotels" i s a i n t e l l i g i b l e t h i n g t o say. (9) 
The f a c t t h a t t h i s statement i s a pe r f e c t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e , although 
perhaps a rather eccentric t h i n g t o say, accentuates, Williams claims, 
'the basic weakness of the pr e s c r i p t i v e account of the evaluative'. (10) 
I t demonstrates t h a t t h i s account makes indistinguishable the notions 
of assessment, preference and action: notions which should be ca r e f u l l y 
separated. 
He makes the point that: 
For many kinds of thi n g , you can d i s t i n g u i s h between t h i n k i n g 
t h a t a given item i s good of i t s kind and l i k i n g , wanting and 
choosing t h a t item; moreover, your a b i l i t y t o make the d i s t i n c t i o n 
shows t h a t you understand t h a t the merits of the th i n g i n 
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question may go beyond your own inte r e s t s or powers of response. 
(11) 
As Williams points out, i t i s possible t o assess something, and 
recognise t h a t others are i n a more knowledgeable p o s i t i o n t o judge the 
merits of something, without assuming that your own int e r e s t s , 
preferences, choices or 'powers of response' are necessarily relevant t o 
the making of t h i s assessment. I t i s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account f a i l s t o acknowledge. 
These d i f f i c u l t i e s make us wonder, Williams says, whether there 
are 'serious problems... about how much work the d i s t i n c t i o n between is 
and ought can be made t o do' (12). This i s because the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
account of the fact/value d i s t i n c t i o n rests precisely upon the dubious 
claim t h a t a l l evaluative assessments express action guiding 
preferences, w h i l s t a l l descriptions do not perform t h i s function. As 
Williams notes, the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t claims t h a t any moral concept can be 
analysed i n t o a descriptive and a p r e s c r i p t i v e element: i n tha t such a 
concept i s , as i t were, guided around the world by i t s descriptive 
content, but has a p r e s c r i p t i v e f l a g attached t o i t . In other words, i t 
i s the descriptive content which i s said t o be 'world guiding', i n th a t 
a concept such as 'promising' may be r i g h t l y or wrongly applied i n the 
world by a user of the concept who i s appropriately or 
misappropriately informed by the fa c t s of the s i t u a t i o n . And i t i s the 
evaluative element that i s said t o be 'action guiding', i n t h a t a 
concept such as 'promising' provides reasons f o r action. Therefore, as 
Williams puts i t : 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s m claims t h a t what governs the application of the 
concept t o the world i s the descriptive element and tha t the 
evaluative i n t e r e s t of the concept plays no part i n t h i s . A l l the 
input i n t o i t s use i s descriptive, j u s t as a l l the evaluative 
aspect i s output. I t follows that, f o r any concept of t h i s s o r t , 
you could produce another t h a t picked out j u s t the same features 
of the world but worked simply as a descriptive concept, lacking 
any p r e s c r i p t i v e or evaluative force. (13) 
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Williams suggests t h a t the basic weakness of the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
account of the descriptive and the evaluative i s most acutely 
manifested i n the notion, c i t e d above, t h a t i t i s always possible t o 
produce a purely descriptive equivalent of a moral concept which 
operates, i n ordinary language use, at both the descriptive and 
evaluative level. He observes that: 
c r i t i c s have made the e f f e c t i v e point t h a t there i s no reason t o 
believe that a descriptive equivalent w i l l necessarily be 
available. How we "go on" from one application of a concept t o 
another i s a function of the kind of the i n t e r e s t that the concept 
represents, and we should not assume t h a t we could see how people 
"go on" i f we d i d not share the evaluative perspective i n which 
t h i s kind of concept has i t s point. An i n s i g h t f u l observer can 
indeed come to understand and anticipate the use of the concept 
without actually sharing the values of the people... but i n 
imaginatively a n t i c i p a t i n g the use of the concept, the observer 
also has t o grasp imaginatively i t s evaluative point. He cannot 
stand quite outside the evaluative i n t e r e s t s of the community he 
i s observing, and pick up the concept simply as a device f o r 
d i v i d i n g up f o r a rather strange way ce r t a i n neutral features of 
the world. (14) 
Williams i s , then, sceptical about the p o s s i b i l i t y of always being 
able t o provide a purely descriptive equivalent of an applied moral 
concept. He argues t h a t which makes the application of a moral concept 
an i n t e l l i g i b l e performance i s the 'function of the kind of i n t e r e s t 
t h a t the concept represents'. In other words, a p a r t i c u l a r moral concept 
i s always employed w i t h i n a communal moral practice or i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
context which necessarily has an 'evaluative point', and which commits 
i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s t o a d i s t i n c t moral vocabulary. 
This point i s , I suggest, correct, and we can restate i t i n the 
foll o w i n g manner. We can say t h a t the nature of a moral practice, and 
the application of a moral concept w i t h i n i t , presupposes an evaluative 
i n t e r e s t which determines the a c t i v i t y of the practice and defines the 
sense of the applied concept used w i t h i n i t . This i s because the 
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meanings of our moral concepts are closely meshed with, and determined 
by, the l i n g u i s t i c moral practices and shared evaluative i n t e r e s t s 
which specify how we i n t e l l i g i b l y apply them i n our e t h i c a l discourse. 
This i s t o recognise t h a t i f a community did not have such a shared 
evaluative i n t e r e s t then there would not be any d i s t i n c t l y moral 
concepts at a l l . 
This point e f f e c t i v e l y undermines the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s account of 
the descriptive and the evaluative. I t leads t o the suggestion t h a t i t 
might be impossible t o grasp f u l l y the meaning of an applied moral 
concept unless one shares, or least understands, the evaluative 
i n t e r e s t s of the community which employs i t . Put another way, i t i s t o 
question the p o s s i b i l i t y of whether a disinterested and i m p a r t i a l 
observer can f u l l y capture the sense of a used moral concept without 
attending t o i t s evaluative point. More c r u c i a l l y , i t i s t o question 
whether an observer can provide a purely descriptive equivalent of a 
moral concept which i s adopted i n a p a r t i c u l a r practice. This i s 
because the meaning of a moral concept i s ine x t r i c a b l e from evaluative 
concerns. I t follows t h a t any attempt t o pick out the features of an 
et h i c a l concept i n a purely descriptive manner would f a i l t o r e t a i n 
the essentially evaluative point, purpose and meaning of the concept, as 
applied by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a practice. 
The significance of t h i s point can be i l l u s t r a t e d by an example. 
There are i n various communal practices many d i f f e r e n t applications of 
the concept of a queue. The d i f f e r e n t meanings of the notion of 
queueing depends upon the p a r t i c u l a r set of evaluative ideals or 
portrayals of moral re l a t i o n s h i p s between persons which determines the 
outlook of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a community. In many cases, these 
evaluations constitute d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l l y ideological perspectives 
which determine the sense of the a c t i v i t y of queuing. We f i n d t h a t 
w i t h i n a society which i s shaped by l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s 
there i s a concept of a queue which i s 6tated i n terms of the maxim 
' f i r s t come f i r s t served', i n the sense t h a t the f i r s t person who jo i n s 
the queue i s understood t o be e n t i t l e d t o f i r s t admittance to a public 
building, and so on. Likewise, a society t h a t i s shaped by s o c i a l i s t 
p r i n c i p l e s specifies t h a t the i n f i r m or aged have the r i g h t t o f i r s t 
admission, whatever t h e i r i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n i n the queue. We can also 
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imagine a society shaped by Conservative p r i n c i p l e s which gives 
pr i v i l e g e d treatment i n the queue to the landed gentry or a r i s t o c r a t s ; 
or a society shaped by National S o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s which denies t h a t 
Jews have any status i n a queue at a l l . 
The point i s t h a t the function or purpose of queueing depends upon 
the evaluative i n t e r e s t s of the p r a c t i t i o n e r s engaged i n the a c t i v i t y of 
queueing, This i s because the s p e c i f i c meaning of the concept of a 
queue i s determined by p a r t i c u l a r ideological understandings of the 
nature of the moral relationships between persons. I t follows that an 
observer of these practices must comprehend or f u l l y understand the 
evaluative i n t e r e s t of a community which employs the concept of 
queueing i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. What he cannot do i s provide a purely 
descriptive equivalent of these queueing a c t i v i t i e s quite independently 
of these evaluative concerns. Any such description would indicate t h a t 
people are choosing t o l i n e up together i n an orderly fashion, but 
t h i s descriptive account of events would not amount to a complete 
characterisation of what a queue i s . This i s because the a c t i v i t y of 
people choosing t o l i n e up together i n an orderly fashion i s an 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e performance unless i t i s informed by the evaluative 
i n t e r e s t s which give i t i t s e t h i c a l sense. For i t i s these evaluative 
concerns which constitute what i s taken t o be the function or purpose 
of a queue. There e x i s t s no notion of a value-neutral concept of a 
queue, and therefore there i s no description of i t which i s available 
to the observer. We may note that t h i s point relates as much to the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s themselves as t o the observer. They also need t o 
comprehend the evaluative point of t h e i r a c t i v i t y t o be able to 
understand i t s e t h i c a l purpose and describe i t s application. 
This i l l u s t r a t e d point can be used t o refute the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
claim that i t i s possible, without loss, t o disentangle the descriptive 
and the evaluative. As McDowell notes: 
i f the disentangling manoeuvre i s always possible, t h a t implies 
t h a t the extension of the associated term, as i t would be used by 
someone who belonged t o the community, could be mastered 
independently of the special concerns which, i n the community, 
would show themselves i n admiration or emulation of actions seen 
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as f a l l i n g under the concept. That i s : one could know which 
actions the term would be applied to, so t h a t one would be able t o 
predict applications and withholdings of i t i n new cases - not 
merely without one sharing the community's admiration (there need 
be no d i f f i c u l t y about t h a t ) , but without even embarking on an 
attempt t o make sense of t h e i r admiration. (15) 
HcDowell suggests t h a t i t i s not at a l l clear how an observer or 
member of a community can grasp the descriptive content of an applied 
concept without benefit of understanding the 'special perspective', or 
evaluative inte r e s t s , which shape how p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a moral practice 
see things as they do. There are, he says, no purely descriptive 
equivalents of applied concepts available which we can master 
independently of the special concerns of the community which uses them. 
As such, there are no means by which we can state the class of actions 
which appropriately apply t o a moral term without comprehending the 
evaluative sense i n which these actions have an appropriate 
application. Therefore i t i s not possible t o disentangle the descriptive 
from the evaluative. 
This l i n e of c r i t i c i s m exposes a basic weakness i n the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t theory. I t i s a weakness which, as John Searle observes, 
i s based upon the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t conception of a descriptive fact. 
Searle notes t h a t t h i s account rests upon the 'classical empirical... 
picture of the way words r e l a t e t o the world'. (16) I t i s a picture 
which t r e a t s a l l descriptive statements about matters of f a c t as being 
of the same type: t h a t i s , as statements which s a t i s f y the c r i t e r i a of 
objective t r u t h by more or less accurately representing the features of 
the f a b r i c of the world. However, he points out t h a t there i s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between two orders of fact: 'brute' facts and 
' i n s t i t u t i o n a l ' facts. Brute f a c t s are physical descriptions which are 
expressed i n statements such as 'ray car goes a t eighty miles an hour'. 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l facts are f a c t s about so c i a l r e l a t i o n s and s o c i a l 
positions, and they presuppose an i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement of some 
kind or other. For example, the statement 'Jackson has f i v e d o l l a r s ' 
expresses an i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t , i n th a t i t presupposes the i n s t i t u t i o n 
of money. 
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Searle maintains t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n makes a difference because: 
though both kinds of statement state matters of objective f a c t , 
the statements containing words such as...'five d o l l a r s ' state 
f a c t s whose existence presupposes certain i n s t i t u t i o n s : a man has 
f i v e d o l l a r s , given the i n s t i t u t i o n of money. Take away the 
i n s t i t u t i o n and a l l he has i s a rectangular b i t of paper w i t h 
green ink on i t . (17) 
Thus, f o r Searle, whereas a descriptive statement such as 'a man has a 
b i t of paper with green ink on i t ' constitutes a 'non-institutional' or 
brute f a c t , a descriptive statement such as 'Jackson has f i v e d o l l a r s ' 
constitutes an i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t , i n that i t presupposes a i n s t i t u t i o n 
or 'system of c o n s t i t u t i v e rules' which 'constitute (and also regulate) 
forms of a c t i v i t y whose existence i s l o g i c a l l y dependent on the rules'. 
(18) I t follows t h a t we cannot provide a purely descriptive or brute 
f a c t equivalent of an i n s t i t u i o n a l fact, because an i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t 
i s always related t o c e r t a i n rules of a practice which create the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of placing t h a t f a c t i n i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l context. 
Further, Searle contends t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between brute and 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s relates to e t h i c a l language as much as t o other 
forms of discourse. He argues th a t the p r e s c r i p t i v l s t account of 
description and evaluation i n ethics i s flawed because i t f a i l s t o 
attend t o the l o g i c a l grammar of evaluative (including moral) language, 
and f a i l s t o give us any coherent account of such notions as 
commitment, r e s p o n s i b i l t y and o b l i g a t i o n w i t h i n t h a t discourse. This 
i s because the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account does not acknowledge, and f a i l s 
t o appreciate the consequences of, the notion of i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s as 
applied t o ethics. 
He observes th a t most of our c e n t r a l moral concepts generate 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s about soc i a l r e l a t i o n s and positions. They are not 
simply descriptive, but are also necessarily evaluative and 
p r e s c r i p t i v e . Part of what they describe are the obligations and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t people incur, and the r i g h t s t h a t they possess, i n 
v i r t u e of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n which they stand and the s o c i a l 
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positions which they occupy. As Milne notes, t h i s point leads us to 
recognise, f o r instance, t h a t 
you cannot say t h a t someone i s a husband, a p r i e s t or a Member of 
Parliament, without saying something not only about what he ought 
t o do but about what he i s e n t i t l e d t o do and how he i s e n t i t l e d 
t o be treated. (19) 
Searle himself i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point by taking the example Df the 
concept of 'promising'. He asserts that: 
promising i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , an act of placing oneself under an 
obligation. No analysis of the concept promising w i l l be complete 
which does not include the feature of the promiser placing himself 
under or undertaking or accepting or recognising an oblig a t i o n t o 
the promisee, t o perform some future course of action normally f o r 
the benefit of the promisee. (20) 
In other words, part of what i t means t o recognise something as a 
promise i s t o grant t h a t , other things being equal, i t ought t o be kept. 
I t i s t o suggest t h a t t o make a promise i s t o put oneself under an 
obliga t i o n to do the promised act, and recognise t h a t everyone ought t o 
do what he i s under an obligation t o do. 
Searle's claim, then, i s tha t c e r t a i n evaluative commitments of 
obliga t i o n and entitlement are b u i l t i n t o the l o g i c a l grammar of a 
moral concept such as promising. Any agent who operates w i t h i n an 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l practice or 'system of c o n s t i t u t i v e rules' t h a t 
determines the sense of an applied concept such as promising i s 
compelled to accept ce r t a i n obligations, commitments, r i g h t s and duties. 
To comprehend and accept the practice of promising, and yet break a 
promise (without providing relevantly good reasons) i s t o act i n an 
incoherent and u n i n t e l l i g i b l e manner. I t i s t o break the rules which 
are necessarily binding t o the keeping of ce r t a i n obligations. 
I t follows t h a t any theory, such as non-cognitivism, which claims 
th a t an evaluative commitment t o a descriptive moral concept i s a 
d i s t i n c t or separate issue misconstrues the l o g i c a l grammar of moral 
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language, and provides an incoherent account of moral obligation. This 
i s because the moral or evaluative sense of obli g a t i o n i s i n t e g r a l with 
the meaning of e t h i c a l concepts, and t o engage, f o r instance, i n 
descriptive performative acts of promising necessarily involves a 
p o s i t i v e evaluative commendation of i t . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t of 
promising, i n other words, contains both descriptive and evaluative 
elements which cannot be coherently separated. 
This feature of the l o g i c a l grammar of the moral concept 
'promising' i s equally present i n other moral concepts. As Searle points 
out, the notions of 'respecting property' and 'truth t e l l i n g ' are other 
examples of an ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d form of obligation', such t h a t , when 
we say 'one ought t o respect property', and 'one ought t o t e l l the 
tr u t h ' , we are a r t i c u l a t i n g our acceptance of certain presupposed 
'constitutive rules' which necessarily bind us, w i t h i n the grammar of 
our practice, t o certain moral obligations. 
In the l i g h t of Searle's d i s t i n c t i o n between brute and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , i t i s clear t h a t the Humean idea th a t f a c t s cannot 
e n t a i l values requires revision. This idea remains true of brute f a c t s , 
i n t h a t a purely physical description neither says or implies anything 
about values, and therefore i t follows t h a t from what i s the case there 
can be no v a l i d inference as t o what ought t o be done. However, as 
Searle's example of promising shows, t h i s i s not true of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
facts. The f a c t t h a t a promise has been made e n t a i l s t h a t the promiser 
ought t o do as he has promised. This i s a necessary consequence 
because p a r t of what i t means to make a promise i s to put oneself 
under an o b l i g a t i o n t o do the promised act, and i t i s a t a u t o l o g i c a l 
premise of undertaking an obli g a t i o n t h a t everyone ought t o do what he 
i s under an obligation t o do. 
Milne i l l u s t r a t e s the point as follows: 
The f a c t t h a t a man i s a Roman Catholic p r i e s t e n t a i l s t h a t he i s 
not e n t i t l e d t o speak about any matter Df which he has knowledge 
only from what has been confided t o him i n the confessional. 
This i s entailed by the f a c t t h a t i n v i r t u e of being a p r i e s t , he 
i s under a obligation never t o betray the secrets of the 
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confessional. Part of what i t i s to be a Roman Catholic p r i e s t i s 
to be under t h i s obligation. (21) 
This example i l l u s t r a t e s the conceptual point t h a t t o have a morally 
relevant s o c i a l p o s i t i o n i n a community e n t a i l s the undertaking of 
certa i n obligations, duties and r i g h t s which form a c o n s t i t u t i v e p a r t 
of t h a t s o c i a l i d e n t i t y . To claim t h a t the descriptive sense of what a 
person i s can be established independently of the evaluative sense of 
what th a t person ought t o do i s t o misinterpret the nature of the 
understanding. Likewise, t o suggest t h a t there i s no formal r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of entailment from what a person i s t o what a person ought t o be i s t o 
provide an incoherent account of how moral obligations and r i g h t s 
function w i t h i n our moral understanding. 
I t i s to be noted, however, th a t Hume's l o g i c a l point about 
s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning i n ethics s t i l l stands. I t remains the case t h a t 
an evaluative conclusion can only be v a l i d l y i n f e r r e d from premises 
which include an evaluative statement. But i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , when 
f u l l y stated, necessarily include evaluative statements. Hence from 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , although not from brute facts, evaluative 
conclusions can be v a l i d l y inferred. 
We can see, then, t h a t there are good reasons t o doubt the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t (and therefore n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t ) account of the 
descriptive and the evaluative. As Williams notes, we should be 
sceptical about the significance which non-c o g n i t i v i s t s place upon the 
rel a t i o n s h i p between facts and values i n e t h i c a l discourse. His 
contention, we r e c a l l , i s tha t the fact/value d i s t i n c t i o n , such as i t 
may be, i s not p r i m a r i l y l o g i c a l , and i s s t i l l less t o be found i n the 
use of words. Nor i s i t something which i s revealed t o us by a 
philosophical analysis of language, 
Williams supports h i s contention by pointing out t h a t a great 
many of our sp e c i f i c e t h i c a l notions, such as 'treachery', 'promise', 
' b r u t a l i t y ' and 'courage', seem t o express a union of f a c t and value, i n 
that they a r t i c u l a t e both factual and evaluative concerns which appear 
to be i n e x t r i c a b l y related. These notions, he says, 'certainly do not 
lay bare the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n ' . (22) I t follows t h a t we are 
un j u s t i f i e d i n assuming that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , which i s concealed i n our 
- 34 -
ordinary moral language use, I s nonetheless there t o be discovered. He 
writes th a t : 
I f there i s some fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n of f a c t and value, i t i s 
ce r t a i n l y not a universal feat of humanity t o have recognised i t -
i t i s instead a discovery, and achievement of enlightenment. But 
then there i s no good reason t o suppose t h a t our e t h i c a l language, 
insofar as there i s any well-defined t h i n g , already presents the 
d i s t i n c t i o n t o us. I t may be i t does not present anything of the 
sor t , either suggestive of such a d i s t i n c t i o n or concealing i t ; i t 
may be a mistake t o t h i n k t h a t language can embody d i s t i n c t l y 
metaphysical beliefs. (23) 
For Williams, then, there i s no good reason t o believe t h a t e t h i c a l 
language reveals t o us the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n . Although there may 
be such a d i s t i n c t i o n , at the ontological and epistemological levels, i t 
i s not something which i s made apparent i n the way we use e t h i c a l 
concepts i n ordinary language. The metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n between 
fac t s and values, i f there i s one, remains a separate issue which 
should be distinguished from our enquiry i n t o the form of e t h i c a l 
language. And i t i s doubtful whether such a d i s t i n c t i o n could be either 
e x p l i c i t l y or l a t e n t l y embodied w i t h i n e t h i c a l language. He concludes 
t h a t 
either language does not disguise the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n , or 
else the l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r i s t has managed t o penetrate the 
disguise. But neither of these options i s correct. What has 
happened i s t h a t the t h e o r i s t s have brought the fact-value 
d i s t i n c t i o n t o language rather than f i n d i n g i t revealed there. (24) 
Williams' suggestion i s th a t l i n g u i s t i c philosophers, including 
most notably the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s , have imposed the fact-value 
d i s t i n c t i o n upon language, and have provided an explanation of the 
function of moral discourse i n those terms. But i t i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
which i s simply not recognised w i t h i n the ordinary use of moral 
concepts. I t follows t h a t i f the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account of the f a c t -
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value d i s t i n c t i o n i s correct, then we must be 'engaged i n a fraudulent 
or self-deceiving business of reading our values i n t o the world.' (25) 
We must be pretending not to recognise, or at least f a i l i n g to 
comprehend, the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n our e t h i c a l language. I f 
t h i s were so then 'our language i s l i k e l y t o be deeply implicated' (26) 
because i t i s not a d i s t i n c t i o n which i s t o be 'found very near the 
surface of language'. (27) But then of course Williams suggests t h a t our 
ordinary e t h i c a l language i s not implicated i n t h i s respect. Rather, i t 
i s the imposed fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n , and the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
explanation of language associated with i t , which i s misconceived. 
The root of t h i s mistake l i e s , he says, i n the urge t o 'impose on 
et h i c a l l i f e some immensely simple model' by which t o explain the 
character of a l l evaluative language, (28) This urge i s generated from 
the false metaphysical assumption t h a t there i s a single and uniform 
analysis of a l l moral language 'as such' which i s available t o us. In 
other words, the errors of presc r i p t i v i s m ultimately relates to the 
unwarranted assumption t h a t there i s a c l e a r l y defined structure and 
universal character t o a l l e t h i c a l language. I t i s t h i s assumption that 
leads the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t to make the overweening contention t h a t the 
character of t h i s language, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between facts and 
values w i t h i n i t , can be discovered through philosophical analysis 
alone. One remedy t o t h i s 'persistent deformation' of et h i c a l language, 
Williams suggests, i s to 'attend t o the great d i v e r s i t y of things t h a t 
people do say about how they and other people l i v e t h e i r lives'. (29) 
We must l i m i t ourselves t o the task of comprehending how actual moral 
languages are shaped by d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l practices. This involves, 
Williams says, a degree of sociological explanation, rather than pure 
l o g i c a l analysis of the s o r t envisaged by p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s . I t i s an 
approach which 
i s at least p o t e n t i a l l y closer t o some understanding of the social 
and h i s t o r i c a l dimensions of e t h i c a l thought than some other 
approaches, which see i t e n t i r e l y i n terms of an autonomous and 
unchanging subject matter. (30) 
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What conclusions are we t o reach from our present discussion? One 
i s that the emphasis which p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s (and more generally non-
c o g n i t i v i s t s ) place upon the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n i n e t h i c a l language 
16 i n many ways un j u s t i f i e d . This i s because i t does appear that moral 
concepts employed i n ordinary e t h i c a l language often function i n a way 
which makes any clear d i s t i n c t i o n u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Consequently, the 
'disentangling manoeuvre' envisaged by p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s i s frequently 
a n a l y t i c a l l y impossible t o perform. As such, we can conclude t h a t the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s t y l e of l i n g u i s t i c analysis i s mistaken t o impose upon 
et h i c a l language a fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n which i s , on many occasions 
at least, not t o be found w i t h i n the e t h i c a l practices of our own and 
d i f f e r e n t cultures. Therefore, the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t approach t o the study 
of e t h i c a l language i s at f a u l t i n not paying s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n t o 
the way i n which d i f f e r e n t people, i n the same and d i f f e r e n t 
sociological environments, use moral concepts and moral languages i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways. 
We must be careful, though, t o be clear about the significance of 
a l l t h i s . We can agree w i t h Williams that p r e s c r i p t i v i s m i s wrong t o 
assume tha t the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n i s always apparent i n e t h i c a l 
language without suggesting, as he appears to, t h a t i t i s never 
apparent. We s h a l l observe at a lat e r stage, f o r instance, t h a t the 
et h i c a l language of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m acknowledges a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between facts and values. That i s , we s h a l l i d e n t i f y the ideological 
sense i n which the p r a c t i t i o n e r s of Western l i b e r a l democratic regimes 
understand the fact-value d i s t i n c t i o n t o be apparent i n t h e i r moral 
language. Consequently, we w i l l show how pr e s c r i p t i v i s m does provide 
an accurate analysis, not of e t h i c a l language 'as such', but of l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t language. This i s overlooked by Williams when he i n s i s t s 
t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v i s m p e r s i s t e n t l y deforms every v a r i e t y of e t h i c a l 
language. 
This point leads t o another consideration, one which relates t o 
Williams' suggestion t h a t the d i v e r s i t y of moral languages i s such t h a t 
no single a n a l y t i c a l explanation of the form of moral language can be 
attempted. We can agree here th a t a t t e n t i o n t o the 'social and 
h i s t o r i c a l dimensions of e t h i c a l thought' i s important t o l i n g u i s t i c 
analysis. We can also agree t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v i s m f a i l s i n t h i s task 
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because i t operates upon a 'simple model'. But we do not have to 
conclude from t h i 6 t h a t no such in v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the form of a l l 
e t h i c a l language i s possible. Rather, what we have t o do i s specify, 
amongst other things, the form of the ideological understandings which 
inform and shape the d i f f e r i n g s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l contexts of 
diverse c u l t u r a l moral practices. In doing t h i s we can see how i t i s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e t o speak of the form of e t h i c a l language 'as such' by 
i n d i c a t i n g how a l l e t h i c a l understandings, and the languages t h a t 
express them, are determined by s o c i a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent 
practices: practices, t h a t i s , which are themselves often and t o a large 
degree shaped by ideological conceptions. 
This i s one of our major tasks. We s h a l l undertake i t i n d e t a i l at 
a l a t e r stage, and i n so doing we s h a l l specify more f u l l y the 
character of non-cognitivism as a philosophical and ideological 
understanding. For the moment, however, we s h a l l return t o our 
examination of the detailed philosophical arguments of non-cognitivism. 
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3. The Place of Sentiment and Reason i n Ethical L i f e . 
I t has been noted t h a t David Hume i s i n many central respects to 
be regarded as the founder of the non-cognitivist s t y l e of et h i c a l 
theorising. For i t was Hume who achieved two notable things the 
acceptance and purported significance of which have t o a great extent 
shaped the character of non-cognitivism. The f i r s t was the discovery of 
the l o g i c a l gulf between statements of fa c t and statements of value. 
The second was the invention of a d i s t i n c t 'theory-schema' which 
cl e a r l y distinguished sentiments and reasons i n ethics. I t i s t h i s 
'theory-schema' which severely l i m i t s the kind of e t h i c a l theory which 
i s available for non-cognitivists t o construct. 
The nature of Hume's 'theory-schema' can be outlined i n three 
stages. The f i r s t stage involves a lo g i c a l claim t h a t some action-
guiding force i s a l o g i c a l l y i n t r i n s i c feature of moral assertion, such 
that when I say, for example, ' k i l l i n g i s wrong', I am in some sense 
moved to act in an appropriate way, and wish others to be s i m i l a r l y 
moved to act. I t i s the presence of t h i s action-guiding force which i s 
held to dis t i n g u i s h evaluative assertions from judgements of other 
kinds; judgements, that i s , which relate exclusively to facts. The 
second stage, or consequent problem a r i s i n g from the f i r s t l o g i c a l 
claim, i s t o address the question of how we are t o explain how moral 
<as evaluative) assertions can possess t h i s i n t r i n s i c power t o guide 
actions. The t h i r d stage, or strategy f o r solving the problem, i s t o 
t r e a t a moral judgement as the verbal expression of some i n t e r i o r state 
whose p r a c t i c a l expression i s the action towards which the moral 
judgement i n question i s presumed l o g i c a l l y t o move us. For Hume, t h i s 
i n t e r i o r state constitutes a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation 
which i s necessarily emotional i n character. 
Although t h i s Humean notion of a sentiment has been revised 
w i t h i n n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t w r i t i n g , i n that, for example, Stevenson t a l k s of 
'attitudes', and Hare t a l k s of 'prescriptions', 'choices' or 'commitments' 
to some practice of universalisation or p r i n c i p l e of maximisation, i t i s 
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nonetheless a notion which has remained cen t r a l t o t h e i r kind of 
et h i c a l theory. Further, i t i s t h i s notion of a sentiment, a t t i t u d e or 
pr e s c r i p t i o n which i s understood t o be absolutely d i s t i n c t from the 
notion of a reason. According to the Humean theory-schema, sentiments 
are i n no sense r a t i o n a l i n character. Rather, they generate the reasons 
f o r action by providing the guiding force which i t i s the task of 
p r a c t i c a l reasoning t o f u l f i l by specifying the best means t o achieve 
the desires and purposes th a t are expressed i n moral judgements. 
I t s h a l l be argued t h a t t h i s conception of the re l a t i o n s h i p 
between moral judgements, moral emotions and moral actions i s 
misleading because i t i s grounded upon an u n i n t e l l i g i b l e account of the 
contrast between att i t u d e s and beli e f s , and sentiments and reasons. I t 
s h a l l be claimed, i n short, t h a t the Humean account of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
presents us with a false dichotomy, But i n order t o make t h i s claim 
clearer i t i s necessary, f i r s t l y , t o specify i n greater d e t a i l the 
implications of the adoption of the Humean theory-schema for our 
understanding of the psychological level of moral th i n k i n g . 
In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Moral Sentiments' Bernard Harrison writes 
t h a t 
we normally t h i n k of our emotions of approbation and 
disapprobation, and f o r that matter of our choices, commitments 
and prescriptions, so f a r as they have a bearing on morality, as 
responses t o moral considerations of one s o r t or another, (1) 
However, according to Hume's schema, there are no such things as 
'moral considerations'. There i s nothing which arises antecedently t o 
the spontaneous incidence of approbation, p r e s c r i p t i o n and the act of 
choice, I t follows therefore that the s p e c i f i c sentiments which we 
express, and the choices and prescriptions which we make, are not t o be 
c l a s s i f i e d as being 'moral' i n v i r t u e of being responses t o moral 
considerations of one s o r t or another. Rather, according to t h i s view, 
we c l a s s i f y some of our sentiments, pres c r i p t i o n s and choices as being 
'moral' because we choose t o c a l l precisely those sentiments, 
prescriptions and choices ' p a r t i c u l a r l y moral' ones, and wish t o 
di s t i n g u i s h them from 'non-moral' ones. 
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This i s to suggest, i n other words, t h a t the a t t r i b u t i o n of a 
'moral' significance t o a p a r t i c u l a r set of sentiments and choices i s 
essentially a matter of the co l l e c t i v e choice of individuals w i t h i n a 
community. I t i s t o argue, as Hume contends, t h a t the pa r t i c u l a r 
significance attached to cer t a i n objects i s simply the product of a 
desire to baptise some of our feelings and motivations with the name 
'moral'. For Hume, we are mistaken i f we fe e l t h a t we have t o act in 
response to anterior moral considerations. Most notably, there are no 
objective values which are found i n the world t h a t compel us t o accept 
an external moral authority of some kind or other. To recognise t h i s i s 
to understand our moral arrangements as the product of shared 
attitudes w i t h i n a community of ind i v i d u a l s whose f l e x i b i l i t y i n 
choosing t h e i r moral standards i s unfettered by any anterior moral 
considerations of whatever kind. And t h i s i n turn leads us t o see tha t 
we are ultimately free t o choose our moral p r i n c i p l e s i n an absolute 
way, taking absolute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r them. 
There are a number of separate issues t h a t relate t o the Humean 
treatment of 'moral considerations'. I t i s possible, f or instance, t o 
accept the Humean rejection of the notion of objective values being 
'part of the world 1 without contending that there i s no sense 
whatsoever i n which moral obligations relate to anterior moral 
considerations. As such, i t i s possible t o accept the Humean grounds 
for denying any ontological or epistemological status to moral values, 
without being necessarily committed t o the view that on the 
psychological and l i n g u i s t i c levels of moral t h i n k i n g agents have the 
freedom to select whatever e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s they choose. 
We mention t h i s i n passing because i t i s important to recognise 
th a t the notions of 'objective values', 'moral considerations' and 
'freedom to choose moral p r i n c i p l e s ' raise d i s t i n c t issues w i t h i n our 
assessment of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the Humean theory-schema. We can 
accept aspects of t h i s account w h i l s t r e j e c t i n g , or at least q u a l i f y i n g , 
others. Indeed, we s h a l l argue th a t the Humean ontological and 
epistemological thesis of value does need some important q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
w h i l s t there are good reasons t o rej e c t the psychological and 
l i n g u i s t i c implications which are held t o follow from i t . 
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However, what concerns us at the moment i s the d i f f i c u l t y i n 
seeing how the adherent of Hume's theory-schema can s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
explain, i n h i s own terms, how i t i s tha t we come t o define d i s t i n c t l y 
moral concepts i n a moral language, The d i f f i c u l t y arises from the fac t 
t h a t adherents of Hume's account have p e r s i s t e n t l y f a i l e d t o provide 
any precise characterisation of the feelings or attitudes which are 
taken t o count as 'pa r t i c u l a r l y moral' ones. As Kaclntyre notes, ' a l l 
attempts so f a r to i d e n t i f y the relevant types of feelings or at t i t u d e s 
have found i t impossible t o avoid an empty c i r c u l a r i t y . ' (2) When 
pushed t o specify the kind of approval which i s t o count as an 
instance of a s p e c i f i c a l l y moral sentiment, the adherents of Hume's 
theory-schema have either remained s i l e n t or have entered a c i r c u l a r 
argument by i d e n t i f y i n g the relevant kind of approval as moral 
approval - t h a t i s , the type of approval expressed by s p e c i f i c a l l y 
moral judgements. 
Circular arguments may not be vicious, but they leave one wi t h a 
sense of unease. In t h i s instance, the uneasiness becomes more severe 
once i t i s acknowledged, following a point made by Wittgenstein, t h a t 
we cannot give sense t o a term j u s t by a t t r i b u t i n g i t to some chosen 
set of objects, unless we can explain what the a t t r i b u t i o n i s supposed 
to achieve: what we are supposed t o do with the term once we have got 
i t attached t o these objects, what use i n sentences we project or 
anticipate f o r i t , and so on. This point raises a problem f o r the 
devotees of the Huraean theory-schema. For they would i n s i s t t h a t the 
sole purpose, function, use or achievement i n adopting the term 'moral' 
i s t o d i s t i n g u i s h some of our emotions, pres c r i p t i o n s and choices from 
others. However, they are unable t o provide a s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation 
of the nature of t h i s achievememt because they f a i l t o i d e n t i f y i n any 
informative way the precise kind of approval which relates t o the term 
'moral'. Therefore, we wonder whether a complete and more importantly 
plausible account of how d i s t i n c t l y moral terms relate t o s p e c i f i c 
kinds of approval can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y given w i t h i n the confines of 
the Humean theory-schema. Further, as Harrison notes, we are l e f t w i t h 
the uneasy conclusion t h a t the term 'moral' has, on these terms, very 
l i t t l e meaning indeed. (3) Likewise, i t seems unconvincing t o suggest, 
as adherents of the Humean theory-schema i n s i s t , t h a t there i s no sense 
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whatsoever i n which our sentiment of moral obli g a t i o n i s a response to 
'moral considerations' of one kind or other. 
Something, then, seems to have gone awry with the Humean account 
of moral terms and moral considerations. We s h a l l argue t h a t the root 
of the problem l i e s i n the assumption t h a t sentiments are l o g i c a l l y 
p r i o r t o and absolutely d i s t i n c t from reasons i n e t h i c a l l i f e . This 
assumption involves a conceptual error t h a t leads to a serious 
misplacement of sentiments and reasons i n ethics. We can show t h i s by 
analysing the nature of a moral practice. 
As Harrison points out: 
moral practices, such as turn-taking, or promise-keeping, or 
mutual aid i n d i s t r e s s , or co-operation f o r p r i v a t e ends, generate 
on the one hand moral claims and on the other moral 
relationships. (4) 
This i s because to be engaged i n a moral practice i s t o be obliged t o 
respect the claims of others to be treated i n a manner appropriate t o 
the practice i n question, As a r e s u l t i t i s t o understand the nature of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between persons which i s specified by t h a t practice. 
Therefore, t o uphold a p a r t i c u l a r moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t o f u l f i l a 
p a r t i c u l a r moral obli g a t i o n w i t h i n a moral practice. 
Further, our understanding of the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of 
moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i s always shaped by an e t h i c a l vocabulary or range 
of 'moral notions' which determines the character of a p a r t i c u l a r moral 
practice. For example, t o understand yourself t o be i n a business 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with someone else presupposes t h a t you have grasped the 
meaning of the moral notion of a 'contract', and t h a t you honour your 
obligations i n terms of t h i s notion. To disregard such contractual 
obligations i s t o commit an appropriate kind of 'wrong-doing' which 
either indicates your f a i l u r e t o comprehend the obligations which are 
inherent w i t h i n the practice, or manifests your contempt f o r the moral 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between businessmen and c l i e n t s . I f i t i s the l a t t e r then 
you are maintaining an e x p l o i t a t i v e and not a moral relationship. 
I t follows t h a t the establishment and upholding of any d i s t i n c t l y 
moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i s based upon an acceptance of and commitment t o an 
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o b l i g a t i o n to follow certain rules of conduct which are l a i d down i n a 
moral practice. Acting i n the appropriate manner constitutes the 
p r a c t i c a l expression of that o b l i g a t i o n , and manifests an a f f i r m a t i o n 
of the commitment to t h a t relationship. Likewise, the moral judgements 
which we make are bound up w i t h i n , and are i n t e l l i g i b l e i n terms of, a 
given moral practice. 
Some moral notions are appropriate to a p a r t i c u l a r set of moral 
practices, and are inappropriate t o others. For example, the concept of 
benevolence i s appropriate to a practice such as friendship but i s 
inappropriate t o the practice of justice. We can see that two friends 
ought t o be benevolent t o each other, but i t would be inappropriate f o r 
a judge t o be benevolent towards a person whom he was convicting. He 
should be f a i r rather than benevolent. However, i t can be shown that 
the concept of trust i s applicable t o a l l moral practices, As Harrison 
notes; 
trust... and trustworthiness constitute essential l o g i c a l 
conditions f o r occupancy of any of the relationships defined by 
moral practices. (5) 
This i s because, as Kant pointed out, no moral r e l a t i o n s h i p can be 
maintained without a commitment to the concept of t r u s t . We can 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s by taking some of Harrison's examples. I f we cannot 
t r u s t each other absolutely not to cheat at cards, then we are not 
related t o one another as fellow players, but as card-sharp and sucker. 
Likewise, i f we cannot t r u s t each other absolutely not to betray a 
common cause then we are not related to one another as fellow c i t i z e n s 
but as opportunists who have cer t a i n p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n common. The 
point i s that a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i s always c o n s t i t u t i v e of a mutual 
recognition between persons of the moral claims generated w i t h i n a 
practice; and such recognition necessitates the making of an absolute 
commitment to avoid the relevant kinds of 'wrong-doing' th a t are 
required f o r trustworthiness. 
I t may be suggested at t h i s stage of the argument t h a t i t i s 
always possible f o r an agent t o pretend t o make such a commitment of 
t r u s t w h i l s t i n fact pursuing his own ends which may c o n f l i c t with 
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those specified i n the moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i n question. This i s to 
suggest t h a t an agent may deceptively e x h i b i t h i s mastery of the rules 
of conduct that generate the moral obligations which are upheld i n a 
moral practice w h i l s t i n f a c t keeping his own i n d i v i d u a l ends 'in view', 
I t i s to be noted that t o state t h i s claim i s not t o make the obvious 
p r a c t i c a l point t h a t a degree of deception i s possible w i t h i n moral 
practices. I t i s not t o draw upon the observation t h a t , f o r example, a 
Tr o t s k y i s t can i n f i l t r a t e the Labour Party with the in t e n t i o n of using 
the organisation t o pursue d i f f e r e n t moral ends from those specified 
w i t h i n the Labour Party Constitution. This i s because although the 
Tr o t s k y i s t i s capable of misleading one group of persons who 
mistakenly believe him t o be a f f i r m i n g a committed r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
them, he i s nonetheless standing i n a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p with another 
group of persons (ie. fellow T r o t s k y i t e s ) , and he i d e n t i f i e s his own 
moral ends i n terms of t h a t relationship. We are quite clearly capable 
of t h i s s o r t of deception because i t i s always possible t o a f f i r m one 
moral r e l a t i o n s h i p wholeheartedly w h i l s t insincerely a f f i r m i n g another, 
However, the claim described above i s stronger i n tha t i t suggests 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that any moral r e l a t i o n s h i p whatsoever can be 
insincerely affirmed by an agent who has a clear view of what h i s own 
individual ends are. I t i s t h i s 'egoistic' claim which i s f a r more 
contentious. Further, i t i s a claim which i s i n t e g r a l t o the Humean 
theory-schema. In order t o show t h i s , we need t o examine the 
assumptions that inform the 'egoistic' claim. 
Harrison remarks t h a t the egoistic claim i s grounded upon the 
centra l assumption that 
i t i s possible t o specify an indiv i d u a l s ultimate, or primary, 
goals without reference to any moral r o l e or rel a t i o n s h i p i n which 
he may stand t o others. (6) 
This i s t o contend, i n other words, t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l agent has an 
understanding of h i s moral goals t h a t stands quite independently of the 
making of an e t h i c a l commitment. I t i s t o assume t h a t an agent enters 
i n t o a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p and performs the actions which are 
appropriate t o i t with a l o g i c a l l y p r i o r grasp of h is own ends, and 
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w i t h the in t e n t i o n of s a t i s f y i n g those aims i n the best possible 
manner. I t i s t h i s notion of p r i o r i n d i v i d u a l purposes which generates 
the claim t h a t an agent can sincerely, or more c r u c i a l l y , insincerely 
a f f i r m a moral commitment t o a practice which best s u i t s h i s 
in d i v i d u a l desires, wants and needs. For i t i s t o conceive of morality 
i t s e l f i n purely instrumental terms: t h a t i s , as a battery of devices 
f o r securing the benefits of co-operation i n the pursuit of specifiable 
ends without reference t o the devices i n question. 
However, i s t h i s egoistic claim, and the instrumental conception 
of morality and moral reasoning consequent on i t , plausible? Harrison 
suggests not, He points out that many of our ultimate ends or goals are 
in f a c t specifiable only i n terms of moral relationships. Our desire to 
have friends, our need f o r respect w i t h i n the community, and so f o r t h , 
are goals specifiable i n terms of such moral notions as friendship and 
community respectively. I t simply makes no sense to claim t h a t these 
ends are specifiable p r i o r to, and independently of, the pa r t i c u l a r 
moral associations w i t h i n which they are placed. I cannot, f o r instance, 
express the desire t o have friends without grasping the meaning of the 
concept of friendship, as employed i n the p a r t i c u l a r communal practice 
w i t h i n which I f i n d myself. 
This point appears to be true f o r a great many of our ultimate 
goals. I t looks as though the only realm of 'self-goals' which can be 
stated without reference to any moral r e l a t i o n s h i p or practice 
whatsoever are such r e f l e x i v e behavioural habits as eating food, 
sleeping, taking exercise and seeking warmth. Quite c l e a r l y , the 
substantive content of such i n d i v i d u a l goals i s extremely s l i g h t . I t 
seems tha t i n order t o have a substantial content of ultimate goals 
which are recognisably moral i n character we must already be 
pa r t i c i p a n t s i n moral practices of some kind or other. Indeed, we may 
say that such practices determine the sense i n which we understand 
ourselves t o have p a r t i c u l a r primary goals, such as having f r i e n d s and 
gaining respect i n our community. Without such practices a great many 
of our ultimate goals would not have any moral significance f o r us. 
The importance of t h i s point can be examined i n a d i f f e r e n t way. 
According t o the egoistic claim, the answer to the question 'why commit 
myself t o morality with a l l the consequent r e s t r i c t i o n s and 
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discomforts?' i s that i t i s t o my advantage t o do so. In saying t h i s , 
i t i s assumed th a t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of an advantage i s made p r i o r t o 
moral association, and generates the freedon of the agent t o 'opt out' 
of any moral practice which f a i l s t o secure i t . However, we can see 
th a t t h i s notion of an advantage i s misconceived. This i s because the 
desires, purposes and goals t h a t makes the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of an 
advantage, related t o t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n , possible i s determined by the 
moral association i n which one participates. I t i s only i n terms of 
such associations or practices that any sense and substantive content 
can be attached t o the notion of goals, and the concept of an advantage 
which relates t o i t . Therefore, as Harrison suggests, the answer t o the 
question 'why commit myself t o morality w i t h a l l the subsequent 
r e s t r i c t i o n s and discomforts?' i s not t h a t i t i s t o my advantage t o do 
so, but rather t h a t I have no choice but to make 6uch a commitment, 
because i f I do not, the concept of advantage i t s e l f w i l l i n consequence 
be so exhausted of content as t o r e t a i n scarcely any meaning f o r me. 
(7) 
Our c r i t i c a l assessment of the egoi s t i c claim has important 
implications f o r any consideration of Hume's theory-schema because i t 
i s a claim which i s i n t e g r a l t o i t . That i s , the theory-schema admits 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of an agent being capable of specifying h i s ultimate 
or primary in d i v i d u a l goals, as expressed i n sentiments or desires, 
p r i o r t o the making of a moral commitment. Likewise, i t i s t o picture 
the i n d i v i d u a l as being capable of freely choosing t o enter and depart 
from whatever moral association best s a t i s f i e s them. In other words, 
according t o t h i s view, our commitment t o a moral practice i s 
determined by the p r i o r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of desires which are sought as 
ends t o be instrumentally f u l f i l l e d by the best possible means 
available w i t h i n a moral practice. And t h i s i s to assume tha t the 
adaption of a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p i s always contingent, i n t h a t we 
possess the f l e x i b i l i t y either t o uphold i t , whether sincerely or not, 
or abandon i t according to the instrumentally reasonable calculation of 
whether i t proves t o be conducive t o the pursuit of our i n d i v i d u a l 
ends. We can see, then, t h a t although adherents of the Humean theory-
schema argue t h a t there are good instrumental reasons f o r committing 
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ourselves t o morality, i n th a t , most notably, the eff e c t s of social 
conditioning and the anticipated consequences of sanctions tend to 
prevent us from breaking the rules of a p a r t i c u l a r moral association, 
they nonetheless have t o acknowledge the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the egoistic 
option i s always l o g i c a l l y available t o us. 
I t follows, therefore, t h a t the objections levelled at the egoistic 
claim are equally applicable t o the Humean theory-schema. However, we 
need t o demonstrate how the weaknesses of the egoi s t i c component th a t 
i s c e n t r a l t o the theory-schema expose problems which r e l a t e more 
generally t o the Humean account of the re l a t i o n s h i p between sentiments 
and reasons, and the freedom t o choose and act i n e t h i c a l l i f e , 
As Milne notes, the contention t h a t evaluative terms express 
emotion i s not i n dispute. (8) However, what i s i n dispute i s the 
nature of the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between evaluative terms, moral 
judgements and emotions. As we have seen, adherents of the Humean 
theory-schema i n s i s t t h a t the emotions expressed i n moral judgements 
are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to the making of those judgements. However, as 
Milne observes, i t i s a feature of the 'highly s p e c i f i c character' of 
the emotions that what we fee l on a given occasion depends on our 
understanding of t h a t occasion, including both our understanding of 
what we are doing and of what i s happening t o us. To take Milne's 
example of a moral understanding: when I say 'Apartheid i s unfair', I 
am cl e a r l y expressing my indignation at i t . The question, though, i s 
whether I am indignant about i t because i t i s unfair, or whether I am 
c a l l i n g i t unfair because I f e e l indignant about i t . Milne suggests 
th a t the answer i s the former. That i s , I am feeling indignant about 
the system of apartheid because I understand i t t o be unfair, i n the 
sense th a t i t requires some people t o be treated more favourably than 
others i n the absence of any relevant differences between them. Put 
another way, I have i d e n t i f i e d the system of apartheid t o be contrary 
to my moral understanding of what constitutes f a i r treatment, and i t i s 
t h i s f a c t which makes me feel indignant about i t . Indignation, i n other 
words, i s a sp e c i f i c emotion which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y f e l t about 
unfairness. I t follows t h a t i f I d i d not take apartheid t o be unfa i r I 
would not fee l indignant about i t . 
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The p o i n t i s t h a t t h e f e e l i n g o f i n d i g n a t i o n presupposes an 
un d e r s t a n d i n g o f u n f a i r n e s s . Therefore, my f e e l i n g o f i n d i g n a t i o n 
presupposes t h a t I have i d e n t i f i e d an example o f u n f a i r n e s s , whether 
r e a l or imagined, which I f e e l i n d i g n a n t about. I t f o l l o w s t h a t my 
moral judgement t h a t a p a r t h e i d i s u n f a i r i s logically prior t o , a l t h o u g h 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y contemporaneous w i t h , my f e e l i n g s o f i n d i g n a t i o n about 
i t . I f t h i s was n o t so, then t h e f a c t t h a t my f e e l i n g s about a p a r t h e i d 
are those o f i n d i g n a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n some ot h e r emotion would be 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The g e n e r a l conceptual p o i n t t o be made, then, i s t h a t our mo r a l 
f e e l i n g s presuppose moral judgements, and n o t v i c e versa. Adherents of 
the Humean theory-schema f a i l t o acknowledge t h i s because they i n s i s t , 
i n e f f e c t , t h a t t h e o p p o s i t e o b t a i n s . As such, t h e i r a n a l y s i s of t h e 
place o f t h e s e n t i m e n t s i n e t h i c a l l i f e i s erroneous. F u r t h e r , t h e 
c o n f u s i o n o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n becomes more apparent when we a t t e n d t o 
th e o t h e r h a l f of t h e i r a n a l y s i s ; t h a t i s , t h e i r account o f t h e place o f 
rea s o n i n g i n e t h i c s . 
I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e Humean account takes reasoning i n 
every area o f human l i f e , i n c l u d i n g t h e e t h i c a l , t o be p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l . 
According t o t h i s view, an agent who p r o v i d e s a good reason f o r 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c e i s one who s p e c i f i e s i n some 
way t h a t he wants t o engage i n t h i s p r a c t i c e because i t i s t h e best 
means o f a c h i e v i n g h i s i n d i v i d u a l ends. Therefore, a l l re a s o n i n g 
d i r e c t l y r e l a t e s t o and depends upon t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 
d e s i r e s . 
M a c l n t y r e notes t h a t t h i s account o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g f a i l s t o 
recognise t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e which i s a t t a c h e d t o our i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e 
w o r l d o f a c t u a l p r a c t i c e s . That i s , i t f a i l s t o acknowledge t h a t our 
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a w o r l d i n which we, f o r i n s t a n c e , p l a y b a s e b a l l and 
chess, s t u d y h i s t o r y and mathematics or l e a r n f a r m i n g or cooking, i s an 
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o areas o f human l i f e i n which ' I want' and ' I t pleases 
me' cease t o have any r o l e i n g i v i n g or h a v i n g reasons f o r a c t i n g i n 
one way r a t h e r t h a n another. (9) Let us c o n s i d e r t h e example o f chess 
p l a y i n g . We can ask our opponent 'why d i d you move your bishop r a t h e r 
t h an your rook?' and he may r e p l y t h a t ' i t was t h e o n l y way t o av o i d 
checkmate'. T h i s i s a good and indeed c o n c l u s i v e reason f o r any chess 
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p l a y e r who understands t h a t i t i s h i s t a s k t o a v o i d defeat, Therefore, 
t h e Humean n o t i o n t h a t something i s added t o t h e g i v i n g o f reasons by 
s a y i n g 'and moreover I wanted t o a v o i d checkmate' i s erroneous because 
i t i s unnecessary t o make t h i s a d d i t i o n t o an a l r e a d y complete 
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e move. T h i s i s because, as M a c l n t y r e says: 
what makes 'Moving t h e bishop i s t h e o n l y way t o a v o i d checkmate' 
a good reason f o r a chess p l a y e r t o move h i s bishop has n o t h i n g 
t o do w i t h t h e d e s i r e s o f i n d i v i d u a l chess p l a y e r s . What 
determines i t t o be a good reason are t h e r u l e s t h a t d e f i n e and 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e game o f chess, Those r u l e s c r e a t e an area o f human 
l i f e and s u b j e c t matter w i t h i n which and about which t h e r e are 
c r i t e r i a d e t e r m i n i n g o b j e c t i v e l y - t h a t i s , independently of t h e 
d e s i r e s , a t t i t u d e s and preferences o f any p a r t i c u l a r person - what 
i s and what i s n o t a good reason f o r a c t i o n . (10) 
As M a c l n t y r e p o i n t s out, what i s t r u e o f chess i s t r u e o f a l l p r a c t i c e s . 
That i s , c o n t r a r y t o t h e Humean view, t h e r e i s no way o f p r e s e n t i n g t h e 
r u l e s o f any p r a c t i c e as somehow or o t h e r d e r i v i n g f r o m and 
m i n i s t e r i n g t o those ' d i r e c t passions' i n i n d i v i d u a l s which ( a l l e g e d l y ) 
antedate a l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e s . 
The p o i n t , then, i s t h a t i t i s t h e r u l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g a p r a c t i c e 
which p r o v i d e us w i t h good reasons f o r a c t i n g i n one way r a t h e r t h a n 
another, and n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s which we happen t o have. T h i s 
leads us t o re c o g n i s e t h a t t h e r e are ( a t l e a s t ) two d i s t i n c t species o f 
re a s o n i n g which are n o t d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e Humean scheme. The f i r s t 
t y p e r e l a t e s t o t h e r u l e s which c o n s t i t u t e a p r a c t i c e , and may be 
c a l l e d constitutive or non-instrumental reasoning. The second t y p e i s 
p r a c t i c a l or i n s t r u m e n t a l r easoning. We need t o examine t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two d i s t i n c t species o f reasoning i n order 
t o show how they r e l a t e t o t h e s e n t i m e n t s i n e t h i c a l l i f e . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l and i n s t r u m e n t a l 
r e a s o n i n g can be made c l e a r e r by d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between t h e n o t i o n s 
o f 'making' and 'doing', To be a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a p r a c t i c e i s t o be 
engaged i n 'making' and up h o l d i n g t h e r u l e s o f o b l i g a t i o n which 
c o n s t i t u t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p between persons. F u r t h e r , i t i s t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
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t y p e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p i n q u e s t i o n which determines t h e t y p e o f a c t i o n 
t h a t we, i n 'doing', understand t o be a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t s maintenance. 
Take, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e example of an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e m o r a l p r a c t i c e 
o f f r i e n d s h i p . A man punches another man who has i n s u l t e d h i s best 
f r i e n d i n a pub. He punches t h e man because he f e e l s angry w i t h him, 
and such anger i s f e l t because of h i s sense o f f r i e n d s h i p f o r h i s 
f r i e n d . I n o ther words, t h e 'doing' o f t h e performed a c t o f v i o l e n c e , 
and t h e anger f e l t , i s r e f l e c t i v e o f t h e 'making' of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
o f f r i e n d s h i p . 
Wow i t may have been, on t h i s occasion, e x t r e m e l y unwise t o have 
done such a t h i n g , because t h e a c t o f punching may do l i t t l e t o r e s o l v e 
t h e problem o f t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t a r i s e s f r o m t h e i n i t i a l i n s u l t . I t 
may have been much w i s e r j u s t t o have ig n o r e d t h e i n s u l t . There may, i n 
o t h e r words, have been good i n s t r u m e n t a l reasons f o r n o t r e a c t i n g i n 
t h e way t h a t t h e man d i d . However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a c t o f v i o l e n c e 
may be considered i r r a t i o n a l , or a t l e a s t n o t r a t i o n a l l y advantageous, 
i n t h i s i n s t r u m e n t a l sense, does n o t i m p l y t h a t t h e r e were no good 
reasons whatsoever f o r i t s occurrence. Rather, t h e r e were good non-
instrumental reasons f o r a c t i n g i n t h e way i n which t h e man d i d 
because t h e r e was a need f o r him t o e x h i b i t or p r a c t i c a l l y express i n 
an a p p r o p r i a t e manner h i s commitment t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of f r i e n d s h i p 
between h i m s e l f and h i s f r i e n d . Indeed, i f t h e man had n o t responded i n 
t h i s v i o l e n t f a s h i o n , or a t l e a s t had n o t f e l t g r e a t anger a t the 
i n s u l t , t h en we may c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e degree of commitment t o t h e 
f r i e n d s h i p which he p r o f e s s e s t o have f o r h i s f r i e n d . 
T h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s a number of r e l a t e d p o i n t s . F i r s t l y , i t 
shows how t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a s e n t i m e n t or emotion can be seen as 
c o n s t i t u t i n g a reason f o r a c t i o n . The anger f e l t a t t h e i n s u l t o f h i s 
f r i e n d c o n s t i t u t e d a n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l reason f o r t h e man t o p e r f o r m a 
v i o l e n t a c t i o n because th e a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d an a p p r o p r i a t e response 
t o an i n s u l t which offended a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p . Although t h e a c t i o n 
may i n f a c t have been i n s t r u m e n t a l l y unreasonable, t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
was a s e p a r a t e m a t t e r and secondary t o t h e moral issue a t stake. The 
moral i s s u e was t h a t t h e man, i n a c t i n g i n t h e way he d i d , understood 
t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f r i e n d s h i p was i n need o f some defence. 
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The second p o i n t t h a t t h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s i s t h a t our 
s e n t i m e n t s a re themselves determined by, and g a i n s i g n i f i c a n c e i n terms 
of, those r u l e s or p r a c t i c e s which 'make' moral r e l a t i o n s h i p s , The 
se n t i m e n t o f anger f e l t by t h e man was caused by h i s p r i o r conceptual 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the nature o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f r i e n d s h i p t o which 
he had committed h i m s e l f . I f he had n o t possessed t h i s conception o f 
what t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f r i e n d s h i p amounted t o , and what o b l i g a t i o n s 
i t committed him t o , then t h e anger t h a t he f e l t , and t h e a c t i o n which 
he took, would have been u n i n t e l l i g i b l e i n terms o f t h i s conception. I f 
he had, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e a c t e d s i m i l a r l y upon h e a r i n g one s t r a n g e r 
i n s u l t i n g another s t r a n g e r , t hen we would need t o s p e c i f y some o t h e r 
reason f o r h i s f e e l i n g s and a c t i o n s . We c o u l d n o t e x p l a i n h i s motives 
i n a way which r e l a t e s t o h i s conception o f f r i e n d s h i p . 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e man's f e e l i n g s and a c t i o n s can be seen t o be 
r a t i o n a l i f we can see an i n t e l l i g i b l e , and n o t merely a causal, 
c o n nection between t h e i n i t i a l i n s u l t t o h i s f r i e n d and h i s r e a c t i o n t o 
t h i s . T h i s connection i s p r o v i d e d by t h e conception o f f r i e n d s h i p . I t 
s p e c i f i e s a conceptual, and n o t merely a causal, r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
an a c t i o n , t h e t y p e o f sen t i m e n t f e l t about i t , and t h e p h y s i c a l 
r e a c t i o n t o i t , F u r t h e r , such a r e l a t i o n i s o n l y i n t e l l i g i b l e t o us, as 
observers, i f we share or a t l e a s t understand t h e p r a c t i c e s , 
c o n v e n t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between persons which a re being upheld. 
The t h i r d p o i n t which t h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s i s t h a t t h e 
employment o f n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l or c o n s t i t u t i v e r e asoning i s always 
logically prior t o t h e employmemt o f i n s t r u m e n t a l reasoning. The man 
recognises t h e 'ends' o f h i s moral commitment t o be understood i n terms 
of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s f r i e n d , and he a c t s i n a way which he 
c o n s i d e r s t o be t h e b e s t means o f p r a c t i c a l l y e x p r e s s i n g or s a t i s f y i n g 
those ends. I f he d i d n o t a p p r e c i a t e those ends then he would have no 
moral reason t o a c t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r manner. Likewise, i f he d i d n o t 
a c t i n t h i s way, then h i s r e a c t i o n would n o t be i n t e l l i g i b l e i n terms 
o f a f f i r m i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f r i e n d s h i p . 
We can see, then, t h a t i t i s t h e moral ends and c o n s t i t u t i v e 
reasons o f moral a c t i v i t y which are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o the g i v i n g o f 
p r a c t i c a l reasons f o r a c t i o n . T h i s i s because those ends determine t h e 
parameters o f what can count as an i n t e l l i g i b l e p r a c t i c a l response t o a 
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g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . F u r t h e r , such r e a s o n - g i v i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s do n o t 
i n v o l v e t h e a d d i t i o n a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s or purposes. 
Rather, these d e s i r e s and purposes a re a c o n s t i t u t i v e aspect o f t h e 
r e a s o n - g i v i n g process. Therefore, t o take our example: t h e q u e s t i o n 
'what am I t o do?', when asked on an occasion l i k e t h i s i s n o t , as 
Graham notes, t h e q u e s t i o n 'by what means may I achieve my purposes 
and desires?', b u t 'what does f r i e n d s h i p r e q u i r e o f me?'. (11) 
I t i s c l e a r , then, t h a t t h e Humean theory-schema i s inadequate i n 
a number o f major i n t e r r e l a t e d ways. Most c e n t r a l l y , i t p r e s e n t s a 
f a l s e dichotomy between sentiment and reason because s e n t i m e n t s are 
no t a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t from reasons, b u t do themselves c o n s t i t u t e non-
i n s t r u m e n t a l reasons f o r a c t i o n . T h i s p o i n t t e l l s a g a i n s t t h e Humean 
assumption t h a t r e asoning i n e t h i c s i s p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l because we can 
see t h a t n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l r easoning has a c e n t r a l place i n e t h i c a l 
d e l i b e r a t i o n , and t h e employment o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g i s secondary t o 
i t . F u r t h e r , such p r a c t i c a l r e a soning does not, as the adherents o f t h e 
Humean theory-schema assume, s p e c i f y i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s and purposes 
which a r e p r i o r t o a moral commitment. Rather, i t s p e c i f i e s how best 
t o s a t i s f y t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of t h a t commitment. We can see t h a t these 
conceptual e r r o r s of t h e Humean view lead t o a misconceived and indeed 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e account o f t h e place o f s e n t i m e n t and reason i n e t h i c a l 
l i f e . They are als o , as we s h a l l see, c o n f u s i o n s which r e l a t e t o the 
n o t i o n s of 'moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' and 'freedom o f choice' t h a t were 
mentioned a t t h e beg i n n i n g o f our d i s c u s s i o n . 
H a r r i s o n w r i t e s t h a t : 
The 'act o f w i l l ' which commits me t o m o r a l i t y i s . . . one which, as 
W i t t g e n s t e i n suggests ( T r a c t a t u s ) , a l t e r s "the l i m i t s o f the 
world " : changes t h e w o r l d f o r me as a whole... Dnce I have made i t , 
t h e w o r l d indeed becomes f o r me "an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t world": 
one i n which, a l t h o u g h no p h y s i c a l change may have taken place, 
t h e r e a r e suddenly m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
(12) 
Harr i s o n ' s p o i n t i s t h a t a commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f e t h i c a l 
b e l i e f s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e acceptance o f a p a r t i c u l a r 'world view' which 
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may be incommensurable w i t h o t h e r s . F u r t h e r , i t i s t h i s commitment t o a 
s p e c i f i c m oral way o f l i f e , as expressed i n a r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e , 
which determines what are m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t s , and s t a t e s t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n s which t h e committed have t o honour i n t h e u p h o l d i n g of a 
moral r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
We f i n d , then, t h a t d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l o r moral p r a c t i c e s are 
r e f l e c t i v e o f coherent bodies o f e t h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n . What makes r u l e -
f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e s i n t e l l i g i b l e a r e the e t h i c a l u n d erstandings which 
i n f o r m them. For example, t h e s p e c i f i c c o n v e n t i o n o f uph o l d i n g t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n t o honour c o n t r a c t s i s based on an e t h i c a l c onception of 
what i t i s t o keep a promise. I t i s t h i s e t h i c a l c o n c e ption which makes 
i n t e l l i g i b l e , f o r t h e adherent, t h e moral sense o f engaging i n the 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e . 
The p o i n t , then, i s t h a t i t i s our e t h i c a l b e l i e f s , as r e f l e c t e d i n 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g moral p r a c t i c e s , which c o n f e r s i g n i f i c a n c e upon our 
moral d e l i b e r a t i o n s on what ought t o be done. They determine what 
moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t t o us. F u r t h e r , these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o , and s p e c i f y t h e range o f , those emotions which 
c o n s t i t u t e an a p p r o p r i a t e response t o them. T h i s i s because our 
commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r moral 'world view' generates moral 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of what o b l i g a t i o n s we ought t o honour i n the upholding 
of moral r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and i t i s these r e l a t i o n s h i p s which determine 
th e t y p e o f emotional response t o them which i s a p p r o p r i a t e . For, as 
H a r r i s o n remarks: 
One e f f e c t o f e n t e r i n g t h i s changed w o r l d i s t h a t new k i n d s of 
emotio n a l response become l o g i c a l l y a c c e s s i b l e t o me. They i n c l u d e 
such 'moral s e n t i m e n t s ' as reproach and remorse. To reproach i s t o 
speak, as i t were, on b e h a l f o f a moral r e l a t i o n s h i p . My f r i e n d 
may complain i f I say or do something h u r t f u l t o him, but 
c o m p l a i n t i s n o t reproach: reproach i s an a p p r o p r i a t e response, 
not t o h u r t , but o n l y t o b e t r a y a l , or t o some o t h e r species o f 
wrong. (13) 
Harrison's p o i n t i s t h a t c e r t a i n t y p e s o f sen t i m e n t are made 
l o g i c a l l y a c c e s s i b l e t o us by c e r t a i n k i n d s o f moral concepts and 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p s . For example, t h e s e n t i m e n t o f f e e l i n g i n d i g n a n t i s 
a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e moral concept 'unfairness*, w h i l s t t h e emoti o n a l 
response o f d i s g u s t i s not. I t f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t adherents of 
th e Humean theory-schema are mistaken t o a s s e r t , i n e f f e c t , t h a t our 
emo t i o n a l responses are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o , and c o n f e r s i g n i f i c a n c e 
upon, these concepts and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Rather, t h e o p p o s i t e o b t a i n s , 
Consequently, they a re wrong t o d i s m i s s out o f hand t h e n a t i o n o f moral 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h i s i s because, as H a r r i s o n notes, moral s e n t i m e n t s are 
emotions which are aroused by some moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n or other. They 
are n o t emotions which, merely by being f e l t towards something, c o n f e r 
moral s i g n i f i c a n c e upon t h e t h i n g i n que s t i o n . There are such no 
emotions, f o r t h e s i m p l e reason t h a t t h a t i s n o t how t h i n g s become 
m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . (14) 
These c r i t i c i s m s of t h e Humean theory-schema a l s o bear upon t h e 
assumption t h a t moral agents are i n some absolute way f r e e t o choose 
whatever moral p r i n c i p l e s of conduct they wish. For i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d 
t h a t t h i s n o t i o n o f freedom o f choice presupposes t h a t our s e n t i m e n t s 
are f e l t p r i o r t o t h e d e l i b e r a t i v e u n d e r t a k i n g o f moral commitments, 
and t h a t t h e p r i m a r y i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s which are expressed i n our moral 
judgements are s p e c i f i a b l e i ndependently o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which we happen t o f i n d ourselves. I t i s , i n o t h e r 
words, t o p i c t u r e moral agents as being capable of disengagement from 
t h e i r s o c i a l m i l i e u , and being a b l e t o make an i n d i v i d u a l m oral choice 
which i s detached from i t , 
We can see, however, t h a t t h e r e are severe problems w i t h t h i s 
s t r o n g a s s e r t i o n o f freedom o f choice. The major d i f f i c u l t y w i t h i t 
l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a l l moral s e n t i m e n t and 
a c t i o n i s determined by a l i n g u i s t i c and t h e r e f o r e s o c i a l c o n t e x t o f 
one k i n d or other. I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e idea t h a t one can detach 
oneself f r o m any moral r e l a t i o n s h i p whatsoever, i n order t o make some 
s o r t o f unencumbered autonomous moral choice, i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e 
because i t i s on l y i n a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e t h a t a chosen a c t i o n has any 
meaning. Likewise, i t i s o n l y w i t h i n a s o c i a l c o n t e x t t h a t any f u l l 
s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c eption of moral s e l f - i d e n t i t y i s p o s s i b l e . Therefore, 
t h e r e i s no sense i n which a s p e c i f i a b l e s e l f - i d e n t i t y , and a s e t o f 
u l t i m a t e g o a l s which p e r m i t s t h e making o f choices, i s a v a i l a b l e 
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l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o , and independently from, any e n t r y i n t o a moral 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f one k i n d or oth e r . 
T h i s leads t o t h e sug g e s t i o n t h a t t h e degree of freedom which i s 
possessed by any mo r a l agent i s l i m i t e d . I t i s t o re c o g n i s e t h a t we are 
able t o c r i t i c i s e o r de p a r t f r o m one moral a s s o c i a t i o n o n l y i f we 
si m u l t a n e o u s l y r e l o c a t e o u r s e l v e s i n another one. The l o g i c a l p o i n t i s 
t h a t a l l c o n v e r s i o n s or changes i n moral commitment r e s t upon a s h i f t 
f r om one moral 'world-view' t o another. C r i t i c i s m and change i s 
p o s s i b l e a t t h e p r a c t i c a l l e v e l because our moral conventions are 
f r e q u e n t l y p l u r a l i s t , i n t h a t they are t h e p r o d u c t o f many d i s t i n c t 
moral v i e w - p o i n t s , and we are able t o l o c a t e o u r s e l v e s i n terms o f 
d i f f e r e n t b u t commensurable approaches t o l i f e . Therefore, we have a 
l i m i t e d degree o f freedom or f l e x i b i l i t y t o c r i t i c i s e our own conceptual 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , as expressed i n r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e s , and we are 
able t o judge our u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o c o n f l i c t i n g but n o t 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e approaches t o l i f e . However, what i s n o t l o g i c a l l y or 
p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e i s t h e freedom t o c r i t i c i s e o r change our own 
moral v i e w - p o i n t s from a t o t a l l y detached and n e u t r a l s t a n d p o i n t . I t i s 
not conceivable, i n o t h e r words, t o d i v o r c e o n e s e l f t o t a l l y f rom a l l t h e 
conceptual schemes and moral p r a c t i c e s which a re a v a i l a b l e t o us, and 
make an i n d i v i d u a l moral choice from such a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . 
Rather, t h i s moral choice i s always dependent upon a frame o f 
ref e r e n c e which i s shaped by such conceptual schemes and p r a c t i c e s . 
F u r t h e r , i t i s these schemes, p r a c t i c e s and s o c i a l c o n t e x t s which 
determine, a t t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l e v e l o f moral t h i n k i n g , t h e range o f 
f e l t s e n t i m e n t s and reasons which a r e l o g i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y 
a v a i l a b l e t o us. The Humean theory-schema, as adopted by non-
c o g n i t i v i s t s , f a i l s t o account f o r t h i s . Does, however, t h e non-
c o g n i t i v i s t a n a l y s i s o f t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l s of 
moral t h i n k i n g f a r e any b e t t e r ? I t i s t o t h i s i s s u e t h a t we now t u r n . 
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4. O b j e c t i v i t y i n E t h i c s . 
An o n t o l o g i c a l e n q u i r y , which seeks t o s t a t e t h e o b j e c t s t h a t 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e w o r l d , i s bound up w i t h b u t d i s t i n c t from an 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e n q u i r y , which seeks t o determine t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
our c l a i m s t o knowledge o f t h a t w o r l d . The d i s t i n c t i o n between these 
two k i n d s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s , f o r our p r e s e n t purposes, i m p o r t a n t . T h i s 
i s because t h e r e are good reasons f o r a c c e p t i n g , w i t h q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
t h e Humean theory-schema or n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t i o n t h a t 
a l l values are 'non-objective', w h i l s t r e j e c t i n g t h e e m p i r i c i s t 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t h e s i s about t h e s t a t u s o f our knowledge c l a i m s which 
r e l a t e s t o i t . I n o r d e r t o show t h i s , we need t o p r o v i d e a c r i t i c a l 
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f knowledge upon which t h e non-
C D g n i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f value i s b u i l t . 
The e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y of knowledge i s grounded upon t h e 
o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a w o r l d o f m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s 
which i s independent from us. T h i s w o r l d i s taken t o be a c c e s s i b l e t o 
us because i t i s presented v i a our sensory experiences. I t i s a w o r l d 
which i s m i r r o r e d i n our p e r c e p t i o n s or raw 'sense-data'. F u r t h e r , these 
p e r c e p t i o n s are organised w i t h i n 'conceptual schemes' or coherent 
t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which enable us t o p r o v i d e a more or l e s s 
accurate d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e f e a t u r e s o f t h i s w o r l d . 
The e m p i r i c i s t observes t h a t we a l l t e n d t o have s t r i k i n g l y 
s i m i l a r p e r c e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s or sensory experiences o f t h e w o r l d . 
AB a consequence, we u s u a l l y share t h e same d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h i s w o r l d , 
as presented w i t h i n our conceptual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t . For the 
e m p i r i c i s t , i t i s t h i s shared agreement w i t h a u n i f o r m s e t o f 
c a t e g o r i e s o f sensory experience which enables us t o infer t h a t t h e 
w o r l d which i s represented i s t h e w o r l d 'as i t r e a l l y i s ' . F u r t h e r , i t 
i s t h i s i n f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r e a l i t y which 
generates any c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v e knowledge o f t h e w o r l d . T h i s i s 
because any such c l a i m i n v o l v e s an a s s e r t i o n t o have an accurate 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f those m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s which we can i n f e r t o be 
c o n s t i t u t i v e aspects o f an independent r e a l i t y . 
The e m p i r i c i s t , then, contends t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n t o be 
made between the w o r l d o f m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , which e x i s t s e n t i r e l y 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e mind's c o g n i t i v e access t o i t , and t h e "conceptual 
scheme', which i s t h e means by which t h e mind p u t s a p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n s t r u c t i o n or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n upon i t . I t i s t h e w o r l d o f m a t e r i a l 
o b j e c t s which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e absolute foundation o f knowledge, because 
i t i s what i s known t o us t o be 'given' t h r o u g h t h e process o f 
i n f e r e n c e . I n other words, i t p r o v i d e s the f o u n d i n g bedrock which i s 
s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t h e case, and which cannot be doubted. I t f o l l o w s t h a t , 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e m p i r i c i s t view, i t i s t h e t a s k o f t h e e p i s t e m o l D g i s t 
t o e l u c i d a t e those u l t i m a t e , s e l f - e v i d e n t and i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l statements which r e p r e s e n t t h i s f o u n d a t i o n a l 'given'. Put 
another way, t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t a s k i s performed by p o s t u l a t i n g those 
s y n t h e t i c or e m p i r i c a l c l a i m s which s a t i s f y t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s by v i r t u e 
of t h e i r correspondence w i t h t h e f a c t s , or r e l a t i o n s between o b j e c t s , 
which o b t a i n i n t h e w o r l d . 
There are, however, major d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y 
of knowledge. The c e n t r a l problem r e l a t e s t o t h e n o t i o n o f t h e 
independent f o u n d a t i o n a l 'given'. As W i l l i a m s remarks: 
I f . . . we t r y t o form some idea of a w o r l d t h a t i s p r i o r t o any 
d e s c r i p t i o n of i t , t h e w o r l d t h a t a l l systems o f b e l i e f and 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n are t r y i n g t o r e p r e s e n t , then we have an empty 
n o t i o n o f something completely u n s p e c i f i e d and u n s p e c i f i a b l e . (1> 
T h i s i s because a l l t h a t we can s t a t e are those d e s c r i p t i o n s or 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d which we have. There s i m p l y are no means 
by which t o be able t o s p e c i f y t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e w o r l d 'as i t r e a l l y 
i s ' which i s independent f r o m our d e s c r i p t i o n s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . I n 
o t h e r words, a l l we have a v a i l a b l e t o us are our p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l l y 
schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d : we have no access t o any 
another d e s c r i p t i o n which i s independent f r o m these conceptual schemes. 
Therefore, t h e n o t i o n o f t h e f o u n d a t i o n a l 'given' i s something which i s 
u n s p e c i f i a b l e and 'empty'. T h i s p o i n t i s i m p o r t a n t because i t w i l l be 
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r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e e m p i r i c i s t wants t o i n s i s t t h a t our n o t i o n s o f 
o b j e c t i v i t y and knowledge are grounded upon t h i s idea o f t h e 'given' 
w o r l d . I t becomes d i f f i c u l t t o see, however, how t h e n o t i o n s o f 
o b j e c t i v i t y and knowledge can p o s s i b l y r e l a t e t o a conception of t h e 
w o r l d which i s empty, u n s p e c i f i e d and u n s p e c i f i a b l e . 
T h i s problem can be approached from another angle. The o b j e c t i o n 
can be made t h a t t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n o f t h e 'given' adds n o t h i n g t o 
our o r d i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what counts as t h e evidence o f science. 
T h i s i s because a l l t h a t can p o s s i b l y count as evidence f o r something 
being t r u e a re those e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s which are a p p l i c a b l e 
piecemeal t o our o r d i n a r y , r e v i s a b l e judgements t h a t operate w i t h i n our 
p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i f i c conceptual scheme. Donald Davidson makes t h i s 
p o i n t when he contends t h a t any p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence which we make 
i n our language i s t r u e by v i r t u e of t h e f a c t t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o those 
judgements which presuppose our p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l l y schematic 
acceptance of t h e w o r l d as 'a r e c o g n i s a b l e place of homely objects'. (2) 
That i s , our c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h i s placed f i r m l y upon t h a t which i s 
' f a m i l i a r t o us': namely, our conceptual u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o g n i t i v e 
sensory experience. I t f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e r e can be no f u r t h e r 
n o t i o n o f t r u t h or evidence as t h e f i t t i n g o f a l l those judgements t o 
an u l t i m a t e immutable 'something' t h a t i s 'given'. 
The major problem, then, w i t h t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n of t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n a l 'given', and t h e a s s o c i a t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h and 
knowledge as c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o i t , i s t h a t i t r e s t s upon a p u r p o r t e d 
d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e independent r e a l i t y and t h e conceptual scheme 
which cannot, i n f a c t , be made. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
which we cannot c o n c e p t u a l l y demarcate. I t i s , o f course, h i g h l y 
p r o b a b l e t h a t an e x t e r n a l w o r l d does e x i s t independently from us. 
However, t h i s i s a t r u t h t h e a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y o f which we are n o t 
capable o f d i s c e r n i n g because a l l t h a t we have c o g n i t i v e access t o are 
those d e s c r i p t i o n s or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f a w o r l d which presupposes our 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l l y schematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t . I n o t h e r 
words, we cannot d i s t i n g u i s h between those o f our b e l i e f s which may be 
actually true, and those which are merely t r u e to us by v i r t u e o f t h e 
f a c t t h a t we share them w i t h i n our p a r t i c u l a r conceptual scheme. I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t our process o f l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e i s i t s e l f determined 
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w i t h i n our p a r t i c u l a r c o nceptual scheme, and does n o t i n f e r something 
"given" w h i c h stands o u t s i d e i t , As C r i s p i n W r i g h t remarks: 'there i s . , , 
no c o n t e n t t o t h e idea o f something's really being a consequence o f 
some s e t o f statements over and above i t s f o l l o w i n g f r o m them by our 
procedures o f inference'. (3) Consequently, 'there i s no u l t e r i o r concept 
of c o r r e c t i n f e r e n c e l u r k i n g behind our a c t u a l procedures o f i n f e r e n c e 
t o which t h e y are answerable'. (4) 
The p o i n t , t hen, i s t h a t our c l a i m s t o knowledge or t r u t h , and our 
procedures o f l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e , do n o t c o n s t i t u t e conceptual 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s which r e l a t e t o an ' u n s h i f t a b l e foundation', or 
correspond w i t h an independent r e a l i t y . Rather, t h e y s i m p l y r e l a t e t o 
t h e conceptual schemes which we use. T h i s i s i m p o r t a n t because i t 
i n d i c a t e s t h e need t o r e j e c t t h e e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f knowledge which 
does assume t h e n o t i o n o f correspondence w i t h r e a l i t y . We must, 
t h e r e f o r e , p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e account o f knowledge. 
As Sabina Lovibond i n s i s t s , our l a c k o f access t o any d i s t i n c t i o n 
between those of our b e l i e f s which are ' a c t u a l l y t r u e ' , and those which 
a r e merely 'true t o us', r a i s e s i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s about our 
un d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s t a t u s o f knowledge and t r u t h c l a i m s , She w r i t e s 
t h a t 
No such d i s t i n c t i o n can s u r v i v e our conscious r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t 
some human a u t h o r i t y has t o decide the c l a i m o f any p r o p o s i t i o n 
t o be regarded as t r u e - and, a c c o r d i n g l y , t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e 
v a l i d i t y o f an a s s e r t i o n o r an argument i s always a t t h e same 
time something o f which human beings (those human beings who 
call i t ' o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d * ) a r e s u b j e c t i v e l y persuaded. (5) 
Lovibond's p o i n t i s t h a t our assessment o f what i s t r u e i s i n e v i t a b l y a 
human m a t t e r which i s n o t grounded upon any absol u t e , independent 
f o u n d a t i o n s . Likewise, our a p p r e c i a t i o n o f " o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d 1 arguments 
i s n o t something which i s u l t i m a t e l y impersonal. Rather, i t i s i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v e . How i s t h i s so? 
The f i r s t p o i n t t o note i s t h a t our conceptual schemes, and t h e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t we a t t a c h t o them i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e w o r l d , are 
determined by our p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . These p r a c t i c e s are 
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c h a r a c t e r i s e d i n terms o f f o l l o w i n g r u l e s , and i t i s these r u l e s which 
enable us t o make sense o f t h e w o r l d and our a c t i o n s w i t h i n i t . 
Consequently, they enable us t o decide what amounts t o a r i g h t or wrong 
a c t i o n , a t r u e or f a l s e statement, or a c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t i n f e r e n c e , 
As W i t t g e n s t e i n remarks: 
The words ' r i g h t ' and 'wrong' are used when g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n i n 
proceeding a c c o r d i n g t o a r u l e . The word ' r i g h t ' makes t h e p u p i l 
go on, t h e word 'wrong' h o l d s him back. How could one e x p l a i n 
these r u l e s t o a p u p i l by s a y i n g i n s t e a d : ' t h i s agrees w i t h t h e 
r u l e - t h a t not'? Well, yes, i f he has a concept o f agreement. 
But what i f t h i s has y e t t o be formed? (The p o i n t i s how he 
r e a c t s t o t h e word 'agree') 
One does n o t l e a r n t o obey a r u l e by f i r s t l e a r n i n g t h e use o f t h e 
word 'agreement'. 
Rather, one l e a r n s t h e meaning o f 'agreement' by l e a r n i n g t o 
f o l l o w a r u l e , (6) 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o i n t i s t h a t a p r a c t i t i o n e r w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e f i r s t l e a r n s how t o f o l l o w a r u l e . T h i s l e a r n i n g 
enables him t o agree w i t h o t h e r s about t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e . I t 
i s t h i s agreement on r u l e - a p p l i c a t i o n which determines how we 
proceed t o argue, t h i n k and i n f e r , and i t enables us t o decide whether 
a p a r t i c u l a r statement, argument o r u t t e r a n c e i s v a l i d or not. T h i s 
procedure, W i t t g e n s t e i n c l a i m s , a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o m a t t e r s of 
epistemology as i t does t o any ot h e r r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e . F u r t h e r , 
t h e procedure i s never impersonal: i t does n o t r e l a t e t o something 
o u t s i d e our r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e . Rather, i t amounts t o what we 
agree upon t o be t h e c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f a r u l e . As such, i t 
generates what we understand t o be a t r u e , o b j e c t i v e o r knowledge 
c l a i m . 
I n o t h e r words, W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t t h e n o t i o n s o f 'objective 
knowledge' and ' t r u t h ' are i n themselves anthropocentric i n c h a r a c t e r . 
They are n o t i o n s which r e l a t e t o human conceptual c a t e g o r i e s o f 
un d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t operate w i t h i n a 'language-game' o f some k i n d or 
oth e r . He w r i t e s t h a t ' i t i s what human beings say t h a t i s t r u e or 
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f a l s e ; and they agree i n t h e language t h e y use'. <6) I t i s t h i s 
agreement which makes p o s s i b l e our c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v e knowledge or 
t r u t h . 
Take t h e example o f c o l o u r p e r c e p t i o n . I n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view, i t 
i s t h e possession o f a shared conceptual apparatus o f p e r c e p t i o n which 
u n d e r l i e s t h e use o f c o l o u r - p r e d i c a t e s , and i t i s our agreement w i t h 
r e s p e c t t o a t t r i b u t i o n s o f c o l o u r which makes o b j e c t i v e d i s c o u r s e about 
c o l o u r s p o s s i b l e , even though t h e agreement i t s e l f i s n o t what we are 
t a l k i n g about when we say t h a t an o b j e c t has a p a r t i c u l a r c o l o u r . 
Wiggins s u p p o r t s t h i s view when he w r i t e s t h a t : 
p i l l a r boxes, p a i n t e d as they are, count as red only because t h e r e 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s a p e r c e p t u a l apparatus (eg. our own) which 
d i s c r i m i n a t e s , and l e a r n s on t h e d i r e c t b a s i s of experience t o 
group t o g e t h e r , a l l and o n l y t h e de facto r e d t h i n g s . (8) 
I t i s , i n o t h e r words, our s h a r i n g o f a p e r c e p t u a l apparatus, and t h e 
agreement generated t h e r e i n , which enables us t o c a l l p i l l a r boxes red. 
However, t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f t h e c o l o u r r e d t o p i l l a r boxes cannot be 
used t o i n f e r t h a t p i l l a r boxes are r e d q u i t e independently of our 
a t t r i b u t i o n . I t i s n o t t h e case, as Wiggins notes, t h a t 'we may see a 
p i l l a r box as r e d because it is red'. (9) Redness i s n o t a ' r e l a t i o n a l 
p r o p e r t y ' , i n t h e sense t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o t h e q u a l i t y o f something 
'given' w h i c h i s independent f r o m us. Rather, i t i s a ' r e l a t i v e 
p r o p e r t y ' , i n t h e sense t h a t what we c a l l r e d depends upon our 
conceptual apparatus o f p e r c e p t i o n . 
Therefore, as Wiggins s t a t e s : 
t h e c a t e g o r y o f c o l o u r i s an anthropocentric category. The 
cat e g o r y corresponds t o an interest which can o n l y t a k e r o o t i n 
c r e a t u r e s w i t h something approaching our own sensory apparatus. 
(10) 
As Wiggins says, t h i s ' i n t e r e s t ' amounts t o our d e s i r e t o o r g a n i s e our 
sensory experience i n such a way as t o be coherent f o r us. T h i s 
i n v o l v e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , c a l l i n g t h i n g s r e d and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g them from 
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o t h e r c o l o u r - o b j e c t s . I n order t o do t h i s , we must have managed t o 
agree t h a t c e r t a i n t h i n g s count as re d ; and t h i s , i n t u r n , depends upon 
our s h a r i n g t h e same c o l o u r sensory apparatus. Other s e n t i e n t 
c r e a t u r e s , who do n o t see p i l l a r boxes as r e d , have a d i f f e r e n t sensory 
apparatus f r o m us. However, t h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s 
are mistaken. I t i s n o t t h e case t h a t they have f a i l e d t o make t h e 
c o r r e c t i n f e r e n c e t h a t p i l l a r boxes are r e d q u i t e independently o f a l l 
v a r i o u s conceptual schemes o f p e r c e p t i o n . Rather, i t means t h a t t h e i r 
c o l o u r c a t e g o r i e s are different f r o m ours, and t h a t t h e y see and 
i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r l d d i f f e r e n t l y . They are n o t wrong t o do so, because 
c o l o u r i s n o t a cate g o r y which r e l a t e s t o something t h a t i s u l t i m a t e l y 
and i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l y t r u e . 
T h i s argument has been c a l l e d t h e ' a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t ' t h e o r y o f 
knowledge. We need t o see how i t r e l a t e s t o our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e 
n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n e t h i c s . The f i r s t p o i n t t o note i s t h a t t h e 
a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t view undermines t h e b a s i s upon which t h e non-
c o g n i t i v i s t d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t s and values, and o b j e c t i v i t y and 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s e s t a b l i s h e d . T h i s i s because t h e a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t 
i n s i s t s t h a t our f a c t u a l and e v a l u a t i v e i n t e r e s t s and di s c o u r s e s are on 
th e same o b j e c t i v e f o o t i n g : t h a t i s , they e q u a l l y r e l a t e t o human 
conceptual p r a c t i c e s . As such, Wiggins c l a i m s t h a t any t a l k o f t h e 
f a c t - v a l u e d i s t i n c t i o n i s 'spurious' because o f t h e 'non-existence o f 
any r e l e v a n t or u s e f u l n o t i o n o f ' f a c t u a l ' by which t o make' or 
e s t a b l i s h i t . (11) 
Midgley s u p p o r t s t h i s c l a i m by a r g u i n g t h a t a l l we can p o s s i b l y 
count as a f a c t i s t h a t which i s t h e r e s u l t o f assimilating our 
experience i n t o a conceptual scheme, where 'at each stage o f 
a s s i m i l a t i o n choices a r i s e about t h e s t a n d a r d s on which we s h a l l group 
and i n t e r p r e t data'. (12) I n o t h e r words, we choose t o accept a 
p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l account which best o r g a n i s e s our experience 
w i t h i n a conceptual scheme. (13) For Midgley, t h i s process o f 
'explanation by s p e c i f i c a t i o n ' goes on ' j u s t as much i n c o n t e x t s t h a t 
would n a t u r a l l y be c a l l e d f a c t u a l as i n undoubtedly e v a l u a t i v e ones'. 
(14) Therefore, our f a c t u a l o r s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e s are, l i k e our 
e v a l u a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s , a m a t t e r o f choosing t o accept e x p l a n a t i o n s 
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which make most coherent our experiences i n the w o r l d . T h i s a n t i -
f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t argument, then, amounts t o t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e r e are no 
means a v a i l a b l e t o us by which we can d i s t i n g u i s h f a c t s and values, or 
t h e n o t i o n s o f o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h i s i s because our 
f a c t u a l and e v a l u a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s are b u i l t upon t h e same ground: 
namely, r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e s w i t h i n which r e a s o n i n g , knowledge and 
t r u t h - as c o n v e n t i o n a l canons o f evidence - presuppose a shared 
conceptual u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f one s o r t or other. 
We may f e e l , however, t h a t t h e a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t t h e s i s , 
a l t h o u g h c o r r e c t i n many c e n t r a l ways, has o v e r s t a t e d i t s case. For i t 
i s a commonplace assumption t h a t t h e r e must be some k i n d of 
d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s and s u b j e c t i v e values. This 
assumption i s supported by t h e f a c t t h a t , as W i t t g e n s t e i n remarks, i t 
seems i n t u i t i v e t o ask t h e q u e s t i o n : 'where do we g e t our concepts from 
- i f n o t f r o m something independent o f us?'. Also, as W i t t g e n s t e i n says, 
i t remains c l e a r t o us t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f some of our concepts -
concepts which we c a l l s c i e n t i f i c - 'can be e x p l a i n e d by f a c t s of 
nature'. (15) T h i s leads us t o wonder whether t h e r e i s some way i n 
which we can express t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t s and values, and the 
degrees o f o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y which r e l a t e s t o these n o t i o n s . 
W i l l i a m s p r o v i d e s a p l a u s i b l e account o f how t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n may 
be a r t i c u l a t e d . His c e n t r a l c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t whereas 
science has some chance o f being more or l e s s what i t seems, a 
s y s t e m a t i s e d t h e o r e t i c a l account o f how t h e w o r l d really i s . . . 
e t h i c a l t h o u g h t has no chance o f being e v e r y t h i n g i t seems. (16) 
W i l l i a m s grounds t h i s c o n t e n t i o n upon t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s o l v i n g 
disagreement t h r o u g h 'convergence o f opinion'. As he remarks, when 
convergence o f o p i n i o n towards an acceptable o r shared s c i e n t i f i c 
t h e o r e t i c a l account i s achieved, 'the b e s t e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e 
convergence i n v o l v e s t h e idea t h a t an answer r e p r e s e n t s how t h i n g s 
are'. (17) T h i s t h e o r e t i c a l convergence i s p o s s i b l e , W i l l i a m s argues, 
because a l l s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r s can, d e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n t 
p e r c e p t i o n s , have a common 'absolute conception' o f t h e w o r l d . Put 
another way, s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r s can possess common b e l i e f s about 
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some features of the world from which 'we can reasonably claim t o 
represent the world i n a way t o the maximum degree independent of our 
perspective and i t s p e c u l i a r i t i e s ' . (18) This leads t o the claim t h a t 
s c i e n t i f i c investigators can reach an understanding of the world that 
i s as objective as possible: one which i s t o the maximum degree 
independently and i m p a r t i a l l y related t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r perspective. 
By contrast, Williams contends t h a t e t h i c a l thought i s never 
capable of such convergence of opinion as t o 'how things are*. We have, 
he says, no 'coherent picture of how i t might happen' th a t such 
convergence would be achieved. (19) This i s because there e x i s t s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of forming an 'absolute conception' of the e t h i c a l world 
which p a r a l l e l s t h a t of science: an e t h i c a l world 'where a range of 
investigators could r a t i o n a l l y , reasonably and unconstrainedly come t o 
converge on a determinate set of e t h i c a l conclusions'. (20) This i s not 
what e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y i s about. Rather, he says, ethics i s concerned 
wi t h r e f l e c t i o n on the excellence of l i f e , and t h i s r e f l e c t i o n 
does not i t s e l f establish the t r u t h of judgements... instead i t 
shows th a t there i s a good reason (granted the commitment t o an 
et h i c a l l i f e ) to l i v e t h a t l i f e . (21) 
Williams' point i s th a t e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n amounts t o a r a t i o n a l 
evaluation of how best to l i v e a l i f e ; and convergence of opinion i n 
ethics constitutes a r a t i o n a l agreement which supports the commitment 
to t h a t e t h i c a l l i f e . However, t h i s convergence i s a p r a c t i c a l , not a 
the o r e t i c a l achievement. I t i s not, l i k e s c i e n t i f i c r e f l e c t i o n , based 
upon a th e o r e t i c a l representation of how things already are. 
Consequently, unlike science, ethics i s not the kind of enquiry t h a t i s 
a candidate f o r objective knowledge or the discovery of t r u t h . 
In drawing the d i s t i n c t i o n s between ethics and science, Williams 
enables us t o place both the e m p i r i c i s t and an t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t 
conceptions of o b j e c t i v i t y i n a better perspective. F i r s t l y , we can 
agree with the e m p i r i c i s t s and non - c o g n i t i v i s t s t h a t values are non-
objective i n the sense th a t they do not constitute part of the 'fabric 
of the world'. However, we need t o qu a l i f y t h i s by recognising the 
ant i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t point t h a t the e m p i r i c i s t theory of knowledge i s 
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based on false assumptions. In short, we can acknowledge t h a t science 
and ethics are equally grounded i n conceptual schemes, and t h a t science 
i s not p r i v i l e g e d i n i t s access to the 'given'• Williams himself makes 
t h i s point, but also shows how the a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t t hesis blurs 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between science and ethics. As Williams claims, science 
should never be t o t a l l y equated with ethics. Science does have a 
greater claim to o b j e c t i v i t y because the conceptual schemes and 
practices w i t h i n which i t operates can converge upon some 'absolute 
conception' or representation of the world. Therefore, a s c i e n t i f i c 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the f a c t s i s more objective than an e t h i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n upon values, not because i t relates t o the 'given', but 
because i t i s capable of providing a generally shared conceptually 
schematic explanation of the world which i s t o the highest possible 
degree independent of p a r t i c u l a r perceptions. Ethics can never achieve 
t h i s . This i s because, as we s h a l l explain l a t e r , d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n s are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y underpinned by ideological 
assumptions t h a t are incommensurable with others, and which create, not 
represent, moral r e a l i t y . 
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5. fecfatyxs. QR. EmnUvAsm 
I t has been our purpose so f a r tD o f f e r a c r i t i c a l examination of 
the philosophical nature of non-cognitivism. However, t h i s analysis has 
i t s l i m i t s because we need t o establish the h i s t o r i c a l and social 
contest w i t h i n which the theory emerged i n order t o f u l l y grasp the 
character of the non-cog n i t i v i s t position. This h i s t o r i c a l enquiry 
involves a consideration of the emotive theory of ethics, and raises 
questions about the re l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy and his t o r y . 
In h i s book e n t i t l e d After Virtue Alasdair Maclntyre has provided 
us with a challenging and controversial analysis of the emotive theory 
of ethics. He off e r s a sociological assessment of e t h i c a l emotivism as 
a defective form of moral understanding which has t o a large degree 
shaped the character of Western social and p o l i t i c a l experience i n t h i s 
century. He also suggests t h a t t h i s achievement constitutes a 'moral 
decline' which can be traced back to the f a i l u r e of the eighteenth 
century 'Enlightenment project'. These claims are presented w i t h i n the 
main body of a thesis which i s both complex and ambitious, and i n 
order t o make a c r i t i c a l appraisal of Maclntyre's arguments, we need t o 
discern the i n t e r r e l a t e d themes which are of d i r e c t relevance t o the 
question of the character and significance of e t h i c a l emotivism. The 
f i r s t i s a discussion of the immediate h i s t o r i c a l context of the 
emergence of the emotive theory, and involves the claim t h a t i t i s only 
possible t o provide a comprehensive understanding of the theory i f an 
account of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l context i s given. The second involves the 
contention t h a t the emotive theory has had a profoundly dominant 
influence upon shaping the character of contemporary moral, social and 
p o l i t i c a l experience i n the Western World. The t h i r d , c l e a r l y related t o 
the f i r s t , involves a general methodological suggestion t h a t any 
sa t i s f a c t o r y philosophical analysis of a body of ideas cannot be 
conducted i n a way t h a t i s independent of a study of those h i s t o r i c a l 
considerations which relate t o t h e i r expression. 
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I . H i s t o r i c a l Context 
Haclntyre's discussion of the immediate h i s t o r i c a l context of the 
emergence of e t h i c a l emotivism rests upon two i n i t i a l observations. The 
f i r s t i s that: 
In the eighteenth century Hume embodied emotivist elements i n the 
large and complex f a b r i c of h i s t o t a l moral theory; but i t i s only 
i n t h i s century t h a t emotivism has flourished as a theory on i t s 
own. (1) 
The second i s t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l context w i t h i n which emotivism 
flourished was r e s t r i c t e d t o the s p e c i f i c academic philosophical 
c i r c l e s of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford i n the 1930's. 
Maclntyre argues th a t the conceptual implications of the 
s p e c i f i c i t y of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l context were overlooked by the emotivist 
t h i n k e r s themselves. I t was a central feature of the emotive theories 
advanced i n t h i s period t o claim to have described the nature and 
form of all evaluative, and hence p a r t i c u l a r l y moral judgements. 
Emotivists understood themselves to have analysed the universal 
character of e t h i c a l discourse i n terms of the expressions of 
preference, attitudes and feelings, and had concluded t h a t a l l moral 
Judgements are neither true nor false and a l l moral disagreement i s 
r a t i o n a l l y interminable. Kaclntyre rejects t h i s emotivist claim because 
he denies the p o s s i b i l i t y of any theory being able t o provide a 
universal description of a l l e t h i c a l l i f e , past, present or future. 
Rather, he argues that any such purported t h e o r e t i c a l achievement i s 
tec h n i c a l l y impossible because any body of ideas, whether philosophical, 
t h e o r e t i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c or p o l i t i c a l , necessarily stands r e l a t i v e t o the 
contingent h i s t o r i c a l features of i t s emergence. This i s to assert t h a t 
the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of any t h e o r e t i c a l claim i s only made passible 
w i t h i n the parameters of the h i s t o r i c a l milieu of i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n . 
According t o t h i s h i s t o r i c i s t view, any t h e o r e t i c a l explanation which 
purports t o be 'universal i n scope' i s simply deluding i t s e l f . I t i s 
attempting the impossible task of reaching a t h e o r e t i c a l understanding 
which goes beyond the l i m i t s of what i t knows t o be i n t e l l i g i b l e ; 
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l i m i t s set by the h i s t o r i c a l g r i d of i t s understanding. For Maclntyre, 
the proponents of the emotive theory of ethics were victims of such a 
delusion. 
I f Maclntyre i s correct t o disregard the emotivists' claim t o be 
addressing the question of the universal character of morality as such, 
then i t follows that they were, a l b e i t unknowingly, addressing the 
question of the character of morality as conceived i n the ' h i s t o r i c a l l y 
s p e c i f i c conditions' of t h e i r time. (2) As he says: 
We ought therefore t o ask whether emotivism as a theory may not 
have been both a response to, and i n the very f i r s t instance, an 
account of not, as i t s protagonists indeed supposed, moral 
language as such, but moral language i n England i n the years a f t e r 
1903 as and when t h a t language was interpreted i n accordance w i t h 
t h a t body of theory t o the re f u t a t i o n of which emotivism was 
pr i m a r i l y dedicated. The theory i n question borrowed from the 
early nineteenth century the name of 'intuitionism' and i t s 
immediate progenitor was G.E. Moore. (3) 
There i s nothing controversial i n Maclntyre's contention that we 
are compelled t o understand the emergence of emotivism as p r i m a r i l y a 
reaction t o the moral theory of G.E. Moore. As he points out, Moore's 
Pr i n c i p i a Ethica (1903) was greeted with extreme enthusiasm by people 
such as John Maynard Keynes, Lytton Strachey, Desmond McCarthy, 
V i r g i n i a Woolf, Roger Fry and Lowes Dickinson, and Moore's ideas on 
ethics became a quite e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y dominant influence i n t h e i r 
w r i t i n g s on philosophy, l i t e r a t u r e and a r t up u n t i l the late 1920's. 
What had attracted them t o the theory, Maclntrye argues, was that i n 
arguing t h a t 'good' i s the name of a non-natural property, and t h a t a 
proposition declaring t h i s or that t o be 'good' could be known to be 
true through i n t u i t i v e r e f l e c t i o n of what state of a f f a i r s best produced 
the most 'good', Moore had provided an impersonal or objective 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r certain actions. Further, i n the s i x t h and f i n a l 
chapter of Principia Ethica. Moore had spelt out j u s t what type of 
action he took t o be the most valuable or e t h i c a l , when he states t h a t 
'personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments include all the greatest, 
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and by far the greatest goods we can imagine...'. This was, f o r Moore, 
the 'ultimate and fundamental t r u t h of Moral Philosophy*. I t i s t o 
re a l i s e t h a t the pursuit of friendship and the contemplation of the 
bea u t i f u l i n nature or i n a r t are the most important and perhaps the 
sole j u s t i f i a b l e ends of human action. 
Maclntyre suggests t h a t i t was t h i s s p e c i f i c contention which 
att r a c t e d the group of i n t e l l e c t u a l s who were known as the 'Bloomsbury 
set* and t h e i r associates. I t offered a philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
t h e i r own l i f e s t y l e and a c t i v i t i e s where personal intercourse and 
discussion of the beautiful were most highly valued. Not wishing to 
accept t h a t t h e i r aesthetic a c t i v i t i e s were merely r e f l e c t i o n s of t h e i r 
own l i f e preferences, Moore's theory provided an objective reassurance 
th a t t h i s l i f e s t y l e was appropriate t o 'the Ethical' and 'the Aesthetic*. 
Keynes provides us with an i n s i g h t into the way t h i s group sought t o 
discuss questions r e l a t i n g t o ethics and aesthetics. By following 
Moore's prescriptions i n precise fashion, observers were asked t o 
discern the presence and absence of the non-natural property of 'good' 
in r e l a t i o n t o a given proposition. Where two observers disagreed, i t 
was suggested that either the two were u n w i t t i n g l y focussing on 
d i f f e r e n t subject matters, or that one had perceptions superior to the 
other. This procedure purported to provide the t h e o r e t i c a l l y correct 
manner of reaching an answer or resolving a dispute. However, Maclntyre 
notes tha t : 
of course, as Keynes t e l l s us, what was r e a l l y happening was 
something quite other: 'In practice, v i c t o r y was with those who 
could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting 
conviction and could best use the accents of i n f a l l i b i l i t y ' and 
Keynes goes on t o describe the effectiveness of Moore's gasps of 
i n c r e d u l i t y and head-shaking, of Strachey's grim silences and of 
Lowes Dickinson's shrugs. (4) 
Maclntyre's contention, then, i s that the di s c i p l e s of Moore were 
doing something quite d i s t i n c t from that which they purported t o be 
doing. Their 'resolution' of e t h i c a l and aesthetic disagreement r e a l l y 
amounted t o the dominance of one w i l l or expressed preference over the 
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w i l l s or expressed preferences of others. This bare psychological 
confrontation was clothed i n the the o r e t i c a l language of 'i n t u i t i o n s ' 
and the discernment of non-natural properties. 
Further, Maclntyre acknowledges th a t i t was the i n s i g h t of the 
emotivists t o expose t h i s philosophical disguise. He characterises the 
emotivist response as taking the following form: 
these people take themselves t o be i d e n t i f y i n g the presence of a 
non-natural property, which they c a l l 'good'; but there i s i n fac t 
no such property and they are doing no more and no other than 
expressing t h e i r feelings and attitude s , disguising the expression 
of preference and whim by an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r own 
utterance and behaviour which confers upon i t an o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t 
i t does not i n f a c t possess. (5) 
As such, the emotive theory was an accurate description of the nature 
of moral utterance at Cambridge and elsewhere a f t e r 1903. I t c o r r e c t l y 
reflected the sociological r e a l i t y of the form which moral language 
took at t h i s time. However, emotivists were confused i n purporting to 
provide a universal theory of meaning. As Maclntyre says: 
I t i s , I take i t , no accident t h a t the acutest of the modern 
founders of emotivism, philosophers such as F.P. Ramsey ( i n the 
'Epilogue' t o The Foundations of Mathematics, 1931), Austin Duncan-
Jones and C.L, Stevenson, were pupils of Moore; i t i s not 
implausible to suppose that they did i n f a c t confuse moral 
utterance at Cambridge (and i n other places with a s i m i l a r 
inheritance) a f t e r 1903 with moral utterance as such, and t h a t 
they therefore presented what was i n essentials a correct account 
of the former as though i t were an account of the l a t t e r . (6) 
Consequently, Maclntyre says: 
Emotivism thus understood turns out to be, as a cogent theory of 
use rather than a false theory of meaning, connected with a 
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s p e c i f i c stage i n moral development or decline, a stage which our 
own culture entered early i n the present century. (7) 
This assessment of the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c conditions which 
shaped the character of emotivism i s accurate enough. I t can be further 
substantiated at a l a t e r stage by i n d i c a t i n g how w r i t e r s such as 
Duncan-Jones and Stevenson were self-consciously reacting against 
Moore's views. I t can be also be shown th a t Haclntyre i s correct to 
point out t h a t 'in other places with a s i m i l a r inheritance' an emotivist 
response to e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s m was evident. The f a c t that both W.H.F. 
Barnes and A.J.Ayer were pupils of Prichard at Oxford confirms 
Maclntyre's contention that: 
there i s an Oxford h i s t o r y beginning from Prichard's i n t u i t i o n i s m 
t o p a r a l l e l Moore's Cambridge h i s t o r y and indeed .. wherever 
something l i k e emotivism i s found to f l o u r i s h i t generally i s the 
successor theory to views analogous t o Moore's and Prichard's. 
(8) 
For the moment, however, we s h a l l attend t o Maclntyre's second major 
argument, which involves an assessment of the so c i a l context of the 
emergence of the emotive theory. 
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Maclntyre i n s i s t s that the discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l context of 
the emergence of the e t h i c a l emotivism i s of more than just academic 
int e r e s t . I t also raises s i g n i f i c a n t social and p r a c t i c a l issues. This 
i s because, he contends, 'we l i v e i n a s p e c i f i c a l l y emotivist culture': 
one i n which 'to a large degree people now think, t a l k and act as if 
emotivism were true, no matter what t h e i r avowed theoretical standpoint 
may be'. (1) Thus we f i n d that 'a wide v a r i e t y of our concepts and 
modes of behaviour - and not only our e x p l i c i t y moral debates and 
judgements - presuppose the t r u t h of emotivism, i f not at the level of 
self-conscious theorising, at least i n everyday practice'. (2) 
Maclntyre begins h i s sociological assessment of the p r a c t i c a l 
significance of emotivism by making the general contention t h a t there 
i s always an important conceptual r e l a t i o n s h i p between moral theories 
and social contexts. He says th a t 
A moral philosophy - and emotivism i s no exception -
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y presupposses a sociology. For every 
moral philosophy o f f e r s e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y at 
least a p a r t i a l conceptual analysis of the rel a t i o n s h i p 
of an agent t o h i s or her reasons, motives, intentions 
and actions, and i n so doing generally presupposes some 
claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can 
be i n the r e a l social world. (3) 
Maclntyre's claim i s tha t any moral theory i s necessarily attached t o 
some conception of personal i d e n t i t y , motivation, intention, reasoning 
or action which either obtains or can obtain i n the world. However, he 
notes t h a t the philosophical proponents of emotivism have f a i l e d t o 
specify the conception of man which they must presuppose. He suggests, 
therefore, t h a t we must perform t h i s task f or them because 'we have 
not yet f u l l y understood the claims of any moral philosophy u n t i l we 
have spelled out what i t s social embodiment would be.' (4) 
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What i s , Maclntyre asks, the d i s t i n c t l y emotivist conception of 
the self? He says that: 
the s p e c i f i c a l l y modern s e l f , the s e l f that I have called 
emotivist, f i n d s no l i m i t s set to tha t on which i t may pass 
judgement f o r such l i m i t s could only derive from r a t i o n a l 
c r i t e r i a f o r evaluation and,.,, the emotivist s e l f lacks any 
such c r i t e r i a . Everything may be c r i t i c i s e d from whatever 
standpoint the s e l f has adopted, including the self's choice 
of standpoint t o adopt... To be a moral agent i s , on t h i s 
view , precisely to be able t o stand back from any and every 
s i t u a t i o n i n which Dne i s involved, from any and every 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t one may possess, and t o pass judgement on 
i t from a purely universal and abstract point of view t h a t 
i s t o t a l l y detached from a l l soci a l p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Anyone 
and everyone can thus be a moral agent, since i t i s i n the 
se l f and not i n social roles or practices that moral agency 
has to be located. (5) 
I m p l i c i t w i t h i n the emotivist view, i n other words, i s a 
conception of the s o c i a l l y disembodied s e l f which i s the sole 
authority i n the making of moral judgements. Given t h a t there are no 
independent r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a by which t o establish any objective 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r e t h i c a l claims, i t follows t h a t morality comes from 
w i t h i n the realm of se l f - d e l i b e r a t i o n . Further, as Maclntyre observes, 
' i t i s i n t h i s capacity of the s e l f t o evade any necessary 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with any p a r t i c u l a r contingent state of a f f a i r s t h a t 
some modern philosophers ... have seen the essence of moral agency'. (6> 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y an assumption which i s made by emotivist thinkers. They 
understand themselves, as anal y t i c philosophers, t o have uncovered the 
'timeless t r u t h s ' about the moral predicament by specifying how a l l 
moral agents, past, present and future, are free t o assess t h e i r moral 
condition. 
Maclntyre argues t h a t t h i s c e n t r a l assumption i s misconceived. He 
contends t h a t rather than specifying i n some 'universalist' way the 
re a l structures of the moral s e l f , what the emotivists are r e a l l y doing 
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i s presupposing a p a r t i c u l a r conception of man which relates to the 
h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c considerations of a d i s t i n c t social episode. As 
such, the emotivist moral theory i s i t s e l f dependent upon an i m p l i c i t 
acceptance of a p a r t i c u l a r conception of moral agency which has 
emerged w i t h i n the context of modern soc i a l h i s t o r y , and which has 
been re f l e c t e d i n modern philosophical thought. 
Maclntyre provides us with an impressively detailed analysis of 
how t h i s modern social context came t o be conceptualised i n Western 
philosophical thought. One s t r i k i n g feature which can be drawn from 
h i s examination i s the s i m i l a r i t y between the emotivist and the 
' l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' view of moral agency and the e t h i c a l l i f e . In 
pa r t i c u l a r , the emotivist notion of freedom of choice appears t o be 
i d e n t i c a l l y expressed i n l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t thought. And t h i s notion 
presupposes an epistemological conception of the rela t i o n s h i p between 
fac t s and values which i s assumed by both emotivism and l i b e r a l -
individualism. As Maclntyre says; 
fo r the l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t , questions of f a c t are se t t l e d 
independently of what anyone wants or chooses, whereas questions 
of value (including moral value) are se t t l e d only by the 
in d i v i d u a l choosing and standing by some p a r t i c u l a r set of 
pr i n c i p l e s which best s a t i s f y h i s desires. I t i s t o picture the 
in d i v i d u a l confronting the objecting facts with a freedom t o make 
such evaluations as he wishes i n the r e a l i s a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 
purposes. (7) 
I t looks, therefore, as i f there i s a close connection between 
emotivism and l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m . As we s h a l l see, t h i s connection i s 
based upon the f a c t t h a t emotivism presupposes an evaluative 
conception of man which i s recognisably l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n 
character. I t i s a conception of moral agency which includes, most 
c e n t r a l l y , the idea of the in d i v i d u a l being free t o choose h i s own 
et h i c a l standards. 
I t i s an observation of t h i s kind t h a t makes t h e o r i s t s such as 
Maclntyre and Charles Taylor suspicious of the emotivist position. As 
Taylor says, they 'want t o accuse the Hares and Stevensons of ... t r y i n g 
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to ram through t h e i r own ethic of disengaged freedom under the guise 
of an independently established, r a t i o n a l l y undeniable meta-ethic' (8) 
In other words, they assert t h a t emotivist, or more generally non-
c o g n i t i v i s t thinkers are not providing a 'value-neutral' and objective 
meta-ethical analysis of the nature of morality, but are rather 
a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e i r own evaluative prejudices of what morality ought t o 
resemble. 
This s o r t of accusation has considerable force. However, we need 
to be clear about the significance which people l i k e Taylor and 
Maclntyre wish t o attach t o i t . An examination of Maclntyre's views 
about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy and ideology w i l l enable us 
to delineate the implications of t h i s argument f o r our understanding of 
the character of emotivism or non-cognitivism. 
Maclntyre argues, we r e c a l l , t h a t any moral theory presupposes a 
sociology, i n t h a t i t presupposes a p a r t i c u l a r conception of man 
which i s both descriptive and normative. In caying t h i s he assumes 
that much of what we c a l l philosophy i s ideology. He contends th a t a 
good deal of what i s characterised as ideology 'not only overlaps with 
the proper concerns of philosophy, i t i s philosophy.' (9) This i s t o 
recognise t h a t i t i s 
a defining property of an ideology that i t does not merely t e l l us 
how the world i s and how we ought to act, but i s concerned with 
the bearing of the one upon the other. This involves a concern, 
e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t , with the status of statements of moral rules 
and of statements of expressing evaluations. (10) 
Maclntyre, then, wishes to blur the d i s t i n c t i o n between philosophy and 
ideology. He argues i n e f f e c t t h a t either label can be attached t o a 
th e o r e t i c a l enquiry which involves the making of statements about the 
nature of things and the issuing of p r e s c r i p t i v e recommendations f o r 
conduct i n the p r a c t i c a l world. 
Two relevant points emerge from t h i s argument. The f i r s t i s that, 
according t o Maclntyre, emotivist or non-c o g n i t i v i s t moral philosophy 
i s ideological i n character. We s h a l l see that there i s a sense i n 
which t h i s i s true; but not, s t r i c t l y speaking, Maclntyre's sense. This 
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i s because Maclntyre has an inaccurate conception of the nature of an 
ideological understanding. The second point i s t h a t Maclntyre denies 
t h a t a philosophical investigation can be purely a n a l y t i c a l and non-
presc r i p t i v e . This claim i s u n j u s t i f i e d because h i s characterisation of 
philosophy i s misconceived. Let us attend f o r the moment to the second 
issue. 
Maclntyre says t h a t 'the notion that the moral philosopher can 
study the concepts of morality merely by r e f l e c t i n g , Oxford armchair 
s t y l e , on what he or she and those around him or her say i s barren.' 
(11) This view s t r i k e s us as being unnecessarily harsh. I t overlooks 
the f a c t t h a t i t remains perfectly conceivable t h a t a moral philosopher 
can examine the v a l i d i t y of e t h i c a l arguments without introducing h i s 
own normative assumptions i n t o the enquiry. This type of detached 
r e f l e c t i o n i s possible, and i t constitutes the appropriate mode of 
inve s t i g a t i o n which we c a l l philosophy. I t i s t o reach an i m p a r t i a l 
understanding of the form of arguments presented by people who share a 
normative p r a c t i c a l l i f e , without presupposing any evaluative 
conceptions or morally relevant concerns as t o how t h i s l i f e i s t o be 
led. Therefore, although we may agree with Maclntyre t h a t the 
emotivists or non-cognitivists have f a i l e d t o provide a value-neutral 
philosophical analysis of ethics, the very p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so i s 
not to be discounted. The suggestion, then, i s t h a t MacTntyre i s not 
j u s t i f i e d i n b l u r r i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between philosophy and ideology, 
because h i s conception of philosophy i s misplaced. The circumstance 
that a great deal of past 'moral philosophy' has not been purely 
a n a l y t i c a l does not mean tha t all moral philosophy, properly 
understood, i s necessarily non-objective i n character. 
We need t o specify how ideology i s d i s t i n c t from philosophy. Our 
suggestion i s that any the o r e t i c a l explanation of morality t h a t does 
either i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y presuppose an evaluative conception of 
man and generates p r a c t i c a l recommendations f o r conduct constitutes an 
ideological understanding. I t i s d i s t i n c t from philosophy because i t i s 
a conceptual understanding which i s based upon an evaluative p o r t r a y a l 
of ideal moral and p o l i t i c a l relationships. This p o r t r a y a l forms the 
moral and p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y which a t t r a c t s committed adherents t o 
conceive of themselves i n these terms, and act i n a way which i s 
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appropriate t o i t . As such, an ideological understanding i s "ideal' 
rather than 'real'. I t does not constitute an enquiry i n t o the nature of 
things which i s capable of issuing either true or false descriptive 
statements about moral or p o l i t i c a l experience. Rather, i t amounts t o 
an ir r e d u c i b l y evaluative conception of an experience which i s created, 
not represented, w i t h i n the vocabulary of the understanding. 
More needs t o be said about t h i s , but i t enables us f o r the moment 
to show how Maclntyre's conception of ideology i s mistaken. I t 
i d e n t i f i e s h i s error as taking at face-value the claims of ideologists 
t o be describing the world i n a normatively s i g n i f i c a n t manner. This i s 
because ideological claims t o provide an accurate t h e o r e t i c a l 
representation of the descriptive nature of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
experience are i l l u s o r y . And i t i s precisely t h i s i l l u s i o n t h a t makes an 
Ideological argument d i f f e r e n t from an authentic philosophical enquiry. 
This i s not t o deny t h a t ideological understandings are often presented 
i n the form of a philosophical argument. When t h i s occurs, however, i t 
i s the philosophical argument which attempts t o give convincing and 
coherent expression t o a presumed and l o g i c a l l y p r i o r evaluative 
po r t r a y a l of human relationships. The philosophical expression i s 
always distinguishable from the ideological p o r t r a y a l . I t i s t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n which Maclntyre u n j u s t i f i a b l y elides together when he 
characterises moral philosophy and ideology as sharing the same 
descriptive and normative concerns. He f a i l s t o recognise that the 
evaluative or moral concerns of the ideologist can be c l e a r l y 
demarcated from the purely a n a l y t i c a l concerns of the philosopher. 
The inadequacies of Maclntyre's views on moral philosophy and 
ideology bears d i r e c t l y upon our consideration of the character of 
et h i c a l emotivism. For i t w i l l be recalled t h a t Maclntyre asserts 
that emotivism constitutes, i n a normatively s i g n i f i c a n t way, an 
accurate description of our c u l t u r a l understanding. In saying t h i s , 
however, he has not made clear how t h i s 'description' has become 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . He has f a i l e d tD specify t h a t i t i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e 
because i t i s grounded upon an ideological p o r t r a y a l of ideal human 
relationships which i s appropriate t o the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n of discourse. In other words, he has not shown how the 
emotive theory i t s e l f , and the culture which i t 'describes', i s informed 
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by a d i s t i n c t e t h i c a l understanding which i s non-descriptive. I t 
follows t h a t emotivism can only count as an accurate description of 
our modern e t h i c a l experience because i t r e f l e c t s how certain people 
ideol o g i c a l l y conceive themselves i n the world and act w i t h i n i t . This 
conception i s not i n i t s e l f descriptive; i t does not represent features 
of an independent moral and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . Rather, i t creates the 
sense i n which adherents of the emotivist view believe i t t o be 
descriptive of t h e i r e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l world. 
This point effects our assessment of Maclntyre's r e j e c t i o n of 
emotivism as a form of e t h i c a l understanding. He argues t h a t the 
emotivist description of moral l i f e i s defective because the 
conception of the s e l f which i t presupposes i s erroneous on both 
desc r i p t i v e and moral grounds. For Maclntyre, the emotivist s e l f has 
'suffered a deprivation, a s t r i p p i n g away of q u a l i t i e s t h a t were once 
believed t o belong to the self.' (12) I t i s a s e l f which i s 'lacking any 
necessary social i d e n t i t y ' and therefore does not have a coherent 
'social embodiment', (13) I t i s to be contrasted, he says, with a type 
of s o c i a l i d e n t i t y that was manifested i n the past, because: 
In many pre-modern, t r a d i t i o n a l societies i t i s through his or her 
membership i n a variety of social groups t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
i d e n t i f i e s himself or herself and i s i d e n t i f i e d by others. I am 
brother, cousin and grandson, member of t h i s household, t h a t 
v i l l a g e , t h i s t r i b e . These are not c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t belong t o 
human beings accidently, t o be stripped away i n order t o 
discover 'the real me'. They are part of my substance, defining 
p a r t i a l l y at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and my 
duties. Individuals i n h e r i t a p a r t i c u l a r space w i t h i n an 
in t e r l o c k i n g set of soci a l relationships; lacking that space, they 
are nobody, or at least a stranger or an outcast. To know oneself 
as such a social person i s however not t o occupy a s t a t i c and 
f i x e d position. I t i s t o f i n d oneself placed a t a cer t a i n point 
on a journey with set goals; t o move through l i f e i s t o make 
progress - or t o f a i l t o make progress - towards a given end. 
<14) 
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For Maclntyre, t h i s pre-emotivist type of social i d e n t i t y involves 
a 'conception of a whole human l i f e as the primary subject of objective 
and impersonal evaluation, of a type of evaluation which provides the 
content f o r judgement upon the p a r t i c u l a r actions or projects of a 
given i n d i v i d u a l 1 . (15) I t involves, i n other words, a conception of the 
se l f as being p a r t l y constituted by the soc i a l practices w i t h i n which 
i t performs. As such, Maclntyre argues, i t i s better than the emotivist 
notion of the subject because i t provides a more accurate description 
of how the in d i v i d u a l relates t o h is normative moral l i f e . The 
emotivist view of the se l f i s therefore t o be rejected, he says, on the 
grounds th a t ' i t would generally be a decisive r e f u t a t i o n of a moral 
philosophy t o show th a t moral agency on i t s own account of the matter 
could never be s o c i a l l y embodied.' (16) 
However, we have been suggesting t h a t the emotivist conception of 
the s e l f does not s t r i c t l y speaking constitute a description at a l l . 
Rather, i t constitutes an ideological p o r t r a y a l which i s neither true 
nor false. I t follows that MacTntyre's attack on emotivism i s p a r t i a l l y 
misdirected. For although there are good philosophical reasons f o r 
rejecting the emotivist view, and favouring the 'socially c o n s t i t u t i v e ' 
notion of the self which Maclntyre advances, these philosophical 
considerations cannot decisively refute i t . The emotivist view belongs 
to a kind of moral philosophy that cannot be decisively refuted a t a l l 
because i t has an ideological character which i s immune from 
philosophical c r i t i c i s m . We may agree with Maclntyre t h a t the emotivist 
conception of the s e l f i s philosophically implausible and even morally 
repugnant, but there are no grounds upon which our arguments can 
conclusively refute i t . Indeed, i n assuming th a t the pre-emotivist 
conception of the s e l f provides a better description and e t h i c a l 
evaluation of moral agency, Maclntyre i s himself engaging i n a 
d i s t i n c t l y ideological argument. He i s attempting t o refute the claims 
of emotivism through the provision of philosophical considerations, but 
t h i s attempt amounts at bottom t o an ideological r e b u t t a l of views 
which are morally incompatible with h i s own. His argument i s on these 
grounds inconclusive. 
There i s , however, a great deal of t r u t h i n Maclntyre's treatment 
of the soc i a l context of emotivism. In p a r t i c u l a r , he i s correct t o 
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claim t h a t emotivism i s not, as i t assumes, a value-neutral enquiry 
i n t o the form of a l l e t h i c a l l i f e . However, Maclntyre f a i l s t o specify 
the d i s t i n c t senses i n which emotivism constitutes an ideological and 
philosophical achievement t h a t relates exclusively t o the doctrine of 
li b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m . We have made a preliminary attempt at t h i s task, 
but i t w i l l be necessary t o perform i t i n greater d e t a i l at a la t e r 
stage. There remains, though, a f i n a l issue which i s relevant t o our 
present discussion. I t relates t o Maclntyre's sociological claim t h a t 
emotivism r e f l e c t s t o a large degree the s p e c i f i c character of the 
modern age; an age which he takes t o be i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n nature. 
This sociological claim i s overstated. A var i e t y of e x p l i c i t l y 
a n t i - i n d i v i d u a l i s t p o l i t i c a l doctrines have emerged i n the modern age, 
and have contributed t o the shaping of contemporary p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
Marxism, Nationalism, Conservatism, National Socialism and Fascism are 
prime examples. A l l of these doctrines are founded upon 'socially 
c o n s t i t u t i v e 1 conceptions of the sel f . The Marxist notion of class, the 
Nati o n a l i s t idea of the state, the Conservative view of a t r a d i t i o n , 
and the National S o c i a l i s t conception of race, are a l l based upon 
conceptions of a social i d e n t i t y which are understood t o determine the 
character of the in d i v i d u a l . A l l these doctrines have i n d i f f e r e n t ways 
rejected the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t notion of the s o c i a l l y disengaged 
person. I t i s d i f f i c u l t therefore to see how Maclntyre can j u s t i f y h i s 
sociological claim. For we f i n d t h a t the emotivist conception of the 
se l f i s most c l e a r l y associated with a l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t view which 
has not been the sole ideological competitor i n the shaping of modern 
p o l i t i c s . Indeed, i t was precisely at the time of the emergence of 
emotivism i n the early 1930's that the ideologies of Stalinism, 
National Socialism and Fascism made t h e i r greatest p r a c t i c a l impact on 
European p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
Maclntyre chooses p a r t i a l l y to ignore t h i s issue by not 
considering the phenomenon of National Socialism and Fascism at a l l . 
We suspect t h a t he dismisses them out of hand f o r not being credible 
descriptions of the human condition. In short, he simply discounts 
t h e i r claims t o be treated as serious p o l i t i c a l doctrines, and therefore 
f a i l s t o consider how they may be seen t o be the expressions of 
conceptions of man which actually existed i n the p o l i t i c a l world of 
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Germany and I t a l y . Also, when he refers t o the phenomenon of Soviet 
Communism, he assumes th a t i t i s a d i s t o r t e d understanding which has 
betrayed the e t h i c a l message i n the w r i t i n g s of Marx. For he i n s i s t s 
that 'the barbarous despotism of the c o l l e c t i v e Tsardom which reigns i n 
Moscow can be taken t o be as i r r e l e v a n t to the question of the moral 
substance of Marxism as the l i f e of the Borgia pope was t o that of the 
moral substance of Ch r i s t i a n i t y ' . <17) 
Maclntyre's dismissal of National Socialism, Fascism and Soviet 
Communism i s highly dubious. We need to accord these doctrines the 
necessary degree of academic respect i n order t o explain f u l l y how they 
came t o make the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t that they did. Whatever t h e i r 
conceptual inadequacies may be, i t remains an indisputable f a c t t h a t 
they have a central place i n shaping the p o l i t i c a l character of the 
modern age. They succeeded, at d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l moments, i n 
capturing the imagination of large numbers of people who became 
committed t o the p o l i t i c a l cause which they represented. They have 
cl e a r l y had a s i g n i f i c a n t p r a c t i c a l impact on the p o l i t i c a l 
conceptions of modern man. Consequently, the emotivist or l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t view of the i n d i v i d u a l can only be understood as 
p a r t i a l l y r e f l e c t i n g the so c i a l context of persons in the e t h i c a l and 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e of t h i s century. 
I t i s of course possible to i n s i s t t h a t the terms 'emotivist' and 
'the modern age' refer exclusively t o the predominantly l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t culture of the contemporary Western Europe and Worth 
America. Maclntyre, however, wishes to say more than t h i s . He makes the 
i n t e r e s t i n g point t h a t the philosophical arguments of Nietzsche and 
Sartre include the emotivist contention t h a t moral judgement amounts 
to the self-expression of f r e e l y chosen preferences, Therefore, 
Maclntyre argues t h a t although Nietzsche and Sartre worked w i t h i n 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s they 'both conceded the 
substance of t h a t f o r which emotivism contended.' (18) In saying t h i s , 
Maclntyre appears t o assume tha t the emotivist view i s the outcome of 
a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t modern philosophical t r a d i t i o n s . This suggests 
that emotivist conclusions were drawn from a uniform conceptual schema 
or set of philosophical suppositions. For Maclntyre's point rests upon 
the assumption t h a t Nietzsche, Sartre and the Anglo-American 
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emotivists were asking, admittedly under d i f f e r e n t philosophical guises, 
the same e t h i c a l questions w i t h i n a 6ingle i n t e l l e c t u a l undertaking. 
We can question t h i s assumption t h a t there was a uniform e t h i c a l 
development which i s i d e n t i f i e d as being 'modern'. For i t i s equally 
plausible t o argue th a t although Hietzsche, Sartre and the Anglo-
American emotivists reached similar e t h i c a l conclusions, these 
resemblances were the outcome of asking d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l questions 
w i t h i n r a d i c a l l y d i s t i n c t t r a d i t i o n s located i n s p e c i f i c i n t e l l e c t u a l 
contexts. This raises the issue of whether the philosophical 
discourses of "Modernity" can be characterised - i n a way which i s 
sensitive to t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l contextuality - as a uniform project at 
a l l . And t h i s has implications f o r Maclntyre's thesis t h a t emotivism i s 
the culmination of a l l aspects of modern Western philosophical thought. 
We s h a l l examine t h i s claim i n greater d e t a i l at a l a t e r stage, but we 
have seen how i t appears t o be exaggerated. For we have shown that 
Maclntyre's thesis has, with revisions, a considerable force i n 
connecting emotivism with the philosophical expressions of l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideology. However, we have also seen how Maclntyre 
overstates the p r a c t i c a l impact of emotivism upon the p l u r a l i d e n t i t i e s 
of the modern age. 
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I I I . The History of Ideas. 
Haclntyre's discussion of the rel a t i o n s h i p between e t h i c a l theory 
and i t s h i s t o r i c a l and soc i a l context, and h i s assessment of the 
character of e t h i c a l emotivism, can be further examined by considering 
hi s general methodological understanding of what i t i s t o study the 
h i s t o r y of ideas. I t i s an approach which i s elaborated upon i n greater 
d e t a i l i n both h i s 'Postscript' t o the Second Edition of After Virtue 
(1985), and i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'The re l a t i o n s h i p of philosophy to 
i t s past', which appeared i n Philosophy i n History (1984). 
Maclntyre states t h a t what l i e s at the heart of the issue of how 
to study the h i s t o r y of ideas i s the question of the re l a t i o n s h i p 
between philosophy and h i s t o r y . As he points out i n the 'Postscript', 
i t remains an 'academic orthodoxy' w i t h i n the Anglo-Saxon t r a d i t i o n of 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy t o conceive of the philosophical and the 
h i s t o r i c a l forms of enquiry as quite d i s t i n c t : the one never 
con t r i b u t i n g t o the knowledge of the other. According t o t h i s orthodox 
view, any philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r subject-matter 
i s undertaken quite independently from any h i s t o r i c a l examination of 
the s p e c i f i c conditions which set i t i n i t s context. As such, Maclntyre 
argues, t h i s conception of philosophical analysis i s based upon the 
assumption th a t the appropriate c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y and t r u t h , 
which i t i s the task of the philosopher to discover, can be applied to 
a given subject-matter i n a way i n which does not conceptually relate 
t o the construction of a h i s t o r i c a l narrative. In t h i s account, the 
v a l i d i t y or no n - v a l i d i t y of certain t h e o r e t i c a l claims can be 
established without attending to any h i s t o r i c a l l y relevant 
considerations. Thus we f i n d t hat, as Maclntyre says, 'the h i s t o r i a n of 
ideas i s assigned the task of recounting the r i s e and f a l l of ideas', 
whereas ' i t f a l l s to the philosopher t o determine by the best r a t i o n a l 
methods what i s i n f a c t true'. (1) 
This orthodox view has been assumed by many of those t h e o r i s t s 
who wish to c r i t i c i s e Maclntyre's claim t h a t a f u l l understanding of 
the philosophical character of emotivism requires a h i s t o r i c a l 
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examination of i t s emergence. For instance, William K. Frankena i n s i s t s 
t h a t ' I can, i f I have the r i g h t conceptual equipment, understand what 
the view i s without seeing i t as the r e s u l t of an h i s t o r i c a l 
development; and, so f a r as I can see, I can also assess i t s status as 
true or false or r a t i o n a l t o believe without seeing i t as such an 
outcome'. (2) Frankena also contends t h a t Maclntyre's assessment of 
emotivism as a defective form of understanding i s i t s e l f based upon the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a n a l y t i c a l philosophy and h i s t o r y . He writes tha t ; 
Maclntyre's own arguments against emotivism are drawn from 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy; and h i s claim t h a t modern attempts t o 
j u s t i f y morality fail and had to fail i s a claim t h a t can be 
established only by a n a l y t i c a l philosophy, not by some kind of 
hi s t o r y . (3) 
Maclntyre, however, argues th a t these objections are misplaced. The 
f i r s t one r e s t s upon a false view of the re l a t i o n s h i p between 
philosophy and h i s t o r y , and the second one i s based upon a 
mis i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s methodological approach. He seeks, therefore, 
to c l a r i f y h i s position when he says that: 
I am committed t o maintaining t h a t although arguments of the kind 
favoured by analytic philosophy do possess an indispensable 
power, i t i s only w i t h i n the context of a p a r t i c u l a r genre of 
h i s t o r i c a l inquiry t h a t such arguments can support the type of 
claim about t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y which philosophers 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y aspire t o j u s t i f y . (4) 
Maclntyre, then, does not deny t h a t r a t i o n a l arguments possess an 
'indispensable power' i n exposing the confusions, inconsistencies and 
i m p l a u s i b i l i t i e s of ce r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l claims. However, he i n s i s t s 
t h a t what counts as a r a t i o n a l argument, as employed w i t h i n 
philosophical analysis and elsewhere, i s always dependent upon 
p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l conditions. The standards of r a t i o n a l i t y and t r u t h 
which make a philosophical analysis possible are always determined by 
the h i s t o r i c a l development of ideas. Therefore, the to o l s of c r i t i c a l 
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analysis which a philosopher has at his disposal at any given moment 
are related t o the h i s t o r i c a l context of t h e i r use. As such, the type of 
claim about t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y which i s appropriate to philosophical 
enquiry i s related t o those considerations which are relevant t o an 
h i s t o r i c a l enquiry. 
Maclntyre asserts t h a t i t i s t h i s connection between philosophy 
and h i s t o r y which the adherents of the orthodox view have overlooked. 
In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s a connection which Frankena f a i l s t o acknowledge 
i n h i s conception of the task of the moral philosopher. For i t i s a 
posit i o n which, Maclntyre says, rests upon two false assumptions. The 
f i r s t i s th a t there exists a general and timeless standard of t r u t h and 
r a t i o n a l i t y which i t i s the task of the philosopher t o discover. The 
second i s th a t i t i s possible t o specify through pure analysis a single 
subject-matter which possesses a universal t h e o r e t i c a l status. 
I t i s the second assumption t h a t Maclntyre seeks t o contend with 
when he stresses: 
the importance of the undeniable fact... t h a t the subject matters 
of moral philosophy at least - the evaluative and normative 
concepts, maxims, arguments and judgements about which the moral 
philosopher enquires - are nowhere t o be found except as embodied 
i n the h i s t o r i c a l l i v e s of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups and so 
possessing the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of h i s t o r i c a l existence: 
both i d e n t i t y and change through time, expression i n 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d practice as well as i n discourse, i n t e r a c t i o n and 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with a var i e t y of farms of a c t i v i t y . Morality 
which i s no p a r t i c u l a r society's morality i s t o be found nowhere. 
There was the-morality-of-fourth-century-Athens, there were the-
moralities-of-thirteenth-century-Vestern Europe; there are 
numerous such moralities, but where ever was or i s morality as 
such ? (5) 
I t i s t o be noted here t h a t philosophers of the orthodox view do 
not dispute with Maclntyre the undeniable sociological f a c t t h a t there 
has never been i n our world of c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y a single practical 
understanding of 'morality as such'. However, i t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
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feature of t h e i r p o s i t i o n t o assume tha t i t i s possible t o provide a 
correct theoretical analysis of the nature of a l l these various 
p r a c t i c a l moral understandings. The emotivists, f o r example, purport t o 
have described the universal character of a l l moral discourse, past 
present, and future. This i s t o claim t h a t the subject-matter of 
'morality as such' has a recognisable form, although i t s s p e c i f i c 
content has varied from epoch t o epoch, and culture t o culture. 
Maclntyre argues t h a t t h i s claim depends upon the f i r s t f a l s e 
assumption noted above. I t presupposes th a t there e x i s t s a general and 
timeless standard of t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y by which to judge the 
v a l i d i t y of t h e o r e t i c a l claims advanced i n various e t h i c a l theories 
irr e s p e c t i v e of the d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l contexts i n which 
they are set. This involves, f o r Maclntyre, the making of the 
'universalist error', because a l l moral philosophy, and a l l the 
conceptual t o o l s at the disposal of the moral philosopher, presuppose a 
sociology. He i n s i s t s t h a t any e t h i c a l theory advanced by a moral 
philosopher, and any c r i t i c a l analysis of t h a t theory by another moral 
philosopher, i s always ult i m a t e l y based upon a p r a c t i c a l e t h i c a l 
understanding which i s adopted i n a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l period. He 
says that: 
any p a r t i c u l a r morality has as i t s core standards by which 
reasons f o r action are judged more or less adequate, conceptions 
of how q u a l i t i e s of character relate t o q u a l i t i e s of actions, 
judgements as how rules are t o be formulated, and so on. Thus 
although there i s always more t o any p a r t i c u l a r morality than the 
philosophy i m p l i c i t w i t h i n i t , there i s no morality allegience t o 
which does not involve some philosophical stance, e x p l i c i t or 
i m p l i c i t . Moral philosophies are, before they are anything else, 
the e x p l i c i t a r t i c u l a t i o n s of the claims of p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l i t i e s 
t o r a t i o n a l allegience. And t h i s i s why the h i s t o r y of morality 
and the h i s t o r y of moral philosophy are a single h i s t o r y . <6) 
In saying t h i s Maclntyre blurs the d i s t i n c t i o n between e t h i c a l theory 
and practice. For he i n s i s t s t h a t any t h e o r e t i c a l explanation of 
morality constitutes the a r t i c u l a t i o n of a p r a c t i c a l e t h i c a l 
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understanding which i s h i s t o r i c a l l y specific. He takes t h i s point t o be 
a r e f u t a t i o n of the orthodox view of the d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
th e o r e t i c a l analysis and practice, and philosophy and hi s t o r y . However, 
l e t us consider the assumptions which inform i t . 
I t can be suggested t h a t Maclntyre has over-emphasised the 
significance of the con t e x t u a l i s t point about the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c 
character of the notions of r a t i o n a l i t y and t r u t h . This i s because i t 
appears t h a t the orthodox conception of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy can be 
defended without maintaining the admittedly highly implausible 
assumption t h a t the standards of r a t i o n a l i t y and t r u t h are general, 
timeless or a h i s t o r i c a l . Indeed, most contemporary philosophers who 
understand t h e i r enterprises t o be purely a n a l y t i c a l do not adhere t o 
such a metaphysical view. Idealism and Rationalism are no longer 
popular positions. A l l that these philosophers need t o show i s that 
t h e i r philosophical a c t i v i t i e s are distinguishable from the contingent 
h i s t o r i c a l considerations which have shaped the development of t h e i r 
conceptual apparatus or to o l s of analysis. They need not be committed 
t o the view t h a t the notions of r a t i o n a l i t y and t r u t h which provide 
t h i s apparatus are a h i s t o r i c a l . Obviously t h i s does need t o be shown, 
but our point f o r the moment i s th a t an attachment t o what Maclntyre 
c a l l s the 'universalist error* i s not necessarily presupposed i n the 
orthodox conception of philosophy. 
The implications of t h i s point can be i l l u s t r a t e d i n another way. 
Maclntyre maintains, f o r instance, t h a t the emotivist thinkers are 
representatives of the misconceived orthodox conception of philosophy. 
What they are r e a l l y doing, he says, i s o f f e r i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l 
explanation of the form of e t h i c a l language which i n f a c t merely 
a r t i c u l a t e s the p r a c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c moral understanding 
of our age. He extends t h i s observation i n t o a general claim t h a t any 
e t h i c a l t h e o r i s t i s s u f f e r i n g from a mistaken s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n i f he 
believes himself to be providing an analysis of 'morality as such' 
which i s not p r a c t i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y specific. 
However, Maclntyre's general claim i s only plausible i f we 
assume t h a t a l l moral philosophy i s necessarily both descriptive and 
pr e s c r i p t i v e i n character, i n t h a t i t amounts t o a t h e o r e t i c a l 
explanation of morality which presupposes cer t a i n normative 
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assumptions w i t h i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l import. We have noted e a r l i e r 
t h a t t h i s assumption i s unwarranted. This can be shown by b r i e f l y 
specifying the sense i n which theory and practice are d i s t i n c t , A 
t h e o r e t i c a l explanation i n t e r p r e t s p r a c t i c a l events i n the world. As 
Popper and others have shown, i t takes the form of a hypothesis which 
i s l o g i c a l l y capable of v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n . An authentic 
t h e o r e t i c a l hypothesis, i n other words, must be amenable t o either 
confirmation or r e f u t a t i o n according t o the facts. Further, the t h e o r i s t 
who posits such a hypothesis must be detached and ulti m a t e l y 
disinterested. He must be prepared t o abandon h i s beli e f i n the t r u t h 
of the theory i n the l i g h t of c o n f l i c t i n g evidence. I f he f a i l s t o do 
so, then he has misunderstood the f a c t t h a t the status of a t h e o r e t i c a l 
explanation depends upon the provision of empirically contingent 
evidence. 
By contrast, a p r a c t i c a l understanding of the world involves an 
interested commitment t o i t . To believe i n a set of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s 
which are put i n t o practice, f o r instance, constitutes the expression of 
emotional convictions which are f a r harder t o abandon than t h e o r e t i c a l 
b e l i e f s . I t requires a change i n the conception of how you morally 
relate t o others which i s f a r more personally s i g n i f i c a n t than a 
re v i s i o n of your th e o r e t i c a l views. A r a t i o n a l allegiance t o a 
th e o r e t i c a l explanation i s therefore distinguishable from a 
fundamentally emotional and normative allegiance t o a p r a c t i c a l 
understanding of the world. The l a t t e r commits the adherent t o act i n a 
manner which i s inappropriate to the former. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n relates t o Maclntyre's claim t h a t a l l moral 
philosophy i s necessarily both descriptive and normative. This i s 
because i f theory and practice can be c l e a r l y distinguished, then the 
descriptive and normative elements which may reside i n c e r t a i n types 
of 'moral philosophy' can be separated. Maclntyre f a i l s t o acknowledge 
t h i s because he does not d i s t i n g u i s h between philosophy and ideology. 
He f a i l s t o show t h a t any moral philosophy which attempts, either 
e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , t o j u s t i f y an allegiance t o a p r a c t i c a l e t h i c a l 
understanding i s not purely philosophical i n character but also has a 
centr a l ideological element which i s separable from i t . 
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Despite these objections t o Maclntyre's treatment of philosophy, 
we can agree with him on a number of points. There i s a need t o 
emphasise the re l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy and h i s t o r y , and abandon 
any conception of philosophy as an enquiry which employs universal or 
a h i s t o r i c a l notions of t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y . Once i t i s acknowledged 
tha t contemporary philosophical enquiries are the outcome of changed 
perceptions about the character of a philosophical understanding, then 
i t f ollows t h a t the tools of analysis which are available t o us are 
themselves shaped by the h i s t o r i c a l development of philosophical ideas. 
This i s t o recognise, f o r example, t h a t our philosophical understanding 
of morality or mathematics i s determined by certain conventional 
practices which relate t o our h i s t o r y . Even propositions which are 
axiomatic, such as 2+2 = 4, are only true because they are 'necessary 
by convention': they constitute the fundamental rules of an i n t e l l i g i b l e 
way of looking at the world which i s contingently dependent upon 
h i s t o r i c a l considerations rather than r e l a t i n g t o an a p r i o r i 
metaphysical t r u t h . 
E t h i c a l t h e o r i s t s such as the emotivists have been in s e n s i t i v e t o 
these considerations. As Maclntyre points out, they have f a l s e l y 
assumed th a t a timeless c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y can be 
employed t o discover the form of 'morality as such' i n the past, 
present and future. In saying t h i s , however, we do not need t o conclude 
t h a t no understanding of 'morality as such* can possibly be given. We 
can assert, f o r instance, t h a t a l l e t h i c a l understandings are determined 
by practices or 'forms of l i f e ' which are set i n h i s t o r i c a l contexts. 
Maclntyre himself appears t o support t h i s claim, but he overlooks the 
fa c t t h a t i t i s a purely conceptual claim which i s the r e s u l t of pure 
philosophical analysis. Further, i t i s a th e o r e t i c a l claim which need 
not be put t o p r a c t i c a l use. I t does not assume any practically 
relevant norms, or make any p r e s c r i p t i v e recommendations t h a t are 
intended t o ef f e c t a change of p r a c t i c a l commitment i n the world. 
Kather, i t i s t o make a purely a n a l y t i c a l claim t h a t may be correct or 
incorrect. This indicates t h a t Maclntyre i s wrong t o dismiss the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t philosophy can provide an i m p a r t i a l analysis, and i s 
likewise mistaken t o blur the d i s t i n c t i o n between theory and practice. 
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We can see, then, t h a t Mac In tyre's account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between philosophy and h i s t o r y i s not e n t i r e l y convincing. He i s 
correct t o point out the central error of the orthodox view by showing 
how the universal and a h i s t o r i c a l notions of t r u t h and r a t i o n a l i t y 
which t h i s view assumes i s false. However, t h i s error need not be 
inherent i n our conception of philosophy as pure analysis. We can 
revise the orthodox view without t o t a l l y abandoning the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between philosophical analysis and h i s t o r i c a l narrative. 
Nonetheless, whatever the weaknesses of Maclntyre's pos i t i o n , i t 
i s t o be noted t h a t he provides an i n t e r e s t i n g account of how 
t h e o r e t i c a l confrontation, resolution and development i s possible w i t h i n 
the discourse of what he c a l l s our 'philosophical history'. In 'The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of philosophy t o i t s past' he contends that : 
p a r t i c u l a r small-scale theories come to us f o r the most part 
embedded i n larger bodies of theory; and such larger bodies of 
theory are i n turn embedded i n s t i l l more comprehensive schemes 
of belief. I t i s these schemes of b e l i e f which provide the 
framework of c o n t i n u i t y through time w i t h i n which the t r a n s i t i o n 
from one incommensurable body of theory t o i t s r i v a l i s made; 
and there has t o be such a framework, f o r without the conceptual 
resources i t affords we could not understand the two bodies of 
theory as r i v a l s which provide a l t e r n a t i v e and incompatible 
accounts of one and the same subject matter and which o f f e r us 
r i v a l and incompatible means of achieving one and the same set of 
theoretical goals. (7) 
Maclntyre asserts t h a t p a r t i c u l a r small-scale theories which generate 
lo c a l t h e o r e t i c a l disputes are set w i t h i n more general theories. These 
larger bodies of theory count as r i v a l s because they presuppose a 
shared framework of b e l i e f which provides a 'common sp e c i f i c a t i o n of 
subject matter and t h e o r e t i c a l goals' (8) That i s , i t i s t h i s shared 
conception of a subject matter and 'stock of senses and references at 
the l e v e l of Weltanschauung1 which enables r i v a l t h e o r e t i c a l accounts to 
compete w i t h each other. (9) 
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Maclntyre takes t h i s observation t o be both empirical and l o g i c a l ; 
i t constitutes a narrative account of how th e o r e t i c a l confrontations 
arise which i s based upon the l o g i c a l claim t h a t unless theories 
purport to describe the same subject-matter they 'simply lack the 
lo g i c a l properties which warrant us i n c l a s s i f y i n g them as r i v a l s ' , 
(10) For although these theories are incompatible and incommensurable 
by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t they cannot both be true a t the same time, 
they must always share a commensurable lev e l of concepts and 
the o r e t i c a l goals which makes communication and r i v a l competition 
between them possible. 
Maclntyre also contends t h a t i t i s t h i s shared framework of 
conceptual b e l i e f s and th e o r e t i c a l goals which enables us t o judge 
which r i v a l t h e o r e t i c a l account i s 'r a t i o n a l l y superior 1 t o the other. As 
such, i t enables us t o explain the t r a n s i t i o n from one theory t o 
another. He asserts that: 
what constitutes the r a t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y of one large 
philosophical standpoint over another i s i t s a b i l i t y tD transcend 
the l i m i t a t i o n s of tha t other by providing from i t s own point of 
view a better explanation and understanding of the f a i l u r e s , 
f r u s t r a t i o n s and incoherencies of the other point of view 
(f a i l u r e s , f r u s t r a t i o n s and incoherencies, t h a t i s , as judged by 
the standards i n t e r n a l t o t h a t other point of view) than t h a t 
other point of view can give of i t s e l f . (11) 
Part of t h i s involves revealing how the other theory i s unable t o 
resolve problems which by i t s own i n t e r n a l standards are recognised t o 
be i n need of resolution. This presupposes t h a t both theories share the 
same t h e o r e t i c a l goal, and seek t o resolve any d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t 
f r u s t r a t e i t s achievement. 
Maclntyre does not relate h i s general account of the nature of 
the o r e t i c a l disputes and resolutions i n our 'philosophical h i s t o r y ' t o 
his s p e c i f i c treatment i n After Virtue of the emergence of e t h i c a l 
emotivism and the demise of e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s m . I t i s , however, an 
account which i s assumed i n his assessment of the two theories. I t 
might therefore be worthwhile t o indicate how h i s general 
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methodological considerations comport with h i s approach t o these 
theories. 
We can see th a t the lo c a l t h e o r e t i c a l disputes conducted by such 
thinkers as Stevenson, Duncan-Jones, Barnes, G.E. Moore and Pritchard 
constitute, i n Haclntyre's account, the a r t i c u l a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r small-
scale theories. These moral theories are embedded i n larger bodies of 
theory which are characterised as e t h i c a l emotivism and e t h i c a l 
i n t u i t i o n i s m , and which are i n t u r n embedded i n a s t i l l more 
comprehensive scheme of bel i e f which i s characterised as modern 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. As such, both emotivism and i n t u i t i o n i s m share, 
at the level of Weltanschauung, the same conceptions about the 
t h e o r e t i c a l goals which can be achieved by o f f e r i n g the best 
explanation or description of the nature of morality. That i s , the 
adherents of both theories assume tha t they are attending t o the 
problem of accounting f o r the same subject-matter, namely, 'the ethical'. 
I t i s t h i s shared assumption about the nature of the e t h i c a l as a 
single subject-matter which makes e t h i c a l emotivism and e t h i c a l 
i n t u i t i o n i s m r i v a l and incompatible theories, i n t h a t both accounts 
cannot be true at the same time. 
I t can also be shown th a t , i n Maclntyre's view, e t h i c a l emotivism 
i s r a t i o n a l l y superior t o e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s m . A plausible narrative 
account can be given which indicates how the emotivist theory 
accurately assesses the success and f a i l u r e , and transcends the 
l i m i t a t i o n s , of the i n t u i t i o n i s t view. Such an account can be sketched 
along these line s . The emotivists praise the i n t u i t i o n i s t r e f u t a t i o n of 
a l l 'naturalist' accounts of ethics, i n t h a t they acknowledge the 
i n t u i t i o n i s t i n s i g h t t h a t any e t h i c a l theory which operates w i t h i n the 
e m p i r i c i s t framework cannot be simply n a t u r a l i s t i n character, 
According t o the emotivists, therefore, the i n t u i t i o n i s t theory as 
advanced by Moore and Pritchard gained the t h e o r e t i c a l successes which 
i t d i d because they exposed the weakness and f a i l u r e of the previously 
dominant n a t u r a l i s t account of ethics. This success was accompanied at 
the p r a c t i c a l level by the acceptance of t h i s i n t u i t i o n i s t view by 
those notable thinkers i n the 'Bloomsbury group' who were convinced 
t h a t Moore had provided them with a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e 
l i f e s t y l e . 
- 93 -
The emotivists argue, however, t h a t the i n t u i t i o n i s t theory faces 
insurmountable d i f f i c u l t i e s on i t s own terms. The problem i s t h a t 
e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s m i s rooted i n a misconception of the function and 
use of e t h i c a l language. Most notably, the theory pays i n s u f f i c i e n t 
a t t e n t i o n t o the emotive aspect of the e t h i c a l l i f e , and f a i l s t o 
recognise t h a t e t h i c a l judgements constitute the non-cognitive 
expression of feeling. This f a i l u r e i s reflected i n the i n t u i t i o n i s t 
dependence upon an ontological thesis about 'non-natural properties' 
which i s implausibly metaphysical, and cannot perform the t h e o r e t i c a l 
task of accounting f o r the emotive function of e t h i c a l language. 
I t i s t o be noted t h a t when i n t u i t i o n i s t thinkers attempt t o 
revise t h e i r own accounts i n a way which accommodates the significance 
of the emotive function of e t h i c a l language they are reduced t o 
confusion and indecision. We f i n d Moore recognising i n his 'Reply t o my 
C r i t i c s ' (1942) th a t Stevenson's analysis of 'emotive meaning' i s 
powerful enough, i f correct, seriously to undermine the p l a u s i b i l i t y of 
hi s own account, and yet remaining unsure whether t o accept or deny 
Stevenson's point. And Moore's indecisiveness p e r s i s t s throughout the 
l a t t e r stages of h i s career. As CD Broad comments i n 1961, 
he i s now incline d to t h i n k t h a t moral disagreement may be 
nothing but oppositon of emotional a t t i t u d e ; but he i s also 
inclined about equally s t r o n g l y t o t h i n k t h a t i t involves a 
l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t between incompatible beliefs. (12) 
The emotivists of course assert t h a t Moore's indecisiveness i s 
u n j u s t i f i e d . They i n s i s t t h a t h i s reluctance t o t a l l y to abandon the 
notion t h a t e t h i c a l disagreement may be a matter of incompatible 
b e l i e f s about an objective e t h i c a l t r u t h i s misplaced. I t merely 
underlines the f a c t t h a t the i n t u i t i o n i s t theory i s incapable w i t h i n 
i t s own account of coherently recognising the emotive functions of 
e t h i c a l language. 
We can see, then, t h a t the emotivists have been successful i n 
exposing the weaknesses and f a i l u r e s of the i n t u i t i o n i s t theory. This 
i s because the emotivist analysis provides an accurate description of 
the character of contemporary moral discourse. As Maclntyre says, 
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emotivism provides the best available explanation of the function and 
uses of our modern e t h i c a l vocabulary. Therefore, i t i s r a t i o n a l l y 
superior t o i t s i n t u i t i o n i s t predecessor. 
Haclntyre f u r t h e r contends t h a t the 'Aristotelian" conception of 
ethics i s r a t i o n a l l y superior t o the emotivist account. He supports t h i s 
claim by arguing t h a t the 'socially c o n s t i t u t i v e ' notion of the s e l f 
which i s advanced i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n account of the v i r t u e s i s better 
than the emotivist conception of the free and s o c i a l l y disengaged 
subject. We have already seen t h a t there are good philosophical reasons 
fo r agreeing with t h i s argument. However, t h i s argument does not i n 
i t s e l f support Maclntyre's claim. In order t o show t h i s , we must attend 
to the underlying methodological assumptions which Maclntyre holds i n 
making the claim. He appears t o assume t h a t the A r i s t o t e l i a n and 
emotivist accounts are r i v a l theories, i n t h a t they purport t o describe 
the same subject-matter, namely 'the ethical', and share the same 
the o r e t i c a l goals. This assumes t h a t the t r a n s i t i o n from the pre-
modern to the modern philosophical understanding was not as r a d i c a l l y 
d i s j o i n t e d as i t may a t f i r s t appear. Indeed, Maclntyre s p e c i f i c a l l y 
i n s i s t s t h a t although the modern understanding became the dominant 
view, there remains i n fragmented form an element of A r i s t o t e l i a n 
t h i n k i n g i n our contemporary culture. As such, he says, there i s a 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we may be able t o resuscitate the A r i s t o t e l i a n forms 
of moral t h i n k i n g i n a way which revises our predominantly emotivist 
conception of moral practices. 
There are, however, a number of problems associated w i t h these 
assumptions. F i r s t l y , i t i s at least equally plausible t o claim t h a t 
there i s l i t t l e or no evidence t h a t fragmented elements of d i s t i n c t l y 
A r i s t o t e l i a n ways of t h i n k i n g have been maintained w i t h i n our culture 
and philosophical h i s t o r y . This claim, i f convincing, leads us tD make 
the important conceptual point t h a t Maclntyre i s himself trapped w i t h i n 
the predominantly emotivist g r i d of understanding: an understanding 
from which there i s no escape t o the A r i s t o t e l i a n view. Secondly, i t i s 
plausible t o reject Maclntyre's assumption t h a t the A r i s t o t e l i a n and 
emotivist theories purport t o describe the same subject-matter. This i s 
to deny t h a t there i s a shared conception of m o r a l i t y which has been 
translated through time from the Greeks to the present day. Rather, i t 
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can be argued t h a t A r i s t o t l e , h i s associates, and the emotivists are 
addressing r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t questions about e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t 
conceptions of the nature of morality. For although there i s a 
s u p e r f i c i a l sense i n which a l l e t h i c a l t h e o r i s t s from A r i s t o t l e t o the 
present day have employed common concepts - such as the 'good', and 
'obligation' - these concepts have been accorded r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
meanings over time as t h e i r expression and reference has altered w i t h i n 
h i s t o r i c a l developments. This point, i f correct, undermines Maclntyre's 
claim t h a t the A r i s t o t e l i a n view i s r a t i o n a l l y superior t o the emotivist 
view because i t questions the conditions upon which t h i s claim can be 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . That i s , i t denies that we can speak s i g n i f i c a n t l y of the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n and emotivist accounts as r i v a l theories which refer t o 
the same subject-matter, namely, the et h i c a l . 
However, whatever the d i f f i c u l t i e s are i n Maclntyre's treatment of 
emotivism, philosophy and hi s t o r y , i t i s p r o f i t a b l e t o take our lead 
from him and construct i n greater d e t a i l a na r r a t i v e account of the 
emergence of the emotive theory, i n order t o gain a clearer h i s t o r i c a l 
i n s i g h t i n t o i t s fundamental character. 
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6. The H i s t o r i c a l Emergence of Emotivism, 
I . Towards an Bmotivist View. 
Maclntyre suggests t h a t a s a t i s f a c t o r y understanding of the 
character and significance of e t h i c a l emotivism can only be reached 
through an examination of the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c context of i t s 
emergence. An assessment of t h i s context reveals the nature of a 
controversy raised at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge i n the 
192O's and 1930's which constituted p r i m a r i l y a reaction t o the e t h i c a l 
theory of G E Moore. I t was t h i s dispute which shaped the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
conditions i n which the d i s t i n c t l y emotivist view of ethics came t o 
f l o u r i s h . 
The response t o Moore's e t h i c a l theory which provided the basis of 
the emotivist view was f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d i n The Meaning of Meaning 
(1923) by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards. The objection of these Cambridge 
academics t o Moore's conception of the nature of the 'good' i s captured 
i n a passage which reads: 
I t seems probable t h a t t h i s word (namely, 'good') i s esse n t i a l l y a 
c o l l e c t i o n of homonyms, such t h a t the set of things, roughly, 
those i n connection which we hear i t pronounced i n early years 
(a good bed, a good kick, a good God) have no common 
char a c t e r i s t i c s . But another use of the word i s often asserted t o 
occur, of which some at least of those we have c i t e d are supposed 
t o be degenerations, where 'good' i n alleged t o stand f o r a unique, 
unanalysible concept. This concept, i t i s said, i s the subject-
matter of Ethics. This peculiar e t h i c a l use of 'good' i s , we 
suggest, a purely emotive use. When so used the word stands f o r 
nothing whatever, and has no symbolic function. Thus, when we use 
i t i n the sentence, 'Tils i s good', we merely re f e r t o this, and 
the addition of 'is good' makes no difference whatever t o our 
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reference. When on the other hand, we say 'This i s red', the 
addition t h a t 'is red' t o 'this' does symbolise an extension of our 
reference, namely, t o some other red thing. But 'is good' has no 
comparable symbolic function; i t serves only as an emotive sign 
expressing our a t t i t u d e t o 'this*, and perhaps evoking s i m i l a r 
a t t i t u d e s i n other persons, or i n c i t i n g them t o actions of one 
kind or another. (1) 
In saying t h a t the e t h i c a l use of 'good' does not stand f o r the 
name of a unique, unanalysible concept, Ogden and Richards accuse Moore 
of being one of the philosophers who 'hypostatise t h e i r definiendum... 
by inventing a peculiar s t u f f , an i n t r i n s i c property, and then saying 
th a t l e t everything which possesses t h i s be said t o possess meaning.' 
(2) That i s , t h e i r charge against Moore i s tha t he i s f a l s e l y committed 
to the view that our e t h i c a l concepts must refer t o some substantive 
property which gives them meaning. In other words, Qgden and Richards 
observe t h a t Moore's acquiescence with the r e f e r e n t i a l theory of 
meaning, and h i s insistence t h a t 'good' does not relate t o natural 
properties, forces him to invent a 'peculiar s t u f f or non-natural 
property which the name 'good' does stand f o r . However, they argue t h a t 
t h i s move i s unconvincing because i t f a i l s t o di s t i n g u i s h between the 
'symbolic' or descriptive and the emotive functions of our language, As 
such, i t f a i l s t o acknowledge t h a t the function of our et h i c a l concepts 
i s 'purely emotive', and possesses a meaning which i s non-symbolic or 
non-referential i n character. This i s to overlook the f a c t t h a t e t h i c a l 
sentences are made 'not f o r the sake of t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y but f o r 
the sake of the at t i t u d e s which t h e i r acceptance w i l l evoke.' (3) 
Ogden and Richards' discussion of morality i s , then, p r i m a r i l y 
based upon a d i s t i n c t i o n which they make between the descriptive and 
the evaluative functions of our language. According t o t h e i r account, 
s c i e n t i f i c discourse i s descriptive and capable of issuing statements 
which s a t i s f y t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s , whereas e t h i c a l or evaluative discourse 
i s a matter of expressing feelings, rather than s t a t i n g t r u t h s , 
This emotive theory of value i s restated i n the context of an 
analysis of the nature of 'aesthetic discussion' by F.P. Ramsey, the 
Cambridge mathematician. His views are f i r s t expressed i n 1925, but 
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were published posthumously i n the 'Epilogue' t o The Foundations of 
Mathematics (1931). He writes that: 
What we r e a l l y l i k e doing is... t o compare our experience; a 
practice which i n t h i s case i s peculiarly p r o f i t a b l e because the 
c r i t i c can point out things t o other people, t o which, i f they 
attend, they w i l l obtain feelings which they value which they 
f a i l e d t o obtain otherwise. We do not and cannot discuss whether 
one work of a r t i s better than another; we merely compare the 
feelings i t gives us. (4) 
Hamsey continues t h a t 'about a r t one exchanges not information but 
feelings....tto] quarrel w i t h a man's feelings, one can only have 
d i f f e r e n t feelings oneself, and perhaps regard one's own as more 
admirable or more conducive t o a happy l i f e . ' (5) In extending t h i s 
observation t o a l l forms of understanding which are ess e n t i a l l y 
evaluative rather than descriptive, he asserts t h a t 'Theology and 
Absolute Ethics are two famous subjects which we have realised t o have 
no r e a l objects. 1 <6) 
Another contributor t o t h i s l i n e of thought i s R.B. Braithwaite, a 
Fellow of Kings College, Cambridge, who c r i t i c i s e s Moore's e t h i c a l 
theory i n a way which he acknowledges t o be drawn from the suggestions 
of Ogden and Richards. Braithwaite addressed the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society 
on March 19th 1928, g i v i n g a paper e n t i t l e d 'Verbal Ambiguity and 
Philosophical Analysis' which was published i n the Proceedings (1927-
1928). In t h i s paper he outlines Moore's argument f o r the contentions 
t h a t 'good' i s a simple, i r r e d u c i b l e q u a l i t y , and t h a t e t h i c a l sentences 
about the 'good' are propositions about t h i s q u a l i t y . In making these 
contentions, Braithwaite suggests, there i s something which Moore 
'entirely neglects': 
This i s the f a c t t h a t most of the sentences i n which the word 
•good' or s i m i l a r e t h i c a l words occur are not the expressions of 
propositions at a l l . Such sentences as the spontaneous 'That i s 
good' before a picture or the i r r i t a t e d 'You are a naughty c h i l d 1 
usually have no 'meaning' i n the sense i n which a sentence has a 
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meaning when i t expresses a proposition which the speaker wishes 
to convey t o the hearer, A great number of the sentences i n 
which the word 'good' occurs are merely noises made either t o 
'purge' an emotion i n the speaker or t o produce d i r e c t l y a d e f i n i t e 
action or emotion i n the hearer. They do not represent 
propositions at a l l : t h e i r object i s not symbolic, but emotive. 
I f I see something which a t t r a c t s me strongly, the words 'Oh, that 
i s good' may come out of my l i p s ; but these are not the 
expressions of an e t h i c a l or aesthetic judgement: they are quite 
simply a sound which, owing largely t o my education, takes the 
form of words that under other circumstances I might use with a 
symbolic meaning. The whole sentence i s psychologically of the 
same nature of the opening 'Oh'. I am j u s t expressing an emotion: 
I am not even expressing the proposition t h a t I am feeling an 
emotion, although t h i s may be deduced from the f a c t that I am 
u t t e r i n g a sound. (7) 
For Braithwaite, then, Moore's analysis of the nature of 'good' i s 
inadequate because i t neglects the s p e c i f i c character of evaluative 
expressions. This i s due t o the f a c t t h a t Moore f a i l s to address 'the 
uses of language Messrs. Ogden and Richards c a l l 'emotive', and 
d i s t i n g u i s h from the 'symbolic' or ' s c i e n t i f i c ' use i n the d i r e c t 
expression of a judgement*. <8) Consequently, Moore f a i l s to observe 
th a t 'our most frequent use of e t h i c a l words i s only 'emotive' so t h a t 
the sentences i n which they occur do not represent propositions at a l l ' . 
(9) As Braithwaite puts i t , 'most apparent e t h i c a l judgements ... are not 
judgements at a l l , but expressions of emotions or v o l i t i o n s ' . (10) 
This kind of observation i s clearly emotivist i n character. 
Thinkers such as Ogden, Richards, Ramsey and Braithwaite paved the way 
i n the 1920's f o r the emotivist view of morality t o develop. However, i t 
i s i n the early 1930's th a t systematic attempts t o provide an emotivist 
theory of ethics emerge. In order t o show t h i s , we s h a l l focus on the 
w r i t i n g s of Stevenson, Duncan-Jones, Barnes and Ayer by drawing upon 
unpublished or previously unconsidered material. 
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I I . C.L. Stevenson. 
Stevenson studied f o r h i s f i r s t degree at Yale between 1926-30. 
Although he majored i n English Literature he attended the "Philosophy B1 
course i n h i s t h i r d year, and i t was during t h i s period t h a t h i s 
thoughts on ethics took shape. He admits t h a t he was 'at the time 
i n s i s t i n g , i n a way more urgent than clear, t h a t values must be 
objective.' (1) However, he came t o reject any such attempt t o place 
ethics upon an objective f o o t i n g w h i l s t s t i l l a t Yale. This i s revealed 
i n a paper e n t i t l e d 'Essay on the Pragmatic Proof of the R e l a t i v i t y of 
Truth', which i s dated March 28th 1929. In t h i s paper Stevenson rejects 
the idea t h a t moral t r u t h relates t o some absolute, invariable q u a l i t y 
which i s capable of objective discovery, Rather, he i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s 
a pragmatic notion which stands r e l a t i v e t o a p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n . As such, he argues t h a t i t applies t o those arrangements 
which best s u i t our purposes. Therefore, he says, the pursuit of moral 
t r u t h i s a matter of prescribing what ought t o be done i n the 
f u l f i l m e n t of those arrangements which 'work' p r a c t i c a l l y i n our 
par t i c u l a r environment. This type of p r e s c r i p t i o n constitutes, f o r 
Stevenson, 'the basis of a suggestion', i n t h a t i f a man issues a 
statement and 'exerts s u f f i c i e n t pressure' upon others t o accept i t , 
then he ' w i l l build up a general confidence among people t h a t h i s 
statement i s true p o t e n t i a l l y ' , and t h i s w i l l cause them t o change t h e i r 
minds. (2) However, Stevenson says t h a t t h i s achievement i s not a 
matter of knowing something t o be true i n the objective sense, and 
revealing t h a t t r u t h t o others. Rather, i t i s a matter of persuading 
others that something which i s desired i s evaluatively worth pursuing, 
and t h i s involves securing an agreement of a t t i t u d e i n the minds of 
others. 
These notions of desire, p r e s c r i p t i o n and persuasion are fu r t h e r 
developed i n a paper e n t i t l e d 'Arguments f o r Determinism', which i s 
dated A p r i l 22nd 1929. Here Stevenson addresses the question of 'the 
re l a t i o n s h i p which determinism bears t o a l l forms of moral Judgement'. 
He asserts t h a t a l l moral decisions t o act are the r e s u l t of a caused 
desire which predominates over other c o n f l i c t i n g and lesser desires. 
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Why then, he asks, do we praise or blame ourselves and others when 
these caused actions are performed? He suggests t h a t our feeling of 
remorse, f o r instance, amounts t o the recognition t h a t although our 
conduct was o r i g i n a l l y thought t o be beneficial, i t i s shown on 
r e f l e c t i o n t o be neither beneficial to ourselves or others. In other 
words, our feeling of remorse involves an acknowledgement t h a t we 
'ought t o have done otherwise' i n cor r e l a t i n g s e l f - i n t e r e s t with the 
int e r e s t s of others. Further, he argues, we praise or blame the actions 
of others because we 'recognise that even though everyone's action i s 
caused, nevertheless our s e l f - i n t e r e s t makes i t imperative t h a t we 
accept and reject nonetheless'. (3) That i s , we praise or blame the 
action of others t o the extent t h a t our own s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s being 
either guaranteed or adversely affected. Stevenson also i n s i s t s t h a t 
t h i s imperative t o praise or blame takes the form of a persuasion. He 
writes that; 
Both blame and praise... look t o the future, not t o the past... The 
judged person cannot change h i s features, but his conduct he can 
change i f only s u f f i c i e n t pressure i s brought t o bear upon him ... 
And blame on the one hand, plus praise on the other, i s one way, 
at least, whereby such change may be brought about. (4) 
Stevenson argues that i t i s t h i s p r e s c r i p t i v e or imperative function 
which i s i n t r i n s i c to the nature of moral judgement. This i s because, he 
says, a moral judgement i s 'offered as a means of i n t e n s i f y i n g or 
cancelling those causations' which determine e t h i c a l conduct. (5) 
We can see how Stevenson's ideas i n 1929 indicate the genesis of 
a e t h i c a l analysis which constitutes the framework of an emotivist 
position. For the ideas present involve the notion t h a t moral action 
implies the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of s e l f - i n t e r e s t or caused desires with the 
common int e r e s t ; the claim t h a t the subject-matter of ethics i s 'non-
objective'; and the suggestion t h a t moral judgements possess an 
i n t r i n s i c p r e s c r i p t i v e function t o persuade others t o change t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s t o f i t your own. 
I t i s worth noting t h a t t h i s c o l l e c t i o n of ideas owes a great deal 
to the thought of Ogden and Richards. Stevenson admits t h i s when he 
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w r i t e s t h a t "in f i n d i n g an explanation of values t h a t would take the 
place of my 'objective' one, I was greatly influenced by a passage from 
The Meaning of Meaning, by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards'. (6) The 
passage i n question i s the one quoted e a r l i e r a t length. Further, we can 
see t h a t Stevenson's recognition of Ogden and Richards' contribution t o 
e t h i c a l theory dates back at least as fa r as 1931. This i s evidenced by 
the f a c t that Stevenson provides an assessment of the controversy 
between Ogden, Richards and Moore i n a paper e n t i t l e d 'The Hature of 
Good', which was dated October 19th 1931. This paper was w r i t t e n w h i l s t 
he was embarking on a two year period of study f o r the Moral Sciences 
degree at Cambridge between 1931 and 1933. 
Stevenson introduces the paper by acknowledging th a t 'Professor 
Moore's Pr i n c i p l a Ethica i s so exceedingly important a work, i n my 
opinion, t h a t any present day discussion of the 'good' could scarcely do 
better than build up around i t as a centre of ins p i r a t i o n ' . (7) And yet, 
he says, ' I f i n d t h a t my own conclusions, which i t i n part provoked, 
are i n u t t e r contradiction with i t ' . (8) Stevenson i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s 
point by means of a hypothetical example. He imagines a man who seeks 
the f u l f i l m e n t of his desires by taking 'his place i n the world i n the 
company of others'. (9) This man, Stevenson argues, recognises t h a t i t 
becomes expedient f o r him to control the result a n t desires of 
others, either t h a t they may p r o f i t by h i s superior knowledge, or 
that he may gain h i s desired objects a t t h e i r expense . This he 
fin d s he can do by suggestion. And the concept of 'good', which 
i n process of suggestion a t t a i n s i t s f u l l e s t meaning, i s the means 
which he employs i n bringing about h i s end. For he uses the word 
not merely t o indicate the object of h i s own result a n t desires, 
but as though i t indicated the result a n t of anyone's desires, 
regardless of how they were constituted. 'Good' thereby comes t o 
have an imperative force, and t o say 'That i s good' conveys very 
subtly the meaning 'Consider th a t t h i n g good'. <10) 
For Stevenson, then, the word 'good' i s 'an adjective applied t o 
cer t a i n things, s i g n i f y i n g t h a t they are desired by the person who uses 
the word*. (11) However, he adds, t h i s 'is by no means the whole 
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meaning of 'good', and indeed, the uniqueness of i t s meaning l i e s i n the 
f a c t t h a t i t i s evocative of a certain attitude of mind - namely, t h a t 
of presuming f o r the sake of discussion t h a t things which are the 
objective of resultant desires can be proved so independently of 
differences i n persons. I t i s on t h i s account t h a t the concept of good 
becomes a social instrument, whereby one man may influence another'. 
(12) 
Stevenson's point i s th a t the purpose of employing the e t h i c a l 
concept 'good' i s twofold; i t i s t o specify objects of desire, and 
express a cer t a i n a t t i t u d e towards those objects with the view to 
persuading other people t o share the same a t t i t u d e . I t follows, he 
argues, 'that the goodness of a t h i n g i s not wholly open t o objective 
t e s t ' because c o n f l i c t s of desires between persons may not necessarily 
be resolved, and agreement reached. (13) Although ce r t a i n conditions 
may obtain which make a discussion of e t h i c a l disagreement p r o f i t a b l e , 
'one can never be cer t a i n t h a t these conditions w i l l be realised' (14) 
That i s , one can never be cer t a i n t h a t an agent w i l l be persuaded of 
the f a c t u a l inaccuracies of h i s bel i e f s about h i s expressed desires, or 
w i l l simply change h i s mind i n the l i g h t of f o r c e f u l persuasion about 
what i s worth pursuing. I t always remains a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t what i s 
considered t o be 'good f o r one may indeed be bad f o r another' and no 
agreement as to the desires t o be f u l f i l l e d , and the attitudes expressed 
towards them, can be reached. (15) 
In the l i g h t of t h i s analysis of the nature of 'good', Stevenson 
suggests t h a t G.E. Moore's notion t h a t good denotes something simple 
and indefinable i s misconceived. He argues t h a t Moore's confusion l i e s 
i n the i n i t i a l f a c t t h a t he considers the question '"Is so and so good?" 
to be asking whether i t i s possessed of a cer t a i n q u a l i t y , whereas i t 
i s r e a l l y asking f o r appraisement, i n accordance with the evocative 
force i n the meaning of the word good*. (16) As such, Stevenson says, 
Moore f a i l s t o recognise 'the unusual nature of the concept of 'good', 
necessitating, f o r analysis, a consideration of both the s c i e n t i f i c and 
the emotive... use of words, of which Ogden and Richards w r i t e so 
i l l u m i n a t i n g l y . (17) I t i s t h i s oversight which Stevenson argues must 
have been responsible f o r 'Professor Moore's being unable t o analyse 
'good' (successfully), and consequently, f o r h i s t h i n k i n g i t was a 
- 104 -
"simple quality"'. (18) We f i n d t h i s point r e i t e r a t e d i n his doctoral 
thesis (1935), when he writes that: 
i t does not follow t h a t 'good' re f e r s t o a simple quality. Ho one 
seems t o be able to f i n d t h i s peculiar q u a l i t y , and Mr Moore 
himself speaks of i t i n a hesitant manner, being led t o postulate 
i t , apparently, because he could f i n d no better alternative. There 
i s , indeed, a f u r t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e which Mr Moore overlooked, 
namely: t h a t good may be indefinable not because i t i s used to 
indicate a simple q u a l i t y , but simply because of i t s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c emotive meaning. (19) 
We can see, then, t h a t Stevenson had developed as early as 1931 a 
c r i t i q u e of Moore's theory which i s based on emotivist lines and which 
drew upon the i n s i g h t s of Ogden and Richards. Further, his 'The Nature 
of Good' was quickly followed by a paper e n t i t l e d 'A Consideration of 
Justice', dated October 26th 1931, i n which he elaborates upon themes 
developed i n previous papers. Stevenson's cent r a l concern i n t h i s paper 
i s t o discuss the basis of j u s t i c e as the f a i r and i m p a r t i a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods. He considers a hypothetical s i t u a t i o n i n which 
there are three people: two of whom are making c o n f l i c t i n g claims about 
what i s owed t o them f o r t h e i r services; the other who, as judge, seeks 
to evaluate t h e i r respective claims on the grounds of what constitutes 
a j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of rewards. Stevenson argues t h a t i n an instance 
of t h i s kind 
since a l l evaluation i s subjective, then between any two parties 
whose values c o n f l i c t , the decision of a t h i r d , however l i t t l e the 
r e s u l t of h i s decision may a f f e c t him d i r e c t l y , w i l l always be 
simply another evaluation; and while i t w i l l i n most instances be 
somewhere i n between the evaluations of the two who c o n f l i c t , i t 
w i l l by no means on that account be any more correct, necessarily. 
Indeed, of two such judges, one may i n c l i n e f a r t o one side, and 
one t o the other, purely f o r reasons of t h e i r own temperaments. 
How, i f we are t o use the concept of ju s t i c e , i n the case i n 
question, I i n s i s t t h a t such a concept should not be dressed up 
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t o appear as a r i s i n g from s-one objective and inc o n t r o v e r t i b l e 
premiss. I t would depend upon a person's ideals perhaps, as 
governing h i s subjective evaluations, and insofar as other people 
did not have such ideals, by so much could he never prove his 
point. He would have t o bring influence t o bear upon others, u n t i l 
they came t o share his ideals. (20) 
Stevenson's contention i s tha t any consideration of what 
constitutes j u s t i c e i n any pa r t i c u l a r instance can never be objective or 
rest upon some independent r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n of adjudication. Any 
such judgement i s always p a r t i a l , and i s grounded upon some subjective 
evaluation of one kind or another. This evaluation relates t o the 
par t i c u l a r e t h i c a l ideals of the person who acts as judge. I t i s not, he 
argues, something the correctness of which can be proven by a set of 
facts , because i n holding an 'ethical attitude... there i s nothing t h a t 
compels a person t o accept a conclusion, simply because i t i s a f a c t 
t h a t i t would be true'. (21) Rather, i t i s a matter of bringing one's 
influence t o bear upon others by persuading them to change t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s t o f i t your own, 
Stevenson notes, however, th a t there i s another sense i n which 
'something l i k e an objective standard f o r j u s t i c e i s to be found'. (22) 
He suggests t h a t i n examining how we reach t h i s standard of jus t i c e i n 
the adjudication of two c o n f l i c t i n g claims 
we can deliberately suppress any subjective evaluation t h a t may 
come t o our mind, and seek only t o point out what things are t o 
the common in t e r e s t t o both parties. That i s t o say, i f there i s a 
mutual advantage i n co-operation, i t may well be the case t h a t 
each side would p r o f i t by giving up many of i t s claims, rather 
than forego co-Dperation. Some s o r t of compromise would 
eventually ensue, perhaps, by bargaining. I t would be the function 
of 'justice' ... t o anticipate the r e s u l t of actual bargaining.., by 
some plan of compromise that w i l l meet the approval of both 
parties, and enable co-operation t o continue... A compromise w i l l 
thus probably be reached which each party would acknowledge i s 
jus t . (23) 
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Stevenson's argument i s i l l u m i n a t i n g i n at least two ways. 
F i r s t l y , i t expresses a conception of ju s t i c e which i s markedly Humean 
in character. Stevenson, l i k e Hume, understands j u s t i c e t o be a 'human 
creation, shaped t o human ends', which establishes standards of co-
operative conduct. As such, the performance of ju s t i c e i s 'a matter of 
compromise, entered upon because of the advantages of cooperation, and 
where the r e s u l t i n g products of co-operative a c t i v i t y are divided 
according t o the market value of services'. (25) Secondly, t h i s 
conception of jus t i c e i s d i s t i n c t l y l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n character. 
For w h i l s t asserting t h a t there i s no single objective c r i t e r i o n of 
judging what i s either j u s t or unjust, Stevenson argues that i t remains 
possible t o bargain f o r an appropriate compromise th a t i s of mutual 
benefit t o a l l . As we s h a l l show l a t e r , these notions of non-
o b j e c t i v i t y , bargaining, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of securing a r a t i o n a l 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of mutual i n t e r e s t through co-operation are a l l 
ch a r a c t e r i s t i c features of the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t view. 
However, leaving f o r the moment t h i s issue, we can see how 
Stevenson's discussion of the nature of 'good' and 'justice' i n these 
1931 papers indicates the development of a recognisably emotivist or 
non - c o g n i t i v i s t theory. I t i s a theory which was largely worked out i n 
d e t a i l i n Cambridge quite independently from any other contemporary 
emotivist t h e o r i s t s , although i t was based upon a c r i t i c a l examination 
of G.E, Moore's theory. This i s unsurprising, given the considerable 
academic and personal importance of Moore's influence on Stevenson's 
thought. Moore tutored Stevenson i n the 'Metaphysics' course during the 
Lent and Michaelmas terms of 1932, and the Lent and May terms of 1933. 
Further, Stevenson has indicated that Moore read and c r i t i c i s e d a 'brief 
preliminary sketch', probably i n 1933, of what became his doctoral 
thesis. I t was t h i s thesis, submitted at Harvard i n 1935, which 
constituted a systematic exposition of the emotivist view. And although 
his l a t e r work does not concern us, i t i s t o be noted t h a t t h i s thesis 
formed the basis of Stevenson's f i r s t published a r t i c l e s , which 
appeared i n the journal Mind i n 1937 and 1938, and h i s most famous 
work, Ethics and Language, which was published i n 1944. 
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Austin Duncan-Jones was educated at Gonville and Caius College, 
Cambridge between 1927-31, where he studied f o r the Classics and Moral 
Sciences degrees. He was tutored, l i k e Stevenson a f t e r him, by G.E. 
Moore, CD. Broad and R.B. Braithwaite. As a r e s u l t of h i s r e f l e c t i o n s 
upon Moore's e t h i c a l theory, and Braithwaite's c r i t i c a l assessment of i t 
i n 'Verbal Ambiguity and Philosophical Analysis', he wrote an a r t i c l e 
e n t i t l e d 'Ethical Words and Ethical Facts', which was published i n the 
October 1933 volume of Mind. 
This a r t i c l e reveals Duncan-Jones' scepticism regarding Moore's 
account of the nature of e t h i c a l disagreement, and the meaning of 
'good'. He suggests t h a t the central problem with t h i s account i s t h a t 
i t does not recognise the f a c t t h a t a moral argument between contending 
parties may well end i n one saying t o the other, not 'you are entirely 
mistaken, but rather something such as you belong to a different moral 
world from mine'. (1) And he adds that: 
I f one would be r i g h t i n speaking i n the l a t t e r rather than i n the 
former way, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see what s o r t of th i n g we are 
saying when we c a l l anything good, and t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s unlike 
those which have commonly been considered i n ethics. <2) 
Further, i n discussing a p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c a l question where there i s 
disagreement with another moralist, Duncan-Jones says that ' I confess 
th a t though I disagree w i t h him I do not see c l e a r l y t h a t there i s any 
sense i n which he i s wrong or mistaken. At the most I should only 
accuse him of bad moral taste'. (3) 
Although Duncan-Jones doubts the p l a u s i b i l i t y of Moore's claim 
t h a t e t h i c a l disagreement i s a matter of one party being mistaken about 
the nature of 'good' as a non-natural property, he i s he s t i t a n t t o reach 
any f i r m conclusions. He acknowledges a problem, but f a i l s on h i s own 
terms t o provide an answer. However, he does suggest that: 
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Perhaps when we use sentences containing such expressions as 
intrinsically good or worth having for its own sake, although our 
words are not meaningless, the s o r t of sentences we use never 
express fa c t s , so that i f I say that a ce r t a i n state of a f f a i r s 
would be and someone else says that i t would not be i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
good we are not f a c t u a l l y disagreeing; none the less each of us i s 
saying something, and i s not as Mr Braithwaite would have said, 
using words emotively. (4) 
This reveals the extent of Duncan-Jones' indecision. For although he 
suggests that e t h i c a l disagreement i s not something t h a t can be 
fa c t u a l l y resolved, he r e s i s t s the emotivist conclusion t h a t there i s no 
sense i n which a resolution can be made. 
He was, however, s h o r t l y t o resolve t h i s dilemma by abandoning 
any attempt t o t r y t o explain the apparent i n t e r m i n a b i l i t y of e t h i c a l 
disagreement i n a way other than i n d i s t i n c t l y emotivist terms. As CD. 
Broad reveals i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Is 'Goodness' a Name of a Simple 
Non-natural Quality?", which was published i n the Proceedings of the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n Society (1933-34), and read to the Society i n June 1934, 
Duncan-Jones came e x p l i c i t l y t o argue t h a t e t h i c a l sentences do not 
express e t h i c a l propositions about f a c t s precisely because what they do 
say i s of 'emotive use'. Presumably Broad was able t o make t h i s change 
i n Duncan-Jones' thought public i n academic c i r c l e s by reading a 
Fellowship d i s s e r t a t i o n , e n t i t l e d 'Ethical Language; an examination of 
the use and meaning of e t h i c a l expressions', which Duncan-Jones 
submitted to Gonville and Caius College i n the summer of 1933. This 
unpublished thesis was completed a f t e r 'Ethical Words and Ethical 
Facts' had been w r i t t e n , but before i t was published i n Mind, 
In t h i s thesis, Duncan-Jones begins h i s examination of moral 
language by s t a t i n g t h a t 'in forming my view of ethics I have... been 
more influenced by the w r i t i n g s of Professor Moore than by any other 
single agency'. However, he adds, 'there are many of Professor Moore's 
opinions about ethics, as there are not i n other subjects, of whose 
t r u t h I feel doubtful'. (5) Most c e n t r a l l y , Duncan-Jones expresses his 
scepticism about Moore's contention t h a t the word 'good' denotes a 
simple, unique, indefinable q u a l i t y or object of thought which has a 
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non-natural character. This contention, he says, runs contrary t o h is 
own e m p i r i c i s t 'prejudice' t h a t 'everything i n the world can be 
described or explained i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c way'. (6) That i s , i t c o n f l i c t s 
with the e m p i r i c i s t assumption t h a t everything which i s capable of 
significance or meaning can be inferred, through the evidence of the 
senses, t o be part of the physical f a b r i c of the world. Quite c l e a r l y , 
Moore's notion of non-natural properties as objects of thought does not 
s a t i s f y t h i s e m p i r i c i s t c r i t e r i o n . And Duncan-Jones furt h e r adds th a t 
because i t i s a notion which cannot be given supporting empirical 
evidence, there i s no available philosophical explanation which can 
show us th a t such a property e x i s t s i n the world. As he says, because 
'we do not f i n d the s o r t of evidence we should expect f o r the occurence 
i n the world of any such character', we are l e f t i n the uneasy pos i t i o n 
of simply asserting t h a t such a non-natural character exists, rather 
than being able t o demonstrate that i t obtains i n the world. (7) 
Duncan-Jones asserts t h a t there are other considerations which 
indicate the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of Moore's ontological argument. These 
relate t o our ordinary use of e t h i c a l language. As he points out, Moore 
assumes that his conception of 'good' as a non-natural property i s the 
one which i s o r d i n a r i l y used i n actual moral discourse. (8) [Although 
Moore i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s assumption i s not fundamental t o his 
enterprise, because he argues t h a t h i s analysis i n t o the form of the 
object 'good' may be true quite independently of the contingent f a c t s 
about ordinary language use.] For Duncan-Jones, however, t h i s 
assumption i s false because 'the word 'good' i s never used i n an 
ordinary sense t o stand f o r a non-relational character of the s o r t 
described'.(9) This can be shown, he suggests, by observing the nature 
of moral debate. He claims t h a t i f Moore's assumption i s correct, i t 
follows t h a t there would be a f a i r l y complete agreement between people 
as to what judgements and actions possess or do not possess the non-
natural character of i n t r i n s i c 'goodness'. However, he observes t h a t 
there i s no s o r t of agreement, either among philosophers or people 
i n general, t h a t c e r t a i n things are good and t h a t certain things 
are not; on the contrary, disputes about the value of t h i s or t h a t 
kind of t h i n g are constantly occurring. (10) 
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And given the fa c t , he argues, t h a t 'people's ascr i p t i o n s of goodness 
c o n f l i c t , we must conclude t h a t either a large number of them are 
mistaken', because they f a i l t o appreciate the existence of the non-
natural q u a l i t y which makes possible the resolution of t h e i r 
disagreements, or we must conclude t h a t no such q u a l i t y e x i s t s , either 
e x p l i c i t l y expressed or disguised i n e t h i c a l debates, (11) Duncan-Jones, 
of course, favours the l a t t e r explanation. He can see no evidence which 
proves the existence of the non-natural property of i n t r i n s i c goodness; 
nor can he see why we should assume t h a t t h i s q u a l i t y rests w i t h i n our 
ordinary moral language. He therefore concludes t h a t there i s no 
pos i t i v e reason t o assert that our use of e t h i c a l words i s c l a s s i f i a b l e , 
and our e t h i c a l disagreements are reconcilable, i n terms of an appeal 
to the notion of a non-natural quality . 
Having discounted Moore's i n t u i t i o n i s t theory, Duncan-Jones 
addresses the question of whether n a t u r a l i s t theories of ethics fare 
any better i n explaining the use and meaning of our ordinary e t h i c a l 
expressions. Given his general e m p i r i c i s t i n c l i n a t i o i i to believe that 
everything i n the world can be described and explained i n a n a t u r a l i s t 
or s c i e n t i f i c way, Duncan-Jones acknowledges t h a t i t i s far more l i k e l y 
t h a t a n a t u r a l i s t approach to ethics, which asserts t h a t 'goodness i s a 
character which can be mentioned i n describing the things t h a t happen', 
w i l l be successful i n t h i s task. (12) Indeed, i t i s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , he 
says, 'which leads me...to look f o r a n a t u r a l i s t explanation of the 
meaning of e t h i c a l words'. (13) However, as we s h a l l see, i t i s w i t h i n 
the confines of t h i s 'naturalist approach' t h a t Duncan-Jones' d i s t i n c t l y 
emotivist view emerges. We need, then, t o examine his own theory, and 
show how he understands i t t o be consistent w i t h naturalism. 
He observes t h a t 
i t i s p r e t t y clear t h a t people use combinations of words not only 
f o r the sake of making statements, but from various other motives. 
The motives f o r using words on any occasion are probably as a 
rule, and c h i e f l y , desires to produce c e r t a i n e f f e c t s i n some 
person or people who hear or read the words. Probably the e f f e c t 
which i s most commonly desired i s t h a t the hearer or reader s h a l l 
become aware of the statement which i s being used... but other 
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effects are also often sought, and among those which are perhaps, 
a f t e r understanding, most commonly sought are t h a t the hearer or 
reader s h a l l act or feel i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. (14) 
In saying t h i s , Duncan-Jones acknowledges th a t 'the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the wish t o make a statement and other motives resembles the 
d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards i n The Meaning of 
Meaning'. (15) However, he argues t h a t 'Ogden and Richards often w r i t e 
as though words spoken an a p a r t i c u l a r occasion exemplified one use or 
the other, but not both. I t seems t o me tha t most sentences are used 
from several kinds of motive.' (16) The point t h a t Duncan-Jones 
believes Ogden and Richards t o have on occasion overlooked i s t h a t 
the majority of sentences uttered i n ordinary language possess two 
distinguishable components: a descriptive element which expresses a 
belie f t h a t a statement i s true, and a non-descriptive element which 
expresses a feeling. These two components correlate t o d i s t i n c t motives 
fo r making an utterance; namely, issuing a statement and expressing a 
feeling. Although these motives are intended t o a f f e c t the hearer or 
reader i n d i f f e r e n t ways, they are normally both present i n sentences 
uttered. I t i s therefore misleading to say t h a t some sentences are 
•purely emotive', because although they do have a d i s t i n c t emotive use, 
t h i s use i s normally co-existent with a descriptive or r e f e r e n t i a l use. 
As such, according t o Duncan-Jones, Ogden and Richards are mistaken t o 
assert t h a t the e t h i c a l use of good i s purely emotive. Rather, he 
claims, most e t h i c a l words such as 'right', 'good', 'ought' and 'duty* 
are used i n sentences which have both emotive and descriptive elements, 
and which are 'par t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y t o lead t o actions or feelings on the 
part of the hearer or reader.' (17) 
What then, Duncan-Jones asks, i s the c r i t e r i o n of meaning which i s 
to be ascribed t o these e t h i c a l sentences? He asserts t h a t 'an 
expression or use of an expression has an accepted meaning i f those 
who use i t have the habit of responding, when they hear or read i t , i n 
a way appropriate t o some element of the world'. (18) In other words, a 
sentence has meaning i f , and only i f , i t r e f e r s t o some descriptive 
element found i n the world. In saying t h i s , Duncan-Jones acknowledges 
t h a t h i s analysis of meaning i s 'based on the view of language 
- 112 -
expressed by Wittgenstein i n the words 'the proposition i s a picture of 
r e a l i t y ' tTractatus 4.01]* (19). However, he says, 'sometimes an 
expression has no accepted meaning at a l l , but i s specially l i k e l y t o 
give some s o r t of stimulus t o action or feeling'. (20) That i s , there 
are c e r t a i n expressions t h a t do not themselves refer t o any objects i n 
the world, but which nonetheless have an a t t i t u d i n a l effect on people. 
For Duncan-Jones, i t i s t h i s type of 'meaningless' expression which i s 
always t o be found i n e t h i c a l sentences. 
However, he claims t h a t 
Host people are not aware th a t some expressions have no accepted 
meanings, and suppose t h a t they are doing the same s o r t of th i n g 
i n using such expressions as i n using expressions w i t h accepted 
meanings from a desire t o produce understanding. I t i s the easier 
f o r them to make t h i s mistake, because as a rule a sentence i n 
which an expression w i t h no accepted meaning occurs has some 
meaning, to which the expression i n question does not contribute. 
(21) 
His point i s tha t i t i s a common error to assume t h a t the complex of 
a l l sentences are purely descriptive or relate t o elements which have 
r e f e r e n t i a l meaning. This misconception i s p a r t i c u l a r l y apparent i n 
many people's understanding of the l i n g u i s t i c structure of e t h i c a l 
sentences. He c l a r i f i e s t h i s confusion by explaining t h a t : 
The word 'good'... i s i n certain of i t s uses a word with no 
accepted meaning... Consequently such a sentence as to lower the 
rate of income tax would be a good thing, i f i t exemplfies one of 
the uses of the word 'good' which have no accepted meaning, has no 
meaning as a whole, because not a l l the words i n i t are capable of 
cont r i b u t i n g t o i t s meaning: but i t has some meaning, namely t h a t 
income tax i s i n force. (22) 
Emotivists have tended t o argue t h a t t h i s analysis of e t h i c a l 
sentences undermines the n a t u r a l i s t approach. This i s because i t 
reveals t h a t n a t u r a l i s t s make the common err o r of assuming t h a t 
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e t h i c a l sentences are purely descriptive. Rather, these sentences 
possess a non-referential, emotive element, or what Duncan-Jones c a l l s 
a 'meaningless use', i n conjunction with an descriptive element which 
does have meaning i n v i r t u e of the f a c t that i t i s used t o refer t o 
some feature of the world. We may therefore be surprised, at f i r s t 
glance, t o observe Duncan-Jones contending t h a t ' i f i t i s admitted that 
there are expressions with no accepted meanings, a f a i r l y convincing 
argument can be used t o show t h a t most or a l l e t h i c a l expressions are 
of t h i s s o r t , so that e t h i c a l naturalism i s probably or c e r t a i n l y true', 
(23) This statement appears paradoxical t o us because emotivist 
theories have become cl e a r l y distinguished from versions of naturalism, 
such as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m or orthodox subjectivism. However, we can 
explain his comment by noting t h a t at the time of w r i t i n g no such 
cle a r l y delineated d i s t i n c t i o n was apparent to Duncan-Jones. Indeed, i t 
was precisely because h i s emotive views were being formulated i n 1933 
that he was in no posi t i o n t o attach self-consciously the term 
'emotivist' t o h is theory, and draw the relevant d i s t i n c t i o n s of 
approach between i t and naturalism. Within the context of his w r i t i n g , 
there were only two al t e r n a t i v e approaches to ethics: the n a t u r a l i s t 
approach, which was consistent with his general e m p i r i c i s t p r i n c i p l e s ; 
and the non-naturalist approach, which was exemplified i n the theory of 
G.E. Moore. Duncan-Jones was cle a r l y committed t o the former approach, 
and he assumed th a t h i s theory constituted a r e v i s i o n w i t h i n t h a t 
t r a d i t i o n . I t was only at a l a t e r stage t h a t emotivism established 
i t s e l f as a d i s t i n c t t r a d i t i o n of i t s own. 
In noting t h i s , however, we should not assume t h a t Duncan-Jones 
was unaware of the conceptual differences between h i s view and previous 
versions of e t h i c a l naturalism. For he makes a number of points 
against the n a t u r a l i s t theories of the past which are cle a r l y 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of what was t o become recognised as the 
d i s t i n c t l y emotivist view. He points out, f o r instance, t h a t the 
expression of feeling or moral approval which i s i n t r i n s i c t o an 
et h i c a l judgement does not necessarily imply t h a t the th i n g approved i s 
believed t o be good by the agent who makes the judgement. He writes 
t h a t ' a l l we can say i s t h a t when someone says t h a t something i s or 
would be good, he very probably i s as a matter of f a c t i n favour Df the 
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t h i n g he c a l l s good'. (24) But i t i s equally possible t h a t an agent 
wishes t o deceive people by suggesting t h a t what he approves of i s a 
good th i n g , w h i l s t i n f a c t not believing t h a t t h i s i s so. The point, f o r 
Duncan-Jones, i s that there i s a l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
expressions of approval and be l i e f s about approval which i s overlooked 
by n a t u r a l i s t s , who tend t o equate the two notions. Thus we f i n d 
u t i l i t a r i a n s arguing t h a t 'to c a l l something good i s t o say something 
about the amount of happiness t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from i t ' , and 
su b j e c t i v i s t s arguing t h a t t o c a l l something good 'is t o say something 
about the speaker's a t t i t u d e t o what he c a l l s good, f o r instance t h a t 
he approves of i t ' . (25) The reason f o r t h i s , Duncan-Jones argues, i s 
th a t n a t u r a l i s t t h e o r i s t s assume that e t h i c a l judgements solely 
a r t i c u l a t e , i n some purely descriptive sense, a q u a n t i t i v e l y measurable 
property (eg. 'happiness' or 'belief about approval') which f i n d s 
expression i n t h a t judgement. This error can commonly be made, he 
says, because there i s a descriptive element i n a l l e t h i c a l judgements; 
but there i s also an 'expressive' element which cannot be reduced t o 
any descriptive level of understanding. Ethical n a t u r a l i s t s f a i l t o see 
t h i s . 
These c r i t i c i s m s of the various v a r i e t i e s of et h i c a l naturalism 
enables us t o see how Duncan-Jones resolves the dilemma which he 
raises i n the concluding passage of 'Ethical Words and Ethical Facts'. 
For he ret a i n s the n a t u r a l i s t point t h a t e t h i c a l sentences 'do say 
something' which i s factual, i n the descriptive sense th a t an object 
which i s approved t o be a good thing i s always specified i n the 
sentence, w h i l s t he explains the inconclusive character of moral 
dispute by showing t h a t t h i s description i s always made i n conjunction 
with an emotive element which cannot i t s e l f be reduced t o a 
description, and which cannot be said t o say something fac t u a l a t a l l . 
He extends t h i s analysis of e t h i c a l sentences and e t h i c a l f a c t s 
i n t o an examination of e t h i c a l reasoning. Given t h a t there are no 
peculiarly e t h i c a l facts which refer t o a qu a l i t y t h a t can be conceived 
as being i n t r i n s i c a l l y good i t follows, he says, t h a t there i s nothing 
which can be considered as ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y reasonable' or necessary 
grounds f o r adopting one moral point of view over another. There i s , 
f o r instance, 'no sense i n which we t a l k about reason i n which the 
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expression we use stands f o r a non-natural character' or necessary 
e t h i c a l t r u t h . (26) Therefore, he suggests: 
no e t h i c a l f a c t or e t h i c a l t r u t h , whether necessary or not, could 
be a reason f o r someone t o act i n a ce r t a i n way by i t s e l f ; i t 
could only be a reason i f also the person concerned wanted t o do 
what was r i g h t or good. (27) 
In saying t h i s , Duncan-Jones i s assuming t h a t e t h i c a l reasoning i s 
instrumental rather t h a t i n t r i n s i c i n character. As such, he i s adopting 
Hume's account of moral reasoning; for he assumes t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r 
moral action i s reasonable i f i t best s a t i s f i e s the f u l f i l m e n t of 
i n d i v i d u a l l y expressed wants or desires. This i s because what i s 
reasonable f o r a ce r t a i n person depends upon th a t person's wishes, 
Therefore, he claims that: 
i t i s not open t o us t o c a l l behaviour of which we disapprove 
unreasonable, simply because of moral objections t o i t ; no kind of 
behaviour can be discovered to be reasonable or unreasonable 
simply on moral grounds; whether behaviour i s reasonable must 
depend upon the desires and wishes of the person who behaves. 
(28) 
This point, Duncan-Jones says, implies t h a t what counts as a 
sensible expression of those e t h i c a l words which a r t i c u l a t e an 
i n t e n t i o n t o act i n a reasonable manner depends upon the contextual 
circumstances of t h e i r use. He claims t h a t 
i n such circumstances these expressions are used i n a great 
va r i e t y of senses, and the exact sense i n which an expression i s 
used depends upon the i n t e r e s t s and aims which the people among 
them i t i s being used have i n common, or the i n t e r e s t s and aims 
on the part of each other which they are f a m i l i a r with; so that 
since an i n d e f i n i t e v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s and aims i s possible, 
there i s no way of g i v i n g an exhaustive catalogue of the senses 
i n which expressions can be used. (29) 
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For Duncan-Jones, then, the sense of moral reasoning and action 
depends upon the p a r t i c u l a r use of e t h i c a l expressions which are 
f a m i l i a r to us i n 'a cer t a i n community of i n t e r e s t or purpose*. (30) I t 
i s a claim which rests upon the non-cog n i t i v i s t or Humean account of 
the place of reasoning i n ethics. Consequently, as we s h a l l see, i t 
presupposes the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t notion t h a t our collecive moral 
understanding i s the sum t o t a l of i n d i v i d u a l l y expressed preferences. 
- 117 -
IV. W.H.F. Barnes 
y.H.F Barnes studied f o r the Literae Humaniores degree at Oxford 
University between 1930-32. Whilst seeking regular academic employment 
he was i n v i t e d t o address a meeting of the Jowett Society a t Oxford on 
November 8th, 1933. The paper which he gave, e n t i t l e d 'Is there a 
Realm of Values?', raised considerable i n t e r e s t because i t expressed an 
emotivist view of the nature of evaluative judgements. Amongst those 
present at the meeting was Duncan-Jones who, i n his capacity as co-
edi t o r of the newly founded journal Analysis, asked f a r a copy of the 
paper f o r the purposes of publication. The published extract was 
renamed 'A Suggestion about Value', and appeared i n the March 1934 
volume. Although the extract was only 150 words long, i t nonetheless 
constituted one of the f i r s t p u b l i c l y accessible statements of the 
emotivist analysis of ethics. 
Barnes explains t h a t at the time of w r i t i n g the paper he was 
engaged i n reading Nicolas Hartmann's Ethics, and was concerned t o 
reject Hartmann's notion t h a t values e x i s t i n some sphere other than 
th a t of the natural world. He was also convinced by Moore's r e f u t a t i o n 
of any n a t u r a l i s t explanation of value, but f e l t sure t h a t Moore's 
notion of goodness as a non-natural q u a l i t y fared no better. However i t 
was, Barnes says, only as the day of the meeting neared th a t he struck 
upon a plausible a l t e r n a t i v e t o both Hartmann's and Moore's theories, 
and made the suggestion t h a t 'to say something i s good i s not t o 
predicate a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c but t o express approval'. (1) I t i s 
therefore worthwhile to examine i n d e t a i l the arguments presented i n 
the u n t i l recently missing Jowett Society paper, and draw upon Barnes' 
re c o l l e c t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l context w i t h i n which he made the 
emotivist suggestion. 
Barnes introduces the paper by summarising Hartmann's thesis i n 
Ethics as an attempt t o prove the o b j e c t i v i t y and absoluteness of 
et h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . He indicates t h a t , f o r Hartmann, these p r i n c i p l e s 
are true because they r e l a t e t o a p l u r a l i t y of values the concrete 
existence of which i s manifest i n t h e i r 'ideal essences'. (2) In showing 
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t h i s , Barnes states t h a t Hartmann's thesis rests upon a procedure of 
analysis which i s t o be characterisised thus: 
The o b j e c t i v i t y of moral p r i n c i p l e s consists... i n t h i s , t h a t they 
derive t h e i r authority always from a value. I f i t can be shown 
th a t values are genuine existent e n t i t i e s , then i t w i l l be shown 
tha t moral p r i n c i p l e s are objective, i n the sense th a t t h e i r 
r e l a t i v i t y rests upon the discernment of values t h a t are absolute, 
not upon the r e l a t i v i t y of values. (3) 
For Hartmann, as Barnes explains, values are 'genuine existent e n t i t i e s ' 
because they are essences, where 'Essences form a realm of entities... 
which i s not less r e a l , and i n a way more r e a l , than the world of 
e x i s t i n g things'. (4) For Barnes, however, t h i s conception of value as 
the essence or common ideal property of a t h i n g i s false. This i s 
because, he argues, our knowledge of the essence of a t h i n g relates 
simply to our necessarily imperfect and contingent observations of 
'what i t is ' , and how i t resembles s i m i l a r e x i s t i n g objects. I t therefore 
follows that t h i s knowledge does not relate t o some alleged property 
the form of which i s perfect and eternal. As Barnes puts i t , to know 
the essence of a table, f o r example, 'is simply t o know what a table i s : 
i t i s an imperfect knowledge of things not a perfect knowledge of an 
ideal entity'. (5) As such, he claims t h a t Hartmann's notion t h a t moral 
p r i n c i p l e s are objective and absolute i s groundless because i t i s based 
upon a conception of ideal value essences which i s mistaken. 
Having dismissed Hartmann's thesis, Barnes focusses h i s a t t e n t i o n 
upon the e t h i c a l theory of G.E. Moore. He o f f e r s a c r i t i c a l summary of 
Moore's p o s i t i o n when he wr i t e s t h a t 
Professor Moore maintains that goodness i s a q u a l i t y i n t u i t i v e l y 
perceived. I t i s unanalysable and indefinable. He fur t h e r adds 
t h a t i t i s a nan-natural q u a l i t y . Reflection seems to show tha t 
i t i s a very puzzling q u a l i t y . I f a th i n g i s t o be good i t seems 
i t must be good i n v i r t u e of what i t i s . That i s to say, i t must 
f i r s t have i t s own completely determinate nature: then, and then 
only, w i l l i t be good. (6> 
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Barnes' p o i n t i s th a t i f Hoore i s correct i n saying t h a t goodness i s a 
qu a l i t y , then he must assume t h a t an object i s good i n v i r t u e of a l l 
i t s properties or i t s whole nature. For Barnes, however, t h i s cannot be 
so. He asserts t h a t ' i f goodness i s a qu a l i t y i t must be a part of the 
thing's nature. The th i n g cannot be good i n v i r t u e of i t s whole nature, 
f o r i t s whole nature includes i t s goodness'. <7) This point i n i t s e l f 
raises problems f o r Hoore's notion. But more importantly, Barnes says, 
'the q u a l i t i e s of a th i n g are what make the t h i n g what i t i s , whereas a 
t h i n g must f i r s t be what i t i s i f i t i s t o be judged good'. (8) This 
point, coupled with the f a c t t h a t ' i t seems possible t o give a 
completely exhaustive description of a thing's nature without 
mentioning whether i t i s good or bad', must cast doubt on the whole 
idea t h a t goodness i s a q u a l i t y of an object. (9> 
Barnes suggests t h a t t h i s doubt accentuates a more general 
deficiency i n the arguments of both Hoore and Hartmann. He writes tha t : 
The defect of... the theories so f a r considered... i s that the 
goodness or value of anything i s not considered t o be i n any way 
r e l a t i v e t o the desires and i n t e r e s t s of appraising subjects. And 
t h i s seems d i f f i c u l t t o maintain. I t would involve maintaining 
that, however r a d i c a l l y men's desires change, s t i l l what has been 
good would remain good. (10) 
Barnes assumes t h a t the goodness or value of something must re l a t e i n 
some way t o the material and p r a c t i c a l contingencies of human moral 
experience, as f e l t i n desires, i n t e r e s t s , and the l i k e . I t i s t h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s not considered by t h e o r i s t s who conceive of 
values as being revealed t o us a p r i o r i , and quite independently of our 
material circumstances as subjects. However, Barnes i n s i s t s t h a t the 
acknowledgement th a t goodness i s r e l a t i v e t o the desires and i n t e r e s t s 
of men does not imply t h a t 'naturalist' d e f i n i t i o n s of good are correct, 
where 'A i s good' i s taken t o mean 'A i s the object of my approval', or 
' I take an i n t e r e s t i n A'. (11) I f t h i s were so, then two people who 
maintain respectively t h a t 'A i s good' and t h a t 'A i s bad' would not be 
contrad i c t i n g each other at a l l . This account, he says, i s incapable of 
explaining a l l arguments about value. We therefore need t o explain 
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arguments about value i n terms which are not n a t u r a l i s t i n character. 
Barnes proceeds t o do so by making the emotivist 'suggestion 1, which 
was published i n Analysis, and s h a l l be quoted here i n f u l l . He writes 
th a t : 
Value judgements i n t h e i r o r i g i n are not s t r i c t l y judgements at 
a l l . They are exclamations expressive of approval. This i s t o be 
distinguished from the theory t h a t the value judgement 'A i s good' 
states t h a t ' I approve A.' The theory t h a t 1 am now put t i n g 
forward maintains t h a t 'A i s good' i s a form of words expressive 
of my approval. To take an i l l u s t r a t i o n : - when I say ' I have a 
pain' t h a t sentence states the occurrence of a cer t a i n feeling i n 
me: when I shout 'Oh!' i n a cer t a i n way t h a t i s expressive of the 
occurrence i n me of a certain feeling. We must seek then f o r the 
o r i g i n of value judgements i n the expressions of approval, del i g h t 
and a f f e c t i o n , which children u t t e r when confronted with c e r t a i n 
experiences,.. 
I f a l l so-called value judgements are, i n p r i n c i p l e , expressions of 
approval, then they w i l l only possess meaning i n so far as the 
society i n which they are used i s agreed on what things i t 
approves. And then 'good' and value w i l l be terms which have 
meaning only by r e f e r r i n g t o the actual nature of the thing, not 
to any non-natural q u a l i t y i t possesses. Meanwhile i t i s 
worthwhile mentioning t h a t many controversies a r i s i n g out of 
value judgements are se t t l e d by saying ' I l i k e i t and you don't, 
and thats the end of the matter 1. We are content t o adopt t h i s 
solution of the d i f f i c u l t y on matters such as food and drink, 
though even here we admit the existence of epicures and 
connoisseurs. Why are we not content t o accept the same solution 
on a l l matters where value i s concerned? 
The reason we are not so content seems t o l i e i n the f a c t t h a t 
the action of one man dictated by h i s approval of something i s 
frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by 
hi s approval of something. Lif e i n a society leads us continually 
t o t r a n s f e r our approval t o d i f f e r e n t objects. Reflection upon 
th a t l i f e leads t o s t i l l f u r t h e r modifications. I t i s t h i s 
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opposition between the approval of one man and tha t of others 
which l i e s at the bottom of controversies about value. I f I 
maintain 'A i s good' against the contention "A i s bad' my attempt 
to prove the t r u t h of my statement i s not r e a l l y what i t pretends 
to be. I point out d e t a i l s i n A which are the object of my 
approval. By so doing I hope t h a t my opponent, when he becomes 
aware of these, w i l l approve A: and so be ready t o say 'A i s good'. 
But what I have done i s not r e a l l y t o gain h i s assent t o a 
proposition but t o change h i s a t t i t u d e from one of disapproval t o 
one of approval towards A. A l l attempts t o persuade others of the 
t r u t h of value judgements are thus r e a l l y attempts to make others 
approve the things we approve. (12) 
We can see that t h i s published passage expresses most l u c i d l y the 
central c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of a d i s t i n c t y emotivist view. Most 
importantly, i t contains the notion that value judgements are 
expressions of approval rather than propositions of f a c t , and the idea 
th a t disagreements about value are p r i m a r i l y reconcilable through 
a t t i t u d i n a l persuasion rather than factual demonstration. I t i s 
worthwhile noting that Barnes extends t h i s analysis i n t o a discussion 
of the standards of our social morality. He continues that: 
I f a l l values are r e l a t i v e i n t h i s way (ie. i f a l l values relate t o 
expressions of approval) how then can we be j u s t i f i e d i n speaking 
of a moral standard? There seems t o be an o b j e c t i v i t y about 
moral values which distinguishes them from other values. Taken 
at t h e i r narrowest they are those ways of acting which everybody 
must approve of i f organised society i s t o be possible. In so f a r 
as every man, i n v i r t u e of h i s membership of society, approves of 
whatever i s necessary to maintain society, these values, though 
r e l a t i v e t o the members of a society, are r e l a t i v e not t o t h i s or 
th a t man but to a standard man... There i s no standard by which 
we can judge him. He may condemn himself f o r f a l l i n g short of 
his own ideals of conduct but h i s ideals of conduct are no ideal 
essences: they are merely the i n t e r n a l signs t h a t he himself i s 
i n process of t r a n s f e r r i n g h i s approval from one set of things t o 
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another. As he changes the standard changes because he i s the 
standard. (13) 
Barnes' r e l a t i v i s t account of social morality i s f a m i l i a r enough 
to us. I t i s t o claim t h a t the e t h i c a l standards which a society adopts 
r e s t upon a c o l l e c t i v e choice of i t s members, who undertake t o follow 
rules of conduct which they i n d i v i d u a l l y approve. Thus, according t o 
t h i s view, the moral standards of a p a r t i c u l a r society always relate t o 
the e x h i b i t i o n of shared i n d i v i d u a l preferences, as set w i t h i n a 
sp e c i f i c context. I t follows t h a t moral standards or general s o c i a l 
rules of conduct are invented and mutable, not absolute and merely 
awaiting discovery. 
Having given t h i s account of so c i a l morality, Barnes turns to the 
issue of whether any philosophical theory which purports t o indicate 
the o b j e c t i v i t y of morality i s plausible. Taking Hartmann as h i s prime 
example, he makes the point t h a t any philosophical examination which 
generates p r e s c r i p t i v e recommendations about moral l i f e i s not an 
authentic analysis of ethics a t a l l , but i s instead an example of 
moralising. In other words, he i n s i s t s t h a t any o b j e c t i v i s t account of 
ethics does not constitute a pure description of moral experience but 
rather makes a p r e s c r i p t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o th a t moral experience which 
i n v i t e s agents t o approve of the same things approved of by the 
prescriber. Thus, Barnes claims t h a t what the o b j e c t i v i s t i s r e a l l y 
doing i s 'simply analysing the si t u a t i o n s , emotions, ways of acting etc. 
which he approves, His purpose i n so doing i s t o induce i n us the same 
feelings of approval as he has.' (14) 
Barnes' contention, then, i s t h a t philosophers such as Hartmann 
f a i l t o recognise t h a t a t h e o r e t i c a l account of the e t h i c a l world, and 
the making of p r e s c r i p t i v e recommendations about the 'good l i f e ' , are 
two l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t a c t i v i t i e s . As such, he says, you can do one or 
the other, never both, at the same time: or you can only do both i f you 
recognise the difference. But i t i s a difference which, he claims, 
e t h i c a l t h e o r i s t s of the past have tended t o overlook. This i s because, 
he states: 
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I t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the great moral philosophers from Plato 
onwards, th a t they were i n t e n t on so presenting the nature of 
things as t o win the approval of t h e i r hearers f o r what they 
themselves approved. A l l men are driven by a deep and 
inescapable desire t o make others approve what they approve. (15) 
However, he says, t h i s desire t o gain approval f o r what you value i s 
inappropriate f o r the moral philosopher t o seek. 
Barnes fu r t h e r asserts t h a t the o b j e c t i v i s t e t h i c a l t h e o r i s t i s 
not only g u i l t y of overlooking the d i s t i n c t i o n between analysis and 
pr e s c r i p t i o n . He i s also committed t o an inappropriate monism. For, as 
he explains: 
I f we were to speak of a Realm of Values we could only mean the 
exposition of a man's preferences i n t h e i r systematic 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n , including s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r emotional 
q u a l i t y t h a t accompanies each act of preference. There w i l l thus 
be not one, but many, Realms of Value. (16) 
Barnes' point i s t h a t an o b j e c t i v i s t cannot claim t h a t the values he 
approves of are s i n g u l a r l y v a l i d . At best, they express one among many 
personal preferences. Therefore, although both o b j e c t i v i s t s and ordinary 
moral agents assume t h a t t h e i r standards are absolutely true, i t i s the 
task of the moral philosopher to inform them t h a t e t h i c a l understanding 
i s i n f a c t r e l a t i v e and p l u r a l . As such, he concludes that: 
morality i s simply i n the long run t h a t set of ideas and 
approving a t t i t u d e s which has triumphed i n any p a r t i c u l a r society. 
And d i f f i c u l t as t h i s view may seem, i t i s nevertheless implied 
every time we speak of the morality of the East, the morality of 
the 14th century, or the morality of Germany. Each i s a morality, 
believing i t s e l f t o be absolute, yet seen on examination t o be 
r e l a t i v e . Ernest Barker has said: ' I t i s the essence of 
nationalism t h a t a nation considers i t s c i v i l i s a t i o n t o be 
C i v i l i s a t i o n ' . In a world where nationalism threatens t o destroy 
c i v i l i s a t i o n a sound conviction of the r e l a t i v i t y of a l l morality 
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i s l i k e l y t o be not so much a solvent of morality as a salutary 
check on i t s onesidedness. (17) 
Barnes has recently given h i s own assessment of the h i s t o r i c a l 
context w i t h i n which h i s emotivist suggestion was made. He has no 
doubt t h a t G.E Moore's P r i n c i p i a Ethica was the major t e x t which the 
early emotivist t h i n k e r s were responding to, The reason why Duncan-
Jones, Stevenson and himself were a l l moving towards a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n 
at the same time was because, he suggests, 'Moore had convinced us t h a t 
there was no analysis of 'good' i n empirical, or as he would say, 
n a t u r a l i s t i c terms, and we could not accept h i s a l t e r n a t i v e of a non-
n a t u r a l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , goodness' (18) Likewise, Barnes d i d not 
accept the version of e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s m which was advanced by 
Professor Prichard, who was h i s tu t o r a t Oxford i n h is undergraduate 
years. He explains t h a t although h i s e a r l i e s t views on ethics were 
shaped by Prichard's lectures and classes, and although he respected 
Prichard's rejection of a l l e m p i r i c o - u t i l i t a r i a n analyses, he was 
convinced that Prichard's own account of good as an indefinable sui 
generis concept fared no better than Moore's. (19) 
In other words, Barnes found Prichard's and Moore's rejection of 
the n a t u r a l i s t account of ethics convincing, but he rejected t h e i r own 
metaphysical views, and sought an a l t e r n a t i v e theory which was 
consistent with h i s e m p i r i c i s t viewpoint, He writes tha t : 
At the time, I held... t h a t a l l knowledge and r a t i o n a l b e l i e f must 
relate to what the senses disclose or what goes on i n my mind: 
but I was not inc l i n e d t o blackball ethics and theology f o r 
membership of the empirical club, simply because they had nD 
d i r e c t and single r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the evidence of the senses. 
Rather I hankered a f t e r showing that they had a looser, but s t i l l 
a j u s t i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p to the world of the senses. (20) 
Barnes' hankering i n t h i s respect was s a t i s f i e d by making the 
suggestion that our e t h i c a l and theological understandings constitute 
the expression of desires which are disclosed through the senses. I t 
was, he says, a notion which linked up with 'the a t t r a c t i v e idea that... 
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a thing's being good i s related t o what we desire i n same way', 
although not i n a way which was describable i n the n a t u r a l i s t manner. 
(21) In concluding t h i s , Barnes acknowledges the possible influence of 
Ogden and Richards, He r e c a l l s t h a t he had read The Meaning of Meaning 
during the period of making the suggestion, and he admits t o the l i k e l y 
p r o b a b i l i t y that i t was h i s f a m i l i a r i t y w i th t h e i r account of the 
emotive use of language i n general which contributed to the emergence 
of h i s d i s t i n c t l y emotivist view. As he puts i t , 'while I cannot be sure 
th a t t h i s volume was the midwife which delivered me from the labour of 
producing the suggestion, I t h i n k i t probably was'. (22) 
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V. A.J. Ayer.. 
A.J. Ayer's famous work Language. Truth and Logic, published i n 
1936, contained a short chapter e n t i t l e d the 'Critique of Ethics and 
Theology' which expressed dramatically the emotivist view. I t was the 
success of t h i s publication, more than any other, which popularised the 
emotive theory and made i t widely accessible to the public. However, 
Ayer's exposition of the emotivist account of ethics was not an 
o r i g i n a l declaration: h i s analysis was presented later than the 
expressed views of Stevenson, Duncan-Jones and Barnes, and his ideas 
were shaped by other i n t e l l e c t u a l influences. Although at the time of 
publication he did not acknowledge any sp e c i f i c influences upon him, he 
has recently admitted t h a t he was 'very l i k e l y t o have been 
unconsciously influenced' by Ogden and Richards. (1) In par t i c u l a r , he 
recognises the d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s claim t h a t the function of 
an e t h i c a l word i s purely emotive was drawn upon the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the symbolic and the emotive uses of language which was made 
by Ogden and Richards i n The Meaning of Meaning. Evidence f o r t h i s 
connection i s c l e a r l y indicated i n the text , where Ayer states that: 
The presence of an et h i c a l symbol i n a proposition adds nothing 
to i t s factual content. Thus i f I say t o someone, 'You acted 
wrongly i n stealing t h a t money', I am not s t a t i n g anything more 
than i f I had simply said 'You stole t h a t money'. In adding t h a t 
t h i s action i s wrong I am not making any fu r t h e r statement about 
i t . I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of i t . (2) 
This passage i s markedly s i m i l a r to the one quoted e a r l i e r from page 
125 of The Meaning of Meaning. Also, Ayer's u n o r i g i n a l i t y i s furt h e r 
confirmed by h i s ind i c a t i o n t h a t h i s view t h a t moral pronouncements 
are expressions of emotion rather than statements of f a c t was 
suggested t o him by Duncan-Jones. (3) 
What was, however, d i s t i n c t i v e about Ayer's contri b u t i o n t o the 
development of emotivism was h i s presentation of the theory i n the 
terms of the philosophical dictates of 'logical positivism'. He 
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acknowledges, though, t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the emotive theory does not 
depend upon the v a l i d i t y of the p o s i t i v i s t p r i n c i p l e s with which he 
seeks to inform i t . He writes, i n the Introduction to the Second Edition 
of Language. Truth and Logic (1946), that: 
The emotive theory of ethics... has provoked a f a i r amount of 
c r i t i c i s m ; but I f i n d t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i s m has been directed more 
often against the p o s i t i v i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s on which the theory has 
been assumed to depend than against the theory i t s e l f . Now I do 
not deny th a t i n p u t t i n g forward t h i s theory I was concerned with 
maintaining the general consistency of my position; but i t i s not 
the only e t h i c a l theory t h a t would have s a t i s f i e d t h i s 
requirement, nor does i t actually e n t a i l any of the non-ethical 
statements which form the remainder of my argument. 
Consequently, even i f i t could be shown t h a t these other 
statements were i n v a l i d , t h i s would not i n i t s e l f refute the 
emotive analysis of e t h i c a l judgements; and i n f a c t I believe t h i s 
analysis t o be v a l i d on i t s own account. (4) 
Ayer i s correct to assert that the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the emotivist 
analysis does not depend upon the p l a u s i b i l i t y of his peculiarly 
p o s i t i v i s t c r i t e r i a of 'verification', 'significance', ' l i t e r a l meaning' 
and so f o r t h . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between emotivism and l o g i c a l p o sitivism 
i s contingent rather than necessary. This can be seen by the fact t h a t 
other emotivist thinkers developed t h e i r e t h i c a l theories quite 
independently of t h e i r general philosophical regard for the a n a l y t i c a l 
achievements of the p o s i t i v i s t school. For instance, Stevenson writes i n 
1937 t h a t h i s studies with Wittgenstein i n Cambridge led him to an 
i n t e r e s t i n the Viennese p o s i t i v i s t s which was by no means u n c r i t i c a l . 
This i s because, he says, ' i t seems quite obvious t h a t a great deal of 
t h e i r l o g i c a l rigour i s gained at the expense of side-stepping 
fundamental and decently human d i f f i c u l t i e s . ' (5) However, he does 
acknowledge th a t 'any speculative metaphysics w i l l be i d l e unless the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e and c r i t i c i s m of these men i s taken seriously*. 
(6) Likewise, Barnes r e c a l l s t h a t when p D s i t i v i s t s l i k e Ayer took over 
his emotivist suggestion they used i t t o tread paths which he declined 
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t o follow. <7) Also, Duncan-Jones states i n his 'Ethical language" 
d i s s e r t a t i o n t h a t he adheres to the general philosophical analysis of 
G.E Moore who was, of course, no p o s i t i v i s t , 
We can see, then, t h a t the emotivist s t y l e of e t h i c a l theorising i s 
not necessarily related t o the s p e c i f i c doctrines of l o g i c a l positivism. 
Rather, i t relates t o the broader doctrines of empiricism. Also, we can 
discern t h a t Ayer had no d i r e c t influence upon the development of other 
emotivist theories. The work of Stevenson, Duncan-Jones and Barnes a l l 
preceded the publication of Langaugef Truth and Logic. Ayer's importance 
l i e s i n his popularisation of the emotive theory i n a controversial 
p o s i t i v i s t language, rather than making an o r i g i n a l t h e o r e t i c a l 
co n t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the emotivist t r a d i t i o n . 
Having outlined the h i s t o r i c a l context of the emergence of e t h i c a l 
emotivism, we need to address i n d e t a i l the question of what are the 
conceptual assumptions which underpin i t s expression; i t i s necessary 
t o establish the form of understanding which constitutes the emotivist, 
and more generally non-cognitivist account of ethics. 
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7. Kon-cQgnltivlsm and Liberal-Individualism. 
I t i s our purpose i n t h i s section t o specify i n greater d e t a i l 
than was provided e a r l i e r the nature of the re l a t i o n s h i p between the 
non-cogn i t i v i s t s t y l e of e t h i c a l theorising and the e m p i r i c i s t v a r i e t y 
of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t thought. For i t has already been seen th a t the 
non-cogn i t i v i s t thesis, set f o r t h as a philosophical claim which 
purports t o be abjective, amounts at bottom to the contention t h a t the 
f i n a l basis of choice f o r moral standards can only be an individual's 
agreement with, or admiration f o r , the at t i t u d e s which the standards 
express. However, t h i s 'philosophical' claim, i t s h a l l be argued, amounts 
to a very p a r t i c u l a r moral position; an evaluative or ideological 
understanding of man, with i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l (including p o l i t i c a l ) 
import, t h a t deserves the t i t l e of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 
Our central contention, therefore, w i l l be th a t non-cognitivism 
f a i l s t o provide, as i t sets out to do, a purely descriptive analysis of 
the nature of morality. Rather, we s h a l l see th a t non-cognitivism 
expresses an ideological evaluation, not observation, of that experience, 
and therefore f a i l s to maintain the clear d i s t i n c t i o n , which i t 
presumes t o e x i s t , between philosophical as opposed to ideological 
conceptions of man. 
I t w i l l be recalled t h a t non-cognitivism maintains that there i s 
no such t h i n g as moral cognition, knowledge or 'objective values'. 
Sabina Lovibond notes t h a t t h i s denial of there being such a thing as 
moral knowledge of a world of 'objective values' may be seen as an 
expression of the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t notion of freedom, as the 
condition i n which no one can order you about, i n th a t no one can t e l l 
you t h a t you are mistaken i n your moral (or other) values. (1) There i s 
a sense i n which t h i s claim i s r e l a t i v e l y uncontentious: the connection 
between e m p i r i c i s t philosophy (within which non-cognitivism i s located) 
and l i b e r a l p o l i t i c s i s a f a m i l i a r one, and i t i s one which has been 
e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged, t o a greater or lesser degree, by non-
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c o g n i t i v i s t thinkers. BDth Hare and Mackie have recently stated t h a t 
t h e i r respective theories are t o be understood as being expressions of, 
broadly speaking, a l i b e r a l v a r i e t y of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m which protects 
personal freedom, However, what we need t o specify i s the sense i n 
which the non - c o g n i t i v i s t expression of t h i s notion of freedom i s 
ideological rather than philosophical i n character, and relates t o an 
evaluative conception of man which i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of the l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological understanding as expressed w i t h i n the 
em p i r i c i s t rather than (most notably) the Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n 
of philosophical t h i n k i n g . 
Charles Taylor i d e n t i f i e s three i n t e r r e l a t e d notions which are 
b u i l t i n t o the d i s t i n c t l y modern conception of the subject and his 
r e l a t i o n t o the external world, and which are fundamental to the 
'epistemological t r a d i t i o n ' associated with Western philosophical 
thought from the Enlightenment to the present day. He writes t h a t 
The f i r s t i s the picture of the subject as i d e a l l y disengaged, that 
i s as free and r a t i o n a l t o the extent t h a t he has f u l l y 
distinguished himself from h i s natural and s o c i a l worlds, so th a t 
his i d e n t i t y i s no longer t o be defined i n terms of what l i e s 
outside him i n these worlds. The second, which flows from t h i s , i s 
the punctual view of the self , i deally ready qua free and r a t i o n a l 
to t r e a t these worlds - and even some of the features of his own 
character - instrumentally, as subject t o change and reordering i n 
order the better to secure the welfare of himself and other l i k e 
subjects. The t h i r d i s the social consequence of the f i r s t two; an 
atomistic construal of society as constituted by, or ultimately t o 
be explained i n terms of, i n d i v i d u a l purposes. (2) 
For Taylor, t h i s picture of the subject has t o be understood as 
something l i k e a moral ideal. I t generates the ideals of 'self-
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' and 'freedom as self-autonomy' which are basic t o our 
c i v i l i s a t i o n or modern culture, i n that, as Taylor remarks, 'to be free 
i n our modern sense i s t o be self-responsible, t o r e l y on one's own 
judgement, t o f i n d one's purpose i n oneself. (3) What t h i s picture 
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amounts t o i s a conception of the free or autonomous, s e l f - d e f i n i n g and 
self-responsible subject, possessing a t r a n s c u l t u r a l and a h i s t o r i c a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y , capable of di s t i n g u i s h i n g himself from a l l natural and 
social p a r t i c u l a r i t y and o b j e c t i f y i n g the world, determining h i s own 
purposes (as r e f l e c t i v e of h i s own natural desires) independently from 
that p a r t i c u l a r i t y , and standing i n social arrangements by which these 
purposes, as manifest i n instrumentally reasonable choices, are best 
s a t i s f i e d . 
I t i s f a i r , I think, t o i d e n t i f y t h i s picture of the 'unencumbered 
s e l f as l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n character; or at least t o acknowledge 
that the conception of the 'free r a t i o n a l man' i s a cent r a l c o n s t i t u t i v e 
assumption of any ' i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' understanding i n general, and i s most 
notably associated with the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t understanding i n 
par t i c u l a r . Further, we can see tha t the form of t h i s understanding i s 
ideological, i n the sense t h a t i t amounts to an evaluative portrayal of 
ideal moral (and political) relationships which pictures the i n d i v i d u a l 
i n a morally coherent world. That i s , i t i s an understanding the form 
of which i s the product of an e t h i c a l imagination: i t creates a moral 
(and p o l i t i c a l ) i d e n t i t y the sense of which i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n a 
pa r t i c u l a r vocabulary or language, and i t has the persuasive force of 
generating moral and p o l i t i c a l commitment from persons who, as 
adherents, i d e n t i f y themselves i n terms of th a t portrayal. As such, i t 
i s an understanding which possesses an i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l import i n 
that i t prescribes how we ought t o conceive of ourselves i n the e t h i c a l 
world, and creates the sense i n which the actions of a committed 
adherent constitute the p r a c t i c a l application of a set of beliefs. 
I t i s a feature of any ideological understanding t h a t i t i s 
irr e d u c i b l y e t h i c a l or evaluative. The p a r t i c u l a r conception of moral 
i d e n t i t y a r t i c u l a t e d therein cannot be categorised i n the same way as, 
for example, dentists, members of Sunderland Football Club or the 
Rotary Club. This i s because the class of person located w i t h i n an 
ideological i d e n t i t y i s not c l a s s i f i a b l e i n the same way as members of 
a professional, sporting or charitable i n s t i t u t i o n . Indeed, an 
ideological i d e n t i t y does not f i t any type of sociological description: 
i t i s not specifiable i n terms of any social condition or performance. 
To suggest, f o r example, t h a t the Marxist notion of the 'proletariat' 
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and the 'bourgeoisie' can be specified i n terms of such (value neutral) 
sociological descriptions as the working and the middle classes i s t o 
miss the ideological sense i n which, f o r the Marxist, the 'proletariat' 
are exploited by t h e i r 'bourgeois' manipulators. I t i s t o f a i l t o capture 
the sense i n which these notions, as employed i n Marxist ideological 
discourse, are c o n s t i t u t i v e of evaluative conceptions endowed with an 
et h i c a l significance which elevates the po r t r a y a l of the ideal type 
beyond anything of comparable standing i n the world which can be 
described i n commonplace terms. (4) 
The point to be drawn from t h i s i s t h a t an ideological 
understanding conceives rather than perceives the world: that which i s 
presented i s an evaluation and not an observation. I t i s not, therefore, 
to be understood as providing a more or less accurate 'picture of the 
world* which i s capable of v e r i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n . I t does not, 
despite the claims of ideological thinkers of various persuasions, 
constitute an objective representation or description of some external 
moral and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y which i s capable of being either true or 
false i n any r e f e r e n t i a l sense. The committed adherent of a p a r t i c u l a r 
ideological p o r t r a y a l does not f i n d an independently 'given' moral and 
p o l i t i c a l world before him which he perceives from a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
'correct' or i n s i g h t f u l viewpoint. Rather, he i d e n t i f i e s himself w i t h i n 
an ideological understanding, 'world-picture' or coherent imaginative 
p o r t r a y a l of ideal moral and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which creates 
the sense of what constitutes, f o r him, moral and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . 
(5) 
Put another way, i t i s an understanding which specifies i n a s e l f -
r e f e r e n t i a l sense what a commited adherent 'believes i n ' rather than 
enabling him t o 'believe that' something standing independent of and 
external to his moral and p o l i t i c a l experience i s indeed the case. Thus 
the adherent may be said t o have an objective knowledge of those 
beliefs which constitute the understanding, but not an objective 
knowledge i n the sense of grasping or picking out some relevantly 
descriptive features of an independent and external moral and p o l i t i c a l 
r e a l i t y which corresponds with that understanding or set of bel i e f s . 
We can see the sense i n which the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t picture of 
the 'free r a t i o n a l 1 subject, and the notion of personal freedom which 
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follows from i t , takes the form of an ideological understanding. For i t 
i s not t o be understood as a purely descriptive characterisation of man 
which actually obtains, or i s even attainable, i n the world. Rather, i t 
constitutes an evaluative moral ideal which i s conceived w i t h i n the 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t p o r t r a y a l of e t h i c a l experience, not perceived i n 
the world. Further, we s h a l l argue t h a t i t i s t h i s moral ideal which 
l i e s at the heart of the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t position. We need, therefore, 
t o show how t h i s evaluative conception of man i s presumed and 
expressed i n the non-cog n i t i v i s t argument. Before we perform t h i s task, 
though, we ought to be clear about the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
philosophical and the ideological understanding, f o r t h i s w i l l enable us 
to specify the sense i n which non-eognitivism relates t o the e m p i r i c i s t 
v a r i e t y of the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . 
Non-cognitivists have taken t h e i r characterisation of the nature 
of moral experience to be exclusively derived from a philosophical 
inv e s t i g a t i o n . And i n the e a r l i e r expositions of the theory, w r i t e r s 
such as Ayer and Stevenson made the additional assumption t h a t any 
philosophical enterprise, properly understood, serves a purely 
c l a r i f y i n g function which, being i n i t s e l f value-neutral, generates no 
prescriptions or recommendations of a p r a c t i c a l s o r t . The emotivist A.J. 
Ayer states t h i s assumption most confidently when he writes that: 
The theory i s e n t i r e l y on the level of analysis; i t i s an attempt 
to show what people are doing when they make moral judgements; i t 
i s not a set of suggestions as to what moral judgements they are 
to make. And t h i s i s true of a l l moral philosophy, as I understand 
i t . A l l moral theories... i n so f a r as they are philosophical 
theories, are neutral as regards actual conduct. (6) 
Ayer's notion i s t h a t a genuinely philosophical investigation i n t o the 
nature of morality constitutes an attempt t o specify the l o g i c a l 
properties of moral concepts and c l a r i f y the meaning of e t h i c a l 
language which expresses moral experience. Such elucidation, i n the 
words of Wittgenstein, 'leaves everything as i t i s ' : i t makes coherent 
and consistent sense of t h a t which i s there, i t does not suggest t h a t 
which ought t o be. (7) 
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Put another way, a philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s to be understood 
as an examination of the v a l i d i t y of postulates or assumed conditions 
which make possible the issuing of descriptive statements or claims to 
propositional knowledge of that which i s i n the nature of things. This 
conception of the l i m i t s of philosophy, widely shared w i t h i n the modern 
analy t i c t r a d i t i o n , remains, I think, the most plausible. In suggesting 
t h a t any meta-ethical philosophical enquiry cannot generate 
prescriptions or normative recommendations of a p r a c t i c a l s o r t r e l a t i n g 
t o moral action or commitment, i t provides a useful demarcation which 
makes clear the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'ethical analysis' and 'moralising', 
or philosophical and ideological understanding, (8) 
This d i s t i n c t i o n can be stated i n the following way. As applied to 
ethics, a philosophical enquiry constitutes an investigation i n t o the 
v a l i d i t y of assumptions r e l a t i n g to the nature of e t h i c a l experience. 
I t s task i s t o ofl'er an analysis of descriptions of the moral 
condition, or ask 'second-order' questions r e l a t i n g t o the v a l i d i t y of 
the ' f i r s t - o r d e r ' or d i r e c t descriptions of e t h i c a l experience. By 
contrast, a p a r t i c u l a r ideological understanding idealises t h a t 
condition i n an evaluatively s i g n i f i c a n t manner: i t does not provide a 
descriptive analysis of e t h i c a l experience (which i s capable of being 
either true or false) but rather creates a p a r t i c u l a r sense of t h a t 
experience through an evaluative p o r t r a y a l of ideal moral relationships. 
I t does not investigate anything and i s not therefore, s t r i c t l y 
speaking, a t h e o r e t i c a l understanding. 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t does not perceive the world and generate any 
technical knowledge about i t which can be put t o any instrumentally 
p r a c t i c a l use, Nonetheless, i t does possess an i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l 
import the evaluative sense of which i s non-technical or non-
instrumental: i t provides the non-instrumental r a t i o n a l sense i n which 
an adherent ought to a f f i r m , i n action, the r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s 
portrayed. I t determines the sense i n which any p r a c t i c a l action 
undertaken by a committed adherent i s i n t e l l i g i b l e or i s appropriate t o 
the a f f i r m a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n question. That i s , i t possesses 
an i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l import i n the form of prescriptions about how 
the adherent ought to conceive of himself and act i n a manner which 
a f f i r m s the moral 'ends' of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n question, although i t 
- 135 -
does not t e l l him what t o do, or recommend i n any precise technical 
way which 'means' he ought t o adopt i n the achievement of those 'ends*. 
A philosophical enquiry, by contrast, does not possess t h i s 
p r e s c r i p t i v e function because i t i s not grounded upon any evaluative 
conception of ideal r e l a t i o n s h i p s which makes i t possible t o prescribe 
anything i n an evaluatively s i g n i f i c a n t manner. What follows from t h i s 
i s the suggestion t h a t any attempt t o engage i n p r a c t i c a l or normative 
moral philosophising does not constitute a legitimate application of 
what we have specified as a genuine philosophical enquiry, but rather 
amounts t o an evaluative enterprise which i s grounded, i n a l l 
pr o b a b i l i t y , upon a recognisable ideological understanding of some kind 
or other. 
The point, then, i s t h a t philosophical descriptive analysis and 
ideological evaluation constitute two logically different forms of 
understanding. I t follows t h a t there i s no strong l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of entailment between them. There i s no sense i n which a philosophical 
enquiry can conclusively inform us of the v a l i d i t y or otherwise of an 
ideological p o r t r a y a l , because such a p o r t r a y a l cannot be tested. An 
ideological understanding i s not i n any conclusive sense j u s t i f i a b l e 
through an appeal t o philosophical reasoning, nor i s i t derived from 
philosophical r e f l e c t i o n or grounded upon philosophical t h i n k i n g . This 
i s because the kind of reasons provided (whether good or bad) w i t h i n a 
philosophical argument cannot necessarily compel an ideological 
adherent t o either maintain or abandon h i s commitment. Although i t i s 
undoubtedly a contingent f a c t t h a t philosophical r e f l e c t i o n may change 
the mind of an adherent by undermining h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l confidence or 
enthusiasm, such a response i s not the necessary outcome of a 
conclusion forced upon him by the logic or reasonableness of h is 
philosophical argument. Because an ideological conviction i s at bottom 
a matter of what one has been persuaded t o 'believe in', rather than 
what one has been shown t o be l o g i c a l l y demonstrable, the exercise of 
philosophical reasoning cannot necessarily make a difference t o i t . 
However, t h i s i s not t o suggest t h a t there i s no re l a t i o n s h i p 
whatsoever between philosophy and ideology. I t i s not to suggest, 
furthermore, t h a t i t i s a purely contingent h i s t o r i c a l f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n 
philosophical positions of the past have emerged at the same time as 
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t h e i r (seemingly) associated ideologies. Rather, the rel a t i o n s h i p can be 
stated i n the following way. Where there i s an instance of a 
recognisably ideological p o r t r a y a l or 'moral ideal' being a r t i c u l a t e d 
w i t h i n the main body of a philosophical argument and couched i n a 
spe c i f i c philosophical vocabulary, then i t i s the ideological component 
of the argument which i s presumed, and stands p r i o r to, the 
philosophical argument which attempts t o give i t convincing and 
coherent expression through the l o g i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n and presentation 
of i t s meaning. The p r i o r i t y of a presumed ideological view over i t s 
philosophical expression establishes the weaker l o g i c a l connection 
between the two understandings, i n that i f a p a r t i c u l a r ideological 
p o r t r a y a l i s presumed, then i t broadly determines, and l o g i c a l l y 
r e s t r i c t s , the range of concepts employed w i t h i n a s t y l e of 
philosophical reasoning which can count as an i n t e l l i g i b l e expression 
of i t . For example, any attempted philosophical expression of l i b e r a l 
ideological views must relate to, i n the sense of making coherent use 
of, certain concepts which are special t o the l i b e r a l ideological 
t r a d i t i o n , i f i t i s to count as an i n t e l l i g i b l e expression of i t at a l l . 
Our contention i s tha t t h i s i s the l o g i c a l sense i n which the non-
c o g n i t i v i s t thesis constitutes an attempt to give convincing and 
coherent philosophical expression to a presumed evaluative conception 
of man (with i n t r i n s i c p r a c t i c a l import) which i s l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t , 
and ideological, i n character. However, t h i s claim needs t o be 
substantiated by specifying i n greater d e t a i l the fundamental 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of the var i e t y of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m which 
h i s t o r i c a l l y relates t o non-cognitivism, and showing how these features 
are expressed i n the non-cog n i t i v i s t argument. The task i s t o 
disentangle the ideological component, as d i s t i n c t from the 
philosophical, which r e s t s i n the non-cog n i t i v i s t thesis. 
The v a r i e t y of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m which I have i n mind i s 
located i n the em p i r i c i s t , as d i s t i n c t from the Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t , 
t r a d i t i o n of philosophical thought. I t i s a t r a d i t i o n which has roots i n 
the w r i t i n g s of David Hume, has greater elements i n the work of Adam 
Smith, and fi n d s more systematic expression i n the works of such 
notable w r i t e r s as J.S. K i l l , Bertrand Russell and Isaiah Berlin. 
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David Hume i s to be considered the founder of t h i s t r a d i t i o n , and 
the c e n t r a l f i g u r e i n i t s emergence. For although Hume's moral and 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy has a strong (perhaps dominant) flavour of 
sceptical conservatism, i t i s possible to discern a l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t element w i t h i n the complex body of his work. Thus we f i n d 
Hume emphasising both the l i b e r a l values of personal freedom and the 
im p a r t i a l rule of law, and the conservative values of the importance of 
a ranked social order and a p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t r e f l e c t s and 
upholds t h a t order. Therefore, as M i l l e r notes, Hume's ideological 
conception of man can be understood to be simultaneously l i b e r a l and 
conservative. (9) Whilst showing s e n s i t i v i t y to the influence of custom, 
convention and social hierarchy upon the moral agent, Hume nonetheless 
made the 'i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' assumption th a t i t was possible (although 
d i f f i c u l t ) f o r people to abstract from t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r spatio-temporal 
pos i t i o n i n a r r i v i n g at moral appraisals. I t i s t h i s assumption, coupled 
with the notion t h a t morality i s a matter of the passions, which formed 
the basis of a t r a d i t i o n of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t thought which was, so 
to speak, in the waking i n the mid t o late 18th century, and which 
found more systematic expression i n the 19th and 20th centuries. (10) 
R.G. Collingwood indicates the foundations of t h i s understanding 
when he writes that: 
Liberalism... begins with the recognition t h a t men, do what we 
w i l l , are free; t h a t a man's acts are his own, spring from his own 
personality, and cannot be coerced. But t h i s freedom i s not 
possessed a t b i r t h ; i t i s acquired by degrees as a man enters i n t o 
the self-conscious possession of his personality through a l i f e of 
d i s c i p l i n e and moral progress. (11) 
Liberal-individualism, therefore, presents a picture of the autonomous 
man standing free i n the world and undertaking f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
h i s actions i n i t . This picture i s founded upon the assumption that 
s e l f - i d e n t i t y stands l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to, and independent of, any 
substantive s o c i a l arrangement. Two related notions follow from t h i s . 
The f i r s t i s t h a t the possession of t h i s self-awareness of one's 
personal condition makes moral progress possible. The second i s tha t 
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the condition of freedom (in the negative sense of lack of external 
r e s t r a i n t or coercion) i s a necessary prerequisite of, and marks the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of, self-determination and moral self-development: i t 
enables the i n d i v i d u a l t o acquire the capacity t o order h i s l i f e t o s u i t 
his personal wants and needs as manifested i n self-chosen actions. 
Therefore, f o r the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t , (of the v a r i e t y we have 
i n mind) morality i s grounded i n 'enlightened' s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I t s 
rationale i s constituted in terms of the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 
purposes or goals and the instrumentally reasonable s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
desires. However, the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t claims, the achievement of 
these goals can only be guaranteed w i t h i n a social arrangement, 
established moral community, or c i v i l association i n which constraints 
are imposed whereby the pursuit of s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h a t 
area of p r i v a t e l i f e which does not adversely a f f e c t or harm the 
i n t e r e s t s of others. I t i s the recognition of the need t o constrain the 
pursuit of purely prudential gain through a system of mutual soc i a l co-
operation which constitutes, f o r the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t , the r a t i o n a l 
decision t o honour the moral obligation, and impose the d i s c i p l i n e , of 
s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . Such obligation to respect the r i g h t s of others to 
pursue t h e i r own mutually r e s t r i c t e d a c t i v i t i e s i s manifested i n the 
acknowledgement of the authority of c i v i l laws which specify the 
conditions t o be subscribed to i n making choices and i n performing 
self-chosen transactions w i t h others. I t i s w i t h i n a system of c i v i l 
law t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l freedom t o act i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner i s 
protected, subject to the condition t h a t any such action does not 
encroach unfavourably upon others. 
The l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t , therefore, understands social a c t i v i t y 
and moral actions to be i n t e l l i g i b l e i n terms of rule-following: t h a t 
i s , actions undertaken i n accordance w i t h the established c i v i l laws 
which are universally applicable i n the sense of s t a t i n g equal 
treatment f o r a l l persons i n a l l relevantly s i m i l a r circumstances. The 
legal r e l a t i o n s h i p between persons i s equal and i m p a r t i a l : every c i t i z e n 
i s equal before the law. Any infringement of those i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s 
and freedoms which are protected by law (including the r i g h t t o p r i v a t e 
property) constitutes, f o r the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t , i r r a t i o n a l , immoral 
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and unjust action. I t i s t o break the rules upon which the mutually 
cooperative benefit of protecting i n d i v i d u a l purposes i s established. 
This characterisation of the fundamental features of a p a r t i c u l a r 
v a r i e t y of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m serves the purpose of h i g h l i g h t i n g the 
centr a l notions of moral progress, the conception of moral obli g a t i o n 
as the r a t i o n a l constraint of s e l f - i n t e r e s t through the establishment 
of universal rules, and the idea of moral community as c i v i l 
association, which are c o n s t i t u t i v e of i t . Specific a t t e n t i o n to the 
vocabulary used i n non - c o g n i t i v i s t argument reveals how these notions 
are also evident preoccupations of the non - c o g n i t i v i s t position. 
Stevenson discusses the case of moral agent A who believes that 
he i s bound t o follow a rule of conduct which has been given an 
external authority because i t i s grounded upon an 'objective value' and 
writes; 
My quarrel with A i s not f o r h i s feeling bound i n obedience t o a 
rule of conduct... I t i s fortunate that we can bind the divergent 
aspects of our personality by feeling bound t o a principle... My 
quarrel with A i s only over h i s i n s i s t i n g that he didn't set up 
the rule, either as an expression of h is own individualism, or as 
a consequence of h i s t r a i n i n g . To deny t h i s i s only a defensive 
gesture of a man who must shelter himself from others influence. 
I t cuts one o f f from a l l growth. (12) 
Stevenson continues t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e open t o A i s t o 'know what 
rule t o set up by deciding what he would most want to do, independently 
of h i s t r a i n i n g ' (13): a decision which involves the 'emancipation from 
authority', 'finding one's s e l f and 'establishing an in d i v i d u a l set of 
values' without 'pretending t h a t such values are supported by the very 
nature of things' (14). 
Likewise, Hare contends that; 
I f I refuse to make my own decisions, I am, i n merely copying my 
fathers, showing myself a lesser man than they; ... t o become 
morally adult (involves)... learning t o make decisions of 
p r i n c i p l e ; i t i s t o learn to use 'ought'-sentences i n the 
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r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t they can only be v e r i f i e d by reference t o a 
standard or set of pr i n c i p l e s which we have by our own decision 
accepted and made our own' (15) 
Both Stevenson and Hare assume, then, t h a t the movement towards a 
condition of moral adulthood, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of moral development 
or growth, necessarily involves the s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n that one has t o 
drop any previous dependence on parental or more generally c u l t u r a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s nurtured through the process of soci a l t r a i n i n g , and choose 
those p r i n c i p l e s which are appropriate to one's own desires, wants or 
needs. This notion of the p o s s i b i l i t y (and d e s i r a b i l i t y ) of emancipating 
oneself from those a u t h o r i t a t i v e standards which r e s t r i c t or f r u s t r a t e 
the expression of mutually compatible i n d i v i d u a l wants i s a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t assumption. I t i s r e f l e c t i v e of the 
l i b e r a l concern for the achievement of a 'self-conscious possession of 
personality 1 which i s deemed to be a necessary precondition f o r 
att a i n i n g the degree of s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or moral d i s c i p l i n e which 
constitutes progress. Further, i t i s t o make the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
assumption t h a t the achievement of moral adulthood generates i n d i v i d u a l 
recognition of the need f o r self-imposed r e s t r a i n t s , as manifest i n the 
undertaking of obligations t o follow universal rules of conduct. For 
non-cognitivists have tended t o assume t h a t i t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
feature of a l l moral understanding and action t h a t r u l e - f o l l o w i n g 
adopted therein i s i n some sense make universal. How i s t h i s notion of 
'universalisablity' b u i l t i n t o the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t s t y l e of e t h i c a l 
theorising? 
Stevenson, following Hume, states the requirement of 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y i n terms of psychological dispositions: he argues 
that i t i s a contingent f a c t about our psychological 'make-up' t h a t we 
make moral utterances i n accordance with the specifications t h a t what 
we say or do i s always governed by an appeal t o universal standards. 
(16) For Stevenson, t h i s psychological requirement that our moral 
prescriptions are considered t o be applicable i n a l l i d e n t i c a l 
circumstances i n r e l a t i o n t o a l l relevantly s i m i l a r persons i s what 
makes any moral system functional. I t i s what makes moral 
communication between persons possible; i t establishes the degree of 
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t r u s t which makes our moral l i f e , i n the pragmatic sense, workable. 
(17) 
Hare, fol l o w i n g Kant, makes the stronger claim that i t i s a 
logical requirement of moral discourse t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r judgement of 
the form 'X ought to do Y' implies, i n the sense t h a t i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l y 
t r a n s l a t a b l e i n t o , a universal p r e s c r i p t i o n of the form 'X and others 
ought t o do Y i n i d e n t i c a l circumstances'. For Hare, i n other words, a 
moral agent i s l o g i c a l l y compelled - on pain of contradiction - t o 
apply his adopted e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e universally and consistently i n a l l 
i d e n t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s which relate t o a l l relevantly s i m i l a r persons. 
There c e r t a i n l y appears to be an element of t r u t h i n the 
suggestion t h a t a l l moral practice i s characterised, and i s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e , i n terms of the universal, t h a t i s consistent, application 
of rules. Wittgenstein has shown th a t the sense of a l l practices 
(including moral) i s determined by the use of rules, and that our grasp 
of such rules i s manifested in actions the appropriateness of which 
indicate our 'mastery of the practice*. A requirement of such mastery 
involves knowing how t o apply consistently the rules which constitute 
practices. I t i s important to note, however, t h a t Wittgenstein's point 
i s purely conceptual: i t indicates the sense i n which the 'logical 
grammar' of any practice i s shaped by the application of rules; and 
specifies the conditions, i n terms of consistency, in which any r u l e -
following utterance or action i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . This point does not, i n 
i t s e l f , presuppose any substantive notions, or generate any p r a c t i c a l 
recommendations as t o how we ought to conduct ourselves i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r fashion. Likewise, Kant's notion of a 'categorical imperative' 
i s , i n i t s e l f , purely formal and hence empty: i t needs to be applied t o 
some substantive conception of man i f i t i s t o generate any p r a c t i c a l 
consideration of treatment. 
Our suggestion, however, i s t h a t the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t adoption of 
the 'principle of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y * extends beyond t h i s conceptual 
point and relates t o a substantive notion which i s recognisably 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n character. In order t o show t h i s i t i s 
necessary to note t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r a l i s a b i l i t y , as expressed 
i n the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t understanding, i s bound up with the 'Golden 
Rule' or maxim 'Do as you would be done by'. This i s a moral or 
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evaluative recommendation: i t requires t h a t everyone s h a l l be judged by 
the same standard by which he judges himself. Furthermore, t h i s 
requirement presupposes th a t a l l individuals have specifiable i n t e r e s t s 
or purposes which stand independent from p a r t i c u l a r social i d e n t i t i e s 
and seek equality of treatment i n terms of these i n t e r e s t s or purposes. 
I t i s t o discount as i r r e l e v a n t any discrimination between persons 
which relates t o pa r t i c u l a r i d e n t i t i e s characterised i n terms of sex, 
race, nation, s o c i a l standing or class. 
The point, then, i s th a t the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t adoption of the 
formal 'principle of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y ' i s set w i t h i n the context of a 
substantive conception of man, and relates to the moral maxim 'treat 
others as you would wish to be treated y o u r s e l f , which makes l i t t l e 
sense outside of the context of a l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t conception of 
morality. A Marxist, f o r example, may indeed be formally committed i n a 
way which relates t o Wittgenstein's conceptual point about the 
consistent application of rules t o t r e a t equally, and expect t o be 
treated equally by, those who he i d e n t i f i e s w i t h i n h i s moral practice 
to be fellow 'proletarians'; but i t i s precisely because of t h i s notion 
of the primacy of the class i d e n t i t y (in the ideological sense) t h a t he 
would expect t o t r e a t members of the 'bourgeoisie* i n a d i f f e r e n t 
fashion from the way i n which he expects t o be treated himself. I t i s , 
therefore, only i f the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological conception of 
man as r a t i o n a l l y transcending a l l c u l t u r a l p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s i s assumed 
th a t the substantive notion of universal treatment i n a l l relevant 
aspects (ie. r e l a t i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s and purposes) has any 
p r a c t i c a l sense. And i t i s t h i s substantive notion of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y 
which i s adopted by non-cognitivists, i n that they assume the 
recognisably l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t conception of man specifying 
i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s and so f o r t h , upon which t h i s notion i s applied. 
We can see then t h a t t h i s substantive notion of 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y i s not, despite the claims of the non-cognitivists, 
t o be understood as a c o n s t i t u t i v e feature of all moral t h i n k i n g . 
Rather, i t i s a feature of liberal moral thinking: i t i s a 
ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of a p a r t i c u l a r l y l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u l i s t evaluative 
conception of morality. To assert, as the non-cognitivists do, that 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y (in t h i s substantive sense of t r e a t i n g equally 
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i n d i v i d u a l s who have i d e n t i c a l i n t e r e s t s and f i n d themselves i n 
i d e n t i c a l circumstances) i s of the essence of moral valuation i s not t o 
t e l l us what 'morality' means or how moral words are used. Eather, i t 
i s to prescribe a meaning f o r 'morality' and other moral words, and 
i m p l i c i t l y i t i s t o prescribe a morality of a recognisably l i b e r a l kind. 
Likewise, i t i s t o presuppose a substantive l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
ideological notion of equal treatment i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s 
t o which the formal notions of the consistent application of rules i s 
attached. 
This substantive notion of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y i s reflected i n the 
non-cog n i t i v i s t conception of a moral community. Hare argues i n Moral 
Thinking: I t s Levels, Method and Point (1981) t h a t h i s theory of 
'rational universal p r e s c r i p t i v i s m ' establishes the point of a moral 
community. His idea i s t h a t our sense of moral obligation as constr a i n t 
i s generated from our capacity to place ourselves i n others' exact 
positions through the application of the u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e . 
For Hare, (echoing Hume) t h i s capacity t o have an 'impartial sympathy' 
f o r others' predicaments generates our sense of moral compulsion t o 
wish f o r , and accommodate, the f u l f i l m e n t of others' preferences or 
expressed int e r e s t s . He writes that 'we r e t a i n , a l l of us, the freedom 
t o prefer what we prefer, subject to the constra i n t t h a t we have... t o 
prefer t h a t ' which, i f we placed ourselves i n others' exact si t u a t i o n s , 
we would imagine they would prefer. (18) 
Further, Hare argues, i t follows t h a t any p r a c t i c a l adoption of 
the u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e leads us a l l t o seek f o r the 
achievement of a 'total i m p a r t i a l preference' f o r those p r i n c i p l e s which 
are r e f l e c t i v e of in t e r e s t s t h a t are of general u t i l i t y t o a l l of us, or 
are c o n s t i t u t i v e of the common intere s t . (Vhere the maximisation of the 
common in t e r e s t includes the protection of the i n d i v i d u a l t o express 
preferences which do not adversely a f f e c t others). Thus, Hare concludes: 
In p r e f e r r i n g what we prefer, morality compels us to accommodate 
ourselves t o the preferences of others, and t h i s has the e f f e c t 
t h a t when we are t h i n k i n g morally and doing i t r a t i o n a l l y we 
s h a l l a l l prefer the same moral presc r i p t i o n s about matters which 
a f f e c t other people (though i n matters which we do not, we remain 
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f r e e ) . Moral t h i n k i n g i s thus revealed as something t h a t we have 
to do i n concert, though each i n d i v i d u a l has t o play h i s own 
part... Reason leaves us with our freedom, but constrains us t o 
respect the freedom of others, and t o combine w i t h them i n 
exercising i t . (19) 
For Hare, i n other words, i t i s our capacity t o have an i m p a r t i a l 
sympathy f o r the predicament of others, and our a b i l i t y to reach a 
'total i m p a r t i a l preference' f o r p r i n c i p l e s t h a t are of general u t i l i t y , 
which constitutes moral (as d i s t i n c t from prudential) t h i n k i n g or 
reasoning, and which makes possible the mutual co-operation w i t h i n a 
moral community, and the obligations undertaken therein. 
I t i s a conception of the rationale of morality which i s also 
reflected i n the w r i t i n g s of J.L Mackie. For Mackie conceives of 
'morality i n the narrow sense' as providing 'acceptable p r i n c i p l e s of 
constraint on action the general encouragement and widespread respect 
fo r which' w i l l do the most t o counter the dangers of individuals 
pursuing purely s e l f i s h goals at the expense of the common int e r e s t . 
(20) And, Mackie says, the point of morality ( i n t h i s narrow sense) i s 
the recognition 'that i t i s necessary f o r the well-being of the people 
i n general t h a t they should act i n some extent i n ways that they 
cannot see t o be ( e g o t i s t i c a l l y ) prudential and also i n ways that i n 
fa c t are not prudential. Morality has the function of checking what 
would be the natural r e s u l t of prudence alone.' (21) 
The no n - c o g n i t i v i s t conception of the point of morality and the 
function of moral community may be seen as a r e f l e c t i o n of the l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological notion of a civil association. For i t i s t o 
conceive the rationale f o r the formation of moral society i n terms of 
the voluntary undertaking of individuals who seek mutual protection and 
co-operation t o lay down moral rules of conduct whereby the common 
int e r e s t of a l l i s guaranteed, including the freedom of in d i v i d u a l 
expression of preference and action which does not i n f r i n g e the 
inter e s t s of others. For the non-cognitivist, such co-operative 
tolerance of the in t e r e s t s of others i s possible through the r a t i o n a l 
establishment of moral obligations (generated by the adoption of the 
u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e ) which transcend the considerations of 
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prudence. I t i s a view which i s grounded upon the substantive l i b e r a l 
notion of ' u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y ' the moral sense of which specifies the 
conditions f o r consistent equality of treatment i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l 
i n t e r e s t s . The n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t conception of moral t h i n k i n g and moral 
association, therefore, r e f l e c t s the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t emphasis of 
the importance of rules and obligations i n a l l voluntary associations: 
whose purpose i s tD preserve the opportunity f o r every i n d i v i d u a l t o 
j o i n with others i n rewarding relationships not injurious t o others. I t 
i s t o express the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y l i b e r a l assumption t h a t the l i b e r t y 
and welfare of the i n d i v i d u a l and the j u s t i c e and security of society 
depend upon there being c l e a r l y defined and enforced legal 
relationships between a l l of i t s members. 
Ve have attempted to indicate the l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l manner in 
which the non-cognitivist s t y l e of e t h i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s inseparable 
from a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a i n of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological discourse 
which f i n d s expression i n the e m p i r i c i s t philosophical t r a d i t i o n . This 
i s not to suggest t h a t non-cognitivism and t h i s v a r i e t y of l i b e r a l -
individualism are synonomous or t o t a l l y indistinguishable - an 
e m p i r i c i s t l i b e r a l thinker such as J.S. M i l l was c l e a r l y not a non-
c o g n i t i v i s t - but i t i s to declare the ideological sense i n which the 
no n - c o g n i t i v i s t approach to ethics since the Enlightenment i s t o be 
understood as being a d i s t i n c t i v e s t y l e of philosophical reasoning 
which constitutes an expression of a presumed and recognisably l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t conception of morality. 
I t i s clear t h a t the force of t h i s suggestion rests upon an 
acceptance of the d i s t i n c t i o n between philosophy and ideology which has 
been developed i n t h i s section. (22) For non-cognitivists would not be 
necessarily perturbed by the suggestion t h a t t h e i r thesis can be 
characterised as r e f l e c t i n g a (broadly speaking) l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
conception of morality, so long as i t i s conceded th a t such an 
enterprise i s not i n i t s e l f the product of engaging i n the type of 
'moralising' which i s inherent in ideological or evaluative discourse, 
but rather constitutes a philosophical analysis or c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the 
sense of 'the moral l i f e * which i s founded upon an accurate description 
of the nature of e t h i c a l experience. However, i t i s t h i s concession 
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which i s being denied. For we have suggested th a t the philosophical 
enterprise of non-cognitivism i s based upon d i s t i n c t ideological, not 
philosophical, assumptions: assumptions which include the notions of 
•freedom as self-autonomy' and 'se l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' , and which 
constitute an evaluative p o r t r a y a l of ideal moral and p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t i s neither true or false i n a descriptive way, the 
acceptance of which rests ultimately upon an act of f a i t h or 
commitment, rather than philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (23) 
This amounts t o the claim t h a t non-cognitivism i s t o be 
understood as an ideological as well as a philosophical achievement. 
For although non-cognitivism has made an undoubted philosophical 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the l o g i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n of issues r e l a t i n g t o our 
understanding of the nature of moral experience, i n tha t i t has 
informed us, f o r example, of the metaphysical pretentions or fall a c i o u s 
b e l i e f s i n 'objective values' which have been i n t r i n s i c to the 
philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n offered t o support other ideological 
positions, i t has also contributed, i n the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
ideological sense, t o the re b u t t a l of other ideological stances 
incompatible with i t s own p a r t i c u l a r conception of morality. For 
instance, J.L. Mackie's expressed hope th a t 'concrete moral issues can 
be argued without appeal t o any mythical objective values' i s 'based on 
some conception of the f l o u r i s h i n g of human l i f e ' which i s i t s e l f 
ideological i n character. (24) 
What follows from t h i s argument i s the claim t h a t previous 
philosophical disputes conducted i n the modern non - c o g n i t i v i s t 
t r a d i t i o n have been i n t e l l i g i b l e because the debate has been grounded 
upon, and determined by, ce r t a i n ideological assumptions which relate 
t o a l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t framework or context. This i s t o assert the 
weaker l o g i c a l sense i n which non-cognitivism i s related t o l i b e r a l -
individualism. As a f i n a l point, i t may be suggested t h a t a version of 
non-cognitivism could be formulated i n the future which abandoned i t s 
attachment t o the notion of self-autonomy and so f o r t h , upon which i t s 
l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l connection with l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s 
established. I doubt th a t t h i s i s possible. I f non-cognitivism were to 
abandon i t s central conception of morality as a matter of in d i v i d u a l 
free choice v o l u n t a r i l y t o establish a moral practice which r e f l e c t s 
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the shared att i t u d e s of individuals, then i t would, so to speak, lose 
i t s 'moral' or point. I t would not constitute a re v i s i o n of an 
established t r a d i t i o n of moral thought, but would amount to a r a d i c a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t understanding. 
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8. B e r l i n and Russell. 
I t was noted i n the previous section t h a t a l i b e r a l account of 
e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y presented w i t h i n a 
philosophical argument. And we have suggested th a t such a depiction 
takes the form of an ideological understanding which i s expressed i n a 
philosophical vocabulary: where the presumed ideological p o r t r a y a l i s 
t o be understood as being l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from, and standing p r i o r 
to, the philosophical argument which a r t i c u l a t e s i t . Further, i t was 
contended th a t w r i t e r s such as A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare and 
J.L. Mackie, who are to be located i n the non-cognitivist t r a d i t i o n of 
e t h i c a l t h e orising, have i m p l i c i t l y expressed and hence presumed the 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological p o r t r a y a l of moral agency i n t h e i r 
philosophical analysis. Such expression i s i m p l i c i t because these 
philosophers do not understand themselves to be making, at least i n 
t h e i r e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , an e x p l i c i t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o normative ethics or 
p o l i t i c a l understanding. (1) However, there are c e r t a i n w r i t e r s , of whom 
Isaiah B e r l i n and Bertrand Russell are good examples, who are 
e x p l i c i t l y concerned to advance l i b e r a l convictions: convictions which 
are expressed i n philosophical arguments which are closely drawn upon 
the c e n t r a l assumptions of the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t thesis. 
Isaiah Berlin's notable achievement was t o restate the l i b e r a l 
p o s i t i o n i n terms c l e a r l y drawn from the modern a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophical t r a d i t i o n i n which non-cognitivism has a c e n t r a l place. 
His purpose was t o o f f e r a c r i t i q u e of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m and i t s 
metaphysical assumptions. (2) This c r i t i q u e constituted an attempt to 
give l i b e r a l i s m a coherent and convincing expression w i t h i n a 
fashionable philosophical vocabulary. I t i s necessary t o outline the 
nature of t h i s achievement. 
Berlin's thesis i s grounded upon two purported an a l y t i c t r u t h s . 
The f i r s t i s the claim t h a t i t i s an ineradicable feature of a l l human 
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experience t h a t values are diverse and c o n f l i c t i n g ; not only i n the 
'non-cognitivist' sense th a t they stand r e l a t i v e t o the expression of 
in d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s or desires, and thus c o n f l i c t i n r e l a t i o n t o 
differences of fee l i n g between persons or societies, but also i n the 
sense t h a t there i s a tension between c o n f l i c t i n g values i n one 
in d i v i d u a l consciousness. (3) For Berlin, i t i s an error t o suppose th a t 
a l l goals, a l l v i r t u e s , a l l ideals held t o be desirable by an agent can 
be compatibly ordered or united i n t o a harmonious whole without loss. 
The second, related claim i s t h a t there are no overarching metaphysical 
standards of r a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n by which t o resolve such c o n f l i c t s 
of values between persons, societies, or w i t h i n our own consciousness. 
This i s because, Be r l i n says, questions of value are excluded from the 
realm of the determinately answerable: they are, i n h i s view, ult i m a t e l y 
contestable or, i n modern parlance, incommensurable. 
This conception of value relates to the non-cog n i t i v i s t thesis i n 
two c e n t r a l ways. I t i s to maintain that value-ascription constitutes 
an expression of feeling which r e s t s ultimately upon an i n d i v i d u a l 
consciousness, and i t i s t o deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of there being any 
'objective values' which stand independently from such i n d i v i d u a l 
expression of feeling. Unlike the non-cognitivists, however, Be r l i n 
employs t h i s conception of value t o make a series of e x p l i c i t 
recommendations f o r conduct which have p r a c t i c a l import of a 
recognisably l i b e r a l kind. These recommendations can best be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by attending t o h i s concluding passage i n the essay 'Two 
Concepts of Liberty', where he wri t e s t h a t 
I t may be tha t the ideal of freedom t o choose ends without 
claiming eternal v a l i d i t y f o r them, and the pluralism of values 
connected with t h i s , i s only the late f r u i t of our declining 
c a p i t a l i s t c i v i l i s a t i o n : an ideal which remote ages and p r i m i t i v e 
societies have not recognised, and one which p o s t e r i t y w i l l regard 
w i t h c u r i o s i t y , even sympathy, but l i t t l e comprehension. This may 
be so; but no sceptical conclusion seems t o me t o follow. 
Principles are not less sacred because t h e i r duration cannot be 
guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire f o r guarantees t h a t our values 
are eternal and secure i n some objective heaven i s perhaps only a 
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craving f o r the c e r t a i n t i e s of childhood and the absolute values 
of our p r i m i t i v e past. 'To realise the r e l a t i v e v a l i d i t y of one's 
own convictions' said an admirable w r i t e r of our time, 'and yet 
stand f o r them u n f l i n c h i n g l y , i s what distinguishes a c i v i l i s e d 
man from a barbarian'. To demand more than t h i s i s perhaps a deep 
and incurable metaphysical need; but t o allow i t t o determine 
one's practice i s a symptom of an equally deep, and more 
dangerous, moral and p o l i t i c a l immaturity. (4) 
This passage r e f l e c t s c e r t a i n moral ideals associated with 
liberalism. I t i s b u i l t upon an ideal picture of the subject 
characterised i n terms of the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l t o choose his 
own purposes without recourse to any metaphysical j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For 
Berlin, the condition of moral and p o l i t i c a l immaturity i s characterised 
as the outcome of an unenlightened, 'childish', 'primitive' or 'barbarian' 
dependence upon the notion of the objective values or eternal v a l i d i t y 
for our p r i n c i p l e s . To recognise the contingency, r e l a t i v i t y and 
p l u r a l i t y of values ( r e l a t i v e t o diverse i n d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s ) , and yet 
not s h i r k from t h i s f a c t , i s , Berlin says, the hallmark of moral 
adulthood and progress. I t i s what distinguishes the c i v i l i s e d man from 
the barbarian, or the l i b e r a l from the n a t i o n a l i s t . 
These notions of 'freedom' and 'moral maturity' are p a r t i c u l a r l y 
l i b e r a l evaluations, and they have t h e i r place i n the l i b e r a l 
ideological understanding. They are also, as we have seen, presumed 
w i t h i n the non-c o g n i t i v i s t s t y l e of e t h i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , and generate 
cer t a i n p r a c t i c a l recommendations which relate t o moral conduct. For we 
can see t h a t the moral r e l a t i v i s m which Berlin associates with moral 
maturity, and the reaction against non-liberal moral practices t h a t 
follows from i t , i s also reflected i n W.H.F. Barnes' statement, made i n 
1933 and quoted e a r l i e r , t h a t 'In a world where nationalism threatens 
to destroy C i v i l i s a t i o n a sound conviction of the r e l a t i v i t y of a l l 
morality i s l i k e l y t o be not so much a solvent of morality as a 
salutory check on i t s onesidedness 1. (5) 
Where, though, B e r l i n d i f f e r s from the n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t s i s i n his 
e x p l i c i t insistence t h a t l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l practice i s supported by the 
arguments of philosophical value-pluralism. For B e r l i n , t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l 
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conception of value i s only p r a c t i c a l l y r ealisable w i t h i n l i b e r a l 
society; an arrangement i n which, as John Gray says 
moral c o n f l i c t s are openly revealed and commended to us, not 
because i t alone s a t i s f i e s the demands of human nature, but 
because i n i t the competition of goods which i s an unalterable 
feature of the human predicament i s not shirked or evaded, but 
act i v e l y embraced. <6) 
Berlin's assumption t h a t there i s a connection between the o r e t i c a l 
value-pluralism and l i b e r a l practice raises the general question of 
what he understands t o be the re l a t i o n s h i p between philosophical theory 
and moral ideals as manifested i n practice. He p a r t i a l l y i l l u s t r a t e s h i s 
view on t h i s issue when he writes that: 
I t was, I th i n k , Bertrand Russell... who remarked somewhere t h a t 
the deepest convictions of philosophers are seldom contained i n 
t h e i r formal arguments: fundamental bel i e f s , comprehensive views 
of l i f e , are l i k e c i t a d e l s which must be guarded against the 
enemy. Philosophers expend t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l power i n arguments 
against actual and possible objections t o t h e i r doctrines, and 
although the reasons they f i n d , and the l o g i c t h a t they use, may 
be complex, ingenious, and formidable, they are defensive weapons; 
the inner f o r t r e s s i t s e l f - the v i s i o n of l i f e f o r the sake of 
which the war i s being waged - w i l l , as a rule, turn out t o be 
r e l a t i v e l y simple and unsophisticated. (7) 
Berlin's view, then, appears to be t h a t a philosopher (of morals 
and p o l i t i c s ) has c e r t a i n 'fundamental be l i e f s ' which he seeks to 
express i n a formal argument. However, what i s not made clear i s how 
these 'comprehensive views of l i f e ' are related t o philosophical theory: 
fo r i s there a sense i n which these 'convictions' are themselves 
philosophically informed?, and i s there, f o r B e r l i n , a r e l a t i o n of 
entailment between the conviction and the philosophical expression of 
i t ? 
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This issue becomes clearer once i t i s noticed t h a t B e r l i n takes 
cer t a i n 'fundamental be l i e f s ' t o be r e f l e c t i v e of true descriptions of 
the human predicament. For when Berlin states h i s admiration f o r the 
convictions expressed by J.S. M i l l i n Qn Liberty, he writes, of M i l l , 
that: 
he i s saying something true and important about some of the most 
fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and aspirations of human beings. M i l l 
i s not merely w r i t i n g a s t r i n g of clear propositions (each of 
which, viewed by i t s e l f i s of doubtful p l a u s i b i l i t y ) connected by 
such l o g i c a l l i n k s as he can supply. He perceived something 
profound and essential.. (8) 
Now, what follows from Berlin's claim that certain convictions 
expressed by M i l l r e f l e c t true descriptions of the human predicament 
i s , I suggest, the assumption that a philosophical argument which i s 
l o g i c a l l y coherent can more or less accurately show these convictions 
t o be true. And i f t h i s i s correct, then there i s a sense i n which a 
plausible philosophical argument can be understood t o inform us about 
the t r u t h of the convictions expressed, and entail us (on pain of 
contradiction) t o accept the convictions presented. 
However, we have suggested th a t t h i s view of the re l a t i o n s h i p 
between 'fundamental be l i e f s ' and philosophical theory i s not correct, 
For i t i s grounded upon the false assumption t h a t c e r t a i n 
'comprehensive views of l i f e ' c onstitute true descriptions or accurate 
representations of the human predicament. Rather, we have argued th a t 
they take the form of an ideological understanding: t h a t i s , they 
con s t i t u t e evaluative portrayals of ideal relationships, not pure 
descriptions of actual relationships i n the world. 
We can say, then, t h a t Berlin's admiration f o r J.S. Mi l l ' s 
characterisation of the human predicament reveals h i s own commitment 
t o the recognisably l i b e r a l p o r t r a y a l . What M i l l and B e r l i n 'perceive' 
t o be 'profound and essential' i s established within the l i b e r a l 
ideological imagination: i t i s not a perception or representation of 
something which i s true independently of our acceptence of i t . Rather, 
i t i s a conception of th a t which i s created by the l i b e r a l mind. 
- 153 -
Likewise, we can see tha t the conception of a 'moral c o n f l i c t ' which 
Gray associates with the l i b e r a l view i s not r e f l e c t i v e of 'an 
unalterable feature of the human predicament': i t i s rather a p a r t i c u l a r 
conception of 'moral c o n f l i c t ' specified i n terms of competing 
i n d i v i d u a l purposes whose sense i s established by the l i b e r a l 
ideological imagination; an imagination which creates the recognisably 
l i b e r a l sense i n which we are t o count i t as unalterable, profound, 
essential, or true. 
The general point t o be made, then, against Berlin, i s th a t our 
e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l convictions are ideological i n character, and are 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of an ideal p o r t r a y a l of the human predicament which 
creates, not represents, the s i g n i f i c a n t manner i n which a committed 
adherent views them. This i s to claim, i n other words, th a t an 
ideological understanding i s non-referential, i n tha t i t does not refer 
t o any describable features of an independently 'given' e t h i c a l and 
p o l i t i c a l world which we 'perceive', or more or less accurately 
represent, t o be either true or false. Rather, i t creates the evaluative 
sense i n which we view ce r t a i n features expressed w i t h i n the ideal 
p o r t r a y a l t o be s i g n i f i c a n t . 
What follows from t h i s i s the contention t h a t our ideological 
convictions are not t o be understood as being informed by philosophical 
(or any other theoretical) argument, because such convictions are not, 
s t r i c t l y speaking, the r e s u l t of a th e o r e t i c a l understanding at a l l . 
That i s , they do not o f f e r a more or less accurate explanation of the 
nature of the real. Consequently, ideological commitments are not 
applied t h e o r e t i c a l understandings which are put in t o practice. As such, 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between moral and p o l i t i c a l ideals and actions i s not 
t o be understood as a r e l a t i o n between (true) theory and practice. I t 
i s , however, precisely t h i s p o i n t which i s not acknowledged by B e r l i n 
when he argues that p r a c t i c a l l i b e r a l society i s j u s t i f i e d i n terms of 
the t h e o r e t i c a l p l a u s i b i l i t y of value-pluralism. 
Berlin's reference (quoted above) t o Bertrand Russell i s most 
appropriate i n the context of our present discussion because Russell, 
l i k e B erlin, was also concerned t o show tha t our e t h i c a l convictions 
are philosophically informed. He wished t o show t h a t rigorous 
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philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n can reveal t o us the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of 
our fundamental moral and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . Most s p e c i f i c a l l y , he 
argued thoughout his l i f e t h a t t h a t the teachings of the e m p i r i c i s t 
t r a d i t i o n of philosophical thought provides sound l o g i c a l reasons f o r 
the adherence to a l i b e r a l view of p r a c t i c a l morality. Indeed, Russell 
suggested t h a t philosophical empiricism and e t h i c a l l i b e r a l i s m are 
inseparable. 
In his address to the National Book League i n 1946, Russell 
delivered a short paper e n t i t l e d Philosophy and P o l i t i c s , In t h i s paper 
he makes a series of points about the re l a t i o n s h i p between 
philosophical enquiry and p o l i t i c a l practice. He s t a r t s with the 
h i s t o r i c a l observation t h a t 'Empiricism, broadly speaking, i s connected 
with liberalism', and goes on t o argue th a t the e m p i r i c i s t doctrine i s 
l o g i c a l l y superior to a v a r i e t y of metaphysical 'idealisms' which have 
been used to support the 'dogmas' of Marxism and Nazism respectively. 
(9) Further, he argues th a t 'Empiricism... i s t o be commended not only 
on the grounds of i t s greater t r u t h , but also on e t h i c a l grounds' (10), 
and concludes that: 
i n our day as i n the time of Locke, e m p i r i c i s t Liberalism (which 
i s not incompatible with democratic socialism) i s the only 
philosophy t h a t can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, 
demands some s c i e n t i f i c evidence f o r h i s be l i e f s , and, on the 
other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of 
t h i s or t h a t party or creed. Our confused and d i f f i c u l t world 
needs various things i f i t i s t o escape disaster, and among these 
one of the most necessary i s that, i n the nations which s t i l l 
uphold Liberal b e l i e f s , these b e l i e f s should be whole-hearted and 
profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms of the r i g h t or the 
l e f t , but deeply persuaded of the value of l i b e r t y , s c i e n t i f i c 
freedom, and mutual forbearance. For without these beliefs l i f e on 
our p o l i t i c a l l y divided but technically u n i f i e d planet w i l l hardly 
continue t o be possible. (11) 
We can see t h a t i n running together empiricism and l i b e r a l i s m 
Russell has u n w i t t i n g l y revealed a t r u t h and yet committed a conceptual 
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error. The error i s t o f a i l t o recognise t h a t a philosophical 
understanding such as empiricism i s l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from an 
ideological understanding such as lib e r a l i s m . The unwitting t r u t h i s 
t h a t e m p i r i c i s t philosophers have tended t o presume the moral ideals of 
li b e r a l i s m , and have expressed these ideals i n t h e i r philosophical 
arguments; although not, of course, i n the sense th a t Russell assumes. 
For the point i s th a t the rela t i o n s h i p between empiricism and 
li b e r a l i s m i s not, as Russell contends, a matter of the t r u t h of t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r philosophical doctrine Informing us of the t r u t h of l i b e r a l 
convictions. Rather, i t i s a matter of the l i b e r a l convictions (which 
are neither true or false) being expressed i n a p a r t i c u l a r philosophical 
vocabulary. 
This general point can be related t o the p a r t i c u l a r example of 
Russell's enterprise. Russell was an e m p i r i c i s t philosopher who, i n at 
least a c e r t a i n stage of h i s philosophical l i f e , was attached to the 
non - c o g n i t i v i s t s t y l e of e t h i c a l theorising. In h is book e n t i t l e d 
Religion and Science, which was published i n 1935, Russell indicates 
the outlines of an e t h i c a l theory which constitutes an early expression 
of the emotivist view. He writes t h a t 
questions as t o 'values' l i e wholly outside the domain of 
knowledge. That i s t o say, when we assert t h a t t h i s or th a t has 
'value', we are giv i n g expression t o our own emotions, not t o a 
fact which would s t i l l be true i f our personal feelings were 
d i f f e r e n t . (12) 
The non- c o g n i t i v i s t character of value-ascription led Russell t o 
observe t h a t 
i n a question as t o whether t h i s or t h a t i s the ultimate Good, 
there i s no evidence ei t h e r way; each disputant can only appeal t o 
hi s own emotions, and employ such r h e t o r i c a l devices as s h a l l 
rouse s i m i l a r emotions i n others. (13) 
For Russell, therefore, there are no objective values the knowledge 
of which can be appealed t o i n the resolution of e t h i c a l disagreement. 
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Rather, such disagreement r e f l e c t s a c o n f l i c t i n desires which are not, 
i n themselves, 'either r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l ' , the resolution of which 
can only be achieved i f one disputant i s persuaded of the value of a 
desire expressed by another. (14) How then, Russell asks, i s a moral 
l i f e possible? 
He argues t h a t 'ethics is... an attempt by an i n d i v i d u a l t o cause 
his desires t o become those of his group': an e f f o r t which amounts to 
the i n d i c a t i o n of those desires which are i n the 'general interest', i n 
t h a t i t i s only i f certain desires are seen to be of common value t h a t 
people w i l l be persuaded t o accept them as being valuable. (15) For 
Russell, therefore, 'ethics i s an attempt t o give universal, and not 
merely personal, importance t o certain of our desires'(16). That i s , i t 
constitutes the attempt t o appeal t o those 'impersonal' desires which 
we a l l have, and which enable us to act i n a manner which serves the 
social purpose of harmonising 'self-interest' and 'the i n t e r e s t s of 
society' as a whole (17). 
Russell assumes th a t t h i s (non-cognitivist) characterisation of 
the nature of morality i s an accurate description of a l l e t h i c a l 
experience, properly understood. However, as we have argued e a r l i e r , i t 
i s a conception of morality which rests upon certain l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological assumptions. In other words, i t i s a 
conception which presumes an ideological p o r t r a y a l of ideal moral 
relationships which specifies the notion of moral community as the sum 
t o t a l of i n d i v i d u a l l y shared desires, thus generating the idea t h a t 
moral obligation t o follow universal rules of conduct amounts to the 
constraint of those personal, s e l f i s h or prudential desires which 
cannot be harmonised with those impersonal, universal and hence 'moral' 
desires which make moral society possible. As such, i t i s a conception 
of morality which presumes the ideological assumptions of the 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Humean va r i e t y of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t thought. 
We can say, therefore, that Russell's enterprise i s t o be 
understood as being both philosophical and ideological. Like the fellow 
non-cognitivists discussed e a r l i e r , h i s enterprise amounts to both a 
philosophical r e f u t a t i o n of any 'objective value' conception of morality, 
and an ideological r e b u t t a l of those ideological understandings (such 
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as Marxism and lazism) which assume such an attachment t o the notion 
of moral o b j e c t i v i t y or realism i n t h i s metaphysical sense. 
I t i s t o be noted, however, t h a t w h i l s t Russell shares w i t h non-
c o g n i t i v i s t s the assumption t h a t t h i s characterisation of e t h i c a l 
experience i s purely descriptive (and, by implication, non-ideological), 
he appears t o d i f f e r w i th them over the question of the l i m i t s of 
philosophy. For he seems t o be committed t o the view t h a t philosophical 
investigations can generate e x p l i c i t recommendations of a p r a c t i c a l 
s o r t r e l a t i n g t o moral and p o l i t i c a l action. In the concluding passage 
of h i s paper Philosophy and P o l i t i c s he seems t o be certain t h a t the 
teachings of 'empiricist Liberalism' can specify i n quite e x p l i c i t 
d e t a i l how we ought to tackle the dangers of the modern world. For 
example, we ought t o adopt the bel i e f s of 'the value of l i b e r t y , 
s c i e n t i f i c freedom, and mutual forbearance', and act i n a p r a c t i c a l 
manner which defends them. However, t h i s apparent assumption appears 
to be contradicted e a r l i e r i n the paper when Russell expresses the 
'modern' view of philosophy, with which he claims t o 'have much 
sympathy': a view which suggests that philosophy i s 'not required... t o 
a r r i v e at conclusions convenient to the government', and i s not 
intended t o influence the p o l i t i c a l convictions of people, or inculcate 
v i r t u e . (18) That task, according t o t h i s view, 'should be l e f t t o 
parents, schoolmasters, and churches', not philosophers. (19) But i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o see how Russell can consistently adhere t o t h i s 'modern' 
view of the l i m i t s of philosophy, and also e x p l i c t l y specify certain 
b e l i e f s r e l a t i n g t o p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l action which, he claims, are 
grounded upon the 'truth' of 'empiricist liberalism*. At the very least, 
a ce r t a i n unexplained ambiguity or confusion appears t o p e r s i s t i n 
Russell's thought. 
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9. ]G>^nnejtd^j^jHXbfir^^aR;J^HBA,,J{prty aad Rawls, 
In the previous section we were concerned t o show how i n the 
recent past certain l i b e r a l thinkers have adopted the non-
c o g n i t i v i s t conception of value t o support t h e i r moral and p o l i t i c a l 
convictions. This raises two furt h e r related issues. The f i r s t i s 
whether non-cognitivism remains a philosophical influence upon 
contemporary l i b e r a l theory. The second i s whether i t has had, and 
continues t o have, a p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t on the shaping of l i b e r a l -
democratic s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Maclntyre gives reasons to suggest 
t h a t t h i s i s so, and he contends t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l 
impact of non-cognitivism (Dr what he c a l l s 'emotivism') on l i b e r a l 
societies of the Western world has grave consequences. Before, however, 
we assess Maclntyre's argument, we must attend t o the present 
discussion on the state of li b e r a l i s m . For various notable commentators 
have been engaged i n the task of specifying how modern l i b e r a l i s m i s 
in a condition of c r i s i s , and have sought t o examine the possible 
future of the l i b e r a l understanding of moral and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The 
debate has focussed upon whether the d i s t i n c t i v e l y l i b e r a l conception 
of the good l i f e i s grounded upon sound enough t h e o r e t i c a l foundations, 
and can generate the epistemological and moral force necessary to 
j u s t i f y p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l action i n the world. 
I t must be noted from the outset, however, t h a t any enquiry of 
t h i s kind w i l l be misplaced i f i t i s based upon the mistaken notion 
t h a t l i b e r a l i s m i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n character. For we have seen that 
l i b e r a l i s m i s t o be understood as an ideology which does not, s t r i c t l y 
speaking, constitute a th e o r e t i c a l understanding a t a l l . Therefore i t 
follows that i t i s erroneous t o embark on any enquiry which seeks to 
assess, philosophically r e f l e c t upon, and resolve the th e o r e t i c a l 
weaknesses of the l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n , i f t h a t enquiry i s believed t o be 
capable of conclusively informing us of the 'truth' of the l i b e r a l view 
through the provision of a new (and 'better') t h e o r e t i c a l account of i t . 
- 159 -
This i s because the l i b e r a l ideological p o s i t i o n i s not i n i t s e l f 
t h e o r e t i c a l , and i s not, therefore, capable of being demonstrated as 
either true or false through any philosphical r e f l e c t i o n . l o r i s i t the 
kind of account which, properly comprehended, specifies any p r a c t i c a l 
recommendations or programmes of action which can be c r i t i c a l l y 
examined. Rather, the ideological character of l i b e r a l i s m i s such t h a t 
i t constitutes a p a r t i c u l a r p o r t r a y a l of moral ideals which motivate a 
committed adherent t o act ( i n the non-instrumental sense) i n a way 
appropriate t o the upholding of a re l a t i o n s h i p between persons. I t i s 
t h i s moral sense of a f f i r m i n g a rel a t i o n s h i p which i s central to the 
l i b e r a l , qua ideological, view, and i t i s established quite independently 
from any elaborate t h e o r e t i c a l arguments which may be employed i n i t s 
defence. 
What follows from t h i s i s the claim t h a t there i s no necessary 
sense i n which the exposition of a th e o r e t i c a l weakness i n an argument 
which attempts to j u s t i f y l i b e r a l ideological convictions would 
undermine the confidence of the adherent, or endanger the future of 
li b e r a l i s m as an understanding which motivates people t o support a 
cause. I t remains psychologically possible f or adherents of the l i b e r a l 
p o r t r a y a l to r e t a i n t h e i r commitment to i t because t h e i r convictions 
r e s t ultimately upon an act of f a i t h , not a belief i n i t s t h e o r e t i c a l 
p l a u s i b i l i t y . 
The purpose of r e s t a t i n g t h i s characterisation of the form of 
ideology i s to indicate the l i m i t s t o what the debate on the future of 
li b e r a l i s m can achieve: l i m i t s which, I suggest, have not been perceived 
c l e a r l y enough by certain w r i t e r s . I t i s t o contend t h a t the future of 
li b e r a l i s m rests ultimately upon the a b i l i t y of l i b e r a l ideologists t o 
capture and sustain the popular p o l i t i c a l imagination through the 
persuasive use of r h e t o r i c i n the p o l i t i c a l arena, and not upon the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l excellence of those p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s who attempt t o give 
the l i b e r a l understanding a detailed, coherent, and convincing 
expression. However, i t i s t o be noted t h a t although the success of the 
former i s not l o g i c a l l y dependent upon the achievement of the l a t t e r , 
there i s nonetheless a connection between them. There i s a contingent 
sense i n which a p a r t i c u l a r type of p o l i t i c a l actor, one who i s 
philosophically receptive, may fee l t h a t h i s ideological commitment to 
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l i b e r a l values i s undermined by the exposure of the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of 
the t h e o r e t i c a l argument by which he seeks to j u s t i f y i t . I t i s t h i s 
contingent p o s s i b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l disillusionment of the 
philosophically receptive audience which makes the current debate on 
the philosophical credentials of the various t h e o r e t i c a l arguments used 
to defend l i b e r a l ideology both i n t e r e s t i n g and important. For i t i s t o 
raise the question as t o whether modern l i b e r a l ideological b e l i e f s are 
being given the convincing t h e o r e t i c a l expression which may support, at 
the psychologically contingent l e v e l , the e t h i c a l convictions of the 
committed. By way of answering t h i s question, we s h a l l f i r s t l y examine 
the arguments of John Dunn. 
(I) John Punn, 
In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'The Future of Liberalism' (1) John Dunn 
i d e n t i f i e s (amongst others) two major v a r i e t i e s of modern l i b e r a l 
theory which are relevant t o our present discussion. The f i r s t kind, 
which Dunn c a l l s 'Cold Var Liberalism', was advanced most notably i n 
the 1950's by thinkers such as Berlin, Popper and Talmon. (Bertrand 
Russell could also be included i n t h i s l i s t ) . I t i s a theory which 
concentrates p r i m a r i l y on the metaphysical assumptions of the 
' t o t a l i t a r i a n ' p o l i t i c a l understanding, and seeks t o i d e n t i f y the 
p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s which i t i s imperative t o avoid, and 
which have not been avoided i n actual p o l i t i c a l regimes w i t h i n the 
Soviet bloc. Dunn argues t h a t although as a s t y l e of soc i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l theory 'Cold War Liberalism' has a valuable negative appeal i n 
specifying the range of what counts as p o l i t i c a l l y prudent action, i t 
does not generate any p o s i t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r Western l i b e r a l -
democratic practices. In short, i t lacks p o s i t i v e moral force. 
The second kind of theory, which Dunn c a l l s 'Utopian Liberalism', 
emerged i n the 1970's and i s expressed most notably by John Raw Is and 
Robert Nozick, As he points out, t h i s Kantian s t y l e of l i b e r a l theory i s 
Utopian i n the sense t h a t i t constitutes an attempt t o construct an 
ideal or hypothetical s i t u a t i o n - which Rawls c a l l s the ' i n i t i a l 
p o s i t i on' i n a 'veil of ignorance* - from which i t i s possible t o derive 
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certain r a t i o n a l grounds f o r conduct which a l l agents would accept 
despite t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g interests- Dunn i n s i s t s that the weakness of 
t h i s type of revived 'contractarian' theory, l i k e i t s 17th and 18th 
century predecessors, i s t h a t i t o f f e r s a purely abstract account of 
how e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l value should be conceived which does not, as 
a consequence, provide a convincing account of why 'human beings have 
good reason t o act i n the p o l i t i c a l s e t t i n g s i n which they happen to 
f i n d themselves' (2). That i s , i t i s a t r a d i t i o n of l i b e r a l t h e o r i s i n g 
which f a i l s t o guide the actions of p o l i t i c a l actors who f i n d 
themselves i n the s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l s e t t i n g of Western l i b e r a l 
democracies. 
For Dunn, therefore, both 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian 
Liberalism' lack s u f f i c i e n t p r a c t i c a l moral and p o l i t i c a l force. He 
suggests t h a t the underlying reason why t h i s i s so i s that both styles 
of l i b e r a l theory appear t o be based on morally a n t i - r e a l i s t 
assumptions. This assumption i s c l e a r l y apparent i n 'Cold War 
Liberalism*, where thinkers such as Berlin, Russell and Popper express 
t h e i r l i b e r a l views i n the (broadly) e m p i r i c i s t philosophical t r a d i t i o n 
and associated non-co g n i t i v i s t s t y l e of e t h i c a l theorising. Likewise, 
'Utopian Liberals' such as Rawls appear t o be committed, although for 
d i f f e r e n t philosophical reasons, to a rejection of moral realism. (3) 
Thus we f i n d Rawls arguing, i n t y p i c a l l y Kantian terms, t h a t our 
notions of moral f a c t , t r u t h and o b j e c t i v i t y are not independently given 
to us by 'the point of view of the universe', but are rather created 
w i t h i n a suitably constructed social point of view. (4) 
Dunn argues that t h i s attachment t o moral anti-realism makes a 
difference. He writes t h a t 
The view t h a t adult human beings can be and ought to be sovereign 
over t h e i r own l i v e s i s a very d i f f e r e n t view i f i t i s grounded on 
epistemologically well founded claims about the nature of human 
r a t i o n a l i t y and the character of value f o r man than i t can be i f 
i t i s grounded merely on the presumption t h a t there are no 
au t h o r i t a t i v e values external t o human preference and choice t o 
which the l a t t e r have any good reason t o defer. The view t h a t 
what the good f o r the human i n d i v i d u a l i s i s something which i s 
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ultimately and f u l l y and solely up t o t h a t i n d i v i d u a l t o see, t o 
judge, and therefore t o decide, i s corrosive of any conception of 
external ob l i g a t i o n and of society as a frame of non-discretionary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . (5) 
Dunn's idea appears t o be tha t both 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian 
Liberalism' have been g u i l t y of overzealously r e j e c t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of basing our sense of oblig a t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon some version 
of moral realism. He wishes to indicate how the underlying assumption 
t h a t there i s no sense whatsoever i n which human values relate t o 
something external t o the expressed desires or purposes of indi v i d u a l s 
has the consequence of placing these v a r i e t i e s of l i b e r a l i s m on very 
shaky ground. Referring t o the Utopian v a r i e t y , Dunn continues: 
To see society as a whole simply as a f a c i l i t y f o r the provision 
of i n d i v i d u a l l y acceptable experiences and t o seek t o reconstitute 
i t i n imagination so th a t i t can fu r n i s h these t o the largest 
possible degree w i l l only be a morally commanding v i s i o n where 
the experiences which ind i v i d u a l s happen t o f i n d acceptable have 
already been rendered (through e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l i s a t i o n ) reasonably 
unrevolting t o each other or where the force of human values has 
been so devastated t h a t the idea of a v i s i o n possessing the force 
of moral command has become u t t e r l y incoherent. (6) 
For Dunn, therefore, t o adopt an a n t i - r e a l i s t and i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
conception of value i s t o face a serious dilemma i n attempting to 
sustain the moral force required t o establish a clear sense of moral 
ob l i g a t i o n amongst persons. For one of two conditions must obtain: 
either the moral force rests upon the contingent f a c t t h a t people 
happen t o be able t o harmonise t h e i r ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t ' w i t h the soci a l 
good, i n which case i f and when such soc i a l harmony breaks down, then 
there i s no sense of moral value or ob l i g a t i o n which can be f i r m l y 
distinguished from the purely prudential pursuit of s e l f gain; or t h i s 
harmony has already broken down and, i n consequence, the danger of 
n i h i l i s m i s realised, and the notion of a moral command has become 
incoherent. This must be, Dunn argues, the dilemma which most acutely 
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faces any l i b e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l argument which excludes the p o s s i b i l t y of 
accounting f o r morality w i t h i n some version of moral realism. I t i s 
only i f l i b e r a l theory seeks a 'solid foundation i n moral realism' (7) 
t h a t these dangers can be overcome, and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 'Utopian 
Liberalism i n any form' can be 'robust enough to stand the gales of the 
future'. (8) For what i s needed, he suggests, i s a prudential and 
sociol o g i c a l l y sensitive l i b e r a l i s m which casts prudence as the central 
p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e , but i n a manner which sustains the c o l l e c t i v e sense of 
moral obligation i n Western societies. 
What, then, i s the type of moral realism which Dunn i s suggesting 
t h a t l i b e r a l i s m should target i n the possible achievement of t h i s task? 
I t i s not one which i s founded upon a metaphysically i d e a l i s t or 
'Platonic' conception of absolute value. ( I t i s t h i s kind of metaphysics 
which the l i b e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , i n both i t s e m p i r i c i s t and 
Kantian modes, has been at great pains to refute.) Nor i s i t one which 
can be stated along str a i g h t f o r w a r d n a t u r a l i s t - u t i l i t a r i a n lines. 
Nonetheless, i t would be a version of moral realism which established 
t h a t 'what true human values are i s v a l i d apprehensions of key aspects 
of what i s the case about human existence' (9). How one obvious feature 
of human existence i s i t s so c i a l dimension, and Dunn discerns the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of establishing a morally r e a l i s t conception of value which 
relates t o the social character of man and the social r e l a t i o n s and 
environment which has (at least p a r t i a l l y ) shaped him. Thus he argues 
t h a t 'the most promising approach.... would be tD construct a l i b e r a l 
p o l i t i c a l theory i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n a l substance of 
(and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power w i t h i n ) e x i s t i n g states.' (10) For what 
he wants i s the formulation of a l i b e r a l conception of p o l i t i c a l value 
as a theory of modern p o l i t i c s which i s not dependent upon a purely 
abstract and 'supposedly timeless meditation on the Form of the Good 
(or Just)' (11), and which avoids the d i f f i c u l t i e s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
which i s inherent i n both the i n d i v i d u a l i s t or subjective views 
advanced by 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian Liberalism'. Such a 
theory would, f o r Dunn, have the advantage of j u s t i f y i n g the p r a c t i c a l 
actions of persons who f i n d themselves occupying the actual s o c i a l 
s e t t i n g of Western l i b e r a l democracies, and providing the moral reasons 
f o r sustaining the relationships established therein. (12) 
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This v a r i e t y of moral realism, therefore, i s being required t o 
perform the task of providing a theoretical j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r a c t i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l action conducted w i t h i n l i b e r a l democratic societies. Where, 
however, are i t s philosophical roots t o be discerned? What Dunn appears 
to have i n mind (although he does not specify t h i s i n any d e t a i l ) i s 
tha t these foundations r e l a t e broadly t o what has been called the 
'Wittgensteinian' notion of o b j e c t i v i t y ; a nation which e x p l i c i t l y 
rejects the t r a d i t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of what counts as a claim to 
objective knowledge i n terms of a knowing subject who possesses a 
given ' s e l f standing independently from the external world of objects 
which he more or less accurately represents. Rather, t h i s notion of 
o b j e c t i v i t y (and the sense of moral realism which relates t o i t ) 
presupposes t h a t our conception of selfhood i s (at least p a r t i a l l y ) 
s o c i a l l y constituted by the e t h i c a l , c u l t u r a l , and ultimately l i n g u i s t i c 
practices w i t h i n which i t f i n d s i t s e l f . Thus our claims to objective 
knowledge are specifiable i n terras of our mastery of the l i n g u i s t i c 
rules which constitute these practices. According t o t h i s theory, the 
meaning of the l i n g u i s t i c practices i s established p r i o r t o , and 
independently from, any i n d i v i d u a l appreciative understanding of them, 
and determines the possible range of i n t e l l i g i b l e i n d i v i d u a l responses 
to them. I t i s a view which i s associated with the conceptual point 
that, w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c practice, i t i s our communal sense 
of who 'we' are which stands p r i o r t o , determines, and (at least 
p a r t i a l l y ) constitutes our i n d i v i d u a l sense of who ' I ' am. 
I t i s t h i s notion of the p r i o r i t y and independence of the 
communal understanding i n r e l a t i o n to i n d i v i d u a l experiences of i t 
which generates the sense of o b j e c t i v i t y i n terms of our in d i v i d u a l 
mastery of something (that i s , l i n g u i s t i c rules) which stands 
independently from us. According t o t h i s view, f o r example, the 
ar i t h m e t i c a l rule t h a t 2+2=4 i s an objective t r u t h which i s determined 
by a convention: the sense of t h i s t r u t h has t o be learnt by a subject 
who recognises i t s v a l i d i t y a f t e r being taught t o master the practice 
of addition. Further, t h i s process of learning t o master the rules of a 
practice generates a sense of o b j e c t i v i t y which, i t i s argued, i s 
equally applicable t o our e t h i c a l as much as t o our s c i e n t i f i c r u l e -
following practices. This i s because, i t i s claimed, although the nature 
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of our moral and s c i e n t i f i c understandings d i f f e r i n t h a t they possess 
d i f f e r e n t substantive contents, and ref e r t o d i f f e r e n t kinds of objects, 
they are nonetheless both based upon cer t a i n human practices of 
conventional rule - f o l l o w i n g which take the same logical form, and are 
therefore on an equal objective footing. 
I t seems plausible to suggest, then, t h a t i t i s (at least broadly 
speaking) t h i s notion of o b j e c t i v i t y , and the v a r i e t y of (moral) realism 
generated w i t h i n i t , which Dunn i s requ i r i n g l i b e r a l theory t o adopt. 
For he rejects the i n d i v i d u a l i s t and a n t i - r e a l i s t arguments advanced 
i n the two major v a r i e t i e s of contemporary l i b e r a l moral and p o l i t i c a l 
thought. And we can see tha t he i s also i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t i n g the non-
c o g n i t i v i s t conception of value t h a t the 'Cold War Liberals' have tended 
to r e l y on. A s i m i l i a r l i n e of approach has been employed by Richard 
Rorty and Alasdair Maclntyre, who have both sought t o undermine the 
th e o r e t i c a l p l a u s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t p o s i t i o n by 
c r i t i c i s i n g the notion of the i n d i v i d u a l subject as being possessed of 
a given s e l f - i d e n t i t y which i s c l e a r l y distinguishable from the 
external world of objects. I t becomes our task, then, t o examine the 
arguments of Rorty and Maclntyre i n d e t a i l , and consider Rawls' most 
recent response t o c r i t i c i s m s levelled a t h i s position. For i t i s 
important t o note t h a t i n making these c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls' theory i n 
p a r t i c u l a r and l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n general, Rorty and Itaclntyre 
d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y about the question of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a l 
understanding as such being re-evaluated and j u s t i f i e d w i t h i n a 
suitably transformed th e o r e t i c a l framework. 
( I I ) Richard Rorty. 
Richard Rorty argues i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Postmodernist 
Bourgeois Liberalism* (13) t h a t there i s a need f o r the l i b e r a l 
understanding to break away from the metaphysical foundations of the 
'Kantian' t h e o r e t i c a l project associated most recently w i t h such w r i t e r s 
as John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Ronald Dworkin. Rorty, l i k e Dunn, 
characterises t h i s modernist Kantian project as an attempt t o establish 
c e r t a i n a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l moral p r i n c i p l e s of conduct which 
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i n d i v i d u a l moral subjects can appeal to whatever the p a r t i c u l a r spatio-
temporal p o s i t i o n i n which they f i n d themselves. As Rorty indicates, i t 
i s a project which presupposes t h a t there e x i s t s some notion of the 
s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g subject who can d i s t i n g u i s h himself from his 
p a r t i c u l a r t a l e n t s , i n t e r e s t s and views about the good. Further, i t 
assumes t h a t the moral subject i s capable of engaging i n moral 
deliberations (which establish r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l conduct) 
from an abstract point of view which i s divorced from the p a r t i c u l a r 
h i s t o r i c a l context and c u l t u r a l community w i t h i n which he i s located. 
Such a project, therefore, seeks t o establish an a h i s t o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the demands of morality and those of prudence through an 
appeal t o ce r t a i n r a t i o n a l foundations which, i t i s claimed, reinforce 
our l o y a l t y t o the p a r t i c u l a r moral practices i n which we engage. 
For Rorty, t h i s Kantian project i s misconceived f o r a number of 
i n t e r r e l a t e d reasons. Most c e n t r a l l y , i t rests upon a false conception 
of the s e l f as possessive of an a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . He argues t h a t 
we need: 
to t h i n k of the moral s e l f , the embodiment of r a t i o n a l i t y , not as 
one of Rawls' o r i g i n a l choosers, somebody who can d i s t i n g u i s h her 
self from her ta l e n t s and int e r e s t s and views about the good, but 
as a network of bel i e f s , desires and emotions with nothing behind 
i t - no substrate behind the a t t r i b u t e s , For purposes of moral and 
p o l i t i c a l deliberation and conversation, a person j u s t i s t h a t 
network, as f o r the purposes of b a l l i s t i c s she i s a point-mass, or 
f o r purposes of chemistry a linkage of molecules. (14) 
Rorty's point amounts to the claim that our conception of the moral 
s e l f i s constituted by the contingent arrangements of our moral 
practices, and our sense of r a t i o n a l moral deliberation and purpose i s 
likewise determined by those practices. Just as the s c i e n t i f i c practices 
of b a l l i s t i c s and chemistry determine the sense of what counts as the 
i n t e l l i g i b l e behaviour of a point-mass or molecule, the manifested 
behavioural expression of bel i e f s , desires and emotions i s determined 
by a p a r t i c u l a r morally relevant r u l e - f o l l o w i n g practice which 
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constitutes the sense of moral selfhood. This i s a view which, Rorty 
says, accepts the Quinean notion that: 
r a t i o n a l behaviour i s j u s t adaptive behaviour of a s o r t which 
roughly p a r a l l e l s the behaviour, i n s i m i l a r circumstances, of the 
other members of some relevant community. I r r a t i o n a l i t y , i n both 
physics and ethics, i s a matter of behaviour t h a t leads one t o 
abandon, or be stripped of, membership i n some such community. 
For some purposes t h i s adoptive behaviour i s ap t l y described as 
'learning' or 'computing' or 're d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t r i c a l charges 
i n neural tissue', and f o r others as 'deliberation' or 'choice*. 
None of these vocabularies i s privileged over against another. 
(15) 
Rorty's point, then, i s that our notion of moral deliberation, choice or 
purpose i s set w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l community whose r u l e -
following practice determines the sense i n which any adaptive behaviour 
counts as being r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . Admittedly the moral subject 
expresses intentions as manifest i n deliberative choices which are not 
present i n atoms, but our moral behaviour, j u s t l i k e s c i e n t i f i c atomic 
behaviour, i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i f one focusses on the practices which 
give i t r a t i o n a l sense. Consequently, Rorty argues, reasoning i n ethics 
i s always dependent upon h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent practices, and does 
not relate t o some abstract notion of a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y assumed 
by l i b e r a l thinkers such as Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin. 
Rorty's conception of the (moral) s e l f i s cl e a r l y , then, t o be 
s t a r k l y contrasted w i t h the Kantian notion of the subject who employs 
an a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l f a c u l t y by which t o discover the sense of 
moral conduct independently from any h i s t o r i c a l p a r t i c u l a r i t y , and who 
engages i n moral conversation with others who have the same moral 
sense i n view. Michael Sandel makes a point which supports Rorty's view 
when he says that we cannot regard ourselves as Kantian subjects or 
Rawlsian choosers who constitute meaning on t h e i r own 
without great cost to those l o y a l t i e s and convictions whose moral 
force consists p a r t l y i n the fac t t h a t l i v i n g by them i s 
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inseparable from understanding ourselves as the p a r t i c u l a r people 
we are - as members of t h i s family or community or nation Dr 
people, as bearers of t h i s h i s t o r y , as sons and daughters of that 
revolution, as c i t i z e n s of t h i s republic. (16) 
For Rorty and Sandel, therefore, any version of Kantian li b e r a l i s m 
i s defective i n i t s perception of the primacy of alleged a h i s t o r i c a l 
r a t i o n a l foundations which purportedly support our actual sense of 
moral l o y a l t y and conviction towards our moral practices. They argue 
th a t there i s no such basis which generates and j u s t i f i e s the moral 
force of these l o y a l t i e s and convictions. Rather, as Rorty puts i t , the 
moral force consists wholly i n the f a c t t h a t as members of a 
pa r t i c u l a r community we share an overlap of be l i e f s , desires and 
emotions which enable us t o i d e n t i f y ourselves f o r purposes of moral 
and p o l i t i c a l deliberation as fellow beings. Further, he claims, i t i s 
t h i s network of shared convictions which supplies the d i s t i n c t i v e 
features of a p a r t i c u l a r group; 'features which i t uses t o construct i t s 
self-image through contrasts with other groups'. (17) 
Rorty states that t h i s view of the e t h i c a l i s to be associated 
w i t h what he c a l l s the 'Hegelian' t r a d i t i o n of moral t h i n k i n g , as 
d i s t i n c t from the 'Kantian'. He characterises t h i s t r a d i t i o n , exemplified 
i n the w r i t i n g s of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, as i n s i s t i n g on t h i n k i n g 
of morality as 'the in t e r e s t of an h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned community 
rather than "the common in t e r e s t s of humanity'" (18). According t h i s 
'Hegelian' view, f o r instance, the Kantian notion of a tr a n s c u l t u r a l and 
a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y specifying some universally applicable moral 
value such as 'human d i g n i t y ' i s t o be rejected. Also, from t h i s 
perspective, the Kantian version of the d i s t i n c t i o n between morality 
and prudence i s misconceived, because, i t i s argued, the t r a n s c u l t u r a l 
and a h i s t o r i c a l l y r a t i o n a l foundation upon which i t i s b u i l t i s non-
existent . 
How, then, i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between morality and prudence 
construed, i n Hegelian terms? Rorty writes that, f o r the Hegelian 
the morality/prudence d i s t i n c t i o n appears as a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between appeals t o two parts of the network t h a t i s the s e l f -
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parts separated by b l u r r y and constantly s h i f t i n g boundaries. One 
part consists of those beliefs and desires and emotions which 
overlap with those of most other members of some community w i t h 
which, f o r purposes of deliberation, she i d e n t i f i e s herself, and 
which contrast with those of most members of other communities 
with which hers contrasts i t s e l f . A person appeals t o morality 
rather than prudence when she appeals t o t h i s overlapping, shared 
part of herself, those b e l i e f s and desires and emotions which 
permit her t o say "We do not do t h i s s o r t of thing". Morality i s , 
as Wilfred Sellars has said, a matter of 'we - intentions'. Most 
moral dilemmas are thus r e f l e c t i o n s of the f a c t t h a t most of us 
i d e n t i f y w ith a number of d i f f e r e n t communities and are equally 
reluctant t o marginalise ourselves i n r e l a t i o n t o any of them. 
This d i v e r s i t y of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s increases with education, j u s t as 
the number of communities with which a person may i d e n t i f y 
increases with c i v i l i s a t i o n . (19) 
For Rorty, therefore, any appeal t o morality i s determined by a 
p a r t i c u l a r communal sense of c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y . To engage i n moral, as 
d i s t i n c t from prudential, deliberation i s to i d e n t i f y oneself as a 
member of a community who follow a d i s t i n c t set of rules: t o break 
those rules i s t o 'marginalise' oneself and become alien t o the c u l t u r a l 
practice i n question. Further, t h i s s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with these r u l e -
following practices i s h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent and ' s h i f t i n g ' over time, 
and w i t h i n a p l u r a l i s t society d i f f e r e n t and c o n f l i c t i n g forms of 
communal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n may be adhered to. 
This f a c t , however, does not, f o r Rorty, undermine the endurance of 
a recognisably moral vocabulary or conceptual understanding between 
persons w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . The central v i r t u e of 
' i n t r i n s i c human d i g n i t y ' i s , f o r example, sustained as 'the comparative 
d i g n i t y of a group with which a person i d e n t i f i e s h e r s e l f (20). 
Further, Rorty suggests: 
Hations or churches or movements are, on t h i s view, shining 
h i s t o r i c a l examples not because they r e f l e c t rays emanating from 
a higher source, but because of contrast-effects - comparisons 
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with other, worse communities. Persons have d i g n i t y not as an 
i n t e r i o r luminescence, but because they share i n such contrast-
effects. (21) 
Rorty pictures moral understanding, then, as being located w i t h i n 
the h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent t r a d i t i o n of a c u l t u r a l practice. He adds 
that: 
i t i s a c o r o l l a r y of t h i s view t h a t the moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices of one's groups i s mostly a matter 
of h i s t o r i c a l narratives, (including scenarios about what i s l i k e l y 
to happen i n certain future contingencies) rather than of 
philosophical metanarratives, (22) 
What Rorty means here i s th a t our moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our 
pa r t i c u l a r communal moral l i f e i s a matter of pragmatically calculating 
the general benefits t o be gained by sustaining or departing from an 
attachment t o those i n s t i t u t i o n s which generate our p r a c t i c a l moral 
understanding. This involves a c r i t i c a l examination of what we hold 
dear, or value, w i t h i n our t r a d i t i o n a l culture, and such an 
examination i s made possible through a h i s t o r i c a l narrative assessment 
of those conventions which have shaped our c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . What we 
cannot do, Rorty i n s i s t s , i s to j u s t i f y our p a r t i c u l a r moral practices 
i n terms of philosophical 'metanarratives' which seek t o deduce 
general p r i n c i p l e s of conduct that are t r a n s c u l t u r a l l y and 
a h i s t o r i c a l l y applicable to a l l practices. 
How does t h i s relate t o our discussion of li b e r a l i s m and l i b e r a l 
societies? Rorty distinguishes between two types of contemporary 
lib e r a l i s m : 'postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l i s m ' and 'philosophical 
liberalism', He characterises 'philosophical l i b e r a l i s m ' as a c o l l e c t i o n 
of Kantian p r i n c i p l e s (including the notion of inalienable human 
r i g h t s ) which amounts t o a philosophical 'metanarrative' or story t h a t 
purports t o j u s t i f y l o y a l t y to, or breaks with, c e r t a i n contemporary 
communities through the formulation of general abstract p r i n c i p l e s of 
conduct which these communities either s a t i s f y or f a i l to meet. We have 
already seen how Rorty refutes the foundations upon which t h i s 
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philosophical Kantian project i s b u i l t . He argues that the Kantian 
'buttresses' of accounting f o r morality and r a t i o n a l i t y i n t r a n s c u l t u r a l 
and a h i s t o r i c a l terms i s a nonsense. By contrast, Rorty characterises 
'postmodernist bourgeois li b e r a l i s m ' as 'the Hegelian attempt t o defend 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices of the r i c h Worth A t l a n t i c democracies 
without using such buttresses' (23). I t i s , Rorty says, an attempt t o 
'convince our society t h a t l o y a l t y t o i t s e l f i s morality enough, and 
that such l o y a l t y no longer needs an a h i s t o r i c a l back-up' (24). Such an 
attempt can be successful, f o r Rorty, because i t i s possible t o 
construct a h i s t o r i c a l n arrative about what our l i b e r a l democratic 
communities have achieved i n the past, and some scenario about what 
they might do i n the future. I t i s the provision of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l 
narrative which, Rorty hopes, can succeed i n r e - a f f i r m i n g the 
t r a d i t i o n a l communal i d e n t i t i e s which sustain our Western p o l i t i c a l 
practices. There need not be, and there cannot be, f o r Rorty, any 
philosphical j u s t i f i c a t i o n of our Western c u l t u r a l understanding through 
an appeal t o a Kantian 'metanarrative'. I t i s not necessary, he argues, 
nor i s i t philosophically plausible, t o employ the vocabulary of 
'inalienable human r i g h t s ' or an appeal t o general r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . 
Rather, what i s required i s 'convincing our society t h a t i t need be 
responsible only to i t s own t r a d i t i o n s , and not t o the moral law as 
well*. (25) 
Rorty i s o p t i m i s t i c , then, about the p o s s i b i l i t y of sustaining a 
future p o l i t i c a l commitment t o the t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r a l values of 
liberal-democratic societies by constructing a pragmatic h i s t o r i c a l 
narrative. This optimism stems from a cent r a l sociological assumption. 
I t i s that 
I n t r a - s o c i e t a l tensions, of the sor t which Dworkin r i g h t l y says 
mark our p l u r a l i s t i c society, are r a r e l y resolved by appeals t o 
general p r i n c i p l e s of the s o r t Dworkin t h i n k s necessary. More 
frequently they are resolved by appeals t o what he c a l l s 
'convention and anecdote'. The p o l i t i c a l discourse of the 
democracies, at i t s best, i s the exchange of what Wittgenstein 
called 'reminders f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose' - anecdotes about the 
- 172 -
past e f f e c t s of various practices and predictions of what w i l l 
happen i f , or unless, some of these are altered. C26) 
Rorty's contention t h a t social and p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s p r i m a r i l y a matter 
of pragmatically resolving p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s through an appeal to 
past custom rather than abstract p r i n c i p l e i s reflected i n the w r i t i n g s 
of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (who Rorty c a l l s 'a 
post-modernist before h i s time") and echoes the p o l i t i c a l l y 
conservative scepticism of David Hume. I t i s a view of the nature of 
moral and p o l i t i c a l discourse which, Rorty i n s i s t s , i s reflected i n the 
s t y l e of deliberation conducted by 'postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l s ' , 
who, unlike t h e i r Kantian contemporaries, avoid 'the formulation of 
general principles'. (27) As a consequence, he argues, postmodernist 
bourgeois l i b e r a l s are f a r more adept than the Kantians i n 
communicating t h e i r moral convictions i n a pragmatic way which relates 
more closely t o 'the moral consensus of the nation' or the practices 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s of American cit i z e n s . The i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the Kantian 
l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n have, Rorty contends, become separated from the 
actual practices which they have sought t o j u s t i f y because t h e i r 
abstract metanarrative theorising has had the e f f e c t of mislocating the 
issues t h a t need to be resolved i n the defence of these American 
practices. The appeal t o general p r i n c i p l e s has not, and cannot, 
succeed. Rather, an appeal t o t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r i c a l experience i s 
needed, and, f o r Rorty, i t i s the h i s t o r i c a l n arrative provided by the 
postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l s which can secure the future of 
l i b e r a l i s m and l i b e r a l society. 
Rorty's thesis i s complex, and we need t o examine his general 
conception of philosophy i n order t o specify his understanding of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy and p o l i t i c s . For i t i s central t o his 
project t o establish what philosophy i s not. In his major works 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Consequences pf Pragmatism he 
develops the idea that philosophy i s not t o be understood as a 'natural 
kind" of d i s c i p l i n e which has a f i x e d , essential and c l e a r l y demarcated 
subject-matter and cluster of a h i s t o r i e a l problems to resolve. 
Philosophy i s not capable of discovering a h i s t o r i c a l 'Truths', or laying 
down ce r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l foundations of knowledge which can be b u i l t up 
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i n t o a coherent system of b e l i e f s , because such 'Truths' and foundations 
are nowhere t o be found. I t i s , f o r Rorty, a misconception of the nature 
of philosophy t o assume that i t can reach, or even aspire to, an 
epistemological certitude which i s good f o r a l l time and a l l possible 
modes of experience. 
Rorty observes, however, th a t t h i s misplaced picture of philosophy 
has been sustained since the Enlightenment, and has been founded upon 
the myth of the t r a n s c u l t u r a l a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l s e l f . He shows that 
a f t e r Descartes (and Kant) the dominent metaphor of p i c t u r i n g the mind 
as a 'mirror of nature' (in the sense of the mind representing the 
external world) took hold, and philosophy became conceived as the 
d i s c i p l i n e which focusses that m i r r o r upon epistemological foundations. 
Both the em p i r i c i s t s and the i d e a l i s t s were captured by t h i s metaphor 
of the 'mirroring' mind, although they interpreted i t d i f f e r e n t l y . For 
the e m p i r i c i s t , the mind was the purely passive reci p i e n t of a given 
objective r e a l i t y , and for the i d e a l i s t i t i n some sense actively shaped 
the contours of th a t r e a l i t y , but on both accounts the mind represented 
or mirrored the world. As a result , Rorty notes, both empiricism and 
idealism understood philosophical enquiry t o be the quest f o r those 
r a t i o n a l or l o g i c a l foundations or ultimate objective grounds upon 
which t o place our representational knowledge of the world. Philosophy, 
thus understood, became the a n a l y t i c a l branch of science, and was seen 
to promise the indubitable foundations for a l l other modes of thought. 
Rorty argues, l i k e others before him (most notably Wittgenstein), 
th a t the notion of the 'foundational given' upon which t h i s conception 
of philosophy i s b u i l t i s 'empty'. Consequently, he says, there i s no 
strong 'correspondence' notion of 'Truth' available t o us. Rather, 'truth' 
i s , i n the words of William James, 'the name of whatever proves i t s e l f 
t o be good i n the way of b e l i e f . I t follows, then, f o r Rorty, t h a t we 
need t o abandon our attachment t o the mythical notion t h a t 'Philosophy' 
i s foundational i n character, and i s capable of the discovery of 
timeless 'Truths'. Rather, he argues t h a t philosophy i s , properly 
understood, l i k e other modes of thought; a kind of narrative. I t i s a 
matter of the edification of the h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent experiences 
shared w i t h i n a c u l t u r a l t r a d i t o n ; and i t i s the task of the 
philosopher t o engage, as a 'cultural c r i t i c ' , i n a 'conversation' with 
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t h a t t r a d i t i o n , and show us how our t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r a l understanding 
enables us, i n a pragmatic sense, to 'cope with the world*. 
Philosophical enquiry i s then, f o r Rorty, local, not transcendental: i t 
constitutes a h i s t o r i c a l n arrative which e d i f i e s our c u l t u r a l 
understanding of our world at a given moment by showing us where we 
have t r a v e l l e d and what we value; i t does not discover certain 
foundations which place that knowledge on fi r m e r ground. 
I t follows then t h a t , f o r Rorty, philosophy cannot i n any strong 
foundational manner j u s t i f y or refute our understanding of the world. I t 
has no p r i v i l e g e d access to 'knowledge', i n the absolute sense, and 
cannot conclusively demonstrate the absolute 'Truth' or F a l s i t y ' of our 
b e l i e f s , because these a b s o l u t i s t notions of 'knowledge', 'Truth' and 
'Falsity' are mythical. Rather, a l l that philosophy can do i s express 
and edify those convictions which shaped, and have i n turn been shaped 
by, our t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of the world as manifest i n our 
c u l t u r a l practices. For i t constitutes a narrative which leads us up t o 
'where we stand at the moment', and makes clearer t o us our knowledge 
of the world i n the pragmatic way of ed i f y i n g the ongoing process of 
r e f l e c t i v e adjustment between various c u l t u r a l needs and int e r e s t s . This 
kind of n a r r a t i v e can never hope to resolve our philosophical problems, 
as i t were, once and f o r a l l , because, f o r Rorty, no f i n a l metanarrative 
i s available t o us. For although philosophy may voice the main concerns 
of i t s own c u l t u r a l epoch, i t cannot set i t s e l f up as a master 
d i s c i p l i n e of knowledge and t r u t h . 
Rorty observes t h a t w i t h i n our North A t l a n t i c c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , 
'we' are attached to, and i d e n t i f y ourselves i n terms of, e t h i c a l and 
p o l i t i c a l values which can be broadly characterised as ' l i b e r a l ' or 
'social democratic'. These values, which include the f a m i l i a r notions of 
representative government, freedom of speech and association, and the 
r i g h t t o p r i v a t e property, are, as Rorty remarks, c e n t r a l to our 
e t h i c a l , p o l i t i c a l and so c i a l heritage. But, he argues, our p o l i t i c a l 
conviction toward these values and i n s t i t u t i o n a l practices cannot, and 
need not, be p h i l o s p h i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d . In an a r t i c l e called 'From Logic 
t o Language to Play' he writes t h a t 
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philosophy, even though i t i s often inspired by p o l i t i c s , should 
not be thought of as a foundation f o r p o l i t i c s nor as a Weapon of 
politics.... philosophy should t r y t o express our p o l i t i c a l hopes 
rather than t o ground our p o l i t i c a l practices. On the view I am 
suggesting, nothing grounds our practices, nothing legitimates 
them, nothing shows them t o be i n touch with the way things 
r e a l l y are. (28) 
For Rorty, therefore, p o l i t i c a l theory, l i k e other kinds of 
philosophical enquiry, cannot perform the task of laying down any 
foundations by which t o j u s t i f y our p o l i t i c a l understanding as manifest 
i n practices. No j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i n the sense of establishing or l o g i c a l l y 
deducing what p r a c t i c a l conclusions follow from f i x e d premises, i s 
possible. A l l that i s possible i s a philosophical a r t i c u l a t i o n of our 
convictions or hopes: hopes which are themselves 'ungrounded'. 
Rorty's point, then, i s that i t i s our p o l i t i c a l convictions or 
hopes which stand prior t o t h e i r philosophical expression. In an 
a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'The P r i o r i t y of Democracy t o Philosophy' (29) he 
i n s i s t s t h a t controversial philosophical claims about human nature or 
metaphysical theories of the s e l f are not, i n any foundational sense, 
relevant t o the issue of a r t i c u l a t i n g the convictions, s e t t l e d habits 
and shared b e l i e f s of those who i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l community th a t i s committed to l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
democracy. Most notably the e f f o r t s of the Kantians t o j u s t i f y t h i s 
commitment i n terms of a foundational enterprise which i s b u i l t upon a 
d i s t i n c t i v e notion of r a t i o n a l i t y and the s e l f i s both pointless and 
misleading. For what i s needed, and a l l t h a t can be achieved, i s the 
construction of a pragmatic narrative, rather than a metanarrative. 
However, Rorty does concede th a t there nonetheless remains an urge 
w i t h i n our present philosophical community t o o f f e r philosophical 
theories of the s e l f which may serve p o l i t i c a l purposes. He admits that 
he i s himself tempted t o do so i n the defence of l i b e r a l democracy. His 
point, though, i s t h a t nothing c r u c i a l depends upon such an achievement. 
This i s because ' l i b e r a l democracy can get along without philosophical 
presuppositions'; although, he also suggests, 'a conception of the self 
which makes the community c o n s t i t u t i v e of the s e l f does comport well 
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w i t h l i b e r a l democracy'. (30) There i s then, f o r Rorty, a sense i n 
which, f o r the purposes of the a r t i c u l a t i o n of l i b e r a l democratic 
values, a 'socially c o n s t i t u t i v e ' conception of the s e l f i s a suitable 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o the Kantian notion. But i t i s important t o note, he 
i n s i s t s , t h a t t h i s sense i s not foundational, and th a t nothing c r u c i a l 
hangs on fleshing out 'our self-image as ci t i z e n s of such a democracy 
with a philosophical view of the s e l f . (31) 
The reason why t h i s i s so, Rorty claims, i s that any e f f o r t t o 
provide a philosophical view of the s e l f which attempts t o j u s t i f y a 
set of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s constitutes an a r t i c u l a t i o n of a p r i o r 
c u l t u r a l image, not i t s foundation. Therefore, the philosophical 
achievement reached i n t h i s task i s , properly understood, always a 
matter of e d i f y i n g a presupposed c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y , rather 
than providing a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of th a t i d e n t i t y . He t e l l s us that: 
I f ... one has a taste for philosophy - i f one's vocation, one's 
private pursuit of happiness e n t a i l s constructing models of such 
e n t i t i e s as 'the s e l f , 'knowledge', 'language', 'nature', 'God' or 
'history' and then t i n k e r i n g with them u n t i l they mesh with each 
other - one will want a picture of the s e l f . Since my own 
vocation i s of t h i s s o r t , and the moral i d e n t i t y around which I 
wish t o b u i l d such models i s that of a c i t i z e n of a l i b e r a l 
democratic state, I commend the picture of the s e l f as a 
centerless and contingent web t o those w i t h s i m i l a r tastes and 
s i m i l a r i d e n t i t i e s . (32) 
I t i s t h i s notion of the 'socially c o n s t i t u t i v e s e l f , coupled with 
h i s attachment t o 'Deweyian pragmatism', which, f o r Rorty, provides the 
most appropriate philosophical expression of the l i b e r a l or social 
democratic view. I t has the advantage of avoiding the foundationalist 
errors, and the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t conception of the s e l f , which i s 
i n t r i n s i c to the Kantian project. 
In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' <33), 
Richard Bernstein raises an objection t o Rorty's assessment of his 
posi t i o n . For Bernstein suggests t h a t Rorty i s not simply constructing 
a picture of the s e l f t h a t f i t s with his p r i o r l i b e r a l convictions, but 
- 177 -
i s , rather, 'arguing against a l l notions of a centered and 
transcendental self*. Further, he says, of Rorty, that 
Whatever h i s motivations i n coming up with a picture of the 'self 
as center less, as h i s t o r i c a l contingency a l l the way through', he 
i s arguing t h a t t h i s i s a more perspicious - one i s tempted t o 
say a 'truer' - understanding of the s e l f . (34) 
Bernstein's suggestion i s th a t Rorty i s , despite h i s claim to the 
contrary, engaged i n an argument with the Kantians over a 
philosophically contestable conception of the self. As a result , he 
says, Rorty must be committed t o the assumption t h a t h i s notion of 
selfhood i s 'truer' i n some absolute sense. We may add t h a t i f t h i s 
assumption i s held by Rorty (however l a t e n t l y ) then i t looks probable 
th a t , despite his denials, i t i s h i s philosophical view of the s e l f 
which i s the basis of h i s l i b e r a l convictions. 
However, Rorty does, I think, successfully avoid t h i s objection 
when he re i t e r a t e s the point, i n 'Thugs and Theorists: a Reply t o 
Bernstein' (35), t h a t 'we pragmatists t h i n k t h a t the true i s the good i n 
the way of b e l i e f . (36) That i s , Rorty claims, what he holds t o be 
'true' i n th a t which i s , r e l a t i v e t o his social democratic experience, 
most useful t o the a r t i c u l a t i o n of h i s so c i a l democratic beliefs. As 
such, Rorty i n s i s t s , h i s conception of the s e l f i s true only i n the 
pragmatic sense t h a t i t most cle a r l y comports with b i s p r i o r 
conception of a good society: there i s no absolute sense of 'true' 
independently from those beliefs. Further, he i n s i s t s that ' I do not 
know how t o ' j u s t i f y ' or 'defend' social democracy' (37) through the 
presentation of t h i s philosophical view of the s e l f . He continues as 
follows: 
nor would 1 know how t o defend my view of the s e l f (to sceptics) 
without f i r s t making soc i a l democrats out of them. This l a t t e r 
f a c t i s part of what I have i n mind when I speak of 'the p r i o r i t y 
of democracy t o philosophy'. I t h i n k Dewey showed us t h a t we 
pragmatists can s t a r t from our social hopes and work down from 
there t o theories about the standard philosophical topics (38) 
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i n the sense that, f o r Rorty, Dewey would have endorsed Ungers use of 
the slogan 'everything i s p o l i t i e s ' . <39) 
Rorty"s insistence, then, i s t h a t h i s philosophical view of the 
sel f i s bound up wi t h and inseparable from h i s p r i o r social democratic 
convictions. I t i s i n no sense true independently from those beliefs. 
Rather, i t s only function i s th a t i t 'suits the p o l i t i c a l purposes of us 
social democrats'. (40) 
I t becomes necessary, therefore, t o examine i n greater d e t a i l 
Rorty's understanding of p o l i t i c s . He writes t h a t 'we should t h i n k of 
p o l i t i c s as one of the experimental rather than of the th e o r e t i c a l 
d i s c i p l i n e s ' (41), and t h i s view leads him t o question the relevance of 
p o l i t i c a l theory upon p o l i t i c a l practice. For he conceives of p r a c t i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e as being conducted w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n s and invo l v i n g the 
piecemeal experimental changes i n policy and statute which a r t i c u l a t e 
our c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s upon our c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . Such 
experimentation i s not, f o r Rorty, based upon any th e o r e t i c a l 
foundations from which p r a c t i c a l solutions t o problems can be l o g i c a l l y 
deduced. 
I t can be seen th a t t h i s conception of p o l i t i c s and morality has 
an i n t e l l e c t u a l antecedence i n the work of Hume and Oakeshott, and 
Rorty appears t o acknowledge i t as his own. Rorty, l i k e Hume (in his 
conservative moods) and Oakeshott, i s sceptical about any attempt to 
base p o l i t i c a l society upon fix e d r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a , We can see how 
Rorty's s p e c i f i c concern f o r the dangers and misconceptions of the 
Kantian l i b e r a l view of r a t i o n a l i t y r e f l e c t s Oakeshott's c r i t i q u e of 
'rationalism' i n general when Rorty suggests t h a t there i s a need t o 
'envisage a soci a l democratic utopia - a future f o r the human race i n 
which Enlightenment l i b e r a l i s m i s carried through t o i t s l i m i t , 
eradicating i n the process the l a s t traces of Enlightenment 
rationalism' (42). Further, echoing Hume, he says th a t ' I should l i k e the 
sentiments of p i t y and tolerance t o take the place of belief-systems 
(or of what Habermas c a l l s 'the commitment t o r a t i o n a l i t y ' ) i n bonding 
l i b e r a l societies together. I want a meta-ethics t h a t follows up on 
Hume rather than on Kant' (43). 
This attachment t o Hume would seem t o indicate a connection 
between Rorty and the 'Cold War Liberals' who are to be associated with 
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the Humean <and therefore non-Kantian) t r a d i t i o n of non-cognitivist 
moral the o r i s i n g . Also, the a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t and ant i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t 
tenor of Rorty's arguments indicates a connection with the Oakeshottian 
conception of p o l i t i c s as being, properly understood, non-theoretical i n 
character. Indeed, the re l a t i o n s h i p between Rorty and Oakeshott i s made 
more apparent when Rorty applies Oakeshott's notion of poetry as 'a 
conversation of mankind' to the d i s c i p l i n e of philosophy (including 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy) i t s e l f . For Rorty argues th a t philosophy i s t o be 
seen as one kind of narrative (analogous t o poetry) which i s conducted 
w i t h i n a conversation. Thus when Oakeshott says, i n Rationalism i n 
P o l i t i c s , that 
i n a conversation,... the pa r t i c i p a n t s are not engaged i n an 
enquiry or a debate; there i s no Truth t o be discovered, no 
propositions to be affirmed, no conclusions sought,...(44) 
we can see how Rorty applies t h i s characterisation of the sense of a 
conversation t o philosophy. For i t f i t s Rorty's conception of 
philosophy as a d i s c i p l i n e which cannot reveal to us any conclusive 
foundational Truths. 
This discussion of the rel a t i o n s h i p between Rorty and Oakeshott 
i s important, I think, because i t has significance for our understanding 
of Rorty's conception of the place of ideology i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Where 
Rdrty t a l k s of the form of an ideological understanding, he e x p l i c i t l y 
i d e n t i f i e s himself w i t h the 'end-of-ideology' t h e o r i s t s whose views 
are, perhaps, most c l e a r l y expressed by the American Daniel Bell. The 
central contention of these t h e o r i s t s i s that ideology i s the product 
of sociological c o n f l i c t , and that, once a c u l t u r a l consensus i s 
achieved, ideology becomes i r r e l e v a n t t o the conduct of p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s , and has no place i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . (For these t h e o r i s t s , such 
a condition had been reached i n the North American society of the 
1950's.) 
However, i t appears plausible t o suggest t h a t Rorty's own adoption 
of t h i s sociological thesis i s coupled with the acceptance of 
Oakeshott's kind of characterisation of modern ideological 
understandings as misconceived systems of ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' belief. For 
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Rorty assumes, i n a manner which i s at least s i m i l a r t o Oakeshott, that 
any ideological argument i s a defective form of understanding which 
stems from some (false) r a t i o n a l i s t view of human nature, and which 
mistakenly attempts t o put i t s t h e o r e t i c a l understanding i n t o practice. 
Thus we f i n d Rorty arguing that modern ideology i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of, and 
belongs t o , that 'enlightened' mode of thought which imagines that 
theory can r i s e above the conditional assumptions of i t s own time and 
place, the better to explain or reform them. Put another way, Rorty 
i d e n t i f i e s a certain kind of t h e o r e t i c a l explanation in which there i s a 
f a i l u r e t o consider the conditional or temporal s i t u a t i o n i n which the 
theory i s set; and he assumes t h a t t h i s feature marks out t h i s kind of 
theory as being ideological i n character. This i s the sense i n which 
we are t o c l a s s i f y the Kantian meta-narrative (with i t s nation of an 
a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y featuring so c e n t r a l l y w i t h i n i t s assumptions) 
as being a major ideological explanation of the moral and p o l i t i c a l 
world. 
For Rorty, then, ideologies are to be understood as misconceived 
r a t i o n a l i s t t h e o r e t i c a l explanations, and they have to be abandoned. In 
p a r t i c u l a r , Rorty i n s i s t s t h a t the ideological l i b e r a l i s m of the Kantian 
t r a d i t i o n has t o be discarded by our own i n t e l l e c t u a l culture. But how 
i s t h i s p r a c t i c a l l y possible? Rorty bases h i s hope upon the 
assumption, which i s shared by the 'end-of-ideology' school, t h a t the 
e x i s t i n g t r a d i t i o n of the North A t l a n t i c liberal-democracies has 
generated, or at least could generate, a moral consensus of c o l l e c t i v e 
i d e n t i t y which makes the t h e o r e t i c a l postures of any ideological view 
i r r e l e v a n t . Thus he envisages 
a society which encourages the 'end of ideology'.... which takes 
r e f l e c t i v e equilibrium as the only method needed i n discussing 
social policy. Vhen such a society deliberates, when i t c o l l e c t s 
the p r i n c i p l e s and i n t u i t i o n s t o be brought i n t o equilibrium, i t 
w i l l tend t o discard those drawn from philosophical accounts of 
the s e l f , or of r a t i o n a l i t y . (45) 
Rorty, then, contends t h a t i n the 'postmodern culture' which he 
envisages, a l l c o n f l i c t i n g and controversial philosophical, t h e o r e t i c a l 
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or ideological understandings of Ban w i l l be abandoned; and what w i l l 
remain i s a h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e account of our communal i d e n t i t y which 
relates to our p a r t i c u l a r moral consensus or practice, and which 
enables us t o achieve a r e f l e c t i v e equilibrium t h a t secures f o r us non-
c o n f l i c t i n g p r a c t i c a l conduct. I t i s t o suggest, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t the 
philosophical/ t h e o r e t i c a l / ideological conception of the s e l f which i s 
expressed by the Kantian l i b e r a l s should be replaced by the notion of 
communal i d e n t i t y which i s expressed by the 'postmodernist bourgeois 
li b e r a l s ' . 
In saying t h i s , Rorty i s making the general assumption t h a t any 
ideological c o n f l i c t w i t h i n a t r a d i t i o n of thought (eg. communism) i s 
ultimately the r e s u l t of differences i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
orthodox philosophical or th e o r e t i c a l understanding of man which 
underpins t h a t ideological t r a d i t i o n . One way to avoid t h i s ideological 
c o n f l i c t i s t o ignore any t h e o r e t i c a l controversy, and, f o r Rorty, the 
achievement of t h i s task i s possible w i t h i n the so c i a l democratic 
t r a d i t i o n . For he writes t h a t 'one advantage we soc i a l democrats have 
always had over the radicals i s that we have t r a d i t i o n a l l y worried less 
about ideological p u r i t y , and have r e l i e d on what Rawls c a l l s 
"overlapping consensus" '. (46) I t i s t h i s f a c t which, Rorty argues, 
enables soc i a l democrats t o concentrate upon the pragmatically 
experimental considerations i n p o l i t i c s , as d i s t i n c t from the 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n f l e x i b l e ones. I t i s t o suggest t h a t i t i s possible 
w i t h i n the social democratic t r a d i t i o n to avoid any ideological or 
philosophical c o n f l i c t because t h a t t r a d i t i o n can draw upon, i n a 
pragmatic sense, the moral consensus which e x i s t s i n actual social 
democratic practices, 
His claim, then, i s t h a t because soc i a l democrats tend t o agree 
about t h e i r p r a c t i c a l objectives, t h i s enables them t o ignore any 
t h e o r e t i c a l controversy which may hamper them. But at present t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s not being f u l l y realised because there remains a 
t h e o r e t i c a l dispute between the 'Kantians' and others which ought t o be 
abandoned. I t i s t h i s dispute which, f o r Rorty, a r t i c u l a t e s the c r i s i s 
w i t h i n l i b e r a l i s m ; and i t i s a dispute which can only be avoided once 
i t i s recognised t h a t there i s nothing which can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
resolved by i t . Rather, what i s needed, he claims, i s t h a t social 
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democrats (including himself) concentrate upon the p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l 
issues t h a t unite the l i b e r a l or social democratic t r a d i t i o n . Because, 
he says, 'we a l l are working f o r a utopia i n which equal access to a 
free press, a free j u d i c i a r y , and free u n i v e r s i t i e s ' (47) i s sought 
a f t e r , i t follows t h a t 'differences i n philosophical taste between us 
s o c i a l democrats can easily be deferred u n t i l we have come a good deal 
closer t o t h a t utopia' (48). 
Rorty's suggestions concerning the p o s s i b i l i t y of unity w i t h i n the 
soc i a l democratic t r a d i t i o n appears plausible enough as an empirical 
claim about p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l conduct. For i t does seem to be the case 
t h a t social democrats tend t o be able t o co-operate with each other i n 
the achievement of p r a c t i c a l ends i n a f a r more cohesive fashion than, 
f o r example, Marxists, whose a b i l i t y t o co-operate i n p r a c t i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l matters i s noticably more r e s t r i c t e d due to t h e i r paying 
obsessive attention t o the i n t r i c a t e d e t a i l s of t h e i r various 
t h e o r e t i c a l positions. However, as a conceptual point about the 
character of social democratic thought, i t i s t o be questioned; f o r i t 
amounts to the suggestion t h a t there i s something i n t r i n s i c t o the 
social democratic t r a d i t i o n which enables i t t o avoid such ruptures. 
For Rorty assumes, as we have seen, that although social democratic 
thought of the past has f a l l e n i n t o the tr a p of engaging i n 
t h e o r e t i c a l disputes which have generated ideological c o n f l i c t s , i t 
remains possible f o r the so c i a l democratic t r a d i t i o n t o transcend t h a t 
ideological or t h e o r e t i c a l c o n f l i c t and recognise i t s irrelevance t o the 
world of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
The reason why t h i s conceptual point i s mistaken, I suggest, i s 
because i t follows from a related number of erroneous assumptions. 
F i r s t l y , i t rests upon a mistaken conception of ideology as a kind of 
t h e o r e t i c a l understanding which i s put i n t o practice. This conception 
f a i l s t o capture, I suggest, the nature of the form of an ideological 
understanding. For an ideological understanding constitutes, at bottom, 
an e t h i c a l p o r t r a y a l of ideal moral relationships; and i t i s t h i s ideal 
p o r t r a y a l which always stands p r i o r t o any p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l or 
philosophical expression of i t s sense. For example, the evaluative 
picture of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 'proletariat' and the 
'bourgeoisie', as presented i n Marxist thought, stands l o g i c a l l y p r i o r 
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t o , and i s not synonomous with, i t s elaborate t h e o r e t i c a l expression i n 
the w r i t i n g s of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg and so on. Ah ideological 
understanding, therefore, primarily constitutes an e t h i c a l , not a 
th e o r e t i c a l , achievement. The f a c t t h a t committed adherents t o an 
ideological p o r t r a y a l tend t o be immune t o any ind i c a t i o n of the 
the o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e i r argument suggests, not 
that they have f a i l e d t o see the th e o r e t i c a l e r r o r s of t h e i r p o s i t i o n , 
but t h a t such an ind i c a t i o n of error i s , i n the e t h i c a l sense, 
irrelevant t o t h e i r commitment t o the understanding. 
This leads t o the point t h a t a commitment t o the e t h i c a l 
p o r t r a y a l t h a t constitutes an 'ideology' i s sustainable independently 
from any r e f u t a t i o n of the t h e o r e t i c a l arguments employed t o support 
i t . Further, an ideological view, understood as being p r i m a r i l y e t h i c a l , 
does not generate any technical knowledge which can be put in t o 
practice i n the world. Rather, i t portrays how committed adherents 
ought t o conceive of themselves: i t does not specify i n any technical 
d e t a i l 'what i s t o be done'. 
The point, then, i s th a t although ideologists employ t h e o r e t i c a l 
arguments and make p r a c t i c a l recommendations f o r p o l i t i c a l actions, 
such theories and prescriptions are not central t o t h e i r ideological 
understanding. Therefore, although Rorty i s correct t o observe th a t 
c e r t a i n ideologies present themselves as temporally non-specific and 
a h i s t o r i e a l theories, these ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' features are not, as he 
assumes, what i s essential to the form of a l l ideological expressions 
of e t h i c a l conviction. Rather, these features are, as i t were, the 
th e o r e t i c a l baggage which i s carri e d by a t r a d i t i o n of ideological 
thought. In equating 'ideology' with ( r a t i o n a l i s t ) theory Rorty i s 
f a i l i n g t o appreciate that the e t h i c a l dimension of an ideological 
conviction constitutes the form of the understanding, and i s p r i o r to, 
and distinguishable from, i t s t h e o r e t i c a l expression. 
This i s not, I think, merely t o quibble with Rorty over the issue 
of what i s the correct verbal d e f i n i t i o n of the term 'ideology'. Rather, 
i t has significance f o r our understanding of the place of ideology i n 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and t h i s , i n turn, relates t o our assessment Df Rorty's 
own p o l i t i c a l arguments and moral hopes. For i t leads t o the second, 
c o r r e l a t i v e point t h a t Rorty's own commitment t o the ideals and 
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'utopian v i s i o n ' of so c i a l democracy i s i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t i v e of an 
ideological understanding. That i s , h i s e t h i c a l commitment to these 
ideals i s not, as he assumes, made any the less ideological because 
they are not purported t o be based upon any th e o r e t i c a l foundations. 
This i s because, as we have seen, Rorty's assumption that what counts 
as 'ideology' i s r a t i o n a l i s t t h e o retical understanding i s mistaken. 
Rather, i n expressing a commitment t o a recognisably social democratic 
e t h i c a l p o r t r a y a l , Rorty i s making an ideological assumption about the 
moral and p o l i t i c a l world. 
Let us put t h i s another way. Rorty i s quite correct, I thin k , t o 
argue that our e t h i c a l convictions can never be j u s t i f i e d , but only 
expressed, by a th e o r e t i c a l or philosophical argument: and he i s 
likewise quite correct to point to the p r i o r i t y of our values (eg. 
democracy) over t h e i r philosophical a r t i c u l a t i o n . However, he i s wrong 
to assume t h a t the e t h i c a l convictions of the 'postmodernist bourgeois 
l i b e r a l ' are non-ideological i n character because they are not purported 
t o be based on theoretical foundations. The way i n which the moral 
b e l i e f s of the 'postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l ' are expressed i s 
ce r t a i n l y different from the way in which, f or example, the bel i e f s of 
the 'Kantian l i b e r a l ' are expressed, but the l i b e r a l b e l i e f s which are 
shared by both the 'postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l ' and the 'Kantian 
l i b e r a l ' take the same form, and they are ideological i n character. 
The point, then, i s tha t Rorty, l i k e any other ideologist, does 
believe i n a coherent body of e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , and these 
b e l i e f s take the form of an ideal p o r t r a y a l of the moral and p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between persons. Further, he seeks t o give t h i s presumed 
p o r t r a y a l a convincing and coherent philosophical expression. He 
believes t h a t the social democratic ideals which he i s committed to 
are most suitably a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h i n the 'Deweyian pragmatist' 
philosophical t r a d i t i o n ; a t r a d i t i o n which seeks to avoid any unmerited 
metaphysical presuppositions i n i t s argument. 
I t i s worth noting t h a t a s i m i l a r l y anti-metaphysical a r t i c u l a t i o n 
of l i b e r a l values was presented by the 'Cold War Liberals' i n the 
1950's. Therefore, we can see a sense i n which Bernstein i s correct t o 
contend t h a t Rorty's claim t o have pointed up the irrelevance of any 
continued use of the out-worn philsophical (notably r a t i o n a l i s t ) 
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vocabularies of the past t o j u s t i f y our own l i b e r a l convictions i s 
i t s e l f ' l i t t l e more than an ideological apologia f o r an old-fashioned 
version of cold war l i b e r a l i s m dressed up i n a fashionable 'post-
modern' discourse', (49) 
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from t h i s discussion of 
Rorty's assessment of the future of liberalism? F i r s t l y , we can agree 
w i t h Rorty t h a t the kind of 'philosophical liberalism* which has been 
advanced w i t h i n the 'Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t ' t r a d i t i o n rests upon a 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y impoverished conception of the s e l f , and i t i s t o be 
rejected on philosophical grounds alone. Secondly, we can agree with 
Rorty t h a t there are good reasons to suggest th a t the t h e o r e t i c a l 
disputes conducted w i t h i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of discourse are 
i r r e l e v a n t t o the pragmatic issue of how l i b e r a l s can sustain t h e i r 
commitment to t h e i r moral ideals i n the future. For we can acknowledge 
Rorty's point that our p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s are p r i o r to, and not dependent 
upon, t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l expression. 
However, i t has been argued th a t Rorty has f a i l e d t o provide a 
correct account of the form of an ideological understanding, and, as a 
r e s u l t , he has f a i l e d t o locate the central place that ideology has i n 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Because Rorty's own e t h i c a l convictions are ideological 
i n character, i t follows t h a t the possible success of the 'post-
modernist bourgeois l i b e r a l s ' i n u n i t i n g the i n t e l l e c t u a l community of 
l i b e r a l s would i t s e l f be an ideological achievement. Likewise, the 
abandonment of the metaphysical presuppositions of the Kantian 
t h e o r i s t s would be done on ideological grounds, i n the sense th a t the 
reasons f o r doing so would be contingently related t o the p r a c t i c a l 
issue as t o whether the (philosophically receptive) c i t i z e n s of the 
Western democracies could, or could not, continue to sustain t h e i r 
l i b e r a l commitments i n terms of Kantian t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . 
The point i s t h a t Rorty, by i n c o r r e c t l y marginalising ideology as 
a defective form of t h e o r e t i c a l understanding, underestimates i t s 
c e n t r a l i t y i n past, present, and more importantly, future l i b e r a l or 
s o c i a l democratic p o l i t i c a l l i f e . For i t i s the endurance of the 
e t h i c a l ideals of the l i b e r a l view which determines the future of 
l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and the 'moral consensus' which he 
wishes t o draw upon i s i t s e l f underpinned by t h a t ideological belief. 
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Without sustaining a bel i e f i n these ideals, the p r a c t i c a l point of 
defending these i n s t i t u t i o n s would become u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Ideology i s 
not, as Rorty assumes, something that can be transcended by the 
pragmatically minded 'postmodernist bourgeois l i b e r a l s ' ; i t i s , rather, 
something which i s central to t h e i r task of mapping out the future 
d i r e c t i o n of the defence of l i b e r a l theory and practice. 
The question becomes, then, whether the p r a c t i c a l task of 
successfully achieving a future defence of l i b e r a l i s m i s l i k e l y t o be 
possible, Haclntyre, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , t h i n k s not. He does so 
because he believes th a t non-cognitivism (or 'emotivism') has had a 
dis r u p t i v e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l impact on our Western l i b e r a l 
democratic societies: an impact the consequences of which Rorty has 
overlooked. Before considering t h i s issue though, we s h a l l examine the 
arguments of Rawls. 
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( I l l ) John Raw Is 
I t i s worth noting i n the context of t h i s discussion of the 
future of liberalism t h a t John Rawls has attempted t o address the 
type of objection which t h e o r i s t s such as Dunn and Rorty have levelled 
against him. For Rawls has sought t o deny the charge t h a t h i s 
approach i s too abstract, and f a i l s t o relate t o the s p e c i f i c p r a c t i c a l 
r e a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n the Western l i b e r a l democratic 
societies. Indeed, Rawls has gone so f a r as to o f f e r a defence of the 
l i b e r a l democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regimes which resembles i n many 
s t r i k i n g ways the approaches suggested by Dunn and Rorty. 
In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Justice as Fairness: P o l i t i c a l not 
Metaphysical' (1985), Rawls argues that his analysis of j u s t i c e does 
not depend upon any metaphysical or philosophical claims about 
'universal t r u t h ' or the 'essential nature and i d e n t i t y of persons'. (1) 
Rather, he i n s i s t s t h a t h i s conception of j u s t i c e i s 'public' or 
' p o l i t i c a l ' i n character, and r e s t s upon the basic structure of the 
' i n t u i t i v e ideas' which actually obtain w i t h i n the practices or 
c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democratic regimes. 
This insistence may s t r i k e us as being rather Ddd because i t has 
become commonplace to understand Rawls' argument as being e x p l i c i t l y 
philosophical i n character, and stemming from a recognisably Kantian 
notion of the s e l f . Most c r i t i c s have interpreted h i s major work A. 
Theory of Justice (1972) along these lines. Perhaps, though, we should 
give Rawls the benefit of the doubt. For whatever the merits of 
suggesting that Rawls' presentation i n 'Justice as Fairness; P o l i t i c a l 
not Metaphysical' either constitutes a r a d i c a l change of view, or 
merely amounts to a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of themes not f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n 
e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , i t i s clear t h a t Rawls' l a t e s t argument must 
severely undermine both Dunn's and Rorty's previous c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
of Rawls w i t h i n the 'Utopian Liberalism' and 'philosophical l i b e r a l i s m ' 
t r a d i t i o n s respectively. I t i s t o dismantle t h e i r c e n t r a l contention 
that Rawls' enterprise r e s t s upon an erroneous philosophical 
conception of the free, r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l as the Kantian subject, 
Therefore i t i s of i n t e r e s t t o examine Rawls' pos i t i o n i n some d e t a i l . 
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Rawls says th a t i t i s h i s purpose t o avoid, as f a r as possible, 
any controversial metaphysical or philosophical claims the v a l i d i t y of 
which stands independently from the 'public' conception of justice 
which he seeks t o defend. Most notably, he wishes t o di s t i n g u i s h h i s 
variety of l i b e r a l i s m as a ' p o l i t i c a l doctrine' from those 
'comprehensive moral conceptions' of the good which spring from both 
the 'teleological' t r a d i t i o n of l i b e r a l thought (which seeks to 
establish the metaphysical v a l i d i t y of the 'One Rational Good'), and 
the l i b e r a l i s m s of Kant and M i l l (which are grounded upon 'the moral 
ideals of autonomy and i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' ) . He claims t h a t these v a r i e t i e s 
of l i b e r a l i s m , based as they are upon certain metaphysical claims 
about the nature of the 'good' and the essential nature and i d e n t i t y of 
persons, are t h e o r e t i c a l l y contestable, and are, as such, unable to 
provide the necessary p r a c t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our actual democratic 
practices. 
Echoing Berlin, Rawls s t a r t s from the observation that i t i s an 
incontestable social f a c t that our d i f f e r i n g conceptions of the 'good* 
are c o n f l i c t i n g and even incommensurable, and stem from our adherence 
to d i f f e r e n t moral and re l i g i o u s doctrines. I t i s these adherences 
which generate e t h i c a l disagreements the nature of which may be 
th e o r e t i c a l l y irresolvable. Further, he suggests, these theoretical 
disputes cannot be resolved politically. Therefore, he states that 
'philosophy as the search f o r t r u t h about an independent metaphysical 
and moral order', a l b e i t important i n i t s e l f , 'cannot... provide a 
workable and shared basis f o r a p o l i t i c a l conception of justice i n a 
democratic society'. (2) 
For Rawls, therefore, the l i m i t s of philosophy are such th a t no 
practical resolution of actual moral disputes i n society can 
necessarily follow from i t . Any e f f o r t t o provide a philosophical 
theory which essays t o place on a f i r m metaphysical basis, and 
th e o r e t i c a l l y resolve, our moral disputes, may f a i l ; and, more 
importantly, no such e f f o r t can possibly secure p r a c t i c a l moral 
agreement. 
How, then, are we to secure agreement i n soci a l l i f e ? Rawls' 
contention i s th a t we must 'look tD our public p o l i t i c a l culture 
i t s e l f . . . as the shared fund of i m p l i c i t l y recognised basic ideas and 
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principles'. (3) I t i s these basic ideas and p r i n c i p l e s which provide 
our 'overlapping consensus' of shared 'considered convictions' : 'a 
consensus th a t includes a l l the opposing philosophical and r e l i g i o u s 
doctrines l i k e l y t o p e r s i s t and to gain adherents i n a more or less 
j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democratic society'. (4) 
Rawls' hope i s t o show how the p r i n c i p l e s of 'justice as 
fairness' are t o be found w i t h i n our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democratic 
societies. In short, he wishes t o demonstrate how these p r i n c i p l e s 
are deeply held convictions within our Western p o l i t i c a l culture. He 
restates the two p r i n c i p l e s of 'justice as fairness' as: 
1. Each person has an equal r i g h t to a f u l l y adequate scheme of 
equal basic r i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s , which scheme i s compatible 
with a s i m i l a r scheme f o r a l l . 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to s a t i s f y two conditions: 
f i r s t , they must be attached t o of f i c e s and positions open to a l l 
under conditions of f a i r equality of opportunity; and second, 
they must be t o the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society. (5) 
These p r i n c i p l e s , Rawls maintains, are based on a conception of 
'society as a f a i r system of co-operation between free and equal 
persons'. (6) They constitute, he says, 'one of the basic i n t u i t i v e 
ideas which... ( i s ) . . . i m p l i c i t in the public culture of a democratic 
society'. (7) They also relate, he says, t o another basic i n t u i t i v e 
idea: t h a t of the concept of the person as free and equal. 
Rawls goes on t o specify t h i s conception of the free and equal 
person i n terms of three i n t e r r e l a t e d notions. F i r s t l y , c i t i z e n s are 
free i n the sense th a t 'they conceive of themselves and of one other 
as having the moral power to have a conception of the good' (8), and 
they recognise each other t o be 'capable of r e v i s i n g and changing 
t h i s conception on reasonable and r a t i o n a l grounds, and they may do 
t h i s i f they so desire*. (9) What follows from t h i s , he claims, i s the 
recognition t h a t 
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as free persons, c i t i z e n s claim the r i g h t t o view t h e i r persons 
as independent from and as not i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r 
conception of the good. Given t h e i r moral power t o form, and 
revise, and r a t i o n a l l y t o pursue a conception of the good, t h e i r 
public identity as free persons i s not affected by changes over 
time i n t h e i r conception of the good. (10) 
Rawls' suggestion, therefore, i s th a t c i t i z e n s of a democratic regime 
have a public i d e n t i t y as free persons - 'an i d e n t i t y as a matter of 
basic law* - which i s sustained whatever t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 'non-public' 
i d e n t i t y or conception of the good. Secondly, he argues, these free and 
equal c i t i z e n s 
regard themselves as s e l f - o r i g i n a t i n g sources of v a l i d claims. 
They t h i n k t h e i r claims have weight apart from being derived 
from duties or obligations specified by the p o l i t i c a l conception 
of j u s t i c e , f o r example, from duties and obligations owed t o 
society. (11) 
Thirdly, he says t h a t these c i t i z e n s are 'capable of taking 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r ends' i n t h a t they are 'capable of adjusting 
t h e i r aims and aspirations i n the l i g h t of what they can reasonably 
expect t o provide for'. (12). 
I t i s not our major concern to assess i n any d e t a i l the 
p l a u s i b i l i t y of Rawls' claim t h a t his conception of 'justice as 
fairness' i s something which i s i m p l i c i t l y adopted as a basic c u l t u r a l 
idea which relates t o the actual conceptions of ci t i z e n s i n a 
democratic regime: c i t i z e n s who 'conceive of themselves as free' i n 
the three respects outlined above. (13) However, one point may be 
made. I t i s t h a t when Rawls makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'non-
public' and the 'public' i d e n t i t y of the person i n a democratic society, 
he appears t o want t o assert t h a t however important and comprehensive 
i n shaping 'a persons way of l i f e ' c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r convictions about 
a conception of the good may be, these convictions are always 
distinguishable from the public i d e n t i t y of a free and equal c i t i z e n . 
This i s c e r t a i n l y true of an ideologically committed l i b e r a l democrat, 
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who believes i n the notions of r i g h t s and c i v i l laws protecting free 
c i t i z e n s and allowing them t o l e r a n t l y to express d i f f e r e n t and 
c o n f l i c t i n g views i n the p r i v a t e sphere of l i f e . However, t h i s i s 
c l e a r l y not so of all persons who are located i n a democratic society. 
A committed Marxist, f o r example, fi n d s himself as a matter of 
contingent h i s t o r i c a l f a c t l i v i n g i n a democratic society; but there i s 
no ideological sense in which he i d e n t i f i e s himself as a 'law abiding 
public c i t i z e n ' in the Rawlsian manner, and there i s no ideological 
sense in which he feels a commitment to the conception of himself as 
'free' i n the l i b e r a l view described by Rawls. Rather, his Marxist 
p o l i t i c a l convictions serve t o shape his l i f e i n a way which makes the 
Rawlsian l i b e r a l democratic d i s t i n c t i o n between public and non-public 
i d e n t i t i e s i r r e l e v a n t to him. Therefore, i t looks as though i t simply 
i s not true, as Rawls appears to suggest, that a l l people i n the 
l i b e r a l democratic regimes acknowledge a notion of freedom which 
rests upon a d i s t i n c t i o n between the public and the non-public spheres 
of l i f e . 
I t may be suggested that t h i s type of person (for example, a 
Marxist) does not form part of what Rawls c a l l s the 'overlapping 
consensus' of r a t i o n a l b e l i e f and behaviour, and therefore does not 
q u a l i f y , on 'rational' grounds, as a member of that social culture. But 
t o say t h i s i s merely to beg the question. For i t rests fundamentally 
upon the assumption th a t the l i b e r a l democratic conception of a 
person as a 'free c i t i z e n ' i s i n some sense more 'rational' and 'truer' 
than others. This i s not so because the notions of r a t i o n a l i t y and 
t r u t h , as related to ideological understandings, are internal t o those 
be l i e f systems, and therefore i t follows that there are no external 
c r i t e r i a by which to judge that one ideological view i s better than 
another. Yet i t appears t h a t Rawls' analysis does rest upon an 
assumption of t h i s kind. 
The point, then, i s t h a t Rawls' contention t h a t the two 
p r i n c i p l e s of 'justice as fairness' are reflected i n the convictions of 
the c i t i z e n s of the l i b e r a l democratic regime cannot simply be an 
empirical description alone. Rather, i t must re s t upon an ideological 
assumption that the l i b e r a l democratic man i s , qua c i t i z e n , r a t i o n a l l y 
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s u p e r i o r t o o t h e r s because he conceives of h i m s e l f as f r e e , and 
recognises t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a p u b l i c and n o n - p u b l i c i d e n t i t y . 
Leaving t h i s p o i n t aside, we can now t u r n t o another issue; t h a t 
i s , t he exa m i n a t i o n of t h e nature of Raw I s ' procedure f o r j u s t i f y i n g 
l i b e r a l d e mocratic p r a c t i c e s . H is argument, r e s t a t e d , i s t h a t 'the 
conception o f c i t i z e n s as f r e e and equal persons need not involve.... 
q u e s t i o n s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l psychology or a me t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e of 
t h e nature o f t h e se l f . . . (because)... no p o l i t i c a l view t h a t depends on 
these deep and unresolved m a t t e r s can serve as a p u b l i c conception of 
j u s t i c e i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democratic s t a t e ' ( 1 4 ) . How, i n proceeding 
i n t h i s manner, and i n a t t e m p t i n g t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f f r o m any 
unresolved m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t t e r s t h a t i n c l u d e s any attachment t o t h e 
Kantian n o t i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s a l , a h i s t o r i c a l r a t i o n a l s e l f , Rawls 
c e r t a i n l y appears t o have dented t h e c l a i m s of those who had 
p r e v i o u s l y sought t o c h a r a c t e r i s e him as a Kan t i a n ' c o n t r a c t a r i a n ' 
t h e o r i s t , i n sharp c o n t r a s t t o t h e 'communitarian' t h e o r i s t s . 
Rorty has h i m s e l f acknowledged t h i s , and he now i n t e r p r e t s 
Rawls' e n t e r p r i s e t o be c l o s e r t o the h i s t o r i c i s t s t r a i n i n Hegel and 
Dewey r a t h e r t h a n the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t approach t h a t i s 
e v i d e n t i n Kant. As d i s t i n c t from h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f Rawls' 
p o s i t i o n i n 'Postmodernist Bourgeois L i b e r a l i s m ' , i n 'The P r i o r i t y of 
Democracy t o Philosophy' E o r t y argues t h a t Rawls i s not committed t o 
a f a l s e K a n t i a n t h e o r y o f t h e s e l f , or i s i n t e n t on p r o v i d i n g some 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a c y . Rather, he m a i n t a i n s 
t h a t Rawls i s seeking t o g i v e an ' a r t i c u l a t i o n ' ( i n terms of ' j u s t i c e 
as f a i r n e s s ' ) t o the i n t u i t i o n s , shared b e l i e f s and s e t t l e d h a b i t s o f 
those who i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l communities 
committed t o l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy. For Rorty, then, Rawls' 
e n t e r p r i s e i s 'pragmatic 1, n o t ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' i n c h a r a c t e r . 
We can agree t h a t Rorty's r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rawls i s 
p l a u s i b l e enough when we c o n s i d e r how Rawls d e f i n e s the l i m i t s o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n and t h e sense o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n t h e way 
which i s c l o s e l y a k i n t o Rorty. For Rawls argues t h a t he seeks t o 
'avoid t h e problem of t r u t h and t h e c o n t r o v e r s y between r e a l i s m and 
s u b j e c t i v i s m about t h e s t a t u s o f moral and p o l i t i c a l values'; and he 
i n s i s t s t h a t h i s form o f argument 'neither a s s e r t s or denies these 
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d o c t r i n e s ' . (15) Kather, he says t h a t b i s argument 'recasts ideas from 
t h e t r a d i t i o n of t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t o achieve a p r a c t i c a b l e 
c o n c e ption of o b j e c t i v i t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n founded on p u b l i c agreement 
i n judgement on due r e f l e c t i o n ' . (16) 
Thus, f o r Rawls, t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y about t h e s t a t u s 
o f value, a l t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t , i s n o t r e l e v a n t t o t h e t a s k i n hand, 
which i s t h e p r a c t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of l i b e r a l democratic p r a c t i c e s . 
For such p r a c t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n amounts t o t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n , i n a 
p r e c i s e conceptual manner, o f those i n t u i t i v e ideas which are 
o b j e c t i v e i n t h e pragmatic sense of being 'believed i n ' by those who 
are committed t o t h e values i n h e r e n t i n l i b e r a l democratic p r a c t i c e s . 
Such an a r t i c u l a t i o n i n v o l v e s t h e a d a p t a t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n o f a ' s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t ' i n t h e ' o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ' . But t h i s n o t i o n o n l y serves as a 
'device o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' which makes c l e a r e r our a c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n s 
i n t h e l i b e r a l democratic w o r l d . I t i s not, f o r Rawls, t o be understood 
as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l conception which a t t e m p t s t o ground or 
m e t a p h y s i c a l l y j u s t i f y these b e l i e f s : r a t h e r , i t merely serves as an 
a n a l y t i c a l t o o l which best a r t i c u l a t e s these b e l i e f s . For Rawls, then, 
h i s argument i s not t o be understood as being 'foundational'. Ve can 
t h e r e f o r e see how Rorty i s able t o i n t e r p r e t Rawls' e n t e r p r i s e as an 
at t e m p t t o e l a b o r a t e upon c e r t a i n 'conceptual mechanisms' or 'theories' 
which f i t i n w i t h , or comport w i t h , our a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l i n t u i t i o n s ; 
r a t h e r t h a n attempt t o j u s t i f y or base them upon a Kantian 
m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y . 
However, Rawls' argument runs i n t o t h e same d i f f i c u l t y which we 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Rorty's e n t e r p r i s e . For t h e problem i s t h a t n e i t h e r 
Rawls nor Rorty adequately consider t h e place of ideology i n t h e i r 
a n a l y s i s . That i s , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o o f f e r a 'pragmatic', r a t h e r t h a n a 
' p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n of l i b e r a l d e mocratic p o l i t i c a l l i f e , b o t h 
Rawls and Ro r t y assume some s o r t of i d e o l o g i c a l conception o f t h e 
person and h i s r e l a t i o n t o the e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l w o r l d , I n t h e case 
of Rawls, h i s n o t i o n o f c i t i z e n s c o n c e i v i n g o f themselves as h a v i n g a 
'non-public' i d e n t i t y , and 'free and equal' s t a t u s w i t h o t h e r s , presumes 
a l i b e r a l i d e o l o g i c a l c o n c eption of t h e s e l f as possessing t h e 'moral 
power', ' s e l f - o r i g i n a t i o n ' and ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' necessary t o be capable 
of r a t i o n a l l y choosing those conceptions o f t h e good which r e f l e c t 
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i n d i v i d u a l l y s p e c i f i a b l e d e s i r e s , wants and needs. T h i s conception may 
indeed a v o i d any e x p l i c i t l y K a n t i a n a s s o c i a t i o n , b u t i t remains 
i d e o l o g i c a l nonetheless. That i s , i t i s a conception o f i d e a l moral and 
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between persons, and i t i s a t t h e r o o t o f 
Bawls' a n a l y s i s . As such, i t i s t h i s presumed i d e o l o g i c a l view which i s 
t h e b a s i s of, and generates, Rawls' a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e a p r a c t i c a l 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f l i b e r a l democratic s o c i e t i e s , For w i t h o u t t h i s 
presumed i d e o l o g i c a l view, t h e r e would be no (moral) p o i n t i n Rawls 
u n d e r t a k i n g t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . 
Leaving t h i s p o i n t aside, however, a c r u c i a l issue remains t o be 
discussed. I t i s whether any 'pragmatic' j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the b e l i e f s 
and c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e l i b e r a l democratic s o c i e t i e s i s l i k e l y t o be 
s u c c e s s f u l , a t both a t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , i n m a i n t a i n i n g a 
f u t u r e commitment t o them. This i s s u e i s addressed by Maclntyre, who 
suggests t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c e of n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m as a c o r r e c t t h e o r y of 
use i s such t h a t l i b e r a l i s m cannot hope t o m a i n t a i n i t s appeal i n t h e 
f u t u r e . 
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10. O p p o s i t i o n t o L i b e r a l i s m ; M a c l n t y r e 
Haclntyre's argument a g a i n s t l i b e r a l i s m , as expressed most n o t a b l y 
i n A f t e r V i r t u e and v a r i o u s subsequent a r t i c l e s , c o n s t i t u t e s a s e r i o u s 
c h a l l e n g e t o any attempted contemporary defence o f l i b e r a l democratic 
moral and p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e , such as t h a t made by Dunn, Rorty and 
Rawls. For i t amounts t o t h e c l a i m t h a t , a t both t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and 
p r a c t i c a l l e v e l s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , any such a t t e m p t i s doomed t o 
f a i l u r e . 
Maclntyre's argument opens w i t h an o b s e r v a t i o n about the 
ch a r a c t e r o f contemporary moral experience. T h i s experience possesses, 
he says, t h r e e c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s . F i r s t l y , t h e r i v a l 
arguments endorsed by people i n moral debate and disagreement appear 
t o be conceptually incommensurable: t h a t i s , each argument i s i n t e r n a l l y 
l o g i c a l l y v a l i d - t h e c o n c l u s i o n s reached w i t h i n them l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w 
from c e r t a i n premises - but each s t a r t from premises employing q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t n ormative and e v a l u a t i v e concepts. What f o l l o w s from t h i s , 
M a c l n t y r e observes, i s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n our s o c i e t y 'DD e s t a b l i s h e d 
way of d e c i d i n g between these claims', and 'the i n v o c a t i o n o f one 
premise a g a i n s t another becomes a ma t t e r o f pure a s s e r t i o n and 
c o u n t e r - a s s e r t i o n . ' (1) Put another way, moral disagreement i s l o g i c a l l y 
i n t e r m i n a b l e because t h e r e a re no good reasons or impersonal r a t i o n a l 
c r i t e r i a a v a i l a b l e by which t o s e t t l e a p u b l i c argument. 
T h i s f a c t about contemporary moral l i f e i s , f o r M a c l n t y r e , of the 
utmost importance. He w r i t e s t h a t 
i f we possess no u n a s s a i l a b l e c r i t e r i a , no s e t o f c o m p e l l i n g 
reasons by means o f which we may convince our opponents, i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t i n t h e process o f making up our own minds we have 
made no appeal t o such c r i t e r i a or such reasons. I f I l a c k any 
good reasons t o inv o k e a g a i n s t you, i t must seem t h a t I l a c k any 
good reasons. Hence i t seems t h a t u n d e r l y i n g my own p o s i t i o n 
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t h e r e must be some non-rational decision to adopt that position. 
Corresponding t o t h e i n t e r m i n a b i l i t y o f p u b l i c argument t h e r e i s 
a t l e a s t t h e appearance of a d i s q u i e t i n g private arbitrariness. 
(2) 
M a c l n t y r e e x p l a i n s t h a t t h i s f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f modern 
e t h i c a l arguments leads one t o suggest t h a t 'there i s n o t h i n g t o such 
contemporary disagreements b u t a c l a s h o f a n t a g o n i s t i c w i l l s , each w i l l 
determined by some s e t o f a r b i t r a r y choices o f i t s own'. (3) However, 
Ma c l n t y r e notes, i t i s a p a r a d o x i c a l f e a t u r e , and a second 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such arguments, t h a t t h e y c l a i m t o be impersonal 
r a t i o n a l arguments, That i s , they are arguments which p u r p o r t t o appeal 
t o ' o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d s ' or e x t e r n a l c r i t e r i a t he a l l e g e d e x i s t e n c e o f 
which s t a n d s independent from t h e preferences or a t t i t u d e s of t h e 
speaker or hearer. Such an appeal, as a t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f modern 
e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , i s couched i n a conceptual vocabulary which employs 
such n o t i o n s as ' r i g h t s ' , 'duties', ' j u s t i c e ' , ' u t i l i t y ' and 
' u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y 1 . A conceptual vocabulary, t h a t i s , which i s f a m i l i a r 
t o t h e l i b e r a l d e mocratic t r a d i t i o n of di s c o u r s e , 
Maclntyre's c e n t r a l purpose i s t o 'construct a t r u e h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e ' which makes c l e a r how i t came about t h a t contemporary moral 
d i s c o u r s e a c q u i r e d t h i s p a r a d o x i c a l nature. He wants t o show how 'the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f our own moral arguments' developed i n t h i s way, and 
how we are t o e x p l a i n 'most n o t a b l y t h e f a c t t h a t we s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and 
i n c o n s i s t e n t l y t r e a t moral argument as an e x e r c i s e o f our r a t i o n a l 
powers and as mere e x p r e s s i v e a s s e r t i o n ' . (4) 
For M a c l n t y r e , such an e x p l a n a t i o n r e l i e s upon an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f 
th e impact o f t h e emotive t h e o r y o f e t h i c s upon the p u b l i c moral 
consciousness o f t h e Western w o r l d . For i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t 
e motivism amounts t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m t h a t a l l e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , 
whatever t h e h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l c o n t e x t o f i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n , amounts 
t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s which can i n no sense be 
r a t i o n a l l y determined or r e s o l v e d . T h i s t h e s i s has, f o r Maclntyre, 
whatever i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y , shaped t h e p r a c t i c a l use of contemporary 
moral debate. He i n s i s t s , we r e c a l l , t h a t 'to a l a r g e degree people 
now t h i n k , t a l k and a c t as if emotivism were tr u e . ' (5) And he 
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c o n t i n u e s t h a t 'the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e modern age' i s e m o t i v i s t 
because 'emotivism has become embodied i n our c u l t u r e ' and has 
determined 'a wide range of our concepts and modes o f behaviour', such 
t h a t 'our e x p l i c i t l y m o r a l debates and judgements presuppose t h e t r u t h 
o f emotivism, i f not a t t h e l e v e l o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s t h e o r i s i n g , a t l e a s t 
i n everyday p r a c t i c e ' . (6) Maclntyre's s o c i o l o g i c a l p o i n t , t hen, i s t h a t 
t h e modern m o r a l agent i s t o be understood as an 'emotive man' i n t h e 
sense t h a t h i s p r a c t i c a l moral a c t i v i t y amounts t o t h e a s s e r t i o n of 
h i s own a r b i t r a r i l y chosen p r i n c i p l e s of conduct which express h i s own 
pe r s o n a l f e e l i n g s . How i s i t then, we may ask, t h a t contemporary moral 
debate r e t a i n s i t s s u p e r f i c i a l appearance o f ap p e a l i n g t o o b j e c t i v e 
r a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s ? 
MacTntyre e x p l a i n s t h i s phenomenon i n terms of a h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e . He argues t h a t t h e e m o t i v i s t t h e o r y c o n s t i t u t e s t he 
c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t : an e n t e r p r i s e 
which sought t o p r o v i d e some s e t of r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a by which t o 
j u s t i f y our e t h i c a l b e l i e f s and moral p r a c t i c e s . But t h i s p r o j e c t , he 
argues, f a i l e d . N e ither Hume nor Kant, who were t h e major p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
f i g u r e s of t h e Enlightenment p e r i o d , were s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e t a s k o f 
p l a c i n g moral b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s upon s o l i d ground. F u r t h e r , 
M a c l n t y r e p o s i t s t h a t t h e reason why t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t was 
bound t o f a i l i s t h a t i t was grounded upon c e r t a i n premises r e l a t i n g 
t o t h e n a t i o n o f t h e s e l f which could never have secured t h e necessary 
f o u n d a t i o n s f o r moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
Emativism i s , f o r M a c l n t y r e , t h e l o g i c a l c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h i s f a i l e d 
e n t e r p r i s e . I t i s i t s e l f p a r t o f t h e Enlightenment t r a d i t i o n , d rawing 
most h e a v i l y from Hume, and i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h a t t r a d i t i o n i s shown 
i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t makes c l e a r t h a t no r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r moral 
b e l i e f and p r a c t i c e i n t h e modern w o r l d can p o s s i b l y be g i v e n w i t h i n 
t h e conceptual apparatus o f t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t . That i s , 
emotivism c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e n d - p o i n t o f a t r a d i t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t h o u g h t which was fu n d a m e n t a l l y f l a w e d i n i t s i n c e p t i o n because i t was 
based upon a f a l s e c o n c eption o f the s e l f ; a s e l f which, a l l e g e d l y , 
s tands a p a r t from whatever i n t e r s e c t i o n o f s o c i a l r o l e s we happen t o 
occupy. 
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I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e e m o t i v i s t t h e o r y o f e t h i c s r e c e i v e d 
i t s g r e a t e s t s y s t e m a t i c e x p r e s s i o n and a t t e n t i o n i n t h e 1930's t o mid-
1940's by such w r i t e r s as Ayer, Stevenson and Duncan-Jones. As an 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e meaning o f e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , i t q u i c k l y became 
unf a s h i o n a b l e and was r a p i d l y d i s m i s s e d as inadequate w i t h i n 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l c i r c l e s . However, M a c l n t y r e argues, t h e ' c u l t u r a l power' o f 
e m o t i v i s m as a 'theory o f use' ( r a t h e r t h a n a 'theory o f meaning') 
remains s i g n i f i c a n t because i t has r e t a i n e d i t s dominance i n shaping 
t h e p r a c t i c a l moral consciousness o f t h e Western w o r l d . Also, a t t h e 
t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , M a c l n t y r e says t h a t 
e m otivism d i d n o t d i e and i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note how o f t e n i n 
w i d e l y d i f f e r e n t modern p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e x t s something v e r y l i k e 
emotivism's attempted r e d u c t i o n o f m o r a l i t y t o p e r s o n a l preference 
c o n t i n u a l l y r e c u r s i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f those who do n o t t h i n k o f 
themselves as e m o t i v i s t s . (7) 
For example, R.M. Hare i n t r o d u c e d t h e n o t i o n o f ' u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y ' as a 
necessary l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e f o r moral judgement by which t o place moral 
r e a s o n i n g on a f i r m f o o t i n g . However, i n so d o i n g , Hare acknowledged 
t h e b a s i c e m o t i v i s t p o i n t t h a t a f t e r an appeal t o u n i v e r s a l s t a n d a r d s 
had been g i v e n , no f u r t h e r r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o u l d be p r o v i d e d . 
Therefore, as M a c l n t y r e remarks: 
The t e r m i n u s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h u s always, on t h i s view, a n o t 
f u r t h e r t o be j u s t i f i e d choice, a choice unguided by c r i t e r i a . Each 
i n d i v i d u a l i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y has t o adopt h i s or her f i r s t 
p r i n c i p l e s on t h e b a s i s o f such a choice. The u t t e r a n c e o f any 
u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e i s i n t h e end an e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e preferences 
of an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l and f o r t h a t w i l l i t s p r i n c i p l e s have and 
can have o n l y such a u t h o r i t y as i t chooses t o c o n f e r upon them by 
a d o p t i n g them. Thus emotivism has n o t been l e f t v e r y f a r behind 
a f t e r a l l . (8) 
Hare's t h e o r y , which a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e u t i l i t a r i a n grounds f o r 
our m o r a l s t a n d a r d s i n terms o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e , i s 
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not, as M a c l n t y r e notes, t o be regarded as t h e o n l y major c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o modern moral p h i l o s o p h y which s p r i n g s f r o m e m o t i v i s t premises. 
Other t h e o r i s t s such as J.L. Mackie can be in c l u d e d . As such, t h e r e i s a 
d i s c e r n i b l e t r a d i t i o n of moral t h e o r i s i n g t h a t we have c a l l e d 'non-
c o g n i t i v i s m ' which presupposes t h e b a s i c a l l e g e d t r u t h o f the e m o t i v i s t 
a n a l y s i s . 
How, though, i s t h i s assessment o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f emotivism r e l e v a n t t o Maclntyre's a t t e m p t t o address 
t h e problems o f j u s t i f y i n g l i b e r a l d emocratic t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e ? I t s 
relevance i s t h a t M a c l n t y r e b e l i e v e s t h a t our attachment t o e m o t i v i s t 
ways o f t h i n k i n g i n t h e modern age i s f a t a l t o any a t t e m p t t o j u s t i f y 
m o r a l l y our e t h i c a l b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s . He contends t h a t a l t h o u g h 
t h e r e are contemporary l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s , such as Rawls, Nozick and 
Gewirth, who may appear t o be preoccupied w i t h r e j e c t i n g e m o t i v i s t and 
s u b j e c t i v i s t accounts o f m o r a l i t y , they are nonetheless i n f e c t e d by t h e 
e m o t i v i s t s t r a i n . These t h e o r i s t s have attempted, as Ma c l n t y r e says, t o 
'show t h a t t h e n o t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f s u p p l i e s m o r a l i t y w i t h a 
basis'. (9) However, he notes t h a t a l l these a t t e m p t s have f a i l e d ; and 
t h i s i s because 
such w r i t e r s cannot agree among themselves e i t h e r on what the 
ch a r a c t e r o f moral r a t i o n a l i t y i s or on t h e substance o f t h e 
m o r a l i t y which i s t o be founded on t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y . The d i v e r s i t y 
of contemporary moral debate and i t s i n t e r m i n a b i l i t y a r e indeed 
m i r r o r e d i n t h e c o n t r o v e r s i e s o f a n a l y t i c a l moral p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
(10) 
Maclntyre's p o i n t i s t h a t t h e l e v e l o f disagreement between 
contemporary t h e o r i s t s as t o how t o e s t a b l i s h a r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r m o r a l i t y i s i n d i c a t i v e o f a deep c r i s i s i n Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t h i n k i n g . For i t shows t h a t these t h e o r i s t s cannot draw upon a 
conceptual vocabulary which p r o v i d e s any coherent and u n i f o r m n o t i o n 
of what c o n s t i t u t e s ' m o r a l i t y ' o r 'moral r a t i o n a l i t y ' . Rather, t h e r e i s a 
p l e t h o r a of fragmented concepts a v a i l a b l e ; a l l o f which, c o l l e c t i v e l y , 
make t h e t a s k o f t h e o r e t i c a l agreement i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s i s why, f o r 
Ma c l n t y r e , t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e n a t u r e o f contemporary moral debate i s 
- 200 -
m i r r o r e d i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l or p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s i e s o f a n a l y t i c a l 
moral p h i l o s o p h y . 
How, though, has t h i s c u r r e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i s i s come about? 
M a c l n t y r e r o o t s t h e problem i n t h e f a c t t h a t these contemporary 
a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s remain a t t a c h e d t o t h e Enlightenment (and, as a 
consequence, b a s i c a l l y e m o t i v i s t ) conceptual schema, which f i n d s 
m o r a l i t y i n i n d i v i d u a l choice or e x p r e s s i o n o f preference. C r u c i a l l y , 
however, these t h e o r i s t s have f a i l e d t o a p p r e c i a t e , or have re f u s e d t o 
acknowledge, t h e b a s i c lesson which emotivism has t a u g h t us; namely, 
t h a t no r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l i t y i s 
p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e conceptual s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s schema. What we f i n d 
i n s t e a d , as M a c l n t y r e observes, i s t h a t a wide range o f concepts, such 
as ' r i g h t s ' , 'duties', ' u t i l i t y ' , ' j u s t i c e ' and ' u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y ' , 
c o n t i n u e t o be used by a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s t o j u s t i f y r a t i o n a l l y our 
moral b e l i e f s ; b u t these concepts do n o t have any coherent source 
because they do n o t r e l a t e t o any conception o f m o r a l i t y or moral 
r a t i o n a l i t y which can p o s s i b l y p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r such 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . 
M a c l n t y r e b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s e x p l a i n s how t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d i s p u t e s 
o f contemporary a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y r e f l e c t t h e p a r a d o x i c a l and 
indeed i n c o n s i s t e n t c h a r a c t e r o f modern e t h i c a l debate as an a t t e m p t t o 
a s s e r t p e r s o n a l preferences and y e t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y appeal t o e x t e r n a l 
s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For i t r e v e a l s t h a t p r o f e s s i o n a l 
a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , no l e s s than t h e o r d i n a r y moral p r a c t i t i o n e r , 
a r e d e l u d i n g themselves by t h i n k i n g t h a t t h e i r c o n c eption o f m o r a l i t y 
as p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e can be g i v e n any e x t e r n a l r a t i o n a l support. 
T h i s problem f a c i n g us cannot, M a c l n t y r e contends, be overcome 
w i t h o u t t o t a l l y abandoning t h e Enlightenment (and e m o t i v i s t ) c o n c e p t i o n 
o f m o r a l i t y as p e r s o n a l preference. W h i l s t we c o n t i n u e t o employ t h e 
t o o l s o f t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t , he says, 'we have no good reasons 
t o b e l i e v e t h a t a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y can p r o v i d e any c o n v i n c i n g escape 
from an e m o t i v i s m t h e substance o f which i t so o f t e n i n f a c t concedes'. 
(11) 
For M a c l n t y r e , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s an u r g e n t need f o r such an 
escape i s apparent i n t h e desperate n a t u r e o f t h e p r e s e n t c r i s i s : a 
c r i s i s which i s symptomatic o f a moral d e c l i n e o r t h e 'decay o f moral 
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r e a s o n i n g ' t h a t was consequent on t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t o f t h e 
i n c e p t i o n o f t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t , and has reached i t s c u l m i n a t i o n 
i n t h e modern e m o t i v i s t age. Evidence o f t h i s d e c l i n e i s apparent, John 
Dunn remarks, i n 'the c h a o t i c h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f n o r m a t i v e concepts 
t o u t e d i n t h e Western arguments... t h e d i r e c t c o n f l i c t of w i l l s and 
s e n t i m e n t s , l i g h t l y cloaked by t h e i n v o c a t i o n o f s t a n d a r d s , t h e 
a u t h o r i t y and conclusiveness o f which i s now e n t i r e l y bogus.' (12) The 
reason t h a t any such appeal t o these s t a n d a r d s i s f a l l a c i o u s , M a c l n t y r e 
w r i t e s , i s t h a t ' i n t h e a c t u a l w o r l d which we i n h a b i t t h e language o f 
m o r a l i t y i s i n . . , (a) s t a t e of grave d i s o r d e r . What we possess... are t h e 
f r a g m e n t s of a conceptual scheme, p a r t s o f which now l a c k those 
c o n t e x t s f r o m which t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e derived.' (13) We are, i n o t h e r 
words, c o n t i n u i n g t o employ t h e p a s t vocabulary and concepts o f moral 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h o u t r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t t h e ' i n t e g r a l substance* o f 
m o r a l i t y which gave these concepts t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e has become 
fragmented and i n p a r t destroyed. A l l t h a t we are l e f t w i t h , M a c l n t y r e 
says, i s 'an unharmonious melange o f i l l - a s s o r t e d fragments.' (14) T h i s 
process o f f r a g m e n t a t i o n was a consequence of t h e a t t e m p t o f 
Enlightenment t h i n k e r s t o seek d i f f e r e n t conceptual approaches by which 
t o address t h e problem o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a r a t i o n a l m oral j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r our p r i n c i p l e s which i s founded upon t h e ' i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' c o n c e ption 
of t h e moral person. But t h e c u l m i n a t i n g d e s t r u c t i o n o f any homogeneous 
conceptual u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f m o r a l i t y was hastened by t h e e m o t i v i s t 
r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t no such j u s t i f i c a t i o n was p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h i s schema. 
M a c l n t y r e wishes t o assess what he takes t o be t h e d i s a s t r o u s 
p r a c t i c a l m o r a l consequences o f t h i s process o f conceptual 
f r a g m e n t a t i o n . He argues t h a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e issue r e s t s upon t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e e m o t i v i s t t h e o r y has s u c c e s s f u l l y o b l i t e r a t e d t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between manipulative and non-manipulative r e l a t i o n s i n our 
contemporary s o c i a l l i f e ; and he i n d i c a t e s bow t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l 
o b l i t e r a t i o n i s o f t h e utmost p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r m o r a l i t y . He 
c e n t r e s b i s argument on t h e c o n t r a s t between K a n t i a n e t h i c s and 
emotivism. He argues t h a t Kant i s q u i t e c o r r e c t on one major i s s u e 
because 
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The d i f f e r e n c e between a human r e l a t i o n s h i p uninformed by 
m o r a l i t y and one so informed i s p r e c i s e l y t h e d i f f e r e n c e between 
one i n which each person t r e a t s t h e o t h e r p r i m a r i l y as a means t o 
h i s o r her ends and one i n which each t r e a t s t h e other as an end. 
To t r e a t someone e l s e as an end i s t o o f f e r them what I take t o 
be good reasons f o r a c t i n g i n one way r a t h e r t h a n another, b u t t o 
leave i t t o them t o evaluate those reasons. I t i s t o be u n w i l l i n g 
t o i n f l u e n c e another except by reasons which t h a t o t h e r he or she 
judges t o be good. I t i s t o appeal t o imperso n a l c r i t e r i a of t h e 
v a l i d i t y o f which each r a t i o n a l agent must be h i s or her own 
judge. By c o n t r a s t , t o t r e a t someone e l s e as a means i s t o seek t o 
make him or her an i n s t r u m e n t o f my purposes by advancing 
whatever i n f l u e n c e s or c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i l l i n f a c t be e f f e c t i v e on 
t h i s or t h a t occasion. The g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s o f t h e s o c i o l o g y and 
psychology o f persuasions are what I s h a l l need t o guide me, n o t 
the s t a n d a r d s o f a n a r r a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . (15) 
However, as M a c l n t y r e remarks: 
I f e m o tivism i s t r u e , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i l l u s o r y . For e v a l u a t i v e 
u t t e r a n c e can i n t h e end have no p o i n t or use b u t the e x p r e s s i o n 
o f my own f e e l i n g s or a t t i t u d e s and t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e 
f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s o f o t h e r s . I cannot genuinely appeal t o 
impersonal c r i t e r i a , f o r t h e r e a re no impersonal c r i t e r i a . I may 
t h i n k t h a t I so appeal and o t h e r s may t h i n k t h a t I so appeal, but 
these t h o u g h t s w i l l always be mistaken. The s o l e r e a l i t y o f 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y m o r a l d i s c o u r s e i s t h e a t t e m p t o f one w i l l t o a l i g n 
th e a t t i t u d e s , f e e l i n g s .preferences and choices o f another w i t h i t 
own. Others are always means, never ends. (16) 
M a c l n t y r e i s , t h e n , o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e K a n t i a n a n a l y s i s o f 
t h e c h a r a c t e r o f m o r a l i t y i s s u p e r i o r t o t h e e m o t i v i s t a n a l y s i s on t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between 'means' and 'ends'. He 
b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l i t y and prudence i s 
c o r r e c t l y t o be d i s c e r n e d i n terms o f t r e a t i n g people as ends r a t h e r 
t h a n as means, and o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between non-
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m a n i p u l a t i v e and m a n i p u l a t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . However, i n contending 
t h i s , M a c l n t y r e makes two r e l a t e d p o i n t s . F i r s t l y , he i n s i s t s t h a t 
t h e K a n t i a n t h e o r e t i c a l approach i s nonetheless bound t o f a i l i n i t s 
a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between means and ends upon a 
f i r m p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o o t i n g . T h i s i s because i t i s based upon a f a l s e 
c o n c e p t i o n o f man as a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r a t i o n a l being. Consequently, he 
c l a i m s , t h e r e c e n t K a n t i a n t h e o r e t i c a l arguments advanced by such 
w r i t e r s as Rawls and l o z i c k have been unsuccessful. Secondly, and more 
i n t e r e s t i n g l y , M a c l n t y r e contends t h a t t h e conceptual b a n k r u p t c y of t h e 
K a n t i a n p r o j e c t i s r e l a t e d t o a p r a c t i c a l problem. The problem, he 
i n s i s t s , i s t h a t our contemporary u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r a c t i c a l s o c i a l 
l i f e i s based, t o a l a r g e degree, on t h e assumption t h a t t h e e m o t i v i s t 
c o n c e ption of moral d i s c o u r s e i s t r u e . That i s , i t i s w i d e l y 
presupposed w i t h i n our c u l t u r e t h a t t h e s o c i a l w o r l d , as 'seen w i t h 
e m o t i v i s t eyes' i s t h e c o r r e c t view. Consequently, i t i s a common 
s o c i o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e o f our p r a c t i c a l moral consciousness t o b e l i e v e 
t h a t m o r a l i t y i s a m a t t e r o f e x p r e s s i n g f e e l i n g s and imposing our w i l l 
upon o t h e r s . As a r e s u l t , M a c l n t y r e c l a i m s t h a t we no longer have a 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y r o o t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l i t y 
and prudence, or t r e a t i n g o t h e r people as ends r a t h e r t h a n as means. 
T h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n our p r a c t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g because we a c t and 
behave i n a way t h a t r e v e a l s t h e degree t o which any d i s t i n c t i o n 
between m a n i p u l a t i v e and n o n - m a n i p u l a t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s has been 
o b l i t e r a t e d . Therefore, M a c l n t y r e argues t h a t t h e K a n t i a n t h e o r e t i c a l 
a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e us w i t h a n o t i o n o f moral, as d i s t i n c t f r o m 
p r u d e n t i a l reasoning, i s bound t o have no p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t on us. T h i s 
i s because we behave i n a manner which i n d i c a t e s t h a t we do n o t 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e i s a p r a c t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made 
between m o r a l i t y and prudence. 
One o f Maclntyre's c e n t r a l c o n t e n t i o n s , then, i s t h a t 
contemporary moral t h e o r y cannot p r o v i d e us w i t h a coherent and w e l l -
grounded conception o f moral reasoning. For a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s are 
t r a p p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s o f Enlightenment, and consequently 
e m o t i v i s t , p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . These p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s have, a t b o t h t h e 
t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l l e v e l s o f modern e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g , e f f e c t i v e l y 
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made i t i m p o s s i b l e t o p r o v i d e any i n t e l l i g i b l e account o f moral, as 
d i s t i n c t f r o m p r u d e n t i a l , reasoning. 
I n Maclntyre's view, then, t h e ge n e r a l p i c t u r e l o o k s bleak; and he 
draws h i s pessimism from t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether l i b e r a l i s m , as a 
t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e o f r a t i o n a l m oral j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
has any f u t u r e . I n order t o examine MacIntyre's assessment o f t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h i s f u t u r e , we need b r i e f l y t o r e s t a t e our placement o f 
l i b e r a l i s m w i t h i n i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e x t , and s p e c i f y i t s conceptions 
of m o r a l reasoning. 
M a c l n t y r e notes t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i b e r a l i s m (or what he c a l l s 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m ) sprang from t h e Enlightenment p r o j e c t . Also, as 
he p o i n t s out, i t c o n s t i t u t e s a d i s t i n c t i v e t r a d i t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
argument because i t has i t s source i n an i n d i v i d u a l i s t n o t i o n of man 
and h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d which i s based upon a p a r t i c u l a r 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l conception o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between f a c t s and values. 
As such, i t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m t o 
m a i n t a i n t h a t q u e s t i o n s of f a c t a r e s e t t l e d independently from what 
anyone wants or chooses, whereas q u e s t i o n s o f value ( i n c l u d i n g moral 
value) are s e t t l e d o n l y by t h e i n d i v i d u a l choosing and s t a n d i n g by some 
p a r t i c u a l a r s e t of p r i n c i p l e s which best s a t i s f y h i s d e s i r e s . I t i s t o 
p i c t u r e t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n f r o n t i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s w i t h a freedom 
t o make such e v a l u a t i o n s as he wishes i n t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l 
purposes. 
I t has been i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r t h a t l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m can be 
separated i n t o two major v a r i e t i e s o f t h o u g h t w i t h i n t h e Enlightenment 
t r a d i t i o n : namely, t h e ' e m p i r i c i s t ' and t h e 'Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t ' . The 
e m p i r i c i s t v a r i e t y c l a s s i f i e s moral r e a s o n i n g as a k i n d of p r a c t i c a l or 
i n s t r u m e n t a l reasoning. According t o t h i s view, we behave m o r a l l y so as 
t o s a t i s f y those i n d i v i d u a l purposes which would n o t be guaranteed 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i n a 'non-moral' or p u r e l y p r u d e n t i a l s o c i a l environment. 
The K a n t i a n r a t i o n a l i s t s t r a i n , by c o n t r a s t , denotes moral r e a s o n i n g as 
a d i s t i n c t i v e i n t r i n s i c a l l y r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , we 
behave m o r a l l y because we a r e compelled, by t h e d i c t a t e s o f reason, t o 
re c o g n i s e our moral d u t y t o t r e a t o t h e r s as ends, never as means. 
Consequently our i n d i v i d u a l purposes are best s a t i s f i e d w i t h i n m o r a l 
arrangements. 
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Both v a r i e t i e s o f l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m , t h e r e f o r e , seek t o j u s t i f y 
t h e grounds f o r moral o b l i g a t i o n upon a d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between 
m o r a l i t y and prudence. A d m i t t e d l y , t h e K a n t i a n v e r s i o n o f t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s much sharper: moral and p r u d e n t i a l t h i n k i n g belong t o 
two d i f f e r e n t species o f reasoning. By c o n t r a s t , t h e e m p i r i c i s t 
d e f i n i t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i o n i s much looser: moral and p r u d e n t i a l 
t h i n k i n g belong e q u a l l y t o t h e species o f i n s t r u m e n t a l reasoning. A 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s nonetheless s p e c i f i e d , drawn i n terms o f t h e n o t i o n t h a t 
t h e r e are good i n s t r u m e n t a l reasons f o r c o - o p e r a t i n g w i t h , and 
t r u s t i n g , each other i n s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
t h i s m u t u a l l y advantageous s o c i a l t r u s t , and t h e development of t h e 
n o t i o n s o f 'promise-keeping', 'sympathy' and ' a l t r u i s m ' t h a t are 
as s o c i a t e d w i t h i t , which i s s a i d t o i n v o l v e t h e employment of what 
c o n s t i t u t e s 'moral', as d i s t i n c t f rom 'non-moral', p r a c t i c a l reasoning, 
Maclntyre's c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t both v a r i e t i e s of l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s m f a i l i n t h e i r a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e t h e grounds f o r moral 
o b l i g a t i o n . T h is e n t e r p r i s e f a i l s because i t i s based upon a f a l s e 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t t h e o r y o f t h e s e l f , and i s unsuccessful i n m a i n t a i n i n g 
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l i t y and prudence. The reason f o r t h i s , 
M a c l n t y r e contends, i s t h a t l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m operates w i t h i n a 
conceptual schema the e m o t i v i s t c u l m i n a t i o n o f which has r e s u l t e d i n 
t h e o b l i t e r a t i o n o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between non - m a n i p u l a t i v e and 
m a n i p u l a t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . As a consequence t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and 
p r a c t i c a l l y a p p l i c a b l e dichotomy between m o r a l i t y and prudence has 
become i n c o h e r e n t w i t h i n t h e l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t u nderstanding. 
We can see t h a t i t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Maclntyre's assessment, a 
profound i r o n y and indeed a c u l t u r a l t ragedy t h a t those n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t 
t h i n k e r s who have presupposed and attempted t o j u s t i f y t h e e m p i r i c i s t 
v a r i e t y of t h e l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t c onception o f m o r a l i t y have r e l i e d 
on f o r t h e i r defence t h e e m o t i v i s t a n a l y s i s of e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e which 
has e f f e c t i v e l y o b l i t e r a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a defence. Thus we 
f i n d w r i t e r s such as Hare and Mackie, who have t r i e d t o c o n s t r u c t a 
u t i l i t a r i a n f o u n d a t i o n f o r moral o b l i g a t i o n i n l i b e r a l terms, f a i l i n g i n 
t h e i r t a s k p r e c i s e l y because they have presupposed t h e e m o t i v i s t 
premises which make any r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f moral p r a c t i c e s 
i m p o s s i b l e . 
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But a c c o r d i n g t o Maclntyre's view t h e K a n t i a n r a t i o n a l i s t s f a r e no 
b e t t e r . E q u a l l y t h e a t t e m p t s o f Rawls and l o z i c k f a i l because t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e accounts o f what i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y reasonable moral a c t i o n 
are t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g and redundant. T h e i r appeal t o these 
s t a n d a r d s i s , a t t h e p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , e f f e c t i v e l y i g n o r e d by t h e 
un r e c e p t i v e contemporary audience who t h i n k and a c t as though t h e r e 
i s no d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between people conceived as ends and 
people conceived as means. 
For M a c l n t y r e , then, t h e c u r r e n t c r i s i s i n a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y 
r e f l e c t s b o t h t h e decay o f contemporary moral l i f e and t h e f a i l u r e o f 
l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m t o f i n d a way o f j u s t i f y i n g t h a t l i f e i n 
d i s t i n c t i v e e t h i c a l terms. I t may, however, be suggested t h a t t h e 
at t e m p t s o f Rorty and Rawls t o p r o v i d e a pr a g m a t i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
the a c t u a l c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s o f l i b e r a l democratic regimes have 
proved t o be more s u c c e s s f u l because they have d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided t h e 
assumptions o f t h e p r e v i o u s n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t and Kan t i a n l i b e r a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s , I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t R orty seeks a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
'Enlightenment l i b e r a l i s m ' can be c a r r i e d t h r o u g h t o i t s l o g i c a l l i m i t 
w h i l s t e r a d i c a t i n g i n t h e process t h e l a s t t r a c e s o f 'Enlightenment 
r a t i o n a l i s m ' . L i k e w i s e Rawls denies t h a t h i s approach depends upon any 
met a p h y s i c a l c l a i m s about 'the e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e and i d e n t i t y o f persons' 
based on t h e 'Enlightenment' n o t i o n o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y . We 
wonder, then, i f Rorty and Rawls have paved t h e way f o r t h e s u c c e s s f u l 
denouement o f t h e c r i s i s which M a c l n t y r e has d e s c r i b e d f o r us. 
Ma c l n t y r e suggests n o t , m a i n l y because he contends t h a t these 
t h e o r e t i c a l r e v i s i o n s o f t h e l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n can do n o t h i n g t o 
r e s o l v e t h e p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t a r e i n h e r e n t i n our contemporary 
m o r a l predicament. I n p a r t i c u l a r , M a c l n t y r e t a k e s issue w i t h Rorty's 
assumption t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e 'postmodern bourgeois l i b e r a l ' 
t o p r o v i d e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f our l i b e r a l d emocratic p r a c t i c e s by 
engaging i n a c u l t u r a l c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t draws upon 'our common 
s t o c k o f co n v e n t i o n s and anecdotes'. There i s no p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h i s , he 
says, because t h e r e i s i n f a c t no common i d e n t i t y o f moral persons 
upon which t o draw upon. Rather, modern Western l i f e i s conducted 
w i t h i n 'a s o c i e t y o f s t r a n g e r s ' and t h e r e i s no a c t u a l p r a c t i c a l 
communal consensus o f shared moral b e l i e f s w i t h which t o s u s t a i n any 
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d i s t i n c t i v e l y e t h i c a l attachment t o t h e conventions w i t h i n which we 
operate. Consequently, t h e r e can be no p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f these conventions. As H a c l n t y r e argues, 
'there a r e t o o many r i v a l c o n v e n t i o n s , t o o many c o n f l i c t i n g anecdotes; 
and t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f a s s e r t i o n s and d e n i a l s does n o t c o n s t i t u t e 
c onversation'. (17) Therefore, 'what postmodern bourgeois l i b e r a l i s m 
e x h i b i t s i s n o t moral argument f r e e d from unwarranted p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
p r e t e n t i o u s , but t h e decay o f moral reasoning'. (18) I n o t h e r words, 
what postmodern bourgeois l i b e r a l i s m r e f l e c t s i s t h e fragmented and 
d i s j o i n t e d c h a r a c t e r o f contemporary moral l i f e ; a l i f e i n which t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between moral r e a s o n i n g and p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g has t o a 
l a r g e degree decayed and become obfuscated. The p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s t u r i n g 
o f postmodern bourgeois l i b e r a l s (or indeed anyone e l s e ) cannot, he 
says, d i s g u i s e t h e f a c t t h a t our n o t i o n o f moral r e a s o n i n g has become 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n c o h e r e n t and p r a c t i c a l l y i n a p p l i c a b l e . He w r i t e s : 
That decay i s u n s u r p r i s i n g i n a s o c i e t y whose w o r l d view ... 
obscures t h e connection between t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moral r e a s o n i n g 
and t h e e x e r c i s e o f a c e r t a i n t y p e o f t r a d i t i o n - b e a r i n g community. 
Any p a r t i c u l a r piece o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g has r a t i o n a l f o r c e 
o n l y f o r those who b o t h have d e s i r e s and d i s p o s i t i o n s ordered t o 
some good and r e c o g n i s e t h a t good as f u r t h e r e d by d o i n g what t h a t 
piece of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g b i d s . Only w i t h i n a community w i t h 
shared b e l i e f s about goods and shared d i s p o s i t i o n s educated i n 
accordance w i t h those b e l i e f s , b o t h r o o t e d i n shared p r a c t i c e s , 
can p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n - g i v i n g be an ordered, teachable a c t i v i t y 
w i t h s t a n d a r d s o f success and f a i l u r e . (19) 
H a c l n t y r e ' s c o n t e n t i o n , t h e n , i s t h a t p r a c t i c a l moral r e a s o n i n g i s 
o n l y p o s s i b l e w i t h i n a ' t r a d i t i o n - b e a r i n g community' whose shared 
b e l i e f s a re manifested i n c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . I t 
i s these shared b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s t h a t s e t t h e s t a n d a r d s by which 
any t h o u g h t and behaviour i s t o be considered r a t i o n a l and o b j e c t i v e . 
Therefore, i n o r d e r t o t h i n k and a c t i n a m o r a l l y r a t i o n a l manner i t i s 
necessary t o have grasped t h e sense i n which such t h o u g h t and a c t i o n 
accords w i t h t h e g i v e n c u l t u r a l s t a n d a r d s o f what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e 
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'good' or 'goods'. Maclntyre's point, of course, i s th a t we have no 
notion of moral reasoning i n modern society because we have no uniform 
set of e t h i c a l standards, or conception of the 'good', which can 
underpin any 'tradition-bearing community'. We do not l i v e i n a world 
th a t s t r i c t l y speaking constitutes a moral community at a l l . Rather, we 
l i v e i n a world whose 'world view' has been shaped by the emotivist 
conception of e t h i c a l discourse; a world where 'moral' reasoning i s 
conceived t o be a matter of self-assertion and manipulative 
persuasion, and where the notion of achieving purposes f o r the end of 
some harmonious communal good i s absent. 
This state of a f f a i r s constitutes, f o r Haclntyre, a grave moral 
disorder. I t may be overcome i n the future, he says, i f we resuscitate 
the concept of a p r a c t i c a l telos t h a t i s nurtured i n the 'Aristotelian' 
view of the moral v i r t u e s ; a view which has survived, a l b e i t 
fragmentedly, the ravages of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
period. This suggestion need not concern us here. What does concern us 
i s Maclntyre's contention t h a t t h i s state of a f f a i r s cannot be overcome 
i n the future w h i l s t we remain attached t o the emotivist 
presuppositions which inform our the o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l view of the 
world. For i t leads us t o conclude that l i b e r a l i s m cannot e f f e c t the 
changes that are needed. Indeed, according t o Maclntyre's account, 
l i b e r a l i s m has largely contributed t o the c r i s i s t h a t we f i n d ourselves 
i n . For Maclntyre, l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s m and emotivism have reflected 
and contributed t o the descent i n t o n i h i l i s m t h a t we are increasingly 
witnessing. We observe t h a t i n everyday practice 'emotivist man' f i n d s 
no moral reasons f o r the d i s t i n c t i v e l y e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y of pursuing 'the 
good l i f e ' . The p r a c t i c a l consequence of t h i s i s t h a t emotivist man i s 
compelled as h i s culture faces deeper c r i s i s t o abandon h i s commitment 
t o the l i b e r a l democratic practices which have shaped him. The decay of 
moral reasoning which has accompanied t h i s decline i n e t h i c a l and 
p o l i t i c a l conviction must make the attempts of Dunn, Rorty and Rawls 
t o represent l i b e r a l i s m i n a 'pragmatic' l i g h t quite f u t i l e . This i s 
because the basic d i s t i n c t i o n between morality and prudence, which 
Dunn, Rorty and Rawls a l l assume t o be established, has been 
obliterated. 
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Conclusion 
I t has been established t h a t the philosophical arguments of non-
cognitivisiD, which amount to a p a r t i c u l a r account of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between f a c t s and values, reasons and sentiments, and the 
notions of o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y , are inadequate. This i s 
ultimately because they r e s t upon a conception of the s e l f and his 
r e l a t i o n t o the world which i s not philosophically sustainable. That i s , 
there are good philosophical reasons to reject i t . Nonetheless, i t i s a 
notion of the i n d i v i d u a l which dominates the h i s t o r y of contemporary 
moral philosophy and p o l i t i c a l practice of the Western world. I t s 
a r t i c u l a t i o n i n philosophical c i r c l e s was most prevalent in the 1930!s, 
when emotivist t h e o r i s t s such as Stevenson, Duncan-Jones, Barnes and 
Ayer contributed t o the emergence and popularisation of the non-
c o g n i t i v i s t view. However, they f a i l to r e alise that the form which t h i s 
conception of the s e l f takes i s not s t r i c t l y speaking philosophical, but 
i s rather ideological, and relates t o the l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t 
understanding, As such, they f a i l t o acknowledge th a t t h e i r 
philosophical arguments amount to the expression of the l i b e r a l -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ideological view. As a r e s u l t , they f a i l t o appreciate t h a t 
t h e i r notion of the i n d i v i d u a l moral and p o l i t i c a l agent remains 
philosophically i r r e f u t a b l e , not because i t i s philosophically correct, 
but because i t i s ultimately immune from philosophical c r i t i c i s m . For 
although we can philosophically reject i t , we cannot philosophically 
refute i t . We can reject the logic of the t h e o r e t i c a l arguments which 
support i t , but we cannot philosophically deny i t s ideological sense. I t 
i s a notion which does, however, require ideological j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n 
the future. 
We have, i n t h i s respect, shown how MacIntyre's rejection of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of providing any successful future liberal-democratic 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of our Western p o l i t i c a l practices i s presented i n an 
argument which has great force on i t s own terms. For his claim t h a t 
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l i b e r a l i s m i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y bankrupt rests upon a powerful rejection of 
the concept of the s e l f which i s associated with the recognisably 
l i b e r a l understanding of man. As we have seen, i t i s a conception of 
the subject which sprung from the Enlightenment, and i s assumed i n 
both the no n - c o g n i t i v i s t and Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t philosophical 
expressions of d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t i e s of l i b e r a l - i n d i v i d u a l i s t thought. 
We have also shown, i n the l i g h t of Maclntyre's c r i t i c i s m , t h a t 
n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t l i b e r a l i s m i s t o be understood as p a r t i c u l a r l y s e l f -
defeating. This i s because i t i s based upon emotivist premises which 
e f f e c t i v e l y eradicate the d i s t i n c t i o n between morality and prudence 
that i s c e n t r a l t o the notion of i n d i v i d u a l free choice i n moral, as 
d i s t i n c t from prudential, a f f a i r s . As such, the non-cognitivist 
enterprise cannot successfully sustain the c e n t r a l l i b e r a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between morality and prudence, as specified i n terms of 'ends' and 
'means', which i t purports to support. 
However, the Kantian r a t i o n a l i s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n fares no better. I t 
does, admittedly, demarcate the means-ends d i s t i n c t i o n i n clearer terms; 
but t h i s demarcation i s , at the t h e o r e t i c a l level, dependent upon a 
false theory of transcendental r a t i o n a l i t y and the s e l f , and i s , at the 
p r a c t i c a l level, obliterated by p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n liberal-democratic 
societies who no longer conceive of the d i s t i n c t i o n i n these terms. 
For, as Macintyre argues, our p r a c t i c a l experience i n these societies 
has been t o a large degree shaped by our understanding t h a t the 
emotivist v i s i o n of the nature of moral discourse i s the true version. 
I t i s a v i s i o n which, as John Dunn notes, does 'describe with 
considerable f i d e l i t y what most frequently occurs nowadays i n most 
moral arguments i n the western world'. (1) I t follows, then, t h a t i f the 
impact of emotivism (understood not i n terms of i t s claim as a false 
theory of meaning, but i n terms of a correct theory of use) i s as great 
as both Dunn and Macintyre believe, then i t s unmasking of the l i b e r a l 
enterprise's f a i l u r e t o j u s t i f y t h e o r e t i c a l l y and sustain p r a c t i c a l l y the 
commitments of i t s adherents appears t o be conclusive. We have 
suggested t h a t t h i s i s so. 
There are fur t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s which have been considered, and 
they r e l a t e t o the e f f o r t s of Rorty and Raw I s t o evade these problems, 
and d i f f u s e the c r i s i s which faces contemporary li b e r a l i s m . Both 
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w r i t e r s , i t w i l l be recalled, attempt t o side-step the issue of the 
t h e o r e t i c a l problems that are inherent i n the Enlightenment notion of 
the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , and which was previously employed t o j u s t i f y the 
l i b e r a l understanding. They attempt t o do so by i n s i s t i n g t h a t 
'philosophical' conceptions of the subject are not relevant t o the 
p r a c t i c a l matter of defending c u l t u r a l practices. This i s quite so: 
philosophy and p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s are indeed only contingently related 
t o each other. However, there must always be some s o r t of ideological 
conception of the subject which i s necessary f o r the continued 
commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r moral and p o l i t i c a l practice. This i s 
because without some kind of ideological conception of the subject, our 
understanding of our moral and p o l i t i c a l practices becomes 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , 'senseless' or pointless, and our p r a c t i c a l commitment to 
our practices becomes impossible t o maintain. 
Liberalism, therefore, l i k e any other ideology, needs a conception 
of the s e l f i f i t i s to preserve i t s unity as a recognisable t r a d i t i o n 
t h a t sustains our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith those practices which have been 
shaped by i t . Without t h i s adherence to a p a r t i c u l a r conception of the 
subject, our commitment to the future defence of our l i b e r a l practices 
would flounder and d r i f t : i t would amount to the decay of the l i b e r a l 
ideological t r a d i t i o n , and would lead, ultimately, to i t s decease. 
Rorty and Rawls f a i l t o address t h i s problem. They f a i l t o 
indicate plausibly how l i b e r a l i s m can survive as a body of thought 
which succeeds i n j u s t i f y i n g liberal-democratic moral and p o l i t i c a l 
practices, once t h a t t r a d i t i o n i s stripped from the Enlightenment 
conception of the s e l f which has h i s t o r i c a l l y characterised i t . I t i s , 
in t h i s respect, an irony t h a t Rorty denounces the 'neo-conservative' or 
' l i b e r t a r i a n ' s t r a i n of contemporary American Republicanism which 
'usually t e l l us t h a t we need to recapture our sense of universal and 
objective moral values, and add t h a t t h i s means g e t t i n g back behind 
both pragmatism and the secularisation of the Enlightenment t o either 
'natural law' or t o a r e l i g i o u s ethics'.(2) For i t i s a contingent f a c t 
t h a t l i b e r a l ideology of the 1980s has been r e v i t a l i s e d by ideas which 
have recaptured the p o l i t i c a l imagination of the West from precisely 
these 'neo-conservative' quarters. On t h i s point Rorty has no p r a c t i c a l 
reply, because he i s unable t o show how t h i s p r a c t i c a l commitment can 
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be sustained i n any other, notably 'postmodern bourgeois l i b e r a l ' or 
pragmatic, terms. 
The point, then, i s t h a t however philosophically untenable the 
positions restated by the 'Mew Right' may be, t h e i r ideological 
achievement i n r e v i t a l i s i n g the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n cannot be disputed. 
Whether t h i s achievement can be maintained i n a world i n which moral 
and p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s are such th a t the notion of a moral consensus 
i s becoming increasingly hard to defend i s a d i f f i c u l t and speculative 
matter. We have suggested, following Macintyre, t h a t t h i s looks 
unl i k e l y ; and we have argued t h a t the reason why t h i s i s so i s t h a t the 
emotivist or non-c o g n i t i v i s t conception of morality has u n w i t t i n g l y 
accentuated the conditions which are l i k e l y t o di s r u p t the achievement. 
As such, we can broadly agree with Maclntyre's assessment, although we 
have noted that he f a i l s accurately t o specify and account for the 
ideological dimension i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . We can say, then, t h a t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of an enduring and d i s t i n c t l y l i b e r a l ideological 
commitment to our Western practices i s f r a g i l e . There i s l i t t l e evidence 
to suggest t h a t the 'pragmatic' approach advanced by Rorty and Rawls 
can succeed i n sustaining t h i s l i b e r a l ideological achievement. 
This point leads us t o a f i n a l consideration. I t i s whether the 
pragmatic positions adopted by Rorty and Rawls amount to a 
recognisably l i b e r a l defence of so c i a l democratic practices at a l l . John 
Dunn, who i s equally keen t o separate l i b e r a l i s m from Enlightenment or 
r a t i o n a l i s t premises, concedes t h a t 
l i b e r a l i s m so conceived may w e l l i n practice i n p a r t i c u l a r 
societies and at p a r t i c u l a r times e n t a i l a p o l i t i c s which 
describes i t s e l f as either s o c i a l i s t or conservative. Precisely 
because i t casts prudence as a cen t r a l p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e , i t i s 
obliged t o take i t s bearings as best i t can by assessing the 
current configuration of hazards facing a society and the e x i s t i n g 
resources, moral and material, of which t h a t society then disposes 
and which i t must employ to meet these hazards t o the best of i t s 
a b i l i t i e s . <3) 
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low, t h i s characterisation of a future 'liberalism' as pragmatic 
and f l e x i b l e i s shared by Rorty and Rawls. But we can question whether 
i t i s t o be appropriately called 'liberalism' at a l l ; and we can 
question whether the t h e o r i s t s who advance t h i s view can be i n d e n t i f i e d 
as being recognisably ' l i b e r a l ' i n outlook. Rorty, f o r instance, appears 
t o have a predominantly conservative d i s p o s i t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l issues, 
and t h i s relates t o h i s admiration f o r Oakeshott. Thus we f i n d t h a t 
Rorty i s generally sceptical about philosophical issues, t h a t he 
conceives of p o l i t i c s as 'experimental', and t h a t he rejects the forms 
of 'individualism' which have so c l e a r l y characterised the l i b e r a l 
t r a d i t i o n . Further, we note t h a t he advocates the notion of the 
'communitarian' s e l f , and emphasises the importance of our practices or 
c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s i n determining our moral and p o l i t i c a l character. 
A l l t h i s leads us t o wonder whether what Rorty has i n mind i s the 
r e t u r n of a p o l i t i c a l Conservatism - an understanding which, r e l a t i v e 
t o the Western experience, defends l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l practices on the 
pragmatic grounds t h a t ' i t works f o r us' - and not a r e v i s i o n of 
p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m a t a l l . For i f , as Maclntyre has shown, what counts 
as the recognisably l i b e r a l view i s inescapably circumscribed w i t h i n 
the emotivist or non-c o g n i t i v i s t framework, then i t follows t h a t the 
attempts of Rorty et al t o resolve the c r i s i s t h a t faces l i b e r a l i s m 
cannot be a l i b e r a l resolution, but must rather be a Conservative one. 
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752-753. 
29. R. Rorty, 'The P r i o r i t y of Democracy t o Philosophy' i n The V i r g i n i a 
Statute. o i ReUgiqus Freedom; I t s Evolution and, Consequences la. 
American History. (Ed. by M.D. Peterson and R. Vaughan, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). Quoted i n R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two 
Steps Backward' i n P o l i t i c a l Theory (November 1987). 
30. Rorty, 'The P r i o r i t y of Democracy to Philosophy' p.9. 
31. Rorty, I b i d . 
32. Rorty, Ibid., p.36. 
33. R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' i n P o l i t i c a l 
Theory (November 1987) 
34. Bernstein, Ibid., p.557. 
35. R. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists: A Reply t o Bernstein' i n P o l i t i c a l 
Theory (November 1987). 
36. Rorty, Ibid., p.577. 
37. Rorty, Ibid., pp. 577-578. 
38. Rorty, Ibid., p.578. 
39. Rorty, I b i d . 
40. Rorty, Ibid., p.577. 
41. Rorty, 'From Logic t o Language to Play' pp. 752-753. 
42. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' p.571. 
- 231 -
43. Rorty, Ibid., p.578. 
44. M. Oakeshott, Rationalism i n P o l i t i c s (Metbuen Press, 1962) p.197. 
45. Rorty, 'The P r i o r i t y of Democracy t o Philosophy* p.20. 
46. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' p.573. 
47. Rorty, Ib i d . 
48. Rorty, I b i d , p.573. 
49. R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' p.556. We 
would not, however, want to use the d i s t i n c t l y Marxist sense of 
ideology which i s employed by Bernstein. 
I I I . Rawls. 
1. J. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: P o l i t i c a l not Metaphysical* i n 
Philosophy and Public A f f a i r s (Summer 1985, Volume 14, No.3) p.223. 
2. Rawls, Ibid., p.230. 
3. Rawls, Ibid., p.228. 
4. Rawls, Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
5. Rawls, Ibid., p.227. 
6. Rawls, Ibid., p.231. 
7. Rawls, Ib i d . 
8. Rawls, Ibid., p.240. 
9. Rawls, Ibid., p.241. 
10. Rawls, Ibid. 
11. Rawls, Ibid., p.242. 
12. Rawls, Ibid., p.243. 
13. Rawls, Ibid., p.244. 
14. Rawls, Ibid., p.230. 
15. Rawls, Ib i d . 
16. Rawls, Ib i d . 
- 232 -
10. Opposition t o Liberalism: Maclntyre, 
1. A. Maclntyre, After Virtue: a study i n moral theory (Duckworth, 
Second Edition, 1985) p.8. 
2. Maclntyre, I b i d . 
3. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.9. 
4. Macintyre, Ibid., p . l l . 
5. Maclntyre, Ibid,, p.22. 
6. Maclntyre, I b i d . 
7. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.20. 
8. Maclntyre, Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
9. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.21. 
10. Maclntyre, Ib i d . 
11. Maclntyre, Ibid. 
12. J. Dunn, 'Identity, modernity, and the claim to know better' (1981) 
i n Rethinking Modern P o l i t i c a l Theory pp. 144-145. 
13. A. Maclntyre, After Virtue p.2. 
14. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.10. 
15. Maclntyre, Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
16. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.24. 
17. A. Maclntyre, 'Moral Arguments and Social Contexts' i n the Journal 
of Philosophy (80, 1983) p.590. 
18. Maclntyre, Ibid. 
19. Maclntyre, Ibid., pp. 590-591. 
Conclusion. 
1. J. Dunn, 'Identity, modernity, and the claim to know better' i n 
Rethinking Modern P o l i t i c a l Theory p.144. 
2. R. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' i n P o l i t i c a l Theory (November 1987) 
p.574. 
3. J. Dunn, 'The Future of Liberalism' i n Rethinking Modern P o l i t i c a l 
Theory p.169. 
- 233 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
Ayer, A.J. Language. Truth and Logic (Gollancz, 1936, Pelican Books 
1978) 
'On the Analysis of Moral Judgements', Ph i l o s o p h i c a l 
Essays (MacMillan, 1954) 
Part of My L i f e (Oxford, 1978) 
Freedom and M o r a l i t y (Oxford, 1984) 
L e t t e r t o author (July 3rd, 1986) 
Barnes, V.K.F. ' I s there a Realm of Values?' (1933) 
'A Suggestion about Value', Analysis (1934) 
'The Emotive Theory of Ethics' (A paper w r i t t e n f o r 
the author, November 1986) 
L e t t e r t o author (December 16th 1986) 
B e r l i n , I , Four Essays on L i b e r t y (Oxford, 1969) 
Bernstein, R. 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward', P o l i t i c a l 
Theory (November 1987) 
Blackburn, S. 'Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism', 
Wittgenstein: t o Follow a Rule (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1985) 
Bra i t h w a i t e , R.B. 'Verbal Ambiguity and Ph i l o s o p h i c a l Analysis', 
Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society (1927-28) 
Broad, CD. ' G. E. Moore's Latest Views on Ethics', G. E. Moore: 
Essays i n Retrospect, ed. Ambrose and Lazerowitz 
(George A l l e n and Unwin, 1970) 
Davidson, D. I n q u i r i e s i n t o Truth and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n (Oxford, 1984) 
Duncan-Jones, A.E. 'Meaning and Generality' (Fellowship d i s s e r t a t i o n 
G o n v i l l e and Cauis College, Cambridge, 1932) 
' E t h i c a l Language; an examination of the use and 
meaning of e t h i c a l expressions' ( D i s s e r t a t i o n , 
- 234 -
G o n v i l l e and Cauls College, Cambridge, 1933) 
'Ethi c a l Words and E t h i c a l Facts' , Mfnd (Volume 
X L I I , Ho.168, October 1933) 
Dunn, J. Rethinking Modern P o l i t i c a l Theory (Cambridge, 1985) 
Frankena, W.F. Et h i c s (93, 1983) 
Graham, G. 'Ideology and the s o c i o l o g i c a l understanding', The Form 
of Ideology, ed. D.J. Manning (George A l l e n and Unwin, 
1980) 
Gray, J. 'On negative and P o s i t i v e L i b e r t y ' , Conceptions of L i b e r t y 
i a P o l i t i c a l Philosophy ed. Pelcynski and Gray (The 
Athlone Press, London, 1984) 
Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952) 
Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963) 
Moral Thiaking: I t s Levels, Method and Point (Oxford, 
1981) 
'Ontology i n Et h i c s ' , M o r a l i t y and O b j e c t i v i t y (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1985) 
Hume, D. Enquiry Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s of Morals, ed. Selby-
Bigge (3rd. E d i t i o n , Oxford, 1975) 
A Treatise of Human Nature ed. Selby-Bigge and H i d d i t h , 
(Oxford, 1978) 
Harrison, B. 'Moral Sentiments', Ethics: Proceedings of the F i f t h 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n Symposium 1980, (Holder 
-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981) 
Lovibond, S. Realism and Imagination i n Ethics ( B a s i l Blackwell, 
1983) 
Maclntyre, A. A f t e r V i r t u e ; a study i n moral theory (Duckworth, 
1981, 2nd. E d i t i o n w i t h P o s t s c r i p t , 1985) 
Against the Self-images of the Age (Duckworth, 1971) 
'Moral Arguments and Social Contexts', Journal of 
Philosophy (80, 1983) 
'The r e l a t i o n s h i p of philosophy t o i t s past', Philosophy 
and Hi s t o r y , ed. Rorty, Schneewind, Skinner (Cambridge 
1984) 
'How Moral Agents became Ghosts', Synthese (V, 53, 1982) 
Whose Justice? Which R a t i o n a l i t y ? (Duckworth, 1988) 
- 235 -
Mackie, J.L. Ethics: I n v e n t i n g Right and Wrong (Harmonsworth, 1977) 
Banning, D.J. L i b e r a l i s m (St. Martins Press, Hew York, 1976) 
Manning, D.J. and Robinson, T.J. The Place of Ideology i n P o l i t i c a l 
L i f e (Croom Helm, 1985) 
McDowell, J. 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?', 
Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society (Supplement-
ary Volume, 1978) 
'Non-cognitivism and Rule Following', Wittgenstein: 
t o Follow a Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) 
McGinn, M, 'The Thir d Dogma of Empiricism', A r i s t o t e l i a n Society 
Proceedings (1981-82) 
Midgley, M. 'The Absence Df a Gap between Facts and Values', XM. 
A r i s t o t e l i a n Society (Supplementary Volume, LIV, 1980) 
M i l l e r , D. Philosophy and Ideology i n Hume,'s. P o l i t i c a l Thought 
(Oxford, 1981) 
Milne, A.J.M. 'Values and Ethics: the Emotive Theory', Logical Posi-
t i v i s m i n Perspective Ed. B. Gower (Croom Helm, 1987) 
Moore, G.E. P r i n c i p i a Ethica (Cambridge, 1903) 
Nagel, T. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m (Oxford, 1970) 
Ogden, C.K. and Richards, I . A. The Meaning of Meaning (Kegan Paul, 
2nd E d i t i o n , 1923) 
Oakeshott, M. Rationalism i n P o l i t i c s (Methuen Press, 1962) 
Ramsey, F.R. 'Epilogue', The Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge, 
1931) 
Rawls, J. 'Kantian Constructivism i n Moral Theory', Journal of 
Philosophy (77, 1980) 
'Justice as Fairness: P o l i t i c a l not Metaphysical', 
Philosophy and Public A f f a i r s (14, 1985) 
Rorty, R. Consequences of Pragmatism. (The Harvester Press, 1982) 
'Postmodernist Bourgeois L i b e r a l i s m ' , Journal of 
Philosophy (80, 1983) 
Philosophy and the M i r r o r of Mature (Ba s i l Blackwell, 
1980) 
'Thugs and Theorists: A Reply t o Bernstein', P o l i t i c a l 
Theory (November 1987) 
'From Logic t o Language t o Play', Proceedings and 
- 236 -
addresses of the American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Association 
(June 1986) 
'The P r i o r i t y of Democracy t o Philosophy', The V i r g i n i a 
S t atute oi Religious Freedom; I t s Evolu t i o n and 
Consequences i n American. H i s t o r y ed. Peterson and 
Vaughan (Cambridge, 1988) 
de Ruggerio, Guido. The H i s t o r y of European L i b e r a l i s m (Beacon Press 
, Boston, 1959) 
Russell, B. Philosophy and P o l i t i c s (Cambridge, 1946) 
Re l i g i o n and Science (Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1935) 
Sandel, M. L i b e r a l i s m and the L i m i t s of J u s t i c e (Cambridge, 1982) 
Searle, J. 'How t o Derive 'ought' from'is'' , The Is-Qught Question 
(MacMillan, 1969, Reprinted 1973) 
Stevenson, C.L. 'Essay on the Pragmatic Proof of the R e l a t i v i t y of 
Truth' (March 28th, 1929) 
'Arguments f o r Determinism' ( A p r i l 22nd, 1929) 
'The Nature of Good ( w i t h p a r t i c u l a r remarks about 
the t h e o r i e s of Professor G.E. Moore)', (October 
19th, 1931) 
'A Consideration of J u s t i c e and the Premises from 
which i t s Nature i s Determined' (October 26th 1931) 
'The Re l a t i o n of Logic t o Philosophy, Ethics and 
Mathematics 1 , (Undated) 
•The Emotive Meaning of E t h i c a l Terms' (PhD t h e s i s , 
Harvard, 1935) 
L e t t e r t o Doctor R.F. Piper of Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y , 
(1937) 
Ethics and Language (Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945) 
Facts and. Values; Studies i n E t h i c a l Analysis 
(Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963) 
'Value Judgements: t h e i r I m p l i c i t Generality', 
E t h i c a l Theory ed. Bowie, (Hackett P u b l i s h i n g 
Company, 1983) 
Taylor, C. 'Overcoming Epistemology', A f t e r Philosophy: End or 
Transformation? ed. Baynes, Boham, McCarthy (The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1987) 
- 237 -
Human.Agency and Language (Cambridge, 1985) 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985) 
Tudor, H. P o l i t i c a l Myth ( P a l l Mall, London, 1972) 
Wiggins, D. 'Truth, I n v e n t i o n and the Meaning of L i f e ' , The Procee-
dings of the B r i t i s h Academy ( L X I I , 1976) 
Williams, B. Ethics and the L i m i t s of Philosophy (Fontana Press, 
1985) 
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s (Blackwell, 1958, 2nd 
Ed i t i o n , 1963) 
On C e r t a i n t y ed. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe 
(Blackwell, 1974) 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics ed. G.H. 
von Wright, R. Rees, G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 
1978) 
Culture and Value ed. P. Winch (Blackwell, 1980) 
Wright, C. Wittgejis.te.ija.jan the FxaLadations Q£ Mathematics 
(Cambridge, Mass; Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980) 
- 238 -
